• ベストアンサー
  • 困ってます

英文を訳して下さい。

At 17:00, the voyage resumed, the ships eventually managing 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph) and when the Grand Fleet arrived, Jellicoe increased the screen to thirteen light cruisers and 67 destroyers. A message from the Admiralty arrived that the Germans were planning a night destroyer attack but that the destroyers with the two scouting groups were low on fuel and those with the HSF were too far away. Lion and Indomitable slowed to 7 knots (13 km/h; 8.1 mph) overnight when Lion had more engine-trouble and at dawn were still 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) short of the Firth of Forth. The destroyers reformed into an anti-submarine screen and the ships reached the firth at midnight; the destroyer Meteor was towed into the Humber Estuary. Lion was out of action for four months, Fisher having decreed that the damage be repaired at Armstrong's on the Tyne, without her going into dry dock, making for an extremely difficult and time-consuming job. The surviving German ships reached port; Derfflinger was repaired by 17 February but Seydlitz needed a drydock and was not ready for sea until 1 April.At first the Germans thought that Tiger had been sunk, because of a large fire that had been seen on her decks, but it was soon clear that the battle was a serious German reverse. Kaiser Wilhelm II issued an order that all risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. Ingenohl was sacked and replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. The damage to Seydlitz revealed flaws in the protection of its magazines and dangerous ammunition-handling procedures and some of these failings were remedied in the HSF before the Battle of Jutland (31 May – 1 June 1916). The Germans thought that the appearance of the British squadron at dawn was too remarkable to be coincidence and concluded that a spy near their base in Jade Bay was responsible, not that the British were reading their encrypted wireless communications. (In 1920, Scheer wrote that the number of British ships present suggested that they had known about the operation in advance, but that this was put down to circumstances, although "other reasons" could not be excluded.)

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数25
  • ありがとう数2

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率81% (7179/8833)

>At 17:00, the voyage resumed, the ships eventually managing 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph) and when the Grand Fleet arrived, Jellicoe increased the screen to thirteen light cruisers and 67 destroyers. A message from the Admiralty arrived that the Germans were planning a night destroyer attack but that the destroyers with the two scouting groups were low on fuel and those with the HSF were too far away. Lion and Indomitable slowed to 7 knots (13 km/h; 8.1 mph) overnight when Lion had more engine-trouble and at dawn were still 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) short of the Firth of Forth. ⇒17時に航行が再開し、船団は最終的に10ノット(時速19キロ/12マイル)を何とか維持し、大艦隊が到着すると、ジェリコーは保護隊を13隻の軽巡洋艦と67隻の駆逐艦に増やした。ドイツ軍は夜間の駆逐艦攻撃を計画したが、2つの偵察グループの駆逐艦は燃料不足で、HSF(ドイツ軍公海艦隊)の駆逐艦は遠すぎるとのメッセージが、海軍本部から届いた。ライオン号がさらなるエンジン傷害に見舞われて、ライオン号とインドミタブル号は夜間に7ノット(13キロ/8.1マイル)に減速したので、明け方にはまだフォース湾(スコットランド東部)まで100海里(190キロ;120マイル)の位置にあった。 >The destroyers reformed into an anti-submarine screen and the ships reached the firth at midnight; the destroyer Meteor was towed into the Humber Estuary. Lion was out of action for four months, Fisher having decreed that the damage be repaired at Armstrong's on the Tyne, without her going into dry dock, making for an extremely difficult and time-consuming job. The surviving German ships reached port; Derfflinger was repaired by 17 February but Seydlitz needed a drydock and was not ready for sea until 1 April. ⇒駆逐艦隊は、対潜水艦の保護隊に改編され、船隊は真夜中に湾に到達した。駆逐艦メテオール号はハンバー河口(イングランド北東部)内に曳航された。ライオン号は、フィッシャー(提督)の命で、4か月間の休業に入った。非常に困難で時間のかかる修理ではあるが、ドライドック(陸に引き上げて修理する、乾ドック)には入らず、タイン川べりのアームストロングで修理することを命じられたのである。生き残ったドイツ軍の船艦が港に到着した。ダーフリンガー号は2月17日までに修理されたが、セイドリッツ号はドライドックを必要としており、4月1日まで海に出る準備はできなかった。 >At first the Germans thought that Tiger had been sunk, because of a large fire that had been seen on her decks, but it was soon clear that the battle was a serious German reverse. Kaiser Wilhelm II issued an order that all risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. Ingenohl was sacked and replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. The damage to Seydlitz revealed flaws in the protection of its magazines and dangerous ammunition-handling procedures and some of these failings were remedied in the HSF before the Battle of Jutland (31 May – 1 June 1916). ⇒ドイツ軍は当初、タイガー号がその甲板で見られた大火のために沈んだと考えていたが、戦いはドイツ軍にとって深刻な逆転(敗色)であることがすぐに明らかになった。皇帝ウィルヘルムII世は、全ての海上艦にリスクを回避するよう命令を出した。インゲノール号は略奪され、ウーゴ・フォン・ポール提督に取って代わられた。セイドリッツ号の損傷は、その弾薬庫の保護と危険な弾薬処理手順の欠陥が明らかになったが、これらの問題点の一部は「ユトランドの戦い」(1916年5月31日~6月1日)の前にHSFで修復された。 >The Germans thought that the appearance of the British squadron at dawn was too remarkable to be coincidence and concluded that a spy near their base in Jade Bay was responsible, not that the British were reading their encrypted wireless communications. (In 1920, Scheer wrote that the number of British ships present suggested that they had known about the operation in advance, but that this was put down to circumstances, although "other reasons" could not be excluded.*) ⇒ドイツ軍は、夜明けの英国軍戦隊の出現がどう考えても偶然とは見えないが、それは英国軍が無線通信の暗号を解読したためでなく、ジェイド湾の基地近くのスパイに責任があると結論づけた。(1920年にシェアーは、英国艦船の数の多さが彼らの作戦行動について事前に知っていることを示唆していたので、「それ以外の理由」を排除することはできなかったにもかかわらず、これが状況〈成行き〉のせいにされたのである、と書いた*。) *文意がいまいち不明瞭です。誤訳の節はどうぞ悪しからず。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

