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The Franco-British attack on 9 May had been on a front of 16 mi (25 km) and in June three supporting attacks were planned by the French Second, Sixth and Seventh armies, along with an attack by the British near Zillebeke in Flanders. The preliminary bombardment was due to begin on 13 June and XXI Corps was to attack from the Lorette Spur towards Bois de Givenchy, XX Corps was to complete the capture of Neuville and the Labyrnthe and XXIII Corps was shifted slightly north to attack Souchez, Château Carleul, Côte 119 and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. IX Corps was moved from the northern boundary of the Tenth Army and placed between XXXIII Corps and XX Corps to take Vimy Ridge. During minor attacks in early June, the IX Corps divisions had gained little success and in one attack the infantry went to ground and refused to continue, which if repeated would leave the XXXIII Corps vulnerable to another advance into a salient. The artillery preparation was carefully observed from the front line and IX Corps troops were issued flares to signal to the artillery, who reported a highly accurate bombardment, particularly on the 5 Chemins crossroads and a derelict mill, which were the principal German defensive works opposite. On 15 June the commander of the 17th Division on the right of the IX Corps, wrote to General Curé, the corps commander, that preparations were incomplete and had not conformed to Note 5779, leaving the jumping-off trenches 200–300 metres (220–330 yd) from the German front line, rather than the 160 yd (150 m) or fewer laid down and that the infantry were already exhausted. In the rest of the Tenth Army the situation was the same, with infantry being set to hours of digging under German counter-bombardments. It was also discovering that the accuracy of French artillery-fire, was not sufficient make it effective. An attack on 13 June, by a regiment of the 70th Division on the sugar refinery, captured a small length of the German front trench, where they were bombarded by French artillery. An attack on 14 June took another short length of trench but the regiment had to be relieved by part of the 13th Division during the night of 15/16 June. Reports from the IX and XX corps on the southern flank, described accurate French artillery fire and XXI Corps on the Lorette Spur had a commanding view of German defences. Maistre the corps commander, had made artillery observation a specialist role for trained men, who kept close to the infantry to ensure efficient liaison. It was soon discovered that the Germans had put barbed wire 55 yd (50 m) in front of the front line, rather than just in front and special bombardments were fired to cut the wire, after which patrols went forward to check the results, despite German counter-bombardments. On the 43rd Division front, it was discovered that field artillery was only shifting the barbed wire around and not damaging cheveaux de frise but modern 155mm guns were used in time to create several gaps in the wire.

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During the Battle of Arras the British Fifth Army was intended to help the operations of the Third Army, by pushing back German rear guards to the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line) and then attacking the position from Bullecourt to Quéant, which was 3.5 miles (5.6 km) from the main Arras–Cambrai road. The German outpost villages from Doignies to Croisilles were captured on 2 April and an attack on a 3,500-yard (3,200 m) front, with Bullecourt in the centre was planned. The wire-cutting bombardment was delayed by transport difficulties behind the new British front line and the attack of the Third Army, which was originally intended to be simultaneous, took place on 9 April. A tank attack by the Fifth Army was improvised for 10 April on a front of 1,500 yards (1,400 m) to capture Riencourt and Hendecourt. The attack was intended to begin 48 minutes before sunrise but the tanks were delayed by a blizzard and the attack was cancelled at the last minute; the 4th Australian Division withdrawal from its assembly positions was luckily obscured by a snowstorm.

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The offensive had resumed on 20 September, using similar step-by-step methods to those of the Fifth Army after 31 July, with a further evolution of technique, based on the greater mass of artillery made available, to enable the consolidation of captured ground with sufficient strength and organisation to defeat German counter-attacks. At the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, most of the British objectives had been captured and held, with substantial losses being inflicted on the six German ground-holding divisions and their three supporting Eingreif divisions. British preparations for the next step began immediately and both sides studied the effect of the battle and the implications it had for their dispositions. British offensive preparations Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917 On 21 September, Haig instructed the Fifth and Second armies to make the next step across the Gheluvelt Plateau, on a front of 8,500 yd (7,800 m). The I ANZAC Corps would conduct the main advance of about 1,200 yd (1,100 m), to complete the occupation of Polygon Wood and the south end of Zonnebeke village. The Second Army altered its corps frontages soon after the attack of 20 September so that each attacking division could be concentrated on a 1,000 yd (910 m) front. Roads and light railways were built behind the new front line to allow artillery and ammunition to be moved forward, beginning on 20 September; in fine weather this was finished in four days. As before Menin Road, bombardment and counter-battery fire began immediately, with practice barrages fired daily as a minimum. Artillery from the VIII and IX Corps in the south conducted bombardments to simulate attack preparations on Zandvoorde and Warneton. Haig intended that later operations would capture the rest of the ridge from Broodseinde, giving the Fifth Army scope to advance beyond the ridge north-eastwards and allow the commencement of Operation Hush. The huge amounts of shellfire from both sides had cut up the ground and destroyed roads. New road circuits were built to carry supplies forward, especially artillery ammunition.

