Some infantry divisional commanders believed that the artillery available for the proposed attack was not enough.
Chetwode and Chauvel, the two most experienced generals, were concerned about the Ottoman defences at Gaza.
Dobell modified his battle plan based on fresh information, considering different attack options.
英文を日本語訳して下さい。
Some infantry divisional commanders considered the artillery insufficient for the width of the proposed attack. They thought a more narrowly focused attack would make better use of the available artillery. Chetwode and Chauvel, "the two most experienced generals in the force", watched the extension of the Ottoman defences at Gaza with "some foreboding." They had seen the strength and determination of Ottoman defenders in entrenched positions at the Battle of Magdhaba and the Battle of Rafa.
After receiving fresh information regarding Ottoman deployments on 10 April, Dobell modified his plan to incorporate a more flexible approach. While the first stage would remain unchanged, during the second stage of the battle he might attack directly by swinging his line slightly northeast, with only one division attacking Gaza to create a gap for Desert Column, depending on whether the hostile Atawineh defences were reinforced by units from the Hareira detachment. Or he might send most of his force to the coastal side of Gaza to make an attack there. By 16 April Murray had moved his advanced GHQ EEF in a railway train, from El Arish to Khan Yunis, and was in telephone communication with Dobell's Eastern Force battle headquarters at Deir el Belah, 5 miles (8.0 km) south of the Wadi Ghuzzee. Meanwhile, Chetwode moved his Desert Column headquarters from near In Seirat to Tel el Jemmi.
Just after 19:00, the infantry divisions marched towards the Wadi Ghuzzee crossings, while the Anzac Mounted Division left Deir el Belah at 18:30 with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade leading the night march. At 04:30 on 17 April the Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment led the way across the Wadi Ghuzzee at the Shellal ford, followed by the remainder of the Anzac Mounted Division.
＞Some infantry divisional commanders considered the artillery insufficient for the width of the proposed attack. They thought a more narrowly focused attack would make better use of the available artillery. Chetwode and Chauvel, "the two most experienced generals in the force", watched the extension of the Ottoman defences at Gaza with "some foreboding." They had seen the strength and determination of Ottoman defenders in entrenched positions at the Battle of Magdhaba and the Battle of Rafa.
⇒一部の歩兵師団の指揮官が、提案された攻撃の幅に対して、現有の大砲では不十分であると思った。彼らは、より間近で集中する攻撃の方が、利用可能な大砲をより良く活用できるだろうと考えた。「軍団中で最も経験豊かな2人の将軍」チェトウォードとショーヴェルは、ガザにおけるオスマントルコ軍防衛隊の拡張を「若干の不吉な予感」をもって警戒していた。彼らは、「マグダバの戦い」と「ラファの戦い」で塹壕付きの陣地にこもるオスマントルコ軍防衛隊の軍勢と決断（力）のほどを知っていたのである。
＞After receiving fresh information regarding Ottoman deployments on 10 April, Dobell modified his plan to incorporate a more flexