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The host of reflex actions is arrayed against the proposition, and, in view of such non-mental, though apparently intentional adjustments, we find the necessity for some test of the choice- element as real or fictitious. The only test we have is to ask whether the adjustments displayed are invariably the same under the same circumstances of stimulation. The only distinction between adjustive movements due to reflex action, and adjustive movements accompanied by mental perception, consists in the former depending on inherited mechanisms within the nervous system being so constructed as to effect particular adjustive movements in responso to particular stimulations, while the latter are independent of any such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to the exigencies of special circumstances. Reflex actions, under the influence of their appropriate stimuli, may be compared to the actions of a machine under the manipulations of an operator : when certain springs of action are touched by certain stimuli, the whole machine is thrown into appropriate action ; there is no room for choice, there is no room for uncertainty ; but, as surely as any of these inherited mechanisms is affected by the stimulus with reference to which it has been constructed to act, so surely will it act in precisely the same, way as it always has acted. But the case with conscious mental adjust ment is quite different. For, without going into the question concerning the relation of Body and Mind, or waiting to ask whether cases of mental adjustment are not really quite as mechanical in the sense of being the necessary result or correlative of a chain of psychical sequences due to a physical stimulation, it is enough to point to the variable and incalcu lable character of mental adjustments as distinguished from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjustments.All in fact, that in an objective sense we can mean by a mental adjustment, is an adjustment of a kind that has not been definitely fixed by heredity as the only adjustment possible in the given circumstances of stimulation. For, were there no alternative of adjustment, the case, in an animal at least, would be indistinguishable from one of reflex action.


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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。(すみませんが、最後の2つの段落については、正確に読解できたかどうかあまり自信がありません。) 反射作用(説)に関しては、その提案に対しても、明らかに意図的な調整(適応)であるのに、それを非精神的とする見方についても、大勢がこぞって反対しています。真実か捏造かの選択要素をテストする必要性があると思います。私たちがしているただ一つのテストは、表示された調整が、同じ刺激状況の下で恒常的に同じであるかどうかを尋ねることです。 反射作用に基づく調整動作と精神的知覚の伴った調整動作との間の唯一の相違は、以下のような構図になっています。すなわち、前者が、神経系内で遺伝的に持ち合わせる機構に依存して、特定の刺激に感応して特定の調整的動作の結果を生じるように構築されているのに対し、一方後者は、特殊状況の要求に対して、いかなる相続的調整にも依存せず独立している、ということです。 反射作用は、それに対する適切な刺激の影響下で、オペレーターの操作下にある機械の作動と比較され得るでしょう。すなわち、ある種の作動への動機が何らかの刺激を受け取るとき、機械全体が適切な作動に向けて動き出します。選択の余地はありませんし、不確実性の余地もありません。しかし、これらの(遺伝として)相続した機構はすべて、作動用に構築されているのに照応した刺激によって確実に影響されるのと同様、それまで常に作動してきたのとぴったり同じ仕方で、それは作動することでしょう。 しかし、意識の精神的調整が付随する場合はまったく異なります。なぜなら、「身体と心」の関係についての問題に踏み込むことなしで、あるいは、精神的調整の事例は、物理的刺激に基づいた心霊的連鎖の必然的な結果や相関関係にあるという意味において、実際に完全に機械的ではないかどうかの問いを待つまでもなく、反射的調整の定常的で予測可能な特徴から分離識別されるものとして、精神的調整の変幻かつ計量不能の性格を示すことで十分だからです。 実際、客体の意識中でこれが精神的調整だとし得るのは、所与の刺激状況において唯一可能な調整(現象)として、遺伝によって決定的に固定されているようなものではない種類の調整(現象)がそのすべてです。なぜなら、少なくとも動物の場合には、そこに調整に関する別の選択肢がなければ、その状況は反射作用のうちの1つと判別が不能でしょうから。 以上、ご回答まで。





  • コンマの前のandについて

    文中の2つめのコンマの前にandがあるのですが、その理由がわかりません。なぜandが必要なのか、どのように訳せばよいのか、どなたか教えていただけませんか。よろしくおねがいします。 this topic is A , a state of celebration related to american events that emerges in moments of accelerated stimulation and, as mentioned above , is coded as feminine.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Two points have to be observed with regard to this criterion, in whichever verbal form we may choose to express it. The first is that it is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non- mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. For it is certain that failure to learn by individual experience is not always conclusive evidence against the existence of mind; such failure may arise merely from an imperfection of memroy, or from there not being enough of the mind-element present to make the adjustments needful to meet the novel circum stances. Conversely, it is no less certain that some parts of our own nervous system, which are not concerned in the phenomena of consciousness, are nevertheless able in some measure to learn by individual experience. The nervous apparatus of the stomach, for instance, is able in so con siderable a degree to adapt the movements of that organ to the requirements of its individual experience, that were the organ an organism we might be in danger of regarding it as dimly intelligent. Still there is no evidence to show that non-mental agents are ever able in any considerable measure thus to simulate the adjustments performed by mental ones ; and therefore our criterion, in its practical application, has rather to be guarded against the opposite danger of defying the presence of mind to agents that are really mental For, as I observed in " Animal Intelligence," " it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore con clude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropiate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent ; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evi dence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non- mental action, not to the lower limit of mental[action]''.

