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英文を日本語訳して下さい。

Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.

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>Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. ⇒2つの戦隊(航空大隊)が、上空からの緊密な戦場支援とドイツ軍の離着陸場への低空攻撃のために予約されていた。英国軍は、17,000ヤード(16,000m)の前線上をサン・イーブからソレル山にかけてのオースタヴェルヌ戦線に向かって、最大奥行き3,000ヤード(2,700m)まで進軍することを計画した。一度に3つの中間標的に到着することは停止になって、新しい歩兵連隊が同じ日のうちに(先発隊を)馬飛びして、尾根を奪取するものとされた。そして、午後には尾根を下る更なる進軍がなされることになっていた。 >The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. ⇒攻撃は、第2方面軍(ハーバート・プルーマー卿将軍)の3個軍団によって遂行されることになっていた。すなわち、南東部の第IIアンザック軍団は800ヤード(730m)進軍し、中央部の第IX軍団は5,000ヤード(4,600m)の前線を攻撃して、2,000ヤード(1,800m)の頂上で漸減するが、そこで北部の第X軍団が1,200ヤード(1,100m)の前線を攻撃することになっていた。各軍団は、方面軍指揮官の管轄下で、1916年のソンム作戦行動の分析と4月9日のアラス攻撃で成功した特徴をガイド役として利用しながら彼らの攻撃を計画した。反砲兵隊の砲火、砲兵隊による集中砲火のタイムテーブル、および機関銃による集中砲火などの計画に細心の注意が払われた。 >German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders. ⇒ドイツ軍砲兵隊の陣地と第2(ホーヘン)戦線は、英国の地上観察隊の目には見えなかった。尾根の傾斜の後部を観察するために、300機の航空機がRFC第II旅団に集中して、第II凧式気球航空隊の8個気球班が英国軍の最前線の背後3,000–5,000フィート(910–1,520m)に置かれた。第2方面軍指揮官、ジョージ・フランクス少将は、軍団砲兵隊計画、特にドイツ軍の砲兵隊を抑える重砲の準備を調整したが、これらは軍団と師団砲兵隊の指揮官によって考案された。

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回答ありがとうございました。Battle of Arleux, part of the Second phase of the Second Battle of Arras.という英文は日本語訳するとどのような意味でしょうか?

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    After the explosions, the British artillery began to fire at maximum rate. A creeping barrage in three belts 700 yards (640 m) deep began and counter-battery groups bombarded all known German artillery positions with gas shell. The nine attacking divisions and the three in reserve began their advance as the German artillery reply came scattered and late, falling on British assembly trenches after they had been vacated.The II Anzac Corps objective was the southern part of the ridge and Messines village. The 3rd Australian Division on the right, had been disorganised by a German gas bombardment on Ploegsteert (Plugstreet) Wood around midnight, which caused 500 casualties during the approach march but the attack between St. Yves and the river Douve began on time. The 9th and 10th Brigades benefitted from four mine explosions at Trenches 122 and 127, which were seven seconds early and left craters 200 feet (61 m) wide and 20 feet (6.1 m) deep. The craters disrupted the Australian attack formation, some infantry lines merging into a wave before reforming as they advanced. The New Zealand Division approached over Hill 63 and avoided the German gas bombardment. The two attacking brigades crossed the dry river bed of the Steenebeke and took the German front line, despite the abandonment of the mine at La Petite Douve Farm and then advanced towards Messines village. On the left of the corps, the 25th Division began its advance 600 yards (550 m) further back than the New Zealand Division but quickly caught up, helped by the mine at Ontario Farm. On the right of IX Corps, the 36th (Ulster) Division attack on the front of the 107th Brigade, was supported by three mines at Kruisstraat and the big mine at Spanbroekmolen, 800 yards (730 m) further north.

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    Despite "ideal" weather, air observation failed as it did on the II Corps front. The forward elements of both divisions were overrun and killed or captured. By 10:15 a.m. the corps commander, Lieutenant-General H. Watts, had brought the barrage back to the start-line, regardless of survivors holding out beyond it. At 2:08 p.m. Gough ordered that a line from Borry Farm to Hill 35 and Hindu Cottage be taken to link with XVIII Corps. After consulting the divisional commanders, Watts reported that a renewed attack was impossible, since the reserve brigades were already holding the start line. There were few German counter-attacks on the front of XVIII and XIV Corps, which had also not been subjected to much artillery fire before the attack, as the Germans had concentrated on the corps further south. Despite the "worst going" in the salient, the 48th Division got forward on its left, against fire from the area not occupied by 36th Division on its right; 11th Division advanced beyond Langemarck. The 20th and 29th Divisions of XIV Corps and the French further north, reached most of their objectives without serious counter-attack but the Germans subjected the new positions to intense artillery fire, inflicting heavy losses for several days, especially on the 20th Division. The German army group commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote that the German defence continued to be based on holding the Gheluvelt Plateau and Houthoulst Forest as bastions, British advances in between were not serious threats. Ludendorff's verdict was less sanguine, writing that 10 August was a German success but that the British attack on the 16 August was another great blow. Poelcappelle had been reached and despite a great effort, the British could only be pushed back a short distance. Analysis The British plan to overcome the German "deep battlefield", was based on a conventional attack in three stages but the artillery was able to arrange a fire plan which was far more sophisticated than in previous attacks. The creeping barrage preceded the infantry and in some places moved slowly enough for the infantry to keep up.