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和訳お願い致します。

In positing the evidence' of Choice as my objective (or ejective) criterion of Mind, I do not think it necessary to enter into any elaborate analysis of what constitutes this evidence. In a subsequent chapter I shall treat fully of what I call the physiology or objective aspect of choice ; and then it will be seen that from the gradual manner in which choice, or the mind element, arises, it is not practically possible to draw a definite line of demarcation between choosing and non-choosing agents. Therefore, at this stage of the enquiry I prefer to rest in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as implying a distinction which common sense has always drawn, and probably always will draw, between mental and non-mental agents. It cannot be correctly said that a river chooses the course of its flow, or that the earth chooses an ellipse wherein to revolve round the sun. And similarly, however complex the operations may be of an agent recog nized as non-mental — such, for instance, as those of a calcu lating machine — or however impossible it may be to predict the result of its actions, we never say that such operations or actions are due to choice ; we reserve this term for operations or actions, however simple and however easily the result may be foreseen, which are performed, either by agents who in virtue of the non-mechanical nature of these actions prove themselves to be mental, or by agents already recognized as mental — i.e., by agents who have already proved themselves to be mental by performing other actions of such a non- mechanical or unforeseeable nature as we feel assured can only be attributed to choice. And there can be no reasonable doubt that this common-sense distinction between choosing aud non-choosing agents is a valid one. Although it may be difficult or impossible, in particular cases, to decide to which of the two categories this or that being should be assigned, this difficulty does not affect the validity of the classification — any more, for instance, than the difficulty of deciding whether Limulus should be classified with the crabs or with the scorpions affects the validity of the classification which marks off the group Crustacea from the group Arachnida.

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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。 「心」に関する客体(あるいは表出体)の基準として「選択」の証拠(物件)を立てる際に、私は、この証拠の構成素の精巧な分析に取りかかる必要があるとは思いません。後続の章では、選択の生理機能もしくは客体的実相と私が呼ぶものを、完全に扱うこととします。その章で、選択(または精神的要素)が段階的な仕方で生起することを理解されることでしょう。選ぶか選ばないかの作用因の間に限定的な境界線を引くことは、実際には、まず不可能です。 したがってこの段階の探求では、常に、常識というものが精神的作用因と非精神的作用因とのどちらかを引き出してきたり、また引き出すであろうような区別を示唆するものとしておいて、私自身は通常の術語の語義の中に安んじて留まっていたいと思います。川の流れがどのコースを選ぶかとか、地球が太陽のまわりを回るのにどの点で楕円を選ぶかなどは正確に言うことができません。 それと同様に、例えば計算機の操作のように―非精神的と認識される作用因については、操作がいかに複雑であっても、―あるいはその行為の結果を予言することがいかに不可能であっても、私たちはそのような操作または行為が、選択性に基づくとは言いません。私たちは操作や行為のためにこの用語を保存しておきましょう。いかに単純であろうと、またいかに容易であろうと、これらの行為の非機械的な性質によって精神的であると証明される作用因によって実行されても、すでに精神的なものとして認識されている作用因―例えば非機械的な、または選択の性質しかないと感じられるような予知不能の性質をもった他の行為を行なうことですでに精神的であると証明されている作用因―によって実行されたのならば、結果は予知され得るのです。 また、選択と非選択からいずれかを選ぶこの常識的な区別が有効なものであることに合理的な疑いはあり得ません。たとえ、特殊な場合で、2つの範疇のうちのどちらが割り当てられるべきかを決定することが困難または不可能であっても、この難しさは分類の有効性には影響しません。―それは例えば、カブトガニが、カニに分類されるべきか、あるいはサソリに分類されるかどうか決定する難しさが、クモ綱類から甲殻類を区別する分類の有効性に影響しないのと大同小異です。 以上、ご回答まで。(Arachnidaは、Arachnidと見て訳しました。)

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  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only in such cases that we recognize the element of mind. In other words, ejectively con sidered, the distinctive element of mind is consciousness, the test of consciousness is the presence of choice, and the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives. To this analysis it is, however, needful to add that, although our only criterion of mind is antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action, it does not follow that all adjustive action in which mind is con cerned should be of an antecedently uncertain character; or, which is the same thing, [it does'nt follow] that because some such action may be of an antecedently certain character, we should on this account regard it as non-mental. Many adjustive actions which we recognize as mental are, nevertheless, seen before hand to be, under the given circumstances, inevitable ; but analysis would show that such is only the case when we have in view agents whom we already, and from independent videuce, regard as mental.

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    Or, again adopting the convenient terminology of Clifford, we must always remember that we can never know the mental . states of any mental beings other than ourselves as objects ; we can only know them as ejects^ or as ideal projections of our own mental states. And it is from this broad fact of psycho logy that the difficulty arises in applying our criterion of mind to particular cases — especially among the lower animals. For if the evidence of mind, or of being capable of choice, must thus always be ejective as distinguished from objective, it is clear that the cogency of the evidence must diminish as we recede from minds inferred to be like our own, towards minds inferred to be not so like our own, passing in a gradual series into not-minds. Or, otherwise stated, although the evidence derived from ejects is practically regarded as good in the case of mental organizations inferred to be closely analogous to our own, this evidence clearly ceases to be trust worthy in the ratio in which the analogy fails ; so that when we come to the case of very low animals — where the analogy is least — we feel uncertain whether or not to ascribe to them any ejective existence. But I must again insist that this fact — which springs immediately but of the fundamental isolation of the individual mind — is no argument against my criterion of mind as the best criterion available; it [it=the fact] tends, indeed, to show that no better criterion can be found, for it shows the hopelessness of seeking such.

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    On entering so wide a field of enquiry as that whose limits I have now indicated, it is indispensable to the continuity of advance that we should be prepared, where needful, to supple ment observation with hypothesis. It therefore seems desira ble to conclude this Introduction with a few words both to explain and to justify the method which in this matter I intend to follow. It has already been stated that the sole object of this work is that of tracing, in as scientific a manner as possible, the probable history of Mental Evolution, and therefore, ofcourse, of enquiring into the causes which hare determined it. So far as observation is available to guide us in this enquiry, I shall resort to no other assistance. Where, however, from the nature of the case, observation fails us, I shall proceed to inference. But though I shall use this method as sparingly as possible, I am aware that criticism will often find valid ground to object — ' It is all very well to map out the sup posed genesis of the various mental faculties in this way, but we require some definite experimental or historical proof that the genesis in question actually did take place in the order and manner that you infer.'

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".

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    Two points have to be observed with regard to this criterion, in whichever verbal form we may choose to express it. The first is that it is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non- mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. For it is certain that failure to learn by individual experience is not always conclusive evidence against the existence of mind; such failure may arise merely from an imperfection of memroy, or from there not being enough of the mind-element present to make the adjustments needful to meet the novel circum stances. Conversely, it is no less certain that some parts of our own nervous system, which are not concerned in the phenomena of consciousness, are nevertheless able in some measure to learn by individual experience. The nervous apparatus of the stomach, for instance, is able in so con siderable a degree to adapt the movements of that organ to the requirements of its individual experience, that were the organ an organism we might be in danger of regarding it as dimly intelligent. Still there is no evidence to show that non-mental agents are ever able in any considerable measure thus to simulate the adjustments performed by mental ones ; and therefore our criterion, in its practical application, has rather to be guarded against the opposite danger of defying the presence of mind to agents that are really mental For, as I observed in " Animal Intelligence," " it is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of development to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore con clude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropiate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent ; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evi dence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non- mental action, not to the lower limit of mental[action]''.

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    While writing the first chapters of the present volume, I intended that the latter half of it should be devoted to a con sideration of this question, and therefore in " Animal Intelli gence " I said that such would be the case. But as the work proceeded it soon became evident that a full treat ment of this question would require more space than could be allowed in a single volume, without seriously curtailing both the consideration of this question itself and also that of mental evolution, as this is exhibited in the animal kingdom. I therefore determined on restricting the present essay to a consideration of mental evolution in animal, and on reserv ing for subsequent publication all the material which I have collected beaiing on mental evolution in man. I cannot yet say how long it will be before I can feel that I am justified in publishing my researches concerning this branch of my subject ; for the more that I have investigated it, the more have I found that it grows, as it were, in three dimensions— in depth, width, and complexity. But at whatever time I shall be able to publish the third and final instalment of my work, it will of course rest upon the basis supplied by the present essay, as this rests upon the basis supplied by the previous one.

