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和訳お願い致します。

On entering so wide a field of enquiry as that whose limits I have now indicated, it is indispensable to the continuity of advance that we should be prepared, where needful, to supple ment observation with hypothesis. It therefore seems desira ble to conclude this Introduction with a few words both to explain and to justify the method which in this matter I intend to follow. It has already been stated that the sole object of this work is that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, ofcourse, of enquiring into the causes which hare determined it. So far as observation is available to guide us in this enquiry, I shall resort to no other assistance. Where, however, from the nature of the case, observation fails us, I shall proceed to inference. But though I shall use this method as sparingly as possible, I am aware that criticism will often find valid ground to object — ' It is all very well to map out the sup posed genesis of the various mental faculties in this way, but we require some definite experimental or historical proof that the genesis in question actually did take place in the order and manner that you infer.'

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以下のとおりお答えします。原文の誤植とおぼしきところは、カッコ内のようにみなして訳しました:desira ble (→desireble)、hare (→here)、 sup posed (→supposed)。 今私がその範囲を示したような非常に広い探求の分野に入るに際して、必要なところで仮説を備えた補足観察の心積もりをしておくことが、進歩の連続性にとって不可欠です。したがって、私が(探求を)続けるつもりの問題での方法を説明してそれを正当化するために、短い言葉でこの「導入部」をしめくくるのが望ましく思えます。 この仕事の唯一の目的は、精神発達のありそうな歴史をできるだけ科学的なやり方で追跡することと、したがって、もちろん、ここで決定した原因について調査することであるということは、すでに述べました。この探求で、私たちを導くような観察が利用できる限り、私は他の援助に頼らないつもりです。しかしながら、観察がその場面の性質上私たちの期待に悖るようなところでは、推論的手法に進むことになります。 しかし、この方法はできるだけ控え目にしか使用しませんが、私は批判がしばしば目的への有効な土俵を見つけてくれる、ということには気づいています。―「この方法で、様々な心的能力の起源の構図を描いても、まったく問題はありません。しかし、問題の起源が、あなた方の推測するような順序と方法において実際に起こったという、はっきりした何らかの実験上ないし歴史上の証明は要求されます。」 以上、ご回答まで。

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  • 和訳お願い致します。

    While writing the first chapters of the present volume, I intended that the latter half of it should be devoted to a con sideration of this question, and therefore in " Animal Intelli gence " I said that such would be the case. But as the work proceeded it soon became evident that a full treat ment of this question would require more space than could be allowed in a single volume, without seriously curtailing both the consideration of this question itself and also that of mental evolution, as this is exhibited in the animal kingdom. I therefore determined on restricting the present essay to a consideration of mental evolution in animal, and on reserv ing for subsequent publication all the material which I have collected beaiing on mental evolution in man. I cannot yet say how long it will be before I can feel that I am justified in publishing my researches concerning this branch of my subject ; for the more that I have investigated it, the more have I found that it grows, as it were, in three dimensions— in depth, width, and complexity. But at whatever time I shall be able to publish the third and final instalment of my work, it will of course rest upon the basis supplied by the present essay, as this rests upon the basis supplied by the previous one.

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    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.

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    Or, again adopting the convenient terminology of Clifford, we must always remember that we can never know the mental . states of any mental beings other than ourselves as objects ; we can only know them as ejects^ or as ideal projections of our own mental states. And it is from this broad fact of psycho logy that the difficulty arises in applying our criterion of mind to particular cases — especially among the lower animals. For if the evidence of mind, or of being capable of choice, must thus always be ejective as distinguished from objective, it is clear that the cogency of the evidence must diminish as we recede from minds inferred to be like our own, towards minds inferred to be not so like our own, passing in a gradual series into not-minds. Or, otherwise stated, although the evidence derived from ejects is practically regarded as good in the case of mental organizations inferred to be closely analogous to our own, this evidence clearly ceases to be trust worthy in the ratio in which the analogy fails ; so that when we come to the case of very low animals — where the analogy is least — we feel uncertain whether or not to ascribe to them any ejective existence. But I must again insist that this fact — which springs immediately but of the fundamental isolation of the individual mind — is no argument against my criterion of mind as the best criterion available; it [it=the fact] tends, indeed, to show that no better criterion can be found, for it shows the hopelessness of seeking such.

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    From this statement of the case it will be apparent that our knowledge of mental activities in any organism other than our own is neither subjective nor objective. That it is not subjective I need not wait to show. That it is not objective* may be rendered obvious by a few moments' reflec tion. .For it is evident that mental activities in other organisms can never be to us objects of direct knowledge ; as I have just said, we can only infer their existence from the objective sources supplied by observable activities of such organisms.. Therefore all our knowledge of mental activities other than our own really consists of an inferential inter pretation of bodily activities — this interpretation being founded on our subjective knowledge of our own mental activities. By inference we project, as it were, the known patterns of our own mental chromograph [chromograph=chromolithograph] on what is to us the otherwise blank screen of another mind ; and our only knowledge of the processes there taking place is really due to such a projection of our own subjectively. This matter has been well and clearly presented by the late Professor Clifford, who has coined the exceedingly appropriate term eject (in contradistinction to subject and object), whereby to designate the distinctive character of a mind (or mental process) other than our own in its relation to our own. I shall therefore adopt this convenient term, and speak of all our possible knowledge of other minds as ejective.

