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While writing the first chapters of the present volume, I intended that the latter half of it should be devoted to a con sideration of this question, and therefore in " Animal Intelli gence " I said that such would be the case. But as the work proceeded it soon became evident that a full treat ment of this question would require more space than could be allowed in a single volume, without seriously curtailing both the consideration of this question itself and also that of mental evolution, as this is exhibited in the animal kingdom. I therefore determined on restricting the present essay to a consideration of mental evolution in animal, and on reserv ing for subsequent publication all the material which I have collected beaiing on mental evolution in man. I cannot yet say how long it will be before I can feel that I am justified in publishing my researches concerning this branch of my subject ; for the more that I have investigated it, the more have I found that it grows, as it were, in three dimensions— in depth, width, and complexity. But at whatever time I shall be able to publish the third and final instalment of my work, it will of course rest upon the basis supplied by the present essay, as this rests upon the basis supplied by the previous one.


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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。 (beaiingとあるのは、bearingの誤植とみなして訳しました。) 本書の第1章を書いている間、私はその後半をもっぱらこの問題の考察に当てるように意図しました。それで、「動物知能」のようなことが本題になると述べたわけです。しかし、仕事が進むにしたがって、間もなく明らかになったことがあります。それは、この問題を十分に取り扱おうとすると、これ(精神の発達問題)が全動物界に現れるので、この質問自体の考察およびさらに精神の発達の考察を両方ともあまり短縮しないようにすると、単一章の中で許され得るより多くの紙面を必要とすることになるだろう、ということです。 したがって、私は動物中の精神発達の考察に現在のエッセイを制限し、続報のために人の中の精神発達に関連して集めた資料をすべて取っておくことを決心しました。私は、本主題のこの部門に関する研究の公表については、それが妥当であると思えるようになる前にどれくらいの時間がかかるか、まだ言及できません。というのも、それを調査すればするほど一層、それは、いわば3次元的に ― 深さ、広さおよび複雑さにおいて、膨らみを増すからです。しかし、私が仕事の第3回分、つまり、最終回分を公表することができる時がいつになろうと、当然ながら、これ(現在あるエッセイ)が前回のエッセイによって供給された基礎に基づくように、それ(作成中のエッセイ)は現在のエッセイによって供給された基礎に基づくことになるでしょう。 以上、ご回答まで。





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    On entering so wide a field of enquiry as that whose limits I have now indicated, it is indispensable to the continuity of advance that we should be prepared, where needful, to supple ment observation with hypothesis. It therefore seems desira ble to conclude this Introduction with a few words both to explain and to justify the method which in this matter I intend to follow. It has already been stated that the sole object of this work is that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, ofcourse, of enquiring into the causes which hare determined it. So far as observation is available to guide us in this enquiry, I shall resort to no other assistance. Where, however, from the nature of the case, observation fails us, I shall proceed to inference. But though I shall use this method as sparingly as possible, I am aware that criticism will often find valid ground to object — ' It is all very well to map out the sup posed genesis of the various mental faculties in this way, but we require some definite experimental or historical proof that the genesis in question actually did take place in the order and manner that you infer.'

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    I take it for granted, then, 'that all my readers accept the doctrine of Organic Evolution, or the belief that all species of plants and animals have bad a derivative mode of origin by way of natural descent ; and, moreover, that one great law ormethod of the process has been natural selection, or survival of the fittest. If anyone grants this much, I further assume that he must concede to me the fact, as distinguished from the manner and history of Mental Evolution, throughout the whole range of the animal kingdom, with the exception of man. I assume this because I hold that if the doctrine of Organic Evolution is accepted, it carries with it, as a necessary corollary, the doctrine of Mental Evolution, at all events as far as the brute creation is concerned. For throughout the brute creation, from wholly unintelligent animals to the most highly intelligent, we can trace one continuous gradation ; so that if we already believe that all specific forms of animal life have had a derivative origin, we cannot refuse to believe that all the mental faculties which these various forms present must likewise have had a derivative origin. And, as a matter of fact, we do not find anyone so unreasonable as to maintain, or even to suggest, that if the evidence of Organic Evolution is accepted, the evidence of Mental Evolution, within the limits which I have named, can consistently be rejected. - The one body of evidence therefore serves as a pedestal to the other, such that in the absence of the former the latter would have no locus standi (for no one could well dream, of Mental Evolution were it not for the evidence of Organic Evolution, or of the transmutation of species) ; while the presence of the former irresistibly suggests the necessity of the latter, as the logical structure for the support of which the pedestal is what it is.

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    It being understood, then, that the present essay is restricted to a consideration of mental evolution in animals,I should like to have it also understood that it is further restricted to the psychology as distinguished from the philo sophy of the subject. In a short and independent essay, published elsewhere,* I have already stated my views con cerning the more important questions of philosophy into which the subject-matter of psychology is so apt to dip ; but here it is only needful to emphasize the fact that these two strata of thought, although assuredly in juxtaposition, are no less assuredly distinct. My present enquiry belongs only to the upper stratum, or to the science of psychology as dis tinguished from any theory of knowledge. I am in no wise concerned with " the transition from the object known to the knowing subject," and therefore I am in no wise concerned with any of the philosophical theories which have been pro pounded upon this matter. In other words, I have every where to regard mind as an object and mental modifications as phenomena; therefore I have throughout to investigate the process of Mental Evolution by what is now generally and aptly termed the historical method. I cannot too strongly impress upon the memory of those who from previous reading are able to appreciate the importance of the distinction, that I thus intend everywhere to remain within the borders of psychology, and nowhere to trespass upon the grounds of philosophy.

