Systematic Counter-attack and Reconnaissance: A Strategy for Success in the Battlefield
- Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, aiming to avoid the failures of previous battles with overloaded aircraft. Lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood initiated a three-week pause to plan the attack.
- The Second Army and both corps conducted visibility tests and discussed the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks. X Corps issued its first instruction, providing times and boundaries for its divisions.
- A pattern for British attacks was established, with routine orders and instructions. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd front, supported by the Second Army and the Fifth Army with increased ammunition. The RFC contributed 26 squadrons to the attack.
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Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions. A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge. In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915. Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack.
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＞Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. ⇒航空機については、悪い天候の中で少ない航空機が非常に多くの義務を負った前の戦いの失敗を避けるために、体系的な反撃調査が用意された。アンザック第X、第1軍団の司令官、T.モーランドとW.バードウッド両中将の、8月27日の会談から3週間の休止が提起された。 ＞The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions. ⇒攻撃軍団は、「8月29日の砲兵隊計画が引き出される基盤となる一般原則」を使って、第2方面軍の計画の枠組内で計画を立てた。それ（一般原則）は、地面に砲弾痕を追加することを避けるために纏いつく集中砲火や106番信管などの多重使用を説明して（戒めて）いた。第2方面軍および両軍団は、開始時間をいつに設定すべきかについて視認テストをした。無線機および大砲付戦車の使用が9月15日にプルーマーと議論された。第X軍団は、9月1日、最初の指令を出して、所属の諸師団に予定時間と、相互間の境界線について指定した。 ※この段落、訳文に自信ありません。誤訳の節はどうぞ悪しからず。 ＞A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge. ⇒英国軍攻撃のためのパターンが設定されて、第2方面軍司令と砲兵隊指令は、関係する軍団のための攻撃の段階と時刻表の「攻撃マップ」がルーチン（定番）になった。軍団の動きと攻撃の時間が簡潔に注記された。9個師団が10,000ヤード（9,100m）の前線を攻撃することになっていた。ピルケム・リッジの場合に比べて、第2方面軍は3倍の、第5方面軍は2倍の弾薬を備えた。 ＞In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915. ⇒8月末に、超重砲による破壊的な砲火が始まり、9月初めの貧弱な視界の中で反砲撃砲火が開始された。RFC（英国王立空軍）計画は、砲兵隊司令官と砲兵隊観察乗員によって使われ、規格化された方法を組み入れたが、それは、1915年以来BEF（英国遠征軍）における大砲と航空機の量の増加によって、非公式な連絡方法では不十分であると判明したからであった。 ＞Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack. ⇒上空－地上の連絡のために無線コードが揃えられて、よりよいトレーニングが導入された。攻撃は、ドイツの民家、鉄道、飛行場、および歩兵反撃に対して行われることになっていた。英国王立航空隊（RFC）は、26個の航空大隊を寄与（負担）したが、それには2個の夜間爆撃大隊、およびクーデケルクから来た英国海軍航空隊（RNAS）のハンドリー‐ページ社機（重爆撃用の4発機）が含まれていて、攻撃の前の夜間爆撃が開始された。
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Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.
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After 31 July, Gough had ceased attempts to exploit opportunities created by the Fifth Army's attacks and began a process of tactical revision, which with the better weather in September inflicted several costly defeats on the Germans. II Corps had been ordered to capture the rest of the black line on 2 August. The three northern corps of the Fifth Army were then to complete the capture of their part of the green line on 4 August, while XIV Corps and the French First Army crossed the Steenbeek on the left flank. The unusually wet weather had caused the attacks to be postponed until 10 August and the Battle of Langemarck (16–18 August); some of these objectives were still occupied by the Germans after operations later in the month. Principal responsibility for the offensive was transferred to General Plumer on 25 August. The Second Army boundary was shifted north into the area vacated by II Corps on the Gheluvelt plateau. Haig put more emphasis on the southern fringe of the plateau, by giving to the Second Army the bulk of the heavy artillery reinforcements moved from Artois. British offensive preparations Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917 The General Headquarters staff of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) quickly studied the results of the attack of 31 July and on 7 August, sent questions to the army headquarters about the new conditions produced by German defence-in-depth. The German army had spread strong points and pillboxes in the areas between their defensive lines and made rapid counter-attacks with local reserves and Eingreif divisions, against Allied penetrations. Plumer issued a preliminary order on 1 September, which defined the Second Army area of operations as Broodseinde and the area southwards. The plan was based on the use of much more medium and heavy artillery, which had been brought to the Gheluvelt Plateau from VIII Corps on the right of the Second Army and by removing more guns from the Third and Fourth armies in Artois and Picardy.