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    In positing the evidence' of Choice as my objective (or ejective) criterion of Mind, I do not think it necessary to enter into any elaborate analysis of what constitutes this evidence. In a subsequent chapter I shall treat fully of what I call the physiology or objective aspect of choice ; and then it will be seen that from the gradual manner in which choice, or the mind element, arises, it is not practically possible to draw a definite line of demarcation between choosing and non-choosing agents. Therefore, at this stage of the enquiry I prefer to rest in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as implying a distinction which common sense has always drawn, and probably always will draw, between mental and non-mental agents. It cannot be correctly said that a river chooses the course of its flow, or that the earth chooses an ellipse wherein to revolve round the sun. And similarly, however complex the operations may be of an agent recog nized as non-mental — such, for instance, as those of a calcu lating machine — or however impossible it may be to predict the result of its actions, we never say that such operations or actions are due to choice ; we reserve this term for operations or actions, however simple and however easily the result may be foreseen, which are performed, either by agents who in virtue of the non-mechanical nature of these actions prove themselves to be mental, or by agents already recognized as mental — i.e., by agents who have already proved themselves to be mental by performing other actions of such a non- mechanical or unforeseeable nature as we feel assured can only be attributed to choice. And there can be no reasonable doubt that this common-sense distinction between choosing aud non-choosing agents is a valid one. Although it may be difficult or impossible, in particular cases, to decide to which of the two categories this or that being should be assigned, this difficulty does not affect the validity of the classification — any more, for instance, than the difficulty of deciding whether Limulus should be classified with the crabs or with the scorpions affects the validity of the classification which marks off the group Crustacea from the group Arachnida.

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    In actual research these three objects are prosecuted, not successively, but simultaneously. Thus it is not necessary in either case that the final object — that of classification- should wait for its commencement upon the completion of the dissection or analysis of every organism or every mental structure that is to be found upon the earth. On the con trary, the comparison in each case begins with the facts that are first found to be comparable, and is afterwards pro gressively extended as knowledge of additional facts becomes more extensive. * The word " structure " is used in a metaphorical sense when applied to mind, but the usage it convenient.

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    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

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    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".

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    Two points have to be observed with regard to this criterion, in whichever verbal form we may choose to express it. The first is that it is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non- mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. For it is certain that failure to learn by individual experience is not always conclusive evidence against the existence of mind; such failure may arise merely from an imperfection of memroy, or from there not being enough of the mind-element present to make the adjustments needful to meet the novel circum stances. Conversely, it is no less certain that some parts of our own nervous system, which are not concerned in the phenomena of consciousness, are nevertheless able in some measure to learn by individual experience. The nervous apparatus of the stomach, for instance, is able in so con siderable a degree to adapt the movements of that organ to the requirements of its individual experience, that were the organ an organism we might be in danger of regarding it as dimly intelligent. Still there is no evidence to show that non-mental agents are ever able in any considerable measure thus to simulate the adjustments performed by mental ones ; and therefore our criterion, in its practical application, has rather to be guarded against the opposite danger of defying the presence of mind to agents that are really mental For, as I observed in " Animal Intelligence," " it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore con clude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropiate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent ; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evi dence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non- mental action, not to the lower limit of mental[action]''.

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    It should be borne in mind,' says Dr. Buckland, that the object of the account was, not to state in what manner, but by whom the world was made.' Every one must see that this is an unfounded assertion, inasmuch as the greater part of the narrative consists in a minute and orderly description of the manner in which things were made. We can know nothing as to the object of the account, except from the account itself. What the writer meant to state is just that which he has stated, for all that we can know to the contrary. Or can we seriously beleive that if appealed to by one of his Hebrew hearers or readers as to his intention, he would have replied, My only object in what I have written is to inform you that God made the world; as to the manner of His doing it, of which I have given so exact an account, I have no intention that my words should be taken in their literal meaning? We come then to this, that if we sift the Mosaic narrative of all definite meaning, and only allow it to be the expression of the most vague generalities, if we avow that it admits of no certain interpretation, of none that may not be shifted and altered as often as we see fit, and as the exigencies of geology may require, then may we reconcile it with what science teaches. This mode of dealing with the subject has been broadly advocated by a recent writer of mathematical eminence, who adopts the Bucklandian hypothesis, a passage from whose work we shall quote.