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German defensive changes: late 1917 On 7 October, the 4th Army again dispersed its troops in the front defence zone. Reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif divisions were organised to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery fire to reduce British artillery fire was to be increased, to protect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced. All of the German divisions holding front zones were relieved and an extra division brought forward, as the British advances had lengthened the front line. Without the forces necessary for a counter-offensive south of the Gheluvelt plateau towards Kemmel Hill, Rupprecht began to plan for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even at the risk of uncovering German positions further north and the Belgian coast. Battle of Poelcappelle The French First Army and British Second and Fifth armies attacked on 9 October, on a 13,500 yards (12,300 m) front, from south of Broodseinde to St. Jansbeek, to advance half of the distance from Broodseinde ridge to Passchendaele, on the main front, which led to many casualties on both sides. Advances in the north of the attack front were retained by British and French troops but most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spurs was lost to German counter-attacks. General William Birdwood later wrote that the return of heavy rain and mud sloughs was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground. Kuhl concluded that the fighting strained German fighting power to the limit but that the German forces managed to prevent a breakthrough, although it was becoming much harder to replace losses. First Battle of Passchendaele Passchendaele:パッシェンデール The First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October, was another Allied attempt to gain ground around Passchendaele. Heavy rain and mud again made movement difficult and little artillery could be brought closer to the front. Allied troops were exhausted and morale had fallen.

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Surplus field artillery brigade headquarters planned forward moves for the guns and were kept ready to replace casualties. It was expected that much of the artillery would need to switch rapidly from the bombardment plan to engage counter-attacking German infantry. It was planned that the Forward Observation Officers of the divisions in the first attack onto the ridge would control the artillery which had remained in place and the reserve divisions advancing down the far slope to the Oosttaverne line would control the artillery hidden close to the front line and the artillery which advanced into no-man's-land. Franks planned to neutralise German guns within 9,000 yards (8,200 m) of the attack front. On the flanks of the British attack front of 17,000 yards (16,000 m), 169 German guns had been located, for which 42 British guns (25 percent of the German total) were set aside. The 299 German guns in the path of the attack were each to be engaged by a British gun, a formula which required 341 British guns and howitzers to be reserved for counter-battery fire. Every 45 yards (41 m) of front had a medium or heavy howitzer for bombardment, which required 378 guns, with 38 super-heavy guns and howitzers (5 percent) deployed with the field artillery that was due to fire the creeping and standing barrages. Franks devised a bombardment timetable and added arrangements for a massed machine-gun barrage. The 756 medium and heavy guns and howitzers were organised in forty groups and the 1,510 field guns and howitzers in sixty-four field artillery brigades within the attacking divisions and thirty-three Army field artillery brigades, divided among the three attacking corps.

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The German 4th Army under Albrecht, Duke of Württemberg, and 5th Army of Crown Prince Wilhelm had moved slower than the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies and the French offensive towards them was reported on 21 August. The French armies had few maps and were unaware of the size of the German force opposite, as the Third Army brushed aside small German detachments. On 22 August in the Third army area, the V Corps attacked dug-in German troops at Longwy at 5:00 a.m. in thick fog and heavy rain, with no artillery support. As the fog lifted, German artillery caught the French guns in the open and silenced them. A German counter-attack routed a French division and the corps was not rallied until the evening. To the north the IV Corps also advanced in fog and encountered German troops dug in near Virton and was forced back also with a division routed. On the southern Flank the VI Corps was pushed back a short distance. In the Fourth Army area the II Corps on the right flank managed to keep level with the Third Army to the south but was not able to advance further. The Colonial Corps on the left was defeated at Rossignol, 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) south of Neufchâteau, and had 11,646 casualties but the 5th Colonial Brigade on the left easily reached Neufchâteau before being repulsed with many casualties. Further north XII Corps advanced steadily but the XVII Corps beyond was outflanked and the 33rd Division lost most of its artillery. On the northern flank the XI and IX corps were not seriously engaged.