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During the pause on the ridge crest, an observer reported that the Oosttaverne line was barely occupied, at 2:00 p.m. a balloon observer reported a heavy German barrage on the II Anzac Corps front and a counter-attack patrol aircraft reported German infantry advancing either side of Messines. The German counter-attack was "crushed" by artillery fire by 2:30 p.m. Each corps squadron kept an aircraft on counter-attack patrol all day, to call for barrage fire if German troops were seen in the open but the speed of the British advance resulted in few German counter-attacks. Artillery observers watched for German gunfire and made 398 zone calls but only 165 managed to have German guns engaged. The observers regulated the bombardment of the Oosttaverne line and the artillery of VIII Corps to the north of the attack, which was able to enfilade German artillery opposite X Corps. Fourteen fighters were sent to strafe from low altitude, German ground targets ahead of the British infantry, roving behind German lines, attacking infantry, transport, gun-teams and machine-gun nests; the attacks continued all day, with two of the British aircraft being shot down. Organised attacks were made on the German airfields at Bisseghem and Marcke near Courtrai and the day bombing squadrons attacked airfields at Ramegnies Chin, Coucou, Bisseghem (again) and Rumbeke. Reconnaissance reports of German troops concentrating from Quesnoy–Warneton, led to aircraft setting out to attack them within minutes. German fighters made a considerable effort to intercept corps observation aircraft over the battlefield but were frustrated by patrols on the barrage line and offensive patrols beyond; only one British corps aircraft was shot down by German aircraft during the day. After dark, the night-bombing specialists of 100 Squadron bombed railway stations at Warneton, Menin and Courtrai.
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Communication between the infantry and artillery was established with runners, messenger dogs and pigeons. Wireless transmitters and power buzzers were set up at brigade headquarters and artillery observation posts, one for each artillery group. Engineer and pioneer units began to dig in telephone lines, which took until the afternoon of 21 September. Air operations Observing and reporting on German counter-attack movements was made a duty for all aircraft and patrol areas were given to II and V Brigades and the Ninth Wing to observe. "Hostile Tactical Maps" were issued, showing German assembly points and the likely routes to them and towards the front line. The II Brigade covered the Second Army front east to the Roulers–Menin railway. The area was divided into three sectors, each with a counter-attack patrol of two fighters, maintained for eight hours after "zero-hour", flying below 500 ft (150 m) and using the special maps, to attack any German units they caught on the move and to drive off German low-flying aircraft. On return they were to telephone a report direct to the Second Army Report Centre at Locre, similar arrangements being made for the Fifth Army. Ninth Wing aircraft were to patrol at low altitude east of Zarren–Oostnieukerke–Menin, beginning two hours after the start of the attack, to harass German reinforcements. Corps squadrons were to maintain counter-attack patrols on their Corps fronts, calling for immediate artillery fire and warning British infantry by smoke signal. Not all of these measures were possible on the day due to the weather, because it had rained on 19 September and was misty next morning but air operations commenced as soon as the mist cleared at 8.00 a.m. German aircraft attempting to intervene during the battle suffered from the presence of anti-aircraft guns near the front line and a Lewis gunner of a pioneer battalion in the 19th Division, shot down a German aircraft in flames at 1:30 p.m.; the feat was repeated next day and several German formations were broken up by ground fire.
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Two small formations of fighters were to fly low patrols, on the far side of the final objective of the Fifth Army, from the beginning of the attack for six hours, to break up German attempts to counter-attack and to stop equivalent German contact-patrols. After six hours, the aircraft were to range further east to attack troop concentrations. Aircraft from the Corps and Army wings were to attack all targets found west of Staden–Dadizeele, with the Ninth Wing taking over east of the line. German aerodromes were attacked periodically and special "ground patrols" were mounted below 3,000 ft (910 m) over the front line, to defend the Corps artillery-observation machines. Attempts to co-ordinate air and ground attacks had mixed results; on the II Corps front, few air attacks were co-ordinated with the infantry and only a vague report was received from an aircraft about a German counter-attack, which was further obscured by a smoke-screen. On the XIX Corps front, despite "ideal" visibility, no warning by aircraft was given of a German counter-attack over the Zonnebeke–St. Julien spur at 9:00 a.m., which was also screened by smoke shell. To the north on the XVIII and XIV Corps fronts, the air effort had more effect, with German strong-points and infantry being attacked on and behind the front. Air operations continued during the night, with more attacks on German airfields and rail junctions. German 4th Army The troops of 169th Brigade of the 56th Division, which tried to follow the leading waves from Glencorse Wood, were stopped at the edge of Polygon Wood and then pushed back by a counter-attack by the German 34th Division around 7:00 a.m., the troops ahead of them being overwhelmed. The brigade was driven back later in the afternoon to its start line, by German attacks from the south and east by troops from a regiment of the 54th Division sent back into the line. The 167th Brigade pulled back its right flank as the 169th Brigade was seen withdrawing through Glencorse Wood and at 3:00 p.m. the Germans attacked the front of 167th Brigade and the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division to the north. The area was under British artillery observation and the German attack was stopped by massed artillery fire.
