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Mental Evolution in Animals(1883). In the family of the sciences Comparative Psychology may claim nearest kinship with Comparative Anatomy; for just as the latter aims at a scientific comparison of the bodily structures of organisms, so the former aims at a similar com parison of their mental structures. Moreover, in the one science as in the other, the first object is to analyze all the complex structures with which each has respectively to deal. When this analysis, or dissection, has been completed for as great a number of cases as circumstances permit, the next object is to compare with one another all the structures which have been thus analyzed; and, lastly, the results of such comparison supply, in each case alike, the basis for the final object of these sciences, which is that of classifying, with reference to these results, all the structures which have been thus examined.


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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。 『動物に見る精神の発達』(1883年)。科学の系統にあっては、比較心理学は比較解剖学と最も近い類似を要求するかもしれません。なぜなら、後者がまさに有機体の身体構造の科学的な比較を目指すように、前者もそれらの精神構造の同様の比較を目指すからです。その上さらに、一方の科学においても他方においても、第一の目的は各々がそれぞれに扱うべきすべての複雑な構造を分析することなのですから。 この分析あるいは解剖が、環境によって多くの状況が許容されるのに匹敵するくらいに完了するとき、次なる目的はこのように分析された構造をすべて相互に比較することであります。そして、結局、そのような比較提供の結果、各場合同様にこれらの科学の最終目的の基礎は、これらの結果を参照しつつ、かようにして検査されたすべての構造を分類することにあります。 以上、ご回答まで。





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    On entering so wide a field of enquiry as that whose limits I have now indicated, it is indispensable to the continuity of advance that we should be prepared, where needful, to supple ment observation with hypothesis. It therefore seems desira ble to conclude this Introduction with a few words both to explain and to justify the method which in this matter I intend to follow. It has already been stated that the sole object of this work is that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, ofcourse, of enquiring into the causes which hare determined it. So far as observation is available to guide us in this enquiry, I shall resort to no other assistance. Where, however, from the nature of the case, observation fails us, I shall proceed to inference. But though I shall use this method as sparingly as possible, I am aware that criticism will often find valid ground to object — ' It is all very well to map out the sup posed genesis of the various mental faculties in this way, but we require some definite experimental or historical proof that the genesis in question actually did take place in the order and manner that you infer.'

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    Now each of the three objects which I have named affords in its pursuit many and varied points of interest, which are quite distinct from any interest thaUmay be felt in the attain ment of the ultimate end — Classification, Thus, for example, the study of the human hand as a mechanism has an interest apart from all considerations touching the comparison of ita structure with that of the corresponding member in other animals ; and, similarly, the study of the psychological facul ties in any given animal has an interest apart from all con siderations touching their comparison with the corresponding faculties in other animals. Again, just as the comparison of separate bodily members throughout the animal series has an interest apart from any question concerning the classification of animal bodies to which such comparison may ultimately lead, so the study of separate psychical faculties throughout the animal series (including, of course, mankind) has an interest quite distinct from any question concerning the classification of animal minds to which such comparison may ultimately lead. Lastly, around and outside all the objects of these sciences as such, there lies the broad expanse of General Thought, into which these sciences, in all their stages, tbrow out branches of inference. It is needless to say that of late years the interest with which the unpre cedented growth of these branches is watched has become so universal and intense, that it may be said largely to have absorbed the more exclusive sources of interest which I have enumerated.

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    " Thus it is that philosophy can supply no demonstrative refutation of idealism, even of the most extravagant form. Common sense, however, universally feels that analogy is here a safer guide to truth than the sceptical demand for impossible evidence; so that if the objective existence of other organisms and their activities is granted — without which postulate comparative psychology, like all the other sciences, would be an unsubstantial dream— common sense will always and without question conclude that the activities of organisms other than our own, when analogous to those activities of our own which we know to be accompanied by certain mental states, are in them accompanied by analogous mental states."

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    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.

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    It being understood, then, that the present essay is restricted to a consideration of mental evolution in animals,I should like to have it also understood that it is further restricted to the psychology as distinguished from the philo sophy of the subject. In a short and independent essay, published elsewhere,* I have already stated my views con cerning the more important questions of philosophy into which the subject-matter of psychology is so apt to dip ; but here it is only needful to emphasize the fact that these two strata of thought, although assuredly in juxtaposition, are no less assuredly distinct. My present enquiry belongs only to the upper stratum, or to the science of psychology as dis tinguished from any theory of knowledge. I am in no wise concerned with " the transition from the object known to the knowing subject," and therefore I am in no wise concerned with any of the philosophical theories which have been pro pounded upon this matter. In other words, I have every where to regard mind as an object and mental modifications as phenomena; therefore I have throughout to investigate the process of Mental Evolution by what is now generally and aptly termed the historical method. I cannot too strongly impress upon the memory of those who from previous reading are able to appreciate the importance of the distinction, that I thus intend everywhere to remain within the borders of psychology, and nowhere to trespass upon the grounds of philosophy.