質問者からのお礼

回答ありがとうございました。

関連するQ&A

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    At 13:5, the ships formed into a line abreast formation 15 mi (13.0 nmi; 24.1 km) apart, with Glasgow at the eastern end, and started to steam north at 10 nautical miles (19 km; 12 mi) searching for Leipzig. At 16:17 Leipzig, accompanied by the other German ships, spotted smoke from the line of British ships. Spee ordered full speed so that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Leipzig were approaching the British at 20 nautical miles (37 km; 23 mi), with the slower light cruisers Dresden and Nürnberg some way behind. At 16:20, Glasgow and Otranto saw smoke to the north and then three ships at a range of 12 mi (10.4 nmi; 19.3 km). The British reversed direction, so that both fleets were moving south, and a chase began which lasted 90 minutes. Cradock was faced with a choice; he could either take his three cruisers capable of 20 kn (23 mph; 37 km/h), abandon Otranto and run from the Germans, or stay and fight with Otranto, which could only manage 16 kn (18 mph; 30 km/h). The German ships slowed at a range of 15,000 yd (13,720 m) to reorganise themselves for best positions, and to await best visibility, when the British to their west would be outlined against the setting sun. At 17:10, Cradock decided he must fight, and drew his ships closer together. He changed course to south-east and attempted to close upon the German ships while the sun remained high. Spee declined to engage and turned his faster ships away, maintaining the distance between the forces which sailed roughly parallel at a distance of 14,000 yd (12,800 m). At 18:18, Cradock again attempted to close, steering directly towards the enemy, which once again turned away to a greater range of 18,000 yd (16,460 m). At 18:50, the sun set; Spee closed to 12,000 yd (10,970 m) and commenced firing. The German ships had sixteen 21 cm (8 in) guns of comparable range to the two 9.2 in (234 mm) guns on Good Hope. One of these was hit within five minutes of the engagement's starting. Of the remaining 6 in (152 mm) guns on the British ships, most were in casemates along the sides of the ships, which continually flooded if the gun doors were opened to fire in heavy seas. The merchant cruiser Otranto—having only 4 in (100 mm) guns and being a much larger target than the other ships—retired west at full speed. Since the British 6 in (152 mm) guns had insufficient range to match the German 21 cm (8 in) guns, Cradock attempted to close on the German ships. By 19:30, he had reached 6,000 yd (5,490 m) but as he closed, the German fire became correspondingly more accurate. Good Hope and Monmouth caught fire, presenting easy targets to the German gunners now that darkness had fallen, whereas the German ships had disappeared into the dark. Monmouth was first to be silenced. Good Hope continued firing, continuing to close on the German ships and receiving more and more fire. By 19:50, she had also ceased firing; subsequently her forward section exploded, then she broke apart and sank, with no-one witness to the sinking.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    Spee's cruisers—Gneisenau and Nürnberg—approached Stanley first. At the time, the entire British fleet was coaling. Some believe that, had Spee pressed the attack, Sturdee's ships would have been easy targets, although this is a subject of conjecture and some controversy. Any British ship that tried to leave would have faced the full firepower of the German ships; having a vessel sunk might also have blocked the rest of the British squadron inside the harbour. However, the Germans were surprised by gunfire from an unexpected source: HMS Canopus, which had been grounded as a guardship and was behind a hill. This was enough to check the Germans' advance. The sight of the distinctive tripod masts of the British battlecruisers confirmed that they were facing a better-equipped enemy. Kent was already making her way out of the harbour and had been ordered to pursue Spee's ships. Made aware of the German ships, Sturdee had ordered the crews to breakfast, knowing that Canopus had bought them time while steam was raised. To Spee, with his crew battle-weary and his ships outgunned, the outcome seemed inevitable. Realising his danger too late, and having lost any chance to attack the British ships while they were at anchor, Spee and his squadron dashed for the open sea. The British left port around 10:00. Spee was ahead by 15 mi (13 nmi; 24 km) but there was plenty of daylight left for the faster battlecruisers to catch up. It was 13:00 when the British battlecruisers opened fire, but it took them half an hour to get the range of Leipzig. Realising that he could not outrun the British ships, Spee decided to engage them with his armoured cruisers alone, to give the light cruisers a chance to escape. He turned to fight just after 13:20. The German armoured cruisers had the advantage of a freshening north-west breeze, which caused the funnel smoke of the British ships to obscure their target practically throughout the action. Gneisenau's second-in-command Hans Pochhammer indicated that there was a long respite for the Germans during the early stages of the battle, as the British attempted unsuccessfully to force Admiral Spee away from his advantageous position. Despite initial success by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in striking Invincible, the British capital ships suffered little damage. Spee then turned to escape, but the battlecruisers came within extreme firing range 40 minutes later.

