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和訳お願い致します。

Now, in answer to this objection, I have only to say that no one can have a more lively appreciation than myself of the supreme importance of experimental or historical veri fication, in all cases where the possibility of such verification is attainable. But in cases where such verification is not attainable, what are we to do ? We may clearly do either of two things. We may either neglect to investigate the sub ject at all, or we may Jo our best to investigate it by employ ing the only means of .investigation which are at our disposal. Of these two courses there can be no doubt which is the one that the scientific spirit prompts. The true scientific spirit desires to examine everything, and if in any case it is refused the best class of instruments wherewith to conduct the examination, it will adopt the next best that are available. In such cases science clearly cannot be forwarded by neglect ing to use these instruments, while her cause may be greatly advanced by using them with care. This is proved by the fict that, in the science of psychology, nearly all the con siderable advances which have been made, have been made, not by experiment, but by observing mental phenomena and reasoning from these phenomena deductively. In such cases, therefore, the true scientific spirit prompts us, not to throw away deductive reasoning where it is so frequently the onlyinstrument available, but rather to cany it with us, and to use it as not abusing it.

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以下のとおりお答えします。訳文中にも残しておきましたが、第2段落の最後の方のher causeが何を意味するのかよく分かりませんでした。なお、次の語は、カッコ内に示した語の誤植と判断しました:Jo (= do)、fict (= fact)、cany (= carry)。 さて、この反対論に答えて私の言うべきは次のことだけです。実験上ないし歴史上の立証可能性が達成し得る場合には、その立証の持つ高い重要性をすべからく評価をすることにかけては、私ほど積極的な人は誰もいないだろうということです。しかし、そのような立証が達成可能でない場合、私たちは何をすべきでしょうか。私たちのできることは明らかに次の2つのどちらかでしょう。1にその主題の探求を放棄することがあり得ますし、あるいは私たちの自由になる手段だけを駆使して、探求に最善を尽すこともできるでしょう。 これら2つのコースのうち、科学的精神が勧めるのは1つしかないということに疑問の余地はありません。真実の科学的精神は、すべて検査することを望むものですし、また、どんな場合も、検査を行なうための最良クラスの道具が拒絶されるような場合、利用可能な次善の道具を採用することでしょう。そのような場合、科学はこれらの道具の使用を放棄することによって際立つ前進はできませんが、一方、それらを注意深く使用することにより、her cause(科学的精神の大目的?)は大いに前進することでしょう。 これは次のような事実によって証明されます。すなわち、心理学の科学では、成就された相当な進歩は、ほぼすべて実験によってではなく精神の現象を観察することによって、そして、これらの現象からの推論を演繹的にすることによって成し遂げられました。したがって、そのような場合、真実の科学的精神は、それが非常に頻繁に利用可能なただ1つの道具である場面では、演繹的推理を捨てるのではなく、むしろ、それを乱用しない程度に利用することを私たちに勧めます。 以上、ご回答まで。

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関連するQ&A

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

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    It is refreshing to return to the often-echoed remark, that it could not have been the object of a Divine revelation to instruct mankind in physical science, man having had faculties bestowed upon him to enable him to acquire this knowledge by himself. This is in fact pretty generally admitted; but in the application of the doctrine, writers play at fast and loose with it according to circumstances. Thus an inspired writer may be permitted to allude to the phenomena of nature according to the vulgar view of such things, without impeachment of his better knowledge; but if he speaks of the same phenomena assertively, we are bound to suppose that things are as he represents them, however much our knowledge of nature may be disposed to recalcitrate. But if we find a difficulty in admitting that such misrepresentations can find a place in revelation, the difficulty lies in our having previously assumed what a Divine revelation ought to be. If God made use of imperfectly informed men to lay the foundations of that higher knowledge for which the human race was destined, is it wonderful that they should have committed themselves to assertions not in accordance with facts, although they may have believed them to be true? On what grounds has the popular notion of Divine revelation been built up? Is it not plain that the plan of Providence for the education of man is a progressive one, and as imperfect men have been used as the agents for teaching mankind, is it not to be expected that their teachings should be partial and, to some extent, erroneous? Admitted, as it is, that physical science is not what the Hebrew writers, for the most part, profess to convey, at any rate, that it is not on account of the communication of such knowledge that we attach any value to their writings, why should we hesitate to recognise their fallibility on this head?