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    I take it for granted, then, 'that all my readers accept the doctrine of Organic Evolution, or the belief that all species of plants and animals have bad a derivative mode of origin by way of natural descent ; and, moreover, that one great law ormethod of the process has been natural selection, or survival of the fittest. If anyone grants this much, I further assume that he must concede to me the fact, as distinguished from the manner and history of Mental Evolution, throughout the whole range of the animal kingdom, with the exception of man. I assume this because I hold that if the doctrine of Organic Evolution is accepted, it carries with it, as a necessary corollary, the doctrine of Mental Evolution, at all events as far as the brute creation is concerned. For throughout the brute creation, from wholly unintelligent animals to the most highly intelligent, we can trace one continuous gradation ; so that if we already believe that all specific forms of animal life have had a derivative origin, we cannot refuse to believe that all the mental faculties which these various forms present must likewise have had a derivative origin. And, as a matter of fact, we do not find anyone so unreasonable as to maintain, or even to suggest, that if the evidence of Organic Evolution is accepted, the evidence of Mental Evolution, within the limits which I have named, can consistently be rejected. - The one body of evidence therefore serves as a pedestal to the other, such that in the absence of the former the latter would have no locus standi (for no one could well dream, of Mental Evolution were it not for the evidence of Organic Evolution, or of the transmutation of species) ; while the presence of the former irresistibly suggests the necessity of the latter, as the logical structure for the support of which the pedestal is what it is.

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    We may fairly ask,' he argues, of those persons who consider physical science a fit subject for revelation, what point they can imagine short of a communication of Omniscience at which such a revelation might have stopped without imperfections of omission, less in degree, but similar in kind, to that which they impute to the existing narrative of Moses? A revelation of so much only of astronomy as was known to Copernicus would have seemed imperfect after the discoveries of Newton; and a revelation of the science of Newton would have appeared defective to La Place: a revelation of all the chemical knowledge of the eighteenth century would have been as deficient in comparison with the information of the present day, as what is now known in this science will probably appear before the termination of another age; in the whole circle of sciences there is not one to which this argument may not be extended, until we should require from revelation a full development of all the mysterious agencies that uphold the mechanism of the material world.' Buckland's question is quite inapplicable to the real difficulty, which is, not that circumstantial details are omitted -- that might reasonably be expected -- but that what is told, is told so as to convey to ordinary apprehensions an impression at variance with facts. We are indeed told that certain writers of antiquity had already anticipated the hypothesis of the geologist, and two of the Christian fathers, Augustine and Episcopius, are referred to as having actually held that a wide interval elapsed between the first act of creation, mentioned in the Mosaic account, and the commencement of the six days' work. If, however, they arrived at such a conclusion, it was simply because, like the modern geologist, they had theories of their own to support, which led them to make somewhat similar hypotheses.

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    The host of reflex actions is arrayed against the proposition, and, in view of such non-mental, though apparently intentional adjustments, we find the necessity for some test of the choice- element as real or fictitious. The only test we have is to ask whether the adjustments displayed are invariably the same under the same circumstances of stimulation. The only distinction between adjustive movements due to reflex action, and adjustive movements accompanied by mental perception, consists in the former depending on inherited mechanisms within the nervous system being so constructed as to effect particular adjustive movements in responso to particular stimulations, while the latter are independent of any such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to the exigencies of special circumstances. Reflex actions, under the influence of their appropriate stimuli, may be compared to the actions of a machine under the manipulations of an operator : when certain springs of action are touched by certain stimuli, the whole machine is thrown into appropriate action ; there is no room for choice, there is no room for uncertainty ; but, as surely as any of these inherited mechanisms is affected by the stimulus with reference to which it has been constructed to act, so surely will it act in precisely the same, way as it always has acted. But the case with conscious mental adjust ment is quite different. For, without going into the question concerning the relation of Body and Mind, or waiting to ask whether cases of mental adjustment are not really quite as mechanical in the sense of being the necessary result or correlative of a chain of psychical sequences due to a physical stimulation, it is enough to point to the variable and incalcu lable character of mental adjustments as distinguished from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjustments.All in fact, that in an objective sense we can mean by a mental adjustment, is an adjustment of a kind that has not been definitely fixed by heredity as the only adjustment possible in the given circumstances of stimulation. For, were there no alternative of adjustment, the case, in an animal at least, would be indistinguishable from one of reflex action.

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    The Battle of the Somme has been called the beginning of modern all-arms warfare, during which Kitchener's Army learned to fight the mass-industrial war in which the continental armies had been engaged for two years. This view sees the British contribution to the battle as part of a coalition war and part of a process, which took the strategic initiative from the German Army and caused it irreparable damage, leading to its collapse in late 1918. Haig and General Rawlinson have been criticised ever since 1916 for the human cost of the battle and for failing to achieve their territorial objectives. On 1 August 1916 Winston Churchill criticised the British Army's conduct of the offensive to the British Cabinet, claiming that though the battle had forced the Germans to end their offensive at Verdun, attrition was damaging the British armies more than the German armies.