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After a modest British advance, German counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost opposite Passchendaele. There were 13,000 Allied casualties, including 2,735 New Zealanders, 845 of whom had been killed or lay wounded and stranded in the mud of no-man's-land. In lives lost in a day, this was the worst day in New Zealand history. At a conference on 13 October, Haig and the army commanders agreed that attacks would stop until the weather improved and roads could be extended, to carry more artillery and ammunition forward for better fire support. Action of 22 October 1917 On 22 October the 18th (Eastern) Division of XVIII Corps attacked the east end of Polecappelle as XIV Corps to the north attacked with the 34th Division between the Watervlietbeek and Broenbeek streams and the 35th Division northwards into Houthulst Forest. The attack was supported by a regiment of the French 1st Division on the left flank of the 35th Division and was intended to obstruct a possible German counter-attack on the left flank of the Canadian Corps as it attacked Passchendaele and the ridge. The artillery of the Second and Fifth armies conducted a bombardment to simulate a general attack as a deception. Poelcappelle was captured but the attack at the junction between the 34th and 35th divisions was repulsed. German counter-attacks pushed back the 35th Division in the centre but the French attack captured all its objectives. Attacking on ground cut up by bombardments and soaked by rain, the British had struggled to advance in places and lost the ability to move quickly to outflank pillboxes. The 35th Division infantry reached the fringes of Houthulst Forest but were pushed back in places after being outflanked. German counter-attacks made after 22 October were at an equal disadvantage and were costly failures. The German 4th Army was prevented from transferring troops away from the Fifth Army and from concentrating its artillery-fire on the Canadians as they prepared for the Second Battle of Passchendaele (26 October – 10 November 1917).
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By the end of 1 July, the Sixth Army had captured all of the German first position except Frise on the Somme Canal. Few casualties had been suffered and 4,000 prisoners had been taken. On the south bank, Territorials buried the dead and cleared the battlefield of unexploded ammunition, as artillery was moved forward to prepared positions. I Colonial Corps had advanced within attacking distance of the German second position and indications that the Germans were withdrawing artillery had been detected. In 48 hours, the French had broken through on an 8-kilometre (5.0 mi) front. The advance of I Colonial Corps created a salient and German artillery, safe on the east bank of the Somme and assisted by more aircraft and observation balloons, could enfilade the defences hurriedly built by French troops and make movement on the Flaucourt Plateau impossible in daylight. German counter-attacks at Belloy, La Maisonette and Biaches, increased French casualties. A bold suggestion for a French attack northwards across the river was rejected. By 6 July, Foch had decided to attack on both banks and to extend the attack with the Tenth Army, on the right of the Sixth Army, to exploit success on any part of the front.
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The Battle of St. Quentin (also called the First Battle of Guise (French: 1ere Bataille de Guise) was fought from 29 to 30 August 1914, during the First World War. On the night of 26 August 1914, the Allies withdrew from Le Cateau to St. Quentin. With retreat all along the line, the commander-in-chief of the French forces, Joseph Joffre, needed the Fifth Army (General Charles Lanrezac) to hold off the German advance with a counter-attack, despite a 4 mi (6.4 km) separation from the French Fourth Army on the right flank and the continual retreat of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the left flank. The movement of the Fifth Army took most of 28 August, turning from facing north to facing west against St. Quentin. On 29 August the Fifth Army attacked St. Quentin with their full force. The Germans captured orders from a French officer and General Karl von Bülow, commander of the German 2nd Army had time to prepare. The attacks against the town by the XVIII corps was a costly failure but X and III corps on the right were rallied by the commander of I Corps, General Louis Franchet d'Esperey. Advances on the right were made against Guise and forced the Germans, including the Guard Corps, to fall back. That night, Joffre ordered Lanrezac to resume his retreat and destroy the bridges over the Oise as he fell back. The orders did not reach the Fifth Army until the morning of 30 August, and the retreat began several hours late. The move went unchallenged by the 2nd Army, which neither attacked nor pursued. Bülow found that the 2nd Army was separated by the Oise, which offered the possibility of enveloping the French attack with counter-attacks from both flanks. The risk that the French could exploit the 15 km (9.3 mi) gap between the inner flanks of the 2nd Army, led Bülow to choose a cautious policy of preventing the danger and ordered the corps on the inner flanks to close up and counter-attack the French X Corps. Later in the afternoon French attacks were repulsed and the 14th Division was ordered to advance from the Somme area to intervene in the battle. The divisional commander ignored the order to let the division rest and prepare for an advance on La Fère to get behind the Fifth Army. Lieutenant-General Karl von Einem the VII Corps commander was overruled and all corps of the 2nd Army were ordered to attack and obtain a decisive victory. The Battle of St. Quentin サン=カンタンの戦い