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As the fog lifted, German artillery caught the French guns in the open and silenced them. A German counter-attack routed a French division and the corps was not rallied until the evening. To the north the IV Corps also advanced in fog and encountered German troops dug in near Virton and was forced back also with a division routed. On the southern flank, the VI Corps was pushed back a short distance. In the Fourth Army area, the II Corps on the right flank managed to keep level with the Third Army to the south but was not able to advance further. The Colonial Corps on the left was defeated at Rossignol, 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) south of Neufchâteau and had 11,646 casualties but the 5th Colonial Brigade on the left easily reached Neufchâteau, before being repulsed with many casualties. Further north, XII Corps advanced steadily but the XVII Corps beyond was outflanked and the 33rd Division lost most of its artillery. On the northern flank the XI and IX corps were not seriously engaged.

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Three squadrons of 1st Wing Royal Flying Corps (RFC) were attached to the First Army, to fly defensive patrols for four days before the attack, to deter enemy reconnaissance. During the attack they were to conduct artillery observation and reconnaissance sorties and bomb enemy rear areas, railway junctions and bridges further away. This battle was an unmitigated disaster for the British army. No ground was won and no tactical advantage gained. It is doubted if it had the slightest positive effect on assisting the main French attack 15 miles (24 km) to the south. The battle was renewed slightly to the south, from 15 May as the Battle of Festubert. In the aftermath of the Aubers Ridge failure, the war correspondent of The Times, Colonel Charles à Court Repington, sent a telegram to his newspaper highlighting the lack of high-explosive shells, using information supplied by Sir John French; The Times headline on 14 May 1915 was: "Need for shells: British attacks checked: Limited supply the cause: A Lesson From France". This precipitated a political scandal known as the Shell Crisis of 1915. The German Official Historians of the Reichsarchiv recorded c. 102,500 French casualties from 9 May – 18 June, 32,000 British casualties and 73,072 German casualties for the operations of the Second Battle of Artois. The British Official Historian, J. E. Edmonds recorded British casualties as 11,619 men. Edmonds wrote that the German Official History made little reference to the battle but in 1939 G. C. Wynne wrote that Infantry Regiment 55 had 602 casualties and Infantry Regiment 57 lost 300 casualties. The Battle of Festubert (15–25 May 1915) was an attack by the British army in the Artois region of France on the western front during World War I. The offensive formed part of a series of attacks by the French Tenth Army and the British First Army in the Second Battle of Artois (3 May – 18 June 1915). After the failure of the attempted breakthrough by the First Army in the attack at Aubers Ridge (9 May 1915) tactics of a short hurricane bombardment and an infantry advance with unlimited objectives, were replaced by the French practice of slow and deliberate artillery-fire intended to prepare the way for an infantry attack. A continuous three-day bombardment by the British heavy artillery was planned, to cut wire and demolish German machine-gun posts and infantry strong-points. The German defences were to be captured by a continuous attack, by one division from Rue du Bois to Chocolat Menier Corner and by a second division 600 yards (550 m) north, which was to capture the German trenches to the left of Festubert. The objectives were 1,000 yards (910 m) forward, rather than the 3,000 yards (2,700 m) depth of advance intended at Aubers Ridge. The battle was the first British attempt at attrition. Festubert フェステュベール

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Wire-cutting began on 21 May and an extra two days were added to the bombardment for more counter-battery fire. The main bombardment began on 31 May, with only one day of poor weather before the attack. Two flights of each observation squadron concentrated on counter-battery observation and one became a "bombardment flight", working with particular artillery '"bombardment groups" for wire-cutting and trench-destruction; these flights became "contact-patrol flights" intended to observe the positions of British troops once the assault began. The attack barrage was rehearsed on 3 June to allow British air observers to plot masked German batteries, which mainly remained hidden but many minor flaws in the British barrage were reported. A repeat performance on 5 June induced a larger number of hidden German batteries to reveal themselves. The 25th Division made its preparations on a front from the Wulverghem–Messines road to the Wulverghem–Wytschaete road, facing 1,200 yards (1,100 m) of the German front line, which tapered to the final objective 700 yards (640 m) wide at the near crest of the ridge, 3,000 yards (2,700 m) distant, behind nine German defensive lines. The advance would begin up a short rise to the near edge of the Steenbeek Valley, then up the steep rise from the valley floor between Hell and Sloping Roof Farms to Four Huns, Chest and Middle Farms on the main ridge, with Lumm Farm on the left flank of the objective. Artillery emplacements for the 25th divisional artillery and 112th Army Field Brigade were built and the Guards Division field artillery was placed in concealed forward positions. Road making and the construction of dug-outs and communication trenches took place between 12–30 April and between 11 May – 6 June.