  • 次の英文を訳して下さい。

    Slight opposition was met half way to the station and much abandoned equipment was found. Firing was heard until about 1 mi (1.6 km) from Agbeluvhoe, where most of the c. 200 German troops from the trains were found to have surrendered, along with two trains, wagons, a machine-gun, rifles and much ammunition. The Germans who escaped proved too demoralised to conduct demolitions and 30 mi (48 km) of track were captured. The British lost six killed and 35 wounded, some of whom had wounds which raised suspicions that the Germans had used soft-nosed bullets, which was later discovered to have been partly true, as some hurriedly incorporated reservists had used their civilian ammunition. The Germans lost a quarter of their troops in the attempt to harass British forces to the south, by using the railway. It was considered a great failure and defeat for the Germans in Togoland. Although it may briefly have delayed the British northward advance, which was not resumed until 19 August, the Battle of Agbeluvhoe had no lasting effect on the advance of the Allies. The wireless station at Kamina was demolished by the Germans, which cut off German ships in the South Atlantic from communication with Europe and influenced the Battle of the Falkland Islands (8 December). The acting Governor of the colony, Major Hans-Georg von Döring surrendered eleven days after the battle, on 26 August 1914. The German force of c. 1,500 men in one German and seven local companies, had been expected to be most difficult to defeat, given the Togolese terrain and the extensive entrenchments at Kamina. A German prisoner later wrote that few of the Germans had military training, the defences of Kamina had been too large for the garrison to defend and were ringed by hills. The Germans were not able to obtain information about the British in the neighbouring Gold Coast (Ghana) and instructions by wireless from Berlin only insisted that the transmitting station be protected. In the first three weeks of August, the transmitter had passed 229 messages from Nauen to German colonies and German shipping. Defence of the transmitter had wider operational effects but Von Döring made no attempt at protracted resistance. The British had c. 83 casualties and the German forces had c. 41 casualties at the Battle of Agbeluvhoe. On 22 August the Battle of Chra was fought by the Anglo-French invaders and the Germans on the Chra River and in Chra village. The German forces had dug in and repulsed the Anglo-French attack. A new attack on 23 August found that the Germans has retired further inland to Kamina. By the end of the campaign, six of seven provinces had been abandoned by the Germans, bridges had not been blown and only the Chra river line of the three possible water obstacles had been defended. The speed of the invasion by several British and French columns, whose size was over-estimated and lack of local support for the colonial regime, had been insuperable obstacles for the German colonialists. Togoland was occupied by the British and French for the duration of the war.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    British casualties were severe and when French visited II Corps headquarters on 26 October, more reinforcements were promised and French ordered a defensive front to be maintained, with local attacks to keep German troops from moving from the area into Belgium. When dawn broke, the situation at Neuve-Chapelle was seen to be worse than expected, since the Germans had consolidated positions in outlying buildings and the old British trenches. A battalion attempted to recapture the trenches at 7:30 a.m. but the Germans got round a flank and almost surrounded the battalion; the last two companies lost 80 percent of their men retreating through the village. North of Neuve-Chapelle the counter-attack on a triangle of houses nearby did not begin until 10:00 a.m., such was the confusion. Elements of three battalions and the French cyclists, with support from four British and seven French cavalry batteries were quickly stopped by German machine-gun fire and snipers, who had been able to consolidate the captured houses. At 11:00 a.m., two companies and 600 chasseurs à pied arrived and six companies of the Indian Corps were dispatched. German activity opposite the rest of the 3rd Division was slight but the Jullundur Brigade to the north was attacked several times, as the German 14th Division massed in Bois du Biez, about 0.5 mi (0.80 km) from Neuve-Chapelle. By 1:30 p.m. the British-French counter-attack had pushed forward north of the village and British troops held out in Smith-Dorrien Trench to the east. The German attack began at 2:30 p.m. and quickly got behind the defenders, who were almost cut off an hour later and were pursued through the village, the two battalions involved being