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質問

After the war, Churchill wrote,
All they saw was that the British did not hesitate to hazard their greatest vessels as well as their light craft in the most daring offensive action and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt as we should have felt had German destroyers broken into the Solent and their battle cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab. The results of this action were far-reaching. Henceforward, the weight of British Naval prestige lay heavy across all German sea enterprise ... The German Navy was indeed "muzzled". Except for furtive movements by individual submarines and minelayers, not a dog stirred from August till November.
— Churchill
The Germans knew nothing of our defective staff work or the risks we had run.
— Churchill
Lieutenant Stephen King-Hall on Southampton, later wrote about the battle that
As may be deduced from these extracts the staff work was almost criminally negligent and it was a near miracle that we did not sink one or more of our submarines or that one of them did not sink us. Furthermore if anyone had suggested, say in 1917, that our battle-cruisers should rush about without anti-submarine protection and hundreds of miles away from the battle fleet in a mine infested area a few miles from the German battle fleet, he would have been certified on the spot.
It was because the presence of unsupported battle-cruisers was absurd that the logical Germans were sitting in Wilhelmshafen unable to move because the tide was too low on the bar of the Jade river!
I should like to be able to write that this important hydrographical circumstance was part of the plan, but it was only discovered long afterwards.
Nevertheless the strategical and indeed political consequences of this affair were of great importance. The German Navy was manned by a personnel no less courageous and at least as well trained as our own; their ships were superior type for type; their gunnery was more accurate. Yet in the mind of every German seaman was the reflection that they were challenging the might of a navy which, by and large, had dominated the seas for four centuries. The German seaman had a respect and almost traditional veneration for the British Royal navy, and entered the war with an inferiority complex in striking contrast to the superiority complex which the German Army felt towards all other armies.
It was therefore a rude shock to the German Navy ... to learn of this audacious manoeuvre and successful engagement literally within sight of the main German base.
— King-Hall

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞After the war, Churchill wrote,
　All they saw was that the British did not hesitate to hazard their greatest vessels as well as their light craft in the most daring offensive action and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt as we should have felt had German destroyers broken into the Solent and their battle cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab. The results of this action were far-reaching. Henceforward, the weight of British Naval prestige lay heavy across all German sea enterprise ... The German Navy was indeed "muzzled". Except for furtive movements by individual submarines and minelayers, not a dog stirred from August till November.
　— Churchill
　The Germans knew nothing of our defective staff work or the risks we had run.
　— Churchill
⇒戦後、チャーチルはこう書いている。
　彼ら（ドイツ軍）が見たのは、英国軍が極めて大胆な攻撃で彼らの、軽量船はもちろん、最大級の艦艇を危険にさらすことを躊躇せず、明らかに無傷のまま立ち去ったということである。ドイツ軍駆逐艦がソレント（英国南岸）に押し入り、巡洋戦艦がNab（海軍航空隊基地）まで侵入したのではないかと、我々同様、彼らはそう感じた。この行動の結果は広範囲にわたった。そのことがあって以降は、英国海軍の威信の重みがすべてのドイツ海上企業にわたって重くのしかかった…。（爾来）ドイツ海軍は、がっちりと「轡をはめられて」しまったのだ。個々の潜水艦や地雷原による激しい動きを除いて、8月から11月まで犬一匹とて動きがとれなかった。
　― チャーチル
　ドイツ軍は、我々任務関係者の欠陥だらけの仕事や我々の背負ったリスクについては何も知らなかったのだ。
　― チャーチル

＞Lieutenant Stephen King-Hall on Southampton, later wrote about the battle that
　As may be deduced from these extracts the staff work was almost criminally negligent and it was a near miracle that we did not sink one or more of our submarines or that one of them did not sink us. Furthermore if anyone had suggested, say in 1917, that our battle-cruisers should rush about without anti-submarine protection and hundreds of miles away from the battle fleet in a mine infested area a few miles from the German battle fleet, he would have been certified on the spot.
⇒サウサンプトン号のスティーブン・キング‐ホール中尉は、後でこの戦いについて次のように書いた。
これらの抜粋から推論されるように、任務関係者の仕事は（戦争）犯罪についてほとんど無頓着だったということであり、我々が自軍の潜水艦を１隻以上沈めなかったこと、あるいは彼らの潜水艦の1隻が我々を沈めなかったことは、ほとんど奇跡と言えることだった。さらに、例えばあの1917年で、もし誰かが我々の巡洋戦艦は対潜水艦の保護なしだから、機雷のはびこる海域ではドイツ軍の戦闘艦隊から急いで数マイル離れるべきであると言っていたら、的を射た示唆であっただろう。

＞It was because the presence of unsupported battle-cruisers was absurd that the logical Germans were sitting in Wilhelmshafen unable to move because the tide was too low on the bar of the Jade river!
　I should like to be able to write that this important hydrographical circumstance was part of the plan, but it was only discovered long afterwards.
⇒理詰めなドイツ軍がヴィルヘルムスハーフェンに居座っていたのは、ヤーデ川の障害物の上で潮が低すぎたため、巡洋戦艦が支援もなしでそこに存在するというのは、とんでもない振舞いだ（と知っていた）からであった。
　私はこの重要な水位・水路状況は計画の一部であったと書きたいところではあるが、それはずっと後になってから分かったことであった。

＞Nevertheless the strategical and indeed political consequences of this affair were of great importance. The German Navy was manned by a personnel no less courageous and at least as well trained as our own; their ships were superior type for type; their gunnery was more accurate. Yet in the mind of every German seaman was the reflection that they were challenging the might of a navy which, by and large, had dominated the seas for four centuries. The German seaman had a respect and almost traditional veneration for the British Royal navy, and entered the war with an inferiority complex in striking contrast to the superiority complex which the German Army felt towards all other armies.
⇒それにもかかわらず、この事件の戦略的な影響と、実に、政治的な影響は非常に重要であった。ドイツ海軍は、我々に比べて少なからぬ勇者であったし、少なくとも同程度の訓練を受けた要員が配置されていた。彼らの艦船は優れたタイプであったし、彼らの砲術は我々のそれより正確だった。しかし、すべてのドイツ軍の海員の心には、彼らが大よそ4世紀にわたって海を支配していた海軍の力に挑戦しているのだという反省があった。ドイツ軍の海員は英国海軍にほとんど伝統的に敬意を払い、（海軍については）劣等感をもっていたが、これとは対照的に他のすべての分野の軍隊についてドイツ軍が抱いていた優越感をもって戦争に突入したのである。

＞It was therefore a rude shock to the German Navy ... to learn of this audacious manoeuvre and successful engagement literally within sight of the main German base.
　— King-Hall
⇒それゆえに、ドイツ軍の主要基地の視界内では、（英国軍の）文字通り大胆な機動戦と交戦の成功を知ることになるのは、ドイツ海軍にとってはひどい衝撃だったのである。
　― キング‐ホール

お礼

回答ありがとうございました。