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Despite considerable difficulty, the field artillery was moved to within 4,000 yd (3,700 m) of the final objective and ample ammunition and field stores were brought forward. XIV Corps had 49 batteries of 312 × 18-pounder guns in groups, one for each division, the Guards group having 23 batteries; the medium and heavy artillery being grouped similarly. The arrangements agreed by Haig, Gough and Plumer on 2 October, the effect of the victory of 4 October and the disarray of the German defenders, led to the attack planned for 10 October being advanced to 9 October, with a second attack being arranged for 12 October. Attacking a front of 13,500 yd (12,300 m), it was intended to capture Passchendaele ridge in two stages. The first objective (red line) would be captured by a morning attack, which if successful and the cause of a general withdrawal by the Germans, would be followed-up by the reserve brigades of the attacking divisions, which would advance to the second objective (blue line) in the afternoon. On 7 October Haig cancelled the afternoon attack to the blue line due to the wet weather. On the southern flank of the attack, X Corps was to attack to hold German reserves around Becelaere and Gheluvelt. To the north, I Anzac Corps was to advance on the right flank of the main attack, with the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, the 4th and 5th Australian divisions being in reserve. Further north, II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand and 3rd Australian divisions in reserve, was to attack two objectives, the 66th Division advancing along the main ridge, north of the Ypres–Roulers railway to just short of Passchendaele village and the 49th Division on either side of the Ravebeek stream, up Wallemolen spur to the Bellevue pillboxes. If the first objectives were reached, the reserve brigades were to attack the second objectives in the afternoon. The second objectives were 800–1,000 yd (730–910 m) ahead of the red line, beyond the village and the main ridge respectively. The reserve divisions were ready to move rapidly forward, by train from west of Ypres to continue the attack the next day. On the Fifth Army front, XVIII Corps with a brigade each from the 48th and 11th divisions, was to advance 1,200 yd (1,100 m) up Poelcappelle spur and towards Westroosebeke on the main ridge.

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On the north bank, a dawn bombardment was followed by a German attack on the 11th Brigade front, where one battalion was spread along 2,000 yd (1,800 m) from Le Gheer to the Douve river. No continuous trenches existed and the isolated strongpoints had no communication trenches. Infantry Regiment 134 of the 40th Division began to overrun the battalion, until a counter-attack by the brigade reserve pushed the Germans back. An attack on 31 October, reached the British trenches again but the Germans retired before a counter-attack could be mounted. A battalion of the 12th Brigade from the 4th Division took over the right flank of the Cavalry Corps line, which brought the divisional front north to Messines During November, artillery-fire, sniping and local attacks continued south of the Lys and on 1 November, the Cavalry Corps was forced out of Messines, which left the northern flank of III Corps exposed, at a time when the corps was defending a 12 mi (19 km) front with severely depleted units. Few reserves were left and Pulteney reported to the BEF headquarters, that the corps could not withstand another big attack. French sent two battalions north from II Corps and gave permission for the corps to retreat to a reserve line from Fleurbaix to Nieppe and Neuve Eglise if necessary. The daily ration of artillery ammunition was doubled from forty rounds per day for each 18-pounder and twenty per day for each 4.5-inch howitzer, which enabled the 4th and 6th divisions to maintain their front. The Battle of Armentières ended officially on 2 November but north of the Lys, fighting in the 4th Division positions up to the Douve river continued and are described in the Battle of Messines (1914). The battles in French and Belgian Flanders were the last battles of encounter and manoeuvre on the Western front, until 1918. After the meeting engagements, the battles became a desperate defence by the British, French and Belgian armies against the offensives of the German 6th and 4th armies. No defensive system like those built in 1915 existed and both sides improvised shelter pits and short lengths of trench, which were repaired each night. Artillery was concealed by ground features only but the small number of observation aircraft on both sides and the extent of tree cover, enabled guns to remain hidden. The attack by the 6th Army on 21 October, from La Bassée to St Yves by the VII, XIII and XIX corps achieved only small advances against the 6th Division and the XIX Corps attack on the 4th Division front gained no ground but the attacks put great strain on the British defence and prevented reserves from being transferred north to Ypres. British artillery adopted the French practice of night artillery fire on German communication routes, as far as 6-inch gun ammunition allowed.