reduced to about 500 men including replacements. Some of the German troops pressed on through the village but 500 yd (460 m) to the west, met a party of about 250 British troops, who pushed them back to the village and frustrated several attempts to advance again. The Germans shifted the weight of the attack to the south and got round the left flank of the neighbouring battalion, which pulled the flank back at right angles. German rifle-fire from behind killed the commander and adjutant but the survivors held on until the 9th Bhopal Infantry battalion arrived, got behind the German flank and drove them back to the village. The 20th and 21st companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, the last British reserve, were sent to link the 9th Bhopal and the Northumberland fusiliers to the north of the village. Brigadier-General F. S. Maude the 14th Brigade commander to the south, had sent his reserve battalion which arrived after the 9th Bhopal and moved, north to make a flank attack on the Germans in the village but night fell before the troops were ready.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    At 01:00 on 25 April the British ships stopped at sea, and thirty-six rowing boats towed by twelve steamers embarked the first six companies, two each from the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. At 02:00 a Turkish sentry reported seeing ships moving at sea, and at 02:30 the report was sent to 9th Division's headquarters. At 02:53 the ships headed towards the peninsula, continuing until 03:30 when the larger ships stopped. With 50 yards (46 m) to go, the rowing boats continued using only their oars. Around 04:30[nb 3] Turkish sentries opened fire on the boats, but the first ANZAC troops were already ashore at Beach Z, called Ari Burnu at the time, but later known as Anzac Cove. (It was formally renamed Anzac Cove by the Turkish government in 1985.) They were one mile (1.6 km) further north than intended, and instead of an open beach they were faced with steep cliffs and ridges up to around three hundred feet (91 m) in height. However, the mistake had put them ashore at a relatively undefended area; at Gaba Tepe further south where they had planned to land, there was a strong-point, with an artillery battery close by equipped with two 15 cm and two 12 cm guns, and the 5th Company, 27th Infantry Regiment was positioned to counter-attack any landing at that more southern point. The hills surrounding the cove where the ANZACs landed made the beach safe from direct fire Turkish artillery. Fifteen minutes after the landing, the Royal Navy began firing at targets in the hills. On their way in, the rowing boats had become mixed up. The 11th Battalion grounded to the north of Ari Burnu point, while the 9th Battalion hit the point or just south of it, together with most of the 10th Battalion. The plan was for them to cross the open ground and assault the first ridge line, but they were faced with a hill that came down almost to the water line, and there was confusion while the officers tried to work out their location, under small arms fire from the 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, who had a platoon of between eighty and ninety men at Anzac Cove and a second platoon in the north around the Fisherman's Hut. The third platoon was in a reserve position on the second ridge. They also manned the Gaba Tepe strong-point, equipped with two obsolescent multi-barrelled Nordenfelt machine-guns, and several smaller posts in the south.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The Germans had assumed that their cruisers, leaving port one by one, would not meet larger ships or a superior force and failed to keep their ships together so they might have better odds in any engagement. Beatty—when faced with the choice of leaving one of his ships to finish off disabled enemies—had elected to keep his squadron together and only later return in force to finish off the ships. Goodenough managed to lose track of two cruisers, which played no further part in the battle. German light cruisers armed with larger numbers of faster firing 10.5 cm (4.1 in) guns, proved inferior to similar British cruisers with fewer but more powerful 6 in (150 mm) guns. The German ships proved difficult to sink despite severe damage and impressed the British with the quality of their firing. British and German sources reported the determination and bravery of the defeated German ships when overwhelmed. No one reported the presence of British cruisers to Admiral Hipper until 14:35. Had he known, he could have brought his battlecruisers to sea faster and consolidated his fleet, possibly preventing German losses and instead inflicting some on the departing British ships. The British operation took longer than anticipated so that the large German ships would have had