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和訳お願い致します。

Now assuredly we have here a most important issue, and as it is one the discussion of which will constitute a large element of my work, it is perhaps desirable that I should state at the outset the manner in which I propose to deal with it . The question, then, as to whether or not human intelli gence has been evolved from animal intelligence can only be dealt with scientifically by comparing the one with the other, in order to ascertain the points wherein they agree and the points wherein they differ. Now there can be no doubt that when this is done, the difference between the mental faculties of the most intelligent animal and the mental faculties of the lowest savage[savage=wild beast] is seen to be so vast, that the hypothesis of their being so nearly allied as Mr. Darwin's teaching implies, appears at first sight absurd. And, indeed, it is not until we have become convinced that the theory of Evolution can alone afford an explanation of the facts of human anatomy that we are prepared to seek for a similar explanation of the facts of human psychology. But wide as is the difference between the mind of a man and the mind of a brute, we must remember that the question is one, not as to degree, but as to kind ; and therefore that our task, as serious enquirers after truth, is calmly and honestly to examine the character of the difference which is presented, in order to determine whether it is really beyond the bounds of rational credibility that the enormous interval which now separates these two divisions of mind can ever have been bridged over, by numberless inter mediate gradations, during the untold ages of the past.

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以下のとおりお答えします。 確かなところ、今私たちはとても重要な論争の問題点を抱えています。私の仕事うちの大きな要素を構成する議論がその一つであり、それに対処する方法についてまず最初に述べるのが、おそらく望ましいことでしょう。 そこで、人間知能が動物知能から発展したかどうかに関する問題は、それらが一致する点と異なる点を確認するために、それらをつき合わせながら比較することによってのみ、科学的に扱うことが可能になりましょう。 さて、これ(比較)がなされるときに、最も知的な動物の心的能力と、知能が最も低い野蛮種〔=野生動物〕の心的能力との間の差が極めて大きいと見られるので、ダーウィン氏の教えることに密接に組している人たちの仮説が、一見して不合理に見えることに疑いの余地がありえません。 また確かに、私たちは「進化論」が単独で人体解剖学の事実の説明を提供できることを確信するまでは、人間心理の事実について同にような説明を求める心積もりになることはないでしょう。 しかし、人の心と野獣の心の間の差は大きいけれども、問題は1つで、それは程度に関してではなく種類に関してである、ということを覚えておかなければなりません。したがってまた、私たちの課題は、真実を追い求める真摯な探求者として、提示される違いの特徴を冷静かつ誠実に検査するべきです。それというのも、今はこれら2つの心の違いを分離している巨大な間隔が、はるか遠い過去の時代にあった無数の中間的移行によって架橋されていたという可能性が、合理的な信憑性の境界を現実に越えている否かを確定するためであります。 以上、ご回答まで。