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Two areas of the German front line, on either side of the Neuve Chapelle battlefield, were attacked by the British First Army (General Sir Douglas Haig). In the south I Corps and the Indian Corps attacked on a 2,400 yd (1.4 mi; 2.2 km) front from the Rue du Bois and IV Corps attacked in the north on a 1,500 yd (1,400 m) front opposite Fromelles. The attack was intended to make two breaches in the German defences 6,000 yd (3.4 mi; 5.5 km) apart, after which the infantry were to advance to Aubers Ridge about 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) beyond. The preliminary bombardment began at 5:00 a.m. and at 5:30 a.m. became intense. Ten minutes later, the infantry attacked and surprised the German defenders, artillery fire cutting all the German telephone lines to the rear. Visibility was poor due to smoke and dust and the bombardment proved less effective than assumed; much of the British shell-fire fell short and few of the German machine-guns were destroyed. German machine-gunners and artillery began to fire at the same time and in ten minutes inflicted many casualties on the British infantry as they advanced across no man's land. The failure of the attack to gain more than a few footholds in the German first line led to a second attack at 8:00 a.m. after a forty-five-minute bombardment, which was repelled in no man's land by German defensive fire. A new attack was ordered for noon but was delayed until about 5:00 p.m. Despite a "terrific" bombardment, the German machine-gun nests were not destroyed and the machine-gunners stopped the attack with flanking-fire. To assist the French, whose attack had been more successful, another attack was ordered for 8:00 p.m. and then cancelled as it became clear that another attack could not be launched. The extent of the British defeat had not been realised, due to the difficulty of communicating with the front line. The British lost c. 11,000 casualties and German casualties had also been severe; the defensive position had been turned into a crater-field but German reserves were moved from the British front to Vimy Ridge on 12 May. Joffre and Foch met French that day to persuade him to resume the attack after the redeployment of German divisions south against the Tenth Army: French agreed to relieve a French division south of La Bassée by 15 May. Pétain proposed a combined attack on Souchez with the divisions of XXXIII and XXI corps for 12 May, which was rejected due to the exhaustion of the XXI Corps divisions. Pétain substituted a plan for three limited attacks against Carency, Bois 125, Ablain and Souchez, with similar attack in the south against Neuville. Joffre sent the III Corps to the Tenth Army as reinforcement but also had to withdraw artillery to support the British attack due at Festubert.

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The actions of the Hohenzollern Redoubt took place on the Western Front in World War I from 13 to 19 October 1915, at the Hohenzollern Redoubt (Hohenzollernwerk) near Auchy-les-Mines in France. In the aftermath of the Battle of Loos (25 September – 8 October 1915), the 9th (Scottish) Division captured the strongpoint and then lost it to a German counter-attack. The British attack on 13 October failed and resulted in 3,643 casualties, mostly in the first few minutes. In the History of the Great War, James Edmonds wrote that "The fighting [from 13 to 14 October] had not improved the general situation in any way and had brought nothing but useless slaughter of infantry".In the summer of 1915 the German armies continued the strengthening of front trenches, communication trenches and strong-points ordered by Chief of the General Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn, who on 25 January had also ordered the building of more defensive lines behind the front trench. Crown Prince Rupprecht the Sixth Army commander and some Western Front generals had objected to this policy, as an invitation to German troops to retreat rather than fight. After the experience of the Battle of Festubert, where Allied artillery had proved capable of destroying a great width of front trench, opposition had been abandoned and the work carried on as quickly as possible. In early May Falkenhayn had also ordered that a second defensive position be built 2,000–3,000 yd (1.1–1.7 mi; 1.8–2.7 km) behind the whole of the Western Front, to force an attacker to pause to move artillery forward into range. Plans to exploit the Franco-British superiority in numbers on the Western Front, while one third of the German army was on the Russian Front were agreed at a Conference by Joffre and French at Chantilly on 14 September. The British New Armies had begun to arrive, the number of heavy guns had increased since the offensives of May and June and by concentrating resources at the points of attack an even greater numerical superiority could be obtained over the Germans. An unprecedented preliminary bombardment of the German defences would be possible and make attacks by the greater number of Allied infantry decisive. Simultaneous offensives would be mounted from Champagne and Artois towards Namur, the principal attack being made in Champagne. The attack by the French Tenth Army on Vimy Ridge in May and June had failed, which left the German Sixth Army in control of the high ground below which the French were to have assembled a mass of artillery and infantry. It was agreed that in Artois a Franco-British offensive would be mounted towards Douai, by the French Tenth and the British First armies, co-ordinated by General Foch on a front of 20 miles (32 km) between Arras and La Bassée canal.[3] The British First Army was to attack between Grenay and La Bassée canal on a 6-mile (9.7 km) front, with six divisions and three in reserve. The Cavalry Corps and Indian Cavalry Corps were to be held ready to exploit a German collapse. The Franco-British armies were to attack towards Tournai, Valenciennes and Le Quesnoy and subsidiary attacks were to be made by the rest of the Franco-British armies to pin down German reserves.