sufficient high water to join the battle. The British side suffered from poor communication, with ships failing to report engagement with the enemy to each other. The initial failure to include Jellicoe in planning the raid could have led to disaster, had he not sent reinforcements and the communication failures meant British ships were unaware of the new arrivals and could have attacked them. There was no way to warn off British submarines which might have targeted their own ships. It had been the decision of Admiral Sturdee—Admiralty Chief of Staff—not to inform Jellicoe and also not to send additional larger ships which had originally been requested by Keyes. Jellicoe had countermanded this decision once he knew of the raid, by sending ships which were part of his command. Keyes was disappointed that the opportunity for a greater success had been lost by not including the additional cruisers properly into the plan as he had originally intended. Jellicoe was disturbed by the Admiralty failure to discuss the raid with their commander in chief of the Home Fleet at sea. The Germans appreciated that standing patrols by destroyers wasted time and resources, leaving them open to attack. The Germans sowed defensive minefields to prevent enemy ships approaching and freed the destroyers to escort larger ships, which were never to be sent out one by one. The British realised it was foolish to have sent Arethusa into battle with inadequate training and jammed guns.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    Mackenzie was ordered by Haking at 7:30 p.m. to attack again at the Sugarloaf to assist the Australians, before it was discovered that the 184th Brigade had not reached it. The Australian 15th Brigade was asked to co-operate with the British attack and the 58th Battalion was sent forward. A renewed bombardment continued, as preparations were made to attack all along the front at 9:00 p.m., when at 8:20 p.m. Haking cancelled the attack and ordered that all troops were to be withdrawn after dark. Reinforcements for the 182nd Brigade received the order in time but the troops in the German line were overwhelmed, with only a few wounded and stragglers returning.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The battlecruisers were organised in the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron (Beatty) with the Lion (flagship), Tiger and Princess Royal. The new 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, deputy to Beatty) had the New Zealand as flagship and Indomitable. Harwich Force (Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt) sailed from Harwich with three light cruisers and 35 destroyers, to rendezvous with the battlecruisers at 07:00 on 24 January. To cover the East Coast and act as distant support, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the seven pre-dreadnoughts of the 3rd Battle Squadron (Admiral Edward Eden Bradford) sailed from Rosyth for an area in the North Sea, from which they could cut off the German force if it moved north. The Grand Fleet left Scapa at 21:00 on 23 January, to sweep the southern North Sea but could not be expected to arrive on the scene until the afternoon of 24 January. Soon after the German force sailed, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore William Goodenough) and the battlecruisers departed Rosyth, heading south; at 07:05 on 24 January, a clear day with good visibility, they encountered German screening vessels at the Dogger Bank. Sighting the smoke from a large approaching force, Hipper headed south-east by 07:35 to escape but the battlecruisers were faster than the German squadron, which was held back by the slower armoured cruiser Blücher and the coal-fuelled torpedo boats. By 08:00, the German battlecruisers had been sighted from Lion but the older battlecruisers of the British 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron were lagging behind the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron. Chasing the Germans from a position astern and to starboard, the British ships gradually caught up—some reaching a speed of 27 kn (50 km/h; 31 mph)—and closed to gun range. Beatty chose to approach from this direction so that the prevailing wind blew the British ships' smoke clear, allowing them a good view of the German ships, while German gunners were partially blinded by their funnel and gun smoke blowing towards the British ships. Lion opened fire at 08:52, at a range of 20,000 yd (11 mi; 18 km) and the other British ships commenced firing as they came within range, while the Germans were unable to reply until 09:11, because of the shorter range of their guns. No warships had engaged at such long ranges or at such high speeds before and accurate gunnery for both sides was an unprecedented challenge but after a few salvos, British shells straddled Blücher.

  • 次の英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Beatty had lost control of the battle and he judged that the opportunity of an overwhelming victory had been lost and the Admiralty—erroneously believing that Derfflinger had been badly damaged—later reached the same conclusion. Jutland later showed that the British battlecruisers were still vulnerable to ammunition fires and magazine explosions, if hit by plunging fire. Had Moore's three fast battlecruisers pursued Hipper's remaining three (leaving the slower Indomitable behind as Beatty intended), the British might have been at a disadvantage and been defeated. Blücher demonstrated the ability of the German ships to absorb great punishment; all of Hipper's remaining ships were larger, faster, newer, more heavily armed, and far better armoured than Blücher; only Seydlitz had suffered serious damage. Apart from the sinking of Blücher, the Germans out-hit the British by over three to one, with 22 heavy-calibre hits—16 on Lion and six on Tiger—against seven British hits. The battle, although inconclusive, boosted British morale. The Germans learned lessons and the British did not. Rear-Admiral Moore was quietly replaced and sent to the Canary Islands and Captain Henry Pelly of the Tiger was blamed for not taking over when Lion was damaged. Beatty's flag lieutenant Ralph Seymour—responsible for hoisting Beatty's two commands on one flag hoist, allowing them to be read as one—remained. The use of wireless allowed centralised control of ships from the Admiralty, which cramped the initiative of the men on the spot. Signals between ships continued to be by flag but there was no revision of the signal book or the assumptions of its authors. Signalling on board Lion was again poor in the first hours of Jutland, with serious consequences for the British. The battlecruisers failed to improve fire distribution and similar targeting errors were made at Jutland.In 1929, Julian Corbett, the naval official historian, recorded 792 men killed and 45 wounded out of the 1,026 crew on Blücher, 189 of the men being rescued by the British. Seydlitz lost 159 men killed and 33 wounded and Kolberg lost three men killed and two wounded. In 1965, Marder wrote that over 1,000 German sailors had been killed or captured, for British casualties of fewer than 50 men killed or wounded. In 2003, Massie wrote that German casualties were an estimated 951 men killed and 78 wounded, most in Blücher; 153 men were killed and 33 were wounded in the fire in the two after turrets of Seydlitz. The British rescued 189 unwounded prisoners and 45 wounded from Blücher. British casualties were 15 killed and 80 men wounded. On Lion, two men had been killed and eleven wounded, most by a shell hit in the A turret lobby. Ten men were killed on Tiger with nine men wounded and on Meteor, four men were killed and two were wounded.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The Germans secured the appointment of Lieutenant-General Erich Weber as an advisor to the Ottoman GHQ and at the end of August 1914, Vice-Admiral Guido von Usedom, several specialists and 500 men were sent to reinforce the forts on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. In September, Usedom was made Inspector-General of Coast Defences and Mines and Vice-Admiral Johannes Merten relieved Weber at Chanak with a marine detachment to operate the modern guns. By mid-September, the German advisers reported that the guns in the Narrows had been refurbished and were serviceable. By October, most of the guns in the main batteries had German crews, operating as training units but able to man the guns in an emergency. Plans were made to build more defensive works in the Intermediate Zone and to bring in mobile howitzers and quick-firers dismounted from older Ottoman ships. Several heavy howitzers arrived in October but the poor standard of training of the Ottoman gunners, obsolete armaments and the chronic ammunition shortage, which Usedom reported was sufficient only to defend against one serious attack, led him to base the defence of the straits on minefields. Three more lines of mines had been laid before Usedom arrived and another 145 mines were searched out, serviced and laid in early November. Cover of the minefields was increased with small quick-firers and four more searchlights. by March 1915, there were ten lines of mines and 12 searchlights. When the Ottoman Empire went to war on 29 October 1914, the defences of the Straits had been much improved but the Intermediate Defences were still inadequately organised and lacking in guns, searchlights and mines. On 3 November, the outer forts were bombarded by Allied ships, which galvanised the Ottoman defenders into reducing their obstructionism against the German advisers. The fortress commander, Jevad Pasha, wrote later that he had to improve the defences at all costs. The short bombardment had been extraordinarily successful, destroying the forts at Sedd el Bahr with two shots, that exploded the magazine and dismounted the guns. The Ottoman and German defenders concluded that the Outer Defences could be demolished by ships firing from beyond the range of the Ottoman reply. The forts were repaired but not reinforced and the main effort was directed to protecting the minefield and Inner Defences.