  • 次の英文を和訳してほしいです。

    Purely by accident, he found that ezposing thickly wrapped photographic plates to a certain uranium compound caused them to darken, even without the stimulation of cathode rays. この英文を和訳してほしいです。

  • 和訳お願いします

    Those who do not conform find it hard to prosper in society. I very much fear that the first type of individualism, however, is now extremely common in japan. The young have taken up this negative form of individualism as a way of rebelling against authorities, school and parents. This is largely because the second type of individualism is not well understood in japan and not tolerated if it is. Administrators, teachers and parents do not know enough how to “bring out” the best in those under them. Europe has been able to produce an endless stream of original minds and intellectual geniuses of all kinds because of the existence and enkouragement of this creative individualism. Intellectual freedom and mental stimulation are the secret of European people's succes―as pioneers of ideas, ideals and attitudes; as inventors and “discoverers”. 少し長いですがよろしくお願いします。

  • 名詞+名詞 と ~ing +名詞

    曖昧なタイトルですが、ニュアンスの違いを勉強させてください。 たとえば、実験などのレポートを想定していただければと思います。○○を刺激する方法を記述する際に、その章の見出しとして、「刺激方法」、に相当する熟語を使いたいと思っています。考えられるのは、 1. Stimulation Method 2. Stimulating Method なのですが、どちらが適切か否かも質問に入りますが、両者のニュアンスの違いを知りたいです。引いては、一般に ~ing + 名詞のニュアンスを知りたいのですが、いかがでしょうか。 さらに、刺激方法、にたとえば、虫(insect)という具体的な対象を含ませたい場合、 3. Insect Stimulation Method 4. Insecet Stimulating Method とはなりますでしょうか、4.は何か、『「虫」が何かを刺激する方法』のようにも感じ、「虫」が対象ではなく主語のように思われます。 methodの後に繋げるといろいろ出てきそうです。 5. Method to Stimulate Insect 6. Method for Stimulating Insect 7. Method of Insect Stimulation 8. Method of Stimulating Insect 私にはこれらがすべて同じに感じてしまいます。これは前置詞に対する感覚(特に of )が養われていないかも知れない、と危惧しております。これらのニュアンスの違いをお教え頂ければと思います。

  • 名詞 in名詞of名詞or名詞 という英文の訳し方

    The most dramatic disturbances of perception are hallucinations,(以下質問文です) sensory experiences in the absence of relevant or adequate external stimulation. 構造的には、 sensory experiences 【in the absence of 〔relevant〕or〔adequate external stimulation〕.】 だと思うのですが、訳が釈然としません。 『関係がなく、または適切な外的刺激がないような、情緒的な体験』 では、おかしいですよね。 たぶん構造は読めているかと思うのですが、単語の繋がりが読めていないのかと思います。 (以前も似たような質問をしたのですが)…。 どういう部分に気をつけて訳せばよかったのでしょうか。

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    From this statement of the case it will be apparent that our knowledge of mental activities in any organism other than our own is neither subjective nor objective. That it is not subjective I need not wait to show. That it is not objective* may be rendered obvious by a few moments' reflec tion. .For it is evident that mental activities in other organisms can never be to us objects of direct knowledge ; as I have just said, we can only infer their existence from the objective sources supplied by observable activities of such organisms.. Therefore all our knowledge of mental activities other than our own really consists of an inferential inter pretation of bodily activities — this interpretation being founded on our subjective knowledge of our own mental activities. By inference we project, as it were, the known patterns of our own mental chromograph [chromograph=chromolithograph] on what is to us the otherwise blank screen of another mind ; and our only knowledge of the processes there taking place is really due to such a projection of our own subjectively. This matter has been well and clearly presented by the late Professor Clifford, who has coined the exceedingly appropriate term eject (in contradistinction to subject and object), whereby to designate the distinctive character of a mind (or mental process) other than our own in its relation to our own. I shall therefore adopt this convenient term, and speak of all our possible knowledge of other minds as ejective.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.