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On the night of 1/2 January, a German attack captured Hope Post near the Beaumont Hamel–Serre road, before being lost with another post on the night of 5/6 January. The Fifth Army held about 10 miles (16 km) of the Somme front in January 1917, from Le Sars westwards to the Grandcourt–Thiepval road, across the Ancre east of Beaucourt, along the lower slopes of the Beaumont-Hamel spur, to the original front line south of the Serre road, north to Gommecourt Park. The right flank was held by IV Corps up to the north side of the Ancre river, with the XIII Corps on the north bank up to the boundary with the Third Army. II Corps and V Corps were in reserve resting, training and preparing to relieve the corps in line around 7–21 February, except for the divisional artilleries, which were to be joined by those of the relieving divisions.

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By 26 September the ground-holding divisions had been reorganised so that the regiments were side-by-side, covering a front of about 1,000 yd (910 m) each with the battalions one-behind-the-other, the first in the front line, one in support and the third in reserve, over a depth of 3,000 yd (2,700 m). Each of the three ground-holding divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau had an Eingreif division in support, double the ratio on 20 September. On 25 September, a German attack on the front of the 20th Division (XIV Corps) was prevented by artillery fire but on the X Corps front south of I Anzac Corps, a bigger German attack took place. Crown Prince Rupprecht had ordered the attack to recover ground on the Gheluvelt Plateau and to try to gain time for reinforcements to be brought into the battle zone to bolster the defensive system. Two regiments of the 50th Reserve Division attacked either side of the Reutelbeek, with the support of 44 field and 20 heavy batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for one division. The attack on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front from the Menin road to Polygon Wood, to recapture pillboxes and shelters in the Wilhelmstellung 500 yd (460 m) away, had been due to begin at 5:15 a.m. but the barrage fell short onto the German assembly area and the German infantry had to fall back until it began to creep forward at 5:30 a.m. The German infantry managed to advance on the flanks, about 100 yd (91 m) near the Menin road and 600 yd (550 m) north of the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner, with the help of a number of observation and ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage, which obstructed the supply of ammunition to the British defenders, before fire from the 33rd Division troops being attacked and the 15th Australian Brigade along the southern edge of Polygon wood, forced them under cover, after recapturing some of the Wilhelmstellung pillboxes near Black Watch Corner. A number of attempts to reinforce the attacking troops failed, due to British artillery observers isolating the advanced German troops with artillery barrages.