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On 30 December, the French began a new attack as the Germans counter-attacked II Corps on the right flank, took three lines of defence and inflicted many casualties. Next day, II Corps retook most of the lost ground but the Germans made four big counter-attacks against the Fourth Army, which disorganised the French offensive. Over the next few days, the French used artillery-fire to keep pressure on the Germans. A counter-attack on the night of 7/8 January drove the French out of a salient west of Perthes, until another French attack recovered most of the lost ground. French attacks continued for another two weeks, took small amounts of ground and drove off several German counter-attacks but had made few gains, by the time that the offensive was suspended, on 13 January. Supporting attacks in Artois and Champagne by the Second Army, Eighth Army and the troops on the coast at Nieuport supported the Tenth Army at Arras in the First Battle of Artois (17 December 1914 –13 January 1915). The Fourth Army attacks were assisted by the Army Detachment of the Vosges, which had also had little success. The armies on supporting fronts had far fewer guns and an attack by the XI Corps of the Second Army on 27 December, had no artillery support. In the Vosges, French artillery did not begin to fire until the two attacking divisions began to advance. All of the supporting attacks were costly failures. In mid-January a German attack began to the north of Soissons, on the route to Paris but the attack was made by small numbers of troops, to conserve reserves for operations on the Eastern Front and the French defenders repulsed the attack. In late January, a German attack was made against the Third Army, which was defending the heights of Aubréville close to the main railway to Verdun. Having been pushed back, the French counter-attacked six times and lost 2,400 casualties. The German attack failed to divert French troops from the flanks of the Noyon Salient. De Langle wrote a report on the campaign, in which he asserted that the army had followed the principle of avoiding a mass offensive and instead, made a series of attacks against points of tactical significance. When such operations succeeded it had become necessary to make similar preparations for a new attack, by digging approach trenches and destroying German field defences with artillery-fire. Obtaining a breakthrough by "continuous battle" was impossible and de Langle claimed that methodical successive attacks, to capture points of tactical importance, would have more effect. Joffre replied that the failure of the offensive was due to inadequate artillery support and too few infantry. Attacks had been made on narrow fronts of a few hundred yards, despite the offensive taking place on a 12 mi (19 km) front and left infantry far too vulnerable to massed artillery-fire. De Langle was ordered quickly to make several limited attacks but Joffre told Poincaré the French president, that a war of movement was a long way off. Casualties In 2005, Foley recorded c. 240,000 French casualties in February with c. 45,000 German losses, using data from Der Weltkrieg, the German Official History. In 2012, Sheldon recorded 93,432 French casualties and 46,100 German losses.
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Battle of Gheluvelt On 28 October, as the 4th Army attacks bogged down, Falkenhayn responded to the costly failures of the 4th and 6th armies by ordering the armies to conduct holding attacks while a new force, Armeegruppe Fabeck (General Max von Fabeck) was assembled from XV Corps and the II Bavarian Corps, the 26th Division and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, under the XIII Corps headquarters. The Armeegruppe was rushed up to Deûlémont and Werviq, the boundary between the 6th and 4th armies, to attack towards Ypres and Poperinghe. Strict economies were imposed on the 6th Army formations further south, to provide artillery ammunition for 250 heavy guns allotted to support an attack to the north-west, between Gheluvelt and Messines. The XV Corps was to attack on the right flank, south of the Menin–Ypres road to the Comines–Ypres canal and the main effort was to come from there to Garde Dieu by the II Bavarian Corps, flanked by the 26th Division. Battle of Gheluvelt (1 November 1914) On 29 October, attacks by the XXVII Reserve Corps began against I Corps north of the Menin Road, at dawn, in thick fog. By nightfall, the Gheluvelt crossroads had been lost and 600 British prisoners taken. French attacks further north, by the 17th Division, 18th Division and 31st Division recaptured Bixschoote and Kortekeer Cabaret. Advances by Armeegruppe Fabeck to the south-west against I Corps and the dismounted Cavalry Corps further south, came to within 1.9 mi (3 km) of Ypres along the Menin road and brought the town into range of German artillery. On 30 October, German attacks by the 54th Reserve Division and the 30th Division, on the left flank of the BEF at Gheluvelt, were repulsed but the British were pushed out of Zandvoorde, Hollebeke and Hollebeke Château as German attacks on a line from Messines to Wytschaete and St Yves were repulsed. The British rallied opposite Zandvoorde with French reinforcements and "Bulfin's Force" a command improvised for the motley of troops. The BEF had many casualties and used all its reserves but the French IX Corps sent its last three battalions and retrieved the situation in the I Corps sector. On 31 October, German attacks near Gheluvelt broke through until a counter-attack by the 2nd Worcestershire restored the situation.
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