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  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is obvious, then, to start with, that by Mind we may mean two very different things, according as we contemplate it in our own individual selves, or as manifested by other beings. For if I contemplate my own mind, I have an imme diate cognizance of a certain flow of thoughts and feelings, which are the most ultimate things — and, indeed, the only things— of which I am cognizant. But if I contemplate Mind in other persons or organisms, I can have no such immediate cognizance of their thoughts and feelings ; I can only infer the existence of such thoughts and feelings from the activities of the persons or organisms which appear to manifest them. Thus it is that by Mind we may mean either that which is subjective or that which is objective. Now throughout the present work we shall have to consider Mind as an object ; and therefore it is well to remember that our only instrument of analysis is the observation of activities which we infer to be prompted by, or associated with, mental antecedents or accompaniments analogous to those of which we are directly conscious in our own subjective experience. That is to say, starting from what I know subjectively of the operations of my own individual mind, and of the activi ties which in my own organism these operations seem to prompt, I proceed by analogy to infer from the observable activities displayed by other organisms, the fact that certain mental operations underlie or accompany these activities.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The Hebrew race, their works, and their books, are great facts in the history of man; the influence of the mind of this people upon the rest of mankind has been immense and peculiar, and there can be no difficulty in recognising therein the hand of a directing Providence. But we may not make ourselves wiser than God, nor attribute to Him methods of procedure which are not His. If, then, it is plain that He has not thought it needful to communicate to the writer of the Cosmogony that knowledge which modern researches have revealed, why do we not acknowledge this, except that it conflicts with a human theory which presumes to point out how God ought to have instructed man? The treatment to which the Mosaic narrative is subjected by the theological geologists is anything but respectful. The writers of this school, as we have seen, agree in representing it as a series of elaborate equivocations -- a story which palters with us in a double sense.' But if we regard it as the speculation of some Hebrew Descartes or Newton, promulgated in all good faith as the best and most probable account that could be then given of God's universe, it resumes the dignity and value of which the writers in question have done their utmost to deprive it. It has been sometimes felt as a difficulty to taking this view of the case, that the writer asserts so solemnly and unhesitatingly that for which he must have known that he had no authority. But this arises only from our modern habits of thought, and from the modesty of assertion which the spirit of true science has taught us. Mankind has learnt caution through repeated slips in the process of tracing out the truth.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Or, again adopting the convenient terminology of Clifford, we must always remember that we can never know the mental . states of any mental beings other than ourselves as objects ; we can only know them as ejects^ or as ideal projections of our own mental states. And it is from this broad fact of psycho logy that the difficulty arises in applying our criterion of mind to particular cases — especially among the lower animals. For if the evidence of mind, or of being capable of choice, must thus always be ejective as distinguished from objective, it is clear that the cogency of the evidence must diminish as we recede from minds inferred to be like our own, towards minds inferred to be not so like our own, passing in a gradual series into not-minds. Or, otherwise stated, although the evidence derived from ejects is practically regarded as good in the case of mental organizations inferred to be closely analogous to our own, this evidence clearly ceases to be trust worthy in the ratio in which the analogy fails ; so that when we come to the case of very low animals — where the analogy is least — we feel uncertain whether or not to ascribe to them any ejective existence. But I must again insist that this fact — which springs immediately but of the fundamental isolation of the individual mind — is no argument against my criterion of mind as the best criterion available; it [it=the fact] tends, indeed, to show that no better criterion can be found, for it shows the hopelessness of seeking such.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It will be observed that in this statement of the case I have expressly excluded the psychology of man, as being a department of comparative psychology with reference to which I am not entitled to assume the principles of Evolu tion. It seems needless to give my reasons for this exclusion For it is notorious that from the hour when Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace simultaneously propounded the theory which has exerted so enormous an influence on the thought of thepresent century, the difference between the views of these two joint originators of the theory has since been shared by the ever-increasing host of their disciples. We all know what that difference is. We all know that while Mr. Darwin believed the facts of human psychology to admit of being explained by the general laws of Evolution, Mr. Wallace does not believe these facts to admit of being thus explained. Therefore, while the followers of Mr. Darwin maintain that all organisms whatsover are alike products of a natural genesis, the followers of Mr. Wallace maintain that a distinct exception must be made to this general atement in the case of the human organism ; or at all events in the caso of the human mind. Thus it is that the great school of evolutionists is divided into two sects ; according to one the mind of man has been slowly evolved from lower types of psychical exist ence, and according to the other the mind of man, not having been thus evolved, stands apart, sui generis, from all other types of such existence.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It should be borne in mind,' says Dr. Buckland, that the object of the account was, not to state in what manner, but by whom the world was made.' Every one must see that this is an unfounded assertion, inasmuch as the greater part of the narrative consists in a minute and orderly description of the manner in which things were made. We can know nothing as to the object of the account, except from the account itself. What the writer meant to state is just that which he has stated, for all that we can know to the contrary. Or can we seriously beleive that if appealed to by one of his Hebrew hearers or readers as to his intention, he would have replied, My only object in what I have written is to inform you that God made the world; as to the manner of His doing it, of which I have given so exact an account, I have no intention that my words should be taken in their literal meaning? We come then to this, that if we sift the Mosaic narrative of all definite meaning, and only allow it to be the expression of the most vague generalities, if we avow that it admits of no certain interpretation, of none that may not be shifted and altered as often as we see fit, and as the exigencies of geology may require, then may we reconcile it with what science teaches. This mode of dealing with the subject has been broadly advocated by a recent writer of mathematical eminence, who adopts the Bucklandian hypothesis, a passage from whose work we shall quote.

  • 英語に自信のある方 和訳お願いします

    The aim of the physicianin the treatment of insanity is to bring the means at his command to bear, directly or indirectly , on the disordered nerve elemnt. But, in striving to do this, he soon learns with how many bodily organs and functionshe has really to do. to callmind a function of the brain may lead to much misapprehension, if it be thereby supposed that the brain is the only organ which is concerned in the function of mind. There is not an organ in the body which is not in intimate relation with the brain by means of its paths of nervous communication, which has not , so to speak, a special corresopondance with it through internuncial fibres, and which does not, therefore, affect more or less plainly and specially its[ist=the brain's] function as an organ of mind. It is not merely that a parpitating heart may cause anxiety and apprehension, or a disorderedliver[may cause] gloomy feelings, but there are good reasons to believe that eachorgan has its specific influence on the constituiton and function of mind; an influence not yet to be set forth scientifically., because it is exerted on that unconscious mental life which is the basis of all that we consciously feel and think. were the heart of one man to be placed in the body of another it would probably make no difference in the circulation of the blood, but it might make a real difference in the temper of his mind. so close is the physiological sympathy of parts in the commonwealth of the body that it is necessary in the physiological study of mind to regard it as a function of the whole organism, as complehending the whole bodily life.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    On entering so wide a field of enquiry as that whose limits I have now indicated, it is indispensable to the continuity of advance that we should be prepared, where needful, to supple ment observation with hypothesis. It therefore seems desira ble to conclude this Introduction with a few words both to explain and to justify the method which in this matter I intend to follow. It has already been stated that the sole object of this work is that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, ofcourse, of enquiring into the causes which hare determined it. So far as observation is available to guide us in this enquiry, I shall resort to no other assistance. Where, however, from the nature of the case, observation fails us, I shall proceed to inference. But though I shall use this method as sparingly as possible, I am aware that criticism will often find valid ground to object — ' It is all very well to map out the sup posed genesis of the various mental faculties in this way, but we require some definite experimental or historical proof that the genesis in question actually did take place in the order and manner that you infer.'