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The attack was not planned as a breakthrough operation, because Flandern I Stellung, the fourth German defensive position, lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front line and was not an objective on the first day. The Fifth Army plan was a more ambitious version of the earlier plans devised by Rawlinson and Plumer, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m) on the first day. Major-General J. Davidson, Director of Operations at GHQ, wrote in a memorandum that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives" and suggested reverting to a 1,750 yards (1,600 m) advance, to increase the concentration of British artillery. Gough stressed the need to plan to exploit an opportunity to take ground left temporarily undefended; this was more likely in the first attack, which would have the benefit of long preparation. After discussions at the end of June, Haig and Plumer, the Second Army commander, endorsed the Fifth Army plan. Battle of Pilckem Ridge The British attack began at 3:50 a.m. on 31 July; the attack was to commence at dawn but a layer of unbroken low cloud, meant that it was still dark when the infantry advanced. The main attack, by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, confronted the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding (Stellungsdivisionen) and Eingreif divisions. The attack had most success on the northern flank, in front of XIV Corps and the French First Army. In this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 2,500–3,000 yards (2,300–2,700 m) to the line of the Steenbeek stream. In the centre, XVIII Corps and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the Steenbeek to consolidate and sent fresh troops towards the Green and Red lines on the XIX Corps front, for an advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m). Group Ypres counter-attacked the flanks of the British break-in, supported by all available artillery and aircraft around noon.

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Footnotes and appendices in the History of the Great War, show that far from neglecting Haig's desire to concentrate on the Gheluvelt plateau, Gough put a disproportionate amount of the Fifth Army artillery at the disposal of II Corps for the 3 1⁄3 divisions engaged on 31 July, compared to four divisions with two engaged and two in reserve in the other corps, with an average of 19 percent of the Fifth Army artillery each. The green line for II Corps was the shallowest, from a depth of 1,000 yards (910 m) on the southern flank at Klein Zillibeke, to 2,500 yards (2,300 m) on the northern flank along the Ypres–Roulers railway. The green line from the southern flank of XIX Corps to the northern flank of XIV Corps required an advance of 2,500–3,500 yards (2,300–3,200 m). The French First Army had the 29th Division and 133rd Division of the XXXVI Corps (Lieutenant-General Charles Nollet) and the 1st Division, 2nd Division, 51st Division and 162nd Division of I Corps (Lieutenant-General Paul Lacapelle). The I Corps had suffered many casualties in the Nivelle Offensive but had been recruited mainly from northern France and had been rested from 21 April until 20 June. The XXXVI Corps had garrisoned the North Sea coast since 1915 and had not been involved in the mutinies that took place on the Aisne front. The First Army was given 240 × 75 mm field guns, 277 trench artillery pieces (mostly 58 mm mortars), 176 heavy howitzers and mortars, 136 heavy guns and 64 super-heavy guns and howitzers, 22 being of 305 mm or more, 893 guns and mortars for 4.3 miles (7 km) of front. The 1re Armée had relieved the Belgian 4th Division and 5th Division from Boesinghe to Nordschoote from 5–10 July. The 1re Armée was to advance with the 1st and 51st divisions of I Corps on the left of the Fifth Army as flank protection against a German counter-attack from the north. The operation involved a substantial advance over difficult country, to capture the peninsula between the floods at the Martjevaart/St. Jansbeek stream and the land between there and the Yser Canal south of Noordshoote.

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Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions. A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge. In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915. Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack.

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In December and January, casualties due to enemy action were 439, far fewer than those due to the weather and illness; the division was relieved by the 2nd Division on 12 January. The 2nd Division, also transferred from the north side of the Ancre valley, took over from the 51st Division on 13 January, on a front of 2,500 yards (2,300 m), 1,200 yards (1,100 m) south of the village of Pys. The front line consisted of 18 infantry posts and support positions held by ten platoons, with no positions behind until Courcelette, where three platoons were based, with two companies in the vicinity. Ironside Avenue, a communication trench ran forward 800 yards (730 m) towards the front line but was so full of mud as to be impassable. Brushwood tracks which were unusable in daylight, continued the route towards the front line.

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A new attack was planned against Thiepval for 2 July by the 32nd and 49th divisions of X Corps and the 48th Division of VIII Corps was cancelled and replaced by an attack by the 32nd Division, on the east end of the Leipzig Redoubt and the Wonderwork (Wundtwerk) on a front of 800 yards (730 m), by the 14th Brigade and the 75th Brigade attached from the 25th Division. Information about the changed plan reached X Corps late and only reached the 32nd Division commander at 10:45 p.m. along with an increase in the attack frontage to 1,400 yards (1,300 m) north to Thiepval Chateau. With most telephone lines cut the artillery were not told of the postponement, until half of the bombardment for the original 3:15 a.m. zero hour had been fired.

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下記の英文を日本語訳して下さい。

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英文を日本語訳して下さい。

和訳をお願いします。

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