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    From this statement of the case it will be apparent that our knowledge of mental activities in any organism other than our own is neither subjective nor objective. That it is not subjective I need not wait to show. That it is not objective* may be rendered obvious by a few moments' reflec tion. .For it is evident that mental activities in other organisms can never be to us objects of direct knowledge ; as I have just said, we can only infer their existence from the objective sources supplied by observable activities of such organisms.. Therefore all our knowledge of mental activities other than our own really consists of an inferential inter pretation of bodily activities — this interpretation being founded on our subjective knowledge of our own mental activities. By inference we project, as it were, the known patterns of our own mental chromograph [chromograph=chromolithograph] on what is to us the otherwise blank screen of another mind ; and our only knowledge of the processes there taking place is really due to such a projection of our own subjectively. This matter has been well and clearly presented by the late Professor Clifford, who has coined the exceedingly appropriate term eject (in contradistinction to subject and object), whereby to designate the distinctive character of a mind (or mental process) other than our own in its relation to our own. I shall therefore adopt this convenient term, and speak of all our possible knowledge of other minds as ejective.

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    The diffculties and disputes which attended the first revival of science have recurred in the present century in consequence of the growth of geology. It is in truth only the old question over again-precisely the same point of theology which is involved, although the difficulties which present themselves are fresh. The school books of the present day, while they teach the child that the earth moves, yet [they] assure him that it is a little less than six thousand years old and that it was made in six days. On the other hand, geologists of all religious creeds are agreed that the earth has existed for an immense series of years-to be [to be=it should be] counted by millions rather than by thousands:and that indubitably more than six days elapsed from its first creation to the appearance of man upon its surface. By this broad discrepancy between old and doctrine is the modern mind startled, as were the men of the sixteenth century [startled] when [they were] told that the earth moved.

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    Now assuredly we have here a most important issue, and as it is one the discussion of which will constitute a large element of my work, it is perhaps desirable that I should state at the outset the manner in which I propose to deal with it . The question, then, as to whether or not human intelli gence has been evolved from animal intelligence can only be dealt with scientifically by comparing the one with the other, in order to ascertain the points wherein they agree and the points wherein they differ. Now there can be no doubt that when this is done, the difference between the mental faculties of the most intelligent animal and the mental faculties of the lowest savage[savage=wild beast] is seen to be so vast, that the hypothesis of their being so nearly allied as Mr. Darwin's teaching implies, appears at first sight absurd. And, indeed, it is not until we have become convinced that the theory of Evolution can alone afford an explanation of the facts of human anatomy that we are prepared to seek for a similar explanation of the facts of human psychology. But wide as is the difference between the mind of a man and the mind of a brute, we must remember that the question is one, not as to degree, but as to kind ; and therefore that our task, as serious enquirers after truth, is calmly and honestly to examine the character of the difference which is presented, in order to determine whether it is really beyond the bounds of rational credibility that the enormous interval which now separates these two divisions of mind can ever have been bridged over, by numberless inter mediate gradations, during the untold ages of the past.

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    The researchers believe their results can be applied to evolution as a whole. it seems that , in human evolution , it was very important that the majority of people be right-handed. This is because most of the time cooperation was more important to our survival than competition. However in certain situations , competition was more important. In these cases , having about 10 percent of the population left-handed was an advantage for human beings. 文法の解説を含めて和訳が知りたいです。 回答お願いします。

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    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

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    In positing the evidence' of Choice as my objective (or ejective) criterion of Mind, I do not think it necessary to enter into any elaborate analysis of what constitutes this evidence. In a subsequent chapter I shall treat fully of what I call the physiology or objective aspect of choice ; and then it will be seen that from the gradual manner in which choice, or the mind element, arises, it is not practically possible to draw a definite line of demarcation between choosing and non-choosing agents. Therefore, at this stage of the enquiry I prefer to rest in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as implying a distinction which common sense has always drawn, and probably always will draw, between mental and non-mental agents. It cannot be correctly said that a river chooses the course of its flow, or that the earth chooses an ellipse wherein to revolve round the sun. And similarly, however complex the operations may be of an agent recog nized as non-mental — such, for instance, as those of a calcu lating machine — or however impossible it may be to predict the result of its actions, we never say that such operations or actions are due to choice ; we reserve this term for operations or actions, however simple and however easily the result may be foreseen, which are performed, either by agents who in virtue of the non-mechanical nature of these actions prove themselves to be mental, or by agents already recognized as mental — i.e., by agents who have already proved themselves to be mental by performing other actions of such a non- mechanical or unforeseeable nature as we feel assured can only be attributed to choice. And there can be no reasonable doubt that this common-sense distinction between choosing aud non-choosing agents is a valid one. Although it may be difficult or impossible, in particular cases, to decide to which of the two categories this or that being should be assigned, this difficulty does not affect the validity of the classification — any more, for instance, than the difficulty of deciding whether Limulus should be classified with the crabs or with the scorpions affects the validity of the classification which marks off the group Crustacea from the group Arachnida.

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    It is evident that, in entering upon this wider field, I shall frequently have to quit the narrower limits of direct obser vation within which my former work was confined ; and it is chiefly because I think it desirable clearly to distinguish between the objects of Comparative Psychology as a science, and any inferences or doctrines which may be connected with its study, that I have made so complete a-partition of the facts of animal intelligence from the theories which I believe these facts to justify. So much, then, for the reasons which have led to the form of these essays, and the relations which I intend the one to bear to the other. I may now say a few words to indicate the structure and scope of the present essay. Every discussion must rest on some basis of assumption ; every thesis must have some hypothesis. The hypothesis v which I shall take is that of the truth of the general theory of Evolution : I shall assume the truth of this theory so far as I feel that all competent persona of the present day will be prepared to allow me. I must therefore first define what degree of latitude I suppose to be thus conceded.