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Joffre had accepted claims by Castelnau, that up to 6.2–7.5 mi (10–12 km) of ground could be gained in twenty-four hours and rejected a methodical battle, which ... would entail a month of combat, with a maximum expenditure of ammunition; at what point would we be able to declare ourselves ready for attack? — Joseph Joffre Ammunition necessary for a methodical battle did not exist and the opportunity to attack the Germans, when so many divisions had been moved to the eastern front, could not be wasted. The offensive had been fought with unprecedented refinements of tactics and supply. Amendments to Note 5779 were suggested, to cover items like the use of 23,000 hand grenades in two days by the 53rd Division and the importance of attention to detail; Pétain of XXXIII Corps had ensured accurate preparatory bombardments and the tactical reflections written by Pétain were added to the thinking in Note 5779. The ideal characteristics of a network of jumping-off trenches and the time and labour necessary to build it were laid down, so that troops could advance simultaneously and reserve troops could be protected as they moved forward. Pétain wrote the plan for the Groupe d'armées du Centre, for the offensive of 25 September and his views were circulated through the French and British armies. The autumn offensive was fought as a breakthrough attempt, with changes to avoid the mistakes made in Artois in May and had significant tactical success but did not achieve a breakthrough, which led to the adoption of limited attacks in 1916. Krause wrote that the formulation Note 5779 showed that the French command system, was staffed by men who tried to improve the performance of the army and contradicts claims by Gudmundsson, that the Allied armies were too centralised to adapt. Lessons had been collected, analysed and distributed in a manner which combined top-down and bottom-up processes. A flaw in Note 5779, was persistence with a concept of rapid breakthrough, even after many soldiers considered that the war had become a siege and that none of the French offensives of 1915, had been intended to return to mobile warfare. Changes made to the plan for the Second Battle of Artois, had been intended to secure the capture Vimy Ridge as a jumping-off point, rather than to achieve a breakthrough and return to mobile warfare. In the autumn offensive which began on 25 September, with the Third Battle of Artois, Battle of Loos and the Second Battle of Champagne, the strategy was intended to make the Noyon salient untenable and regain a large portion of the occupied territories. Tactics used in the battles of May and June were revised and the creeping barrage became a standard method in all the Western Front armies.

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>Joffre had accepted claims by Castelnau, that up to 6.2–7.5 mi (10–12 km) of ground could be gained in twenty-four hours and rejected a methodical battle, which ... would entail a month of combat, with a maximum expenditure of ammunition; at what point would we be able to declare ourselves ready for attack? — Joseph Joffre  Ammunition necessary for a methodical battle did not exist and the opportunity to attack the Germans, when so many divisions had been moved to the eastern front, could not be wasted. ⇒最大6.2-7.5マイル(10-12キロ)の地面が24時間で獲得できることで、系統的な戦いは拒否する、というカステルノーの主張をジョフルが受け入れた。「それ(系統的な戦い)は、…弾薬の最大支出をもってしても、1か月の戦闘を伴うだろう。どの時点で攻撃の準備ができている、などと宣言できるだろうか?」 — ジョセフ・ジョフル 「整然とした戦いに必要なだけの弾薬などは存在せず、非常に多くの師団が東部戦線に移動したときなら、ドイツ軍を攻撃する機会が無駄になることはあり得ないだろう。」 >The offensive had been fought with unprecedented refinements of tactics and supply. Amendments to Note 5779 were suggested, to cover items like the use of 23,000 hand grenades in two days by the 53rd Division and the importance of attention to detail; Pétain of XXXIII Corps had ensured accurate preparatory bombardments and the tactical reflections written by Pétain were added to the thinking in Note 5779. ⇒この攻勢は、戦術と供給に関して前例のないほどに改良を施して戦われた。「短信5779」の修正が提案されたが、それは第53師団による2日間での23,000発もの手榴弾の使用などの項目と、細部に注意することの重要性をカバーするためであった。第XXXIII軍団のペタンは、正確な予備砲撃を保証したので、ペタンが書いた戦術的考察が「短信5779」の判断欄に追加された。 >The ideal characteristics of a network of jumping-off trenches and the time and labour necessary to build it were laid down, so that troops could advance simultaneously and reserve troops could be protected as they moved forward. Pétain wrote the plan for the Groupe d'armées du Centre, for the offensive of 25 September and his views were circulated through the French and British armies. The autumn offensive was fought as a breakthrough attempt, with changes to avoid the mistakes made in Artois in May and had significant tactical success but did not achieve a breakthrough, which led to the adoption of limited attacks in 1916. ⇒軍隊が同時に進軍できて、かつ予備軍が前進するとき保護されるように、始発塹壕のネットワークの理想的な特性と、それを構築するために必要な時間と労力が定められた。9月25日の攻勢のために、ペタンが中央方面軍グループの計画を書いたところ、彼の見解がフランス方面軍と英国方面軍(の両方)に広まった。秋の攻勢は、5月にアルトワで犯した失策を回避するための変更をもって、突破作戦の試みとして戦われたが、戦術的には有意な成功があったものの、画期的な成果は得られず、1916年に限定的な攻撃が採用することにつながった。 >Krause wrote that the formulation Note 5779 showed that the French command system, was staffed by men who tried to improve the performance of the army and contradicts claims by Gudmundsson, that the Allied armies were too centralised to adapt. Lessons had been collected, analysed and distributed in a manner which combined top-down and bottom-up processes. A flaw in Note 5779, was persistence with a concept of rapid breakthrough, even after many soldiers considered that the war had become a siege and that none of the French offensives of 1915, had been intended to return to mobile warfare. Changes made to the plan for the Second Battle of Artois, had been intended to secure the capture Vimy Ridge as a jumping-off point, rather than to achieve a breakthrough and return to mobile warfare. ⇒クラウゼはこう書いた。「短信5779」の公式は、方面軍の実践行動を向上させようとする兵士がフランス軍の司令システムに配置されていること、および、連合国方面軍は、グドムンドソンの主張に矛盾して、中央集権化され過ぎて適応できないことを示していた、と。トップダウンとボトムアップの両方の流れを組み合わせた方法で、教訓が収集、分析、配布されていた。「短信5779」の欠陥は、多くの兵士が戦争の包囲戦化を認め、1915年のフランス軍の攻勢はいずれも機動戦に戻ることなど意図していない、と見なした後でも、急速な突破作戦という考えには固執していた。「第二次アルトワの戦い」の計画に加えられた変更は、突破口を開いて機動戦に復帰するのではなく、出発点としてヴィミー・リッジの攻略を意図したことであった。 >In the autumn offensive which began on 25 September, with the Third Battle of Artois, Battle of Loos and the Second Battle of Champagne, the strategy was intended to make the Noyon salient untenable and regain a large portion of the occupied territories. Tactics used in the battles of May and June were revised and the creeping barrage became a standard method in all the Western Front armies. ⇒9月25日に始まった秋の攻勢は「第三次アルトワの戦い」、「ルースの戦い」、および「第二次シャンパーニュの戦い」で、戦略としては、ノヨンを無傷の突出地にし、占領された領域の大部分を取り戻すことを目的としていた。5月と6月の戦闘で使用される戦術が修正され、纏いつく集中砲火がすべての西部戦線方面軍の標準的な方法になった。 ※閲覧のご確認をお願いします。→2020/04/05 21:27質問No.9731735

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