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    The other point which has to be noted with regard to this criterion is as follows. I again quote from " Animal Intelligence :"— " Of course to the sceptic this criterion may appear un satisfactory, since it depends, not on direct knowledge, but on inference. Here, however, it seems enough to point out, as already observed, that it is the best criterion available ; and, further, that scepticism of this kind is logically bound to deny evidence of mind, not only in the case of the lower animals, but also in that of the higher, and even in that of men other than the sceptic himself. For all objections which could apply to the use of this criterion of mind in the animal kingdom, would apply with equal force to the evidence of any mind other than that of the individual objector. This is obvious, because, as I have already observed, the only evi dence we can have of objective mind is that which is furnished by objective activities ; and, as the subjective mind can never become assimilated with the objective so as to learn by direct feeling the mental processes which there accompany the objective activities, it is clearly impossible to satisfy any one who may choose to doubt the validity of inference, that in any case, other than his own, mental processes ever do accompany objective activities.

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    The host of reflex actions is arrayed against the proposition, and, in view of such non-mental, though apparently intentional adjustments, we find the necessity for some test of the choice- element as real or fictitious. The only test we have is to ask whether the adjustments displayed are invariably the same under the same circumstances of stimulation. The only distinction between adjustive movements due to reflex action, and adjustive movements accompanied by mental perception, consists in the former depending on inherited mechanisms within the nervous system being so constructed as to effect particular adjustive movements in responso to particular stimulations, while the latter are independent of any such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to the exigencies of special circumstances. Reflex actions, under the influence of their appropriate stimuli, may be compared to the actions of a machine under the manipulations of an operator : when certain springs of action are touched by certain stimuli, the whole machine is thrown into appropriate action ; there is no room for choice, there is no room for uncertainty ; but, as surely as any of these inherited mechanisms is affected by the stimulus with reference to which it has been constructed to act, so surely will it act in precisely the same, way as it always has acted. But the case with conscious mental adjust ment is quite different. For, without going into the question concerning the relation of Body and Mind, or waiting to ask whether cases of mental adjustment are not really quite as mechanical in the sense of being the necessary result or correlative of a chain of psychical sequences due to a physical stimulation, it is enough to point to the variable and incalcu lable character of mental adjustments as distinguished from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjustments.All in fact, that in an objective sense we can mean by a mental adjustment, is an adjustment of a kind that has not been definitely fixed by heredity as the only adjustment possible in the given circumstances of stimulation. For, were there no alternative of adjustment, the case, in an animal at least, would be indistinguishable from one of reflex action.

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    The point is that, notwithstanding special difficulties in assigning this or that being to one or the other class, the psychological classification which I advocate resembles the zoological classification which I have cited ; it is a valid classification, inasmuch as it recognizes a distinction where there is certainly something to distinguish. For even if we take the most mechanical view of mental processes that is possible, and suppose that conscious intelligence plays no part whatever in determining action, there still remains the fact that such conscious intelligence exists, and that prior to certain actions it is always affected in certain ways. Therefore, even if we suppose that the state of things is, so to speak, accidental, and that the actions in question would always he performed in precisely the same way whether or not they were thus connected with consciousness, it would still remain desirable, for scientific purposes, that a marked distinction should be drawn between cases of activity that proceed without, and those that proceed with this remarkable association with consciousness. As the phenomena of subjectivity are facts at any rate no less real than those of objectivity, if it is found that some of the latter are invariably and faithfully mirrored in those of the former, such pheno mena, for this reason alone, deserve to be placed in a distinct scientific category, even though it were proved that the mirror of subjectivity might be removed without affecting any of the phenomena of objectivity.

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