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    Two points have to be observed with regard to this criterion, in whichever verbal form we may choose to express it. The first is that it is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non- mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. For it is certain that failure to learn by individual experience is not always conclusive evidence against the existence of mind; such failure may arise merely from an imperfection of memroy, or from there not being enough of the mind-element present to make the adjustments needful to meet the novel circum stances. Conversely, it is no less certain that some parts of our own nervous system, which are not concerned in the phenomena of consciousness, are nevertheless able in some measure to learn by individual experience. The nervous apparatus of the stomach, for instance, is able in so con siderable a degree to adapt the movements of that organ to the requirements of its individual experience, that were the organ an organism we might be in danger of regarding it as dimly intelligent. Still there is no evidence to show that non-mental agents are ever able in any considerable measure thus to simulate the adjustments performed by mental ones ; and therefore our criterion, in its practical application, has rather to be guarded against the opposite danger of defying the presence of mind to agents that are really mental For, as I observed in " Animal Intelligence," " it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore con clude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropiate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent ; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evi dence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non- mental action, not to the lower limit of mental[action]''.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is obvious, then, to start with, that by Mind we may mean two very different things, according as we contemplate it in our own individual selves, or as manifested by other beings. For if I contemplate my own mind, I have an imme diate cognizance of a certain flow of thoughts and feelings, which are the most ultimate things — and, indeed, the only things— of which I am cognizant. But if I contemplate Mind in other persons or organisms, I can have no such immediate cognizance of their thoughts and feelings ; I can only infer the existence of such thoughts and feelings from the activities of the persons or organisms which appear to manifest them. Thus it is that by Mind we may mean either that which is subjective or that which is objective. Now throughout the present work we shall have to consider Mind as an object ; and therefore it is well to remember that our only instrument of analysis is the observation of activities which we infer to be prompted by, or associated with, mental antecedents or accompaniments analogous to those of which we are directly conscious in our own subjective experience. That is to say, starting from what I know subjectively of the operations of my own individual mind, and of the activi ties which in my own organism these operations seem to prompt, I proceed by analogy to infer from the observable activities displayed by other organisms, the fact that certain mental operations underlie or accompany these activities.

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    It should be borne in mind,' says Dr. Buckland, that the object of the account was, not to state in what manner, but by whom the world was made.' Every one must see that this is an unfounded assertion, inasmuch as the greater part of the narrative consists in a minute and orderly description of the manner in which things were made. We can know nothing as to the object of the account, except from the account itself. What the writer meant to state is just that which he has stated, for all that we can know to the contrary. Or can we seriously beleive that if appealed to by one of his Hebrew hearers or readers as to his intention, he would have replied, My only object in what I have written is to inform you that God made the world; as to the manner of His doing it, of which I have given so exact an account, I have no intention that my words should be taken in their literal meaning? We come then to this, that if we sift the Mosaic narrative of all definite meaning, and only allow it to be the expression of the most vague generalities, if we avow that it admits of no certain interpretation, of none that may not be shifted and altered as often as we see fit, and as the exigencies of geology may require, then may we reconcile it with what science teaches. This mode of dealing with the subject has been broadly advocated by a recent writer of mathematical eminence, who adopts the Bucklandian hypothesis, a passage from whose work we shall quote.

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    From this statement of the case it will be apparent that our knowledge of mental activities in any organism other than our own is neither subjective nor objective. That it is not subjective I need not wait to show. That it is not objective* may be rendered obvious by a few moments' reflec tion. .For it is evident that mental activities in other organisms can never be to us objects of direct knowledge ; as I have just said, we can only infer their existence from the objective sources supplied by observable activities of such organisms.. Therefore all our knowledge of mental activities other than our own really consists of an inferential inter pretation of bodily activities — this interpretation being founded on our subjective knowledge of our own mental activities. By inference we project, as it were, the known patterns of our own mental chromograph [chromograph=chromolithograph] on what is to us the otherwise blank screen of another mind ; and our only knowledge of the processes there taking place is really due to such a projection of our own subjectively. This matter has been well and clearly presented by the late Professor Clifford, who has coined the exceedingly appropriate term eject (in contradistinction to subject and object), whereby to designate the distinctive character of a mind (or mental process) other than our own in its relation to our own. I shall therefore adopt this convenient term, and speak of all our possible knowledge of other minds as ejective.

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    The Hebrew race, their works, and their books, are great facts in the history of man; the influence of the mind of this people upon the rest of mankind has been immense and peculiar, and there can be no difficulty in recognising therein the hand of a directing Providence. But we may not make ourselves wiser than God, nor attribute to Him methods of procedure which are not His. If, then, it is plain that He has not thought it needful to communicate to the writer of the Cosmogony that knowledge which modern researches have revealed, why do we not acknowledge this, except that it conflicts with a human theory which presumes to point out how God ought to have instructed man? The treatment to which the Mosaic narrative is subjected by the theological geologists is anything but respectful. The writers of this school, as we have seen, agree in representing it as a series of elaborate equivocations -- a story which palters with us in a double sense.' But if we regard it as the speculation of some Hebrew Descartes or Newton, promulgated in all good faith as the best and most probable account that could be then given of God's universe, it resumes the dignity and value of which the writers in question have done their utmost to deprive it. It has been sometimes felt as a difficulty to taking this view of the case, that the writer asserts so solemnly and unhesitatingly that for which he must have known that he had no authority. But this arises only from our modern habits of thought, and from the modesty of assertion which the spirit of true science has taught us. Mankind has learnt caution through repeated slips in the process of tracing out the truth.

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    The question of the meaning of the word bara,'create,'has been previously touched upon;it has been acknowledged by good critics that it doesn't of itself necessarily imply 'to make out of nothing upon the simple ground that it is found [to be]uesd in cases where such a meaning would be inapplicable . But the difficultly of giving to it the interpretation contended for by Dr Buckland and of uniting with this the assumption of a six days' creation, such as that described in Genesis, at a comparatively recent period, lies in this,that the heaven itself is distinctly said to have been formed by the division of the waters on the second day. Consequently , until. The first Mosaic day of creation, there was no sky, no local habitation for the sun,moon and stars, even supposing those bodies to have been included in the original material. Dr Buckland doesn't touch this obvious difficulty, without which his argument that the sun and moon might have been contemplated as pre-existing , although they aren't stated to have been set in the heaven until the forth day, is of no value at all.

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    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".