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和訳お願い致します。

Two points have to be observed with regard to this criterion, in whichever verbal form we may choose to express it. The first is that it is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non- mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. For it is certain that failure to learn by individual experience is not always conclusive evidence against the existence of mind; such failure may arise merely from an imperfection of memroy, or from there not being enough of the mind-element present to make the adjustments needful to meet the novel circum stances. Conversely, it is no less certain that some parts of our own nervous system, which are not concerned in the phenomena of consciousness, are nevertheless able in some measure to learn by individual experience. The nervous apparatus of the stomach, for instance, is able in so con siderable a degree to adapt the movements of that organ to the requirements of its individual experience, that were the organ an organism we might be in danger of regarding it as dimly intelligent. Still there is no evidence to show that non-mental agents are ever able in any considerable measure thus to simulate the adjustments performed by mental ones ; and therefore our criterion, in its practical application, has rather to be guarded against the opposite danger of defying the presence of mind to agents that are really mental For, as I observed in " Animal Intelligence," " it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore con clude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropiate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent ; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evi dence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non- mental action, not to the lower limit of mental[action]''.

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以下のとおりお答えします。 なお、(語句の区切りの間違いは別として)、次の2語は、→の後に示した語の誤植と見て訳しました:memroy (→memory), appropiate (→appropriate)。 この基準に関して2点を述べなければなりません。それを表現するためには、どちらの言語形式を選んでもよいでしょう。第1の点は、こうです。それは外見上非精神的な適応における可能性としての精神的特徴を持つことについて、あるいは逆に、外見上精神的な適応における可能性としての非精神的特徴を持つことについて、相互に厳格なまでに排他的というほどではない、ということです。 それゆえに、個的経験によって学習し損なうことが、必ずしも心の存在を否定する確証になるとは限らない、ということは確かです。そのような失敗は、単に記憶の欠陥から発生するかもしれません。あるいは、新しい環境に見合うのに必要な適応をするための心的要素の存在が十分でないことから発生するかもしれません。 反対に、私たち自身の神経系のいくつかの部分は、意識現象に関係していないにも拘わらず、個的経験によって学習することがある程度できることは、少なからず確かです。例えば、胃の神経器官は、その個的経験の要請に対してかなりの程度胃の動作に適応できるので、胃器官が有機体であるとすれば、それをあまり知的でないとみなすのは危険かもしれません。 今のところまだ、非精神的な作用因が、精神的な作用因によって行なわれる適応行為をある程度同じようにシミュレート(模擬遂行)する能力を持つことを示す証拠はありません。したがって私たちの基準は、その実際的応用の場面で、真に精神的である作用因に対する心の存在を無視するという逆の危険に抗して、むしろ保護しなければなりません。なぜなら、私が『動物の知能』で観察したとおり、「かなり以前、心を問題の試験に耐え得るようにする開発の度合いで十分遠くに進んだこと、おそらくそれは発生期の主体性として現れ始めること、が明らかであるからです。 言い換えれば、有機化度の低い動物はそれ自身の個的経験によって学習しないので、適切な刺激、意識あるいは心的要素に対して、それが本来具有するかあるいは祖先から伝来する適応性能を実行してみる際に、それがまったく不在であるとは結論できないでしょう。この要素は、もし存在する場合でも、事実の証拠を顕示しない、と言うことができるに過ぎません。 しかし他方では、もしも有機化度の低い動物がそれ自身の個的経験によって学習するならば、私たちは意図的な適応に結びつくような意識的記憶に関する利用可能な最良の証拠を所有することになります。したがって、私たちの基準は、精神〔活動〕の下限というより、非精神的活動の上限に当てはまる、ということになるわけです。」 以上、ご回答まで。

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