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The point is that, notwithstanding special difficulties in assigning this or that being to one or the other class, the psychological classification which I advocate resembles the zoological classification which I have cited ; it is a valid classification, inasmuch as it recognizes a distinction where there is certainly something to distinguish. For even if we take the most mechanical view of mental processes that is possible, and suppose that conscious intelligence plays no part whatever in determining action, there still remains the fact that such conscious intelligence exists, and that prior to certain actions it is always affected in certain ways. Therefore, even if we suppose that the state of things is, so to speak, accidental, and that the actions in question would always he performed in precisely the same way whether or not they were thus connected with consciousness, it would still remain desirable, for scientific purposes, that a marked distinction should be drawn between cases of activity that proceed without, and those that proceed with this remarkable association with consciousness. As the phenomena of subjectivity are facts at any rate no less real than those of objectivity, if it is found that some of the latter are invariably and faithfully mirrored in those of the former, such pheno mena, for this reason alone, deserve to be placed in a distinct scientific category, even though it were proved that the mirror of subjectivity might be removed without affecting any of the phenomena of objectivity.


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以下のとおりお答えします。(抽象的な表現が多く、具体的な意味が不鮮明になりがちです。これは、翻訳のまずさもあると思いますが、取り扱っている事柄の性質に由来する部分もあると考えます。) 私の主張する心理学的分類は、どれとどれをどれとどれの種類に割り当てるかという場面で特別の困難があるにもかかわらず、すでに引用した動物学的分類に似ているということが重要なところです。それは、何かを確実に区別するような違いを認識するものであるからこそ、有効な分類であります。 なぜなら、もしも私たちが可能な心理作用の中で最も機械的な視点をとり、そして、意識的な知能が、決定する行為において何の役も演じないと推測するにしても、そこにはまだ、そのような意識的知能は存在し、特定の行為に先立って、何らかの方法で常にそれに影響する、という事実は残ります。 したがって、ものごとの状態はいわば偶然的なものであり、問題の行為が、意識とこのように関係があるにせよないにせよ、常に同じ方法で正確に実行されるであろうと私たちが想像するにしても、科学的目的のためには、意識との明確な関連なしに進行する行為の場合と、関連を伴って進行するものとの間に刻印される区別の線引きをするのが望ましい、ということは依然変わりないでしょう。 とにかく、主体性の現象は、まさに客体性のそれに負けず劣らず現実的事実ですので、もし後者のうちのいくつかが前者のそのような現象の中で常に忠実に反映されるのが見られる場合は、たとえ主体性の反射鏡が客体性の現象のうちのどれにも影響せずに転移するというようなことが証明されたとしても、この理由だけで個別の科学的範疇内に置かれるに値するものであります。 以上、ご回答まで。





  • 和訳お願い致します。

    In actual research these three objects are prosecuted, not successively, but simultaneously. Thus it is not necessary in either case that the final object — that of classification- should wait for its commencement upon the completion of the dissection or analysis of every organism or every mental structure that is to be found upon the earth. On the con trary, the comparison in each case begins with the facts that are first found to be comparable, and is afterwards pro gressively extended as knowledge of additional facts becomes more extensive. * The word " structure " is used in a metaphorical sense when applied to mind, but the usage it convenient.

  • 訳し方

    The word "classification" comes from the word "class" - meaning a group of things that all have one important element in common. この文の訳に困っているのですが -のあとがよく分かりません。 meaning の前には Classification is が省略されているのでしょうか? 直訳すると、どうも納得のいく訳し方が見つかりません。よろしくおねがいします。 あと、commonは何故前置詞がinなのでしょうか。

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Now in this necessarily ejective method of enquiry, what is the kind of activities that we are entitled to regard as indicative of mind ? I certainly do not so regard the flowing of a river or the blowing of a wind. Why ? First, because the subjects are too remote in kind from my own organism to admit of my drawing any reasonable analogy between them and it; and, secondly, because the activities which they present are invariably of the same kind under the same circumstances : they therefore offer no evidence of that which I deem the distinctive character of my own mind as such — Consciousness. In other words, two conditions require to he satisfied before we even begin to imagine that observable activities are indicative of mind ; the activities must be dis played by a living organism, and they must be of a kind to suggest the presence of consciousness. What then is to be taken as the criterion of consciousness ? Subjectively, no criterion is either needful or possible ; for to me, individually, nothing can be more ultimate than my own consciousness, and, therefore, my consciousness cannot admit of any criterion having a claim to a higher certainty. But, ejectively, some such criterion is required, and as my consciousness cannot come within the territory of a foreign consciousness, I can only appreciate the latter through the agency of ambassadors — these ambassadors being, as I have now so frequently said, the observable activities of an organism. The next question, therefore, is, What activities of an organism are to be taken as indicative of consciousness ? The answer that comes most readily is, — All activities that are indicative of Choice; wherever wo see a living organism apparently exerting inten tional choice, we may infer that it is conscious choice, and, therefore, that the organism has a mind. But physiology shows that this answer will not do ; for, while not disputing whether there is any mind without the power of conscious choice, physiology, as we shall see in the next chapter, is very firm in denying that all apparent choice is due to mind.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    We pass to the account of the creation contained in the Hebrew record. And it must be observed that in reality two distinct accounts are given us in the book of Genesis, one being comprised in the first chapter and the first three verses of the second, the other commencing at the fourth verse of the second chapter and continuing till the end. This is so philologically certain that it were useless to ignore it. But even those who may be inclined to contest the fact that we have here the productions of two different writers, will admit that the account beginning at the first verse of the first chapter, and ending at the third verse of the second, is a complete whole in itself. And to this narrative, in order not to complicate the subject unnecessarily, we intend to confine ourselves. It will sufficient for our purpose to enquire, whether this account can be shown to be in accordance with our astronomical and geological knowledge. And for the right understanding of it the whole must be set out, so that the various parts may be taken in connexion with one another.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It being understood, then, that the present essay is restricted to a consideration of mental evolution in animals,I should like to have it also understood that it is further restricted to the psychology as distinguished from the philo sophy of the subject. In a short and independent essay, published elsewhere,* I have already stated my views con cerning the more important questions of philosophy into which the subject-matter of psychology is so apt to dip ; but here it is only needful to emphasize the fact that these two strata of thought, although assuredly in juxtaposition, are no less assuredly distinct. My present enquiry belongs only to the upper stratum, or to the science of psychology as dis tinguished from any theory of knowledge. I am in no wise concerned with " the transition from the object known to the knowing subject," and therefore I am in no wise concerned with any of the philosophical theories which have been pro pounded upon this matter. In other words, I have every where to regard mind as an object and mental modifications as phenomena; therefore I have throughout to investigate the process of Mental Evolution by what is now generally and aptly termed the historical method. I cannot too strongly impress upon the memory of those who from previous reading are able to appreciate the importance of the distinction, that I thus intend everywhere to remain within the borders of psychology, and nowhere to trespass upon the grounds of philosophy.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is refreshing to return to the often-echoed remark, that it could not have been the object of a Divine revelation to instruct mankind in physical science, man having had faculties bestowed upon him to enable him to acquire this knowledge by himself. This is in fact pretty generally admitted; but in the application of the doctrine, writers play at fast and loose with it according to circumstances. Thus an inspired writer may be permitted to allude to the phenomena of nature according to the vulgar view of such things, without impeachment of his better knowledge; but if he speaks of the same phenomena assertively, we are bound to suppose that things are as he represents them, however much our knowledge of nature may be disposed to recalcitrate. But if we find a difficulty in admitting that such misrepresentations can find a place in revelation, the difficulty lies in our having previously assumed what a Divine revelation ought to be. If God made use of imperfectly informed men to lay the foundations of that higher knowledge for which the human race was destined, is it wonderful that they should have committed themselves to assertions not in accordance with facts, although they may have believed them to be true? On what grounds has the popular notion of Divine revelation been built up? Is it not plain that the plan of Providence for the education of man is a progressive one, and as imperfect men have been used as the agents for teaching mankind, is it not to be expected that their teachings should be partial and, to some extent, erroneous? Admitted, as it is, that physical science is not what the Hebrew writers, for the most part, profess to convey, at any rate, that it is not on account of the communication of such knowledge that we attach any value to their writings, why should we hesitate to recognise their fallibility on this head?

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The question of the meaning of the word bara,'create,'has been previously touched upon;it has been acknowledged by good critics that it doesn't of itself necessarily imply 'to make out of nothing upon the simple ground that it is found [to be]uesd in cases where such a meaning would be inapplicable . But the difficultly of giving to it the interpretation contended for by Dr Buckland and of uniting with this the assumption of a six days' creation, such as that described in Genesis, at a comparatively recent period, lies in this,that the heaven itself is distinctly said to have been formed by the division of the waters on the second day. Consequently , until. The first Mosaic day of creation, there was no sky, no local habitation for the sun,moon and stars, even supposing those bodies to have been included in the original material. Dr Buckland doesn't touch this obvious difficulty, without which his argument that the sun and moon might have been contemplated as pre-existing , although they aren't stated to have been set in the heaven until the forth day, is of no value at all.

  • 英語の訳をお願いします

    This classification of the material out of which a novel is built is perhaps no worse than many others, and no better. どうしてもわからない一文です。 小説の要素の話で、物語、筋、性格描写、雰囲気についての説明があった後の一文です。this classification とはこの四つの分類のことを指しています。 宜しくお願いしますm(_ _)m

  • 和訳お願いします。

    “The finest and happiest years of our lives,” he spoke on in triumph. ~ But what I still can't figure out is why I never got tired and why I never felt better in my life. I guess the answer is, we were fighting for survival, protecting and providing for those we loved” He went on setting me straight. “In this business of getting it made, it's not the great moments that count. It's the partial victories, the deadlocks, the waiting ― even the defeats. If we are ever unlucky enough to have it made, then we will be spectators, not participants. It's the journey, not the arrival, that counts in life.” 上記の和訳をお願いしたいのですが… 自力では曖昧なところが多くて>< 宜しくお願いします。

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Without, therefore, entertaining the question as to the connexion between Body and Mind, it is enough to say that under any view concerning the nature of this connexion, we are justified in drawing a distinction between activities which are accompanied by feelings, and activities which, so far as we can see, are not so accompanied. If this is allowed, there seems, to be no term better fitted to convey the distinction than the term Choice ; agents that are able to choose their actions are agents that are able to feel the stimuli which determine the choice. Such being our Criterion of Mind, it admits of being otherwise stated, and in a more practically applicable manner, in the following words which I quote from " Animal Intelli gence :" — " It is, then, adaptive action by a living organism in cases where the inherited machinery of the nervous system does not furnish data for our prevision of what the adaptive action must necessarily be — it is only here that we recognize the objective evidence of mind. The criterion of mind, therefore, which I propose, and to which I shall adhere throughout the present volume, is as follows : — Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience ? If it does so, the fact cannot be merely due to reflex action in the sense above described ; for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon or alterations of its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual".