The Sarikamish Campaign: A Battle of Inadequate Preparation

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  • The Sarikamish Campaign was characterized by inadequate preparation on the part of the Ottoman forces, who faced a well-equipped Russian Caucasus Army.
  • The Russian Caucasus Army, originally consisting of 100,000 troops, had almost half of its forces redeployed to the Prussian front due to previous defeats.
  • To supplement their troops, the Russians created Armenian volunteer detachments, consisting of Armenians who were not citizens of the empire or obligated to serve.
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英文を訳して下さい。

The total manpower including transportation units, depot regiments, and military police was 150,000. There were 73 machine guns and 218 artillery pieces. Ottoman forces were inadequately prepared for the campaign. Two divisions of the IX Corps began a long trek with no winter clothing and only dry bread and olives for rations. The Russian Caucasus Army was a well-equipped 100,000 troops. However, the Russians redeployed almost half of the Caucasus Army to the Prussian front due to the defeats at the Battle of Tannenberg (August 23 – September 2, 1914) and the Masurian Lakes (September 9–14, 1914), leaving behind 60,000 -65,000 troops. To remedy these troop movements Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov consulted with the Mayor of Tbilisi Alexandre Khatsian, the primate of Tbilisi Bishop Mesrop, and the prominent civic leader Dr. Hakob Zavriev about the creation of Armenian volunteer detachments. The Russian Armenian reservists had already been drafted into the regular armed forces and sent to the European theatre. The volunteer units consisted of Armenians, who were not citizens of the empire or obligated to serve. However, many other, non-Russian communities were also represented in the Russian Caucasus Army as volunteers, conscripts, and regular soldiers and officers. These particularly included men who belonged to Christian Orthodox communities settled in the surrounding Kars Oblast since 1878, such as Georgians and Caucasus Greeks, who generally saw service in the Russian imperial army as a means of achieving their own communities' ambitions to recapture Greek Orthodox territory from the Muslim Ottomans on the back of the Russian imperial enterprise. Originally, there were four volunteer battalions created. Along the Kars Oblast, the 3rd battalion commanded by Hamazasp (Hamazasp Srvandztyan) and 4th battalion by Keri (Arshak Gavafian) operated on the front facing Erzurum between Sarikamish and Oltu. The Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Military District (Caucasian Army) was Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. Effective command was in the hands of Infantry General Aleksandr Zakharevich Myshlayevsky, who was originally a military historian graduated from the Imperial General Staff Academy. General Nikolai Yudenich was his Chief of Staff. Initial manoeuvres, December 22–28 Soldiers push an artillery piece up a mountain pass Hafız Hakki was at the left flank. His order was to move the IX and X Corps to Sarikamish and Kars. He contemplated a two step plan: a sudden initial attack and a second step with both Corps proceeding at full speed towards Oltu. He expected the assault at Narman to be concluded by the afternoon of December 22. Then the Corps would march 30 kilometers a day and arrive in the Kars-Sarikamish line by December 25. Two divisions of the Stange regiment had been sent by sea from Constantinople to Trabzon.

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>The total manpower including ~ dry bread and olives for rations. ⇒(オスマン軍は)輸送部隊、補給隊、軍警察を含む人的総戦力は150,000人であった。(わずか)73丁の機関銃と218門の大砲があった。オスマン帝国の軍隊は、この野戦の準備としては不十分だった。第IX軍団の2個師団は、冬用の衣服を使わず、しかも乾いたパンとオリーブだけを糧食として長い旅を始めた。 >The Russian Caucasus Army ~ to the European theatre. ⇒ロシアのコーカサス方面軍は、装備の整った100,000人の軍隊であった。それにもかかわらず、ロシア軍は「タンネンベルクの戦い」(1914年8月23日-9月2日)と「マズーリ湖沼地帯の戦い」(1914年9月9日-14日)の敗北により、コーカサス方面軍のほぼ半分をプロシア前線に再配備して、60,000人-65,000人の軍隊をそこに残した。これらの部隊の動きを改善するために、イラリオン・イワノビッチ・ボロンツォフ‐ダシコフ伯は、行政長官ツビリス・アレキサンドル・カツシアン、大司教ツビリシ・ビショップ・メスロプ、著名な市民指導者ハコブ・ザブリエフ博士らとアルメニア人志願兵の派遣について相談した。ロシアのアルメニア人予備兵はすでに通常の正規軍に抜擢され、ヨーロッパの戦場に送られていたのである。 >The volunteer units consisted ~ the Russian imperial enterprise. ⇒志願兵の部隊は、帝国の市民ではない、または兵役義務を負っていないアルメニア人で構成されていた。しかしながら、ロシアのコーカサス方面軍ではロシア以外の多くの共同体も志願兵、徴兵、それに通常の兵士や将校として選ばれていた。グルジア人やコーカサスギリシャ人のように、1878年以来カルス州周辺に設定されていたキリスト教正教会共同体に属する兵士は、特別ここに組み込まれた。彼らは、ロシアの帝国事業の裏側でイスラム教徒のオスマン帝国からギリシャ正教会の領土を取り戻し、彼ら自身の共同体の野心を達成する手段として、一般的にロシア軍の兵役に身を投じた。 >Originally, there were four ~ was his Chief of Staff. ⇒当初は4個の志願兵大隊が創られた。カルス州に沿って、ハマザスプ(ハマザスプ・スルバンヅチャン)の指揮する第3大隊と、ケリ(アルシャク・ガバフィアン)の指揮する第4大隊が、サリカミッシュとオルツの間のエルズルムに面した前線で活動した。コーカサス軍地区(コーカサス方面軍)の最高司令官はイラリオン・イワノビッチ・ボロンツォフ‐ダシコフであった。効果的な指揮は、元帝国総参謀アカデミー卒の軍事史家でもある歩兵隊将軍アレキサンドル・ザハレビッチ・ミシライフスキーの手に負っていた。ニコライ・ユデニッチ将軍は彼の参謀長であった。 >Initial manoeuvres, December 22–28  Soldiers push an artillery piece up a mountain pass  Hafız Hakki was ~ from Constantinople to Trabzon. ⇒初期の機動作戦行動、12月22日-28日  兵士たちが山岳峠に砲台を持ち上げる  ハフィズ・ハッキは左側面にいた。彼の命令は、第IX、第X軍団をサリカミッシュとカルスに移動させることであった。彼は2段階の計画を熟考した。すなわち、まず初めに突然の攻撃、第2段階として両軍団がオルツに向かって全速力で進軍する。彼は、ナルマンの攻撃は12月22日の午後までに終結すると予想した。それから両軍団は1日に30キロ行進し、12月25日までにカルス‐サリカミッシュラインに到着するものとした。スタンゲ連隊の2個師団がコンスタンチノープルから海路トラブゾンへ派遣された。

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