The Mosaic Narrative and Modern Science: A Conciliation

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  • The Mosaic narrative, despite appearing at odds with our current knowledge, is considered true and has been better understood with the help of modern science.
  • There are two popular modes of conciliation regarding the Mosaic narrative, both aiming to reconcile it with modern knowledge.
  • The first mode, introduced by Chalmers and supported by Dr. Buckland, suggests that modern science can explain the apparent inconsistencies in the Mosaic narrative.
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The task which sundry modern writers have imposed upon themselves is to prove, that the Mosaic narrative, however apparently at variance with our knowledge, is essentially, and in fact true, although never understood properly until modern science supplied the necessary commentary and explanation. Two modes of conciliation have been propounded which have enjoyed considerable popularity, and to these two we shall confine our attention. The first is that originally brought into vogue by Chalmers and adopted by the late Dr. Buckland in his Bridgewater Treatise, and which is probably still received by many as a sufficient solution of all difficulties. Dr. Buckland's treatment of the case may be taken as a fair specimen of the line of argument adopted, and it shall be given in his own words.

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以下のとおりお答えします。 種々の現代作家が自分自身に課した課題は以下のようなことを証明することです。すなわち、モーゼの話は、いかに明らかに私たちの知識と食い違っていようとも、現代科学が必要な注釈や説明を提供するまで、適切に理解されませんでしたが、本質的に、かつまったくのところ真実そのものであります。 相当な人気を享受した、懐柔策の関する2つの方法論が提示されました。そして私たちは、これらの2つに注意を集中します。 その第1は、まず初めにシャルマースによって流行し、故バックランド博士の『ブリッジウォーター論文』に採用されたもので、それは、すべての困難に対する十分な解決策として、今なお大勢の人によって受け入れられています。本件に関するバックランド博士の論述は、採用された議論に関する道筋の公平な標本として受け取ることができるかもしれません。そしてそれは、彼自身の言葉でも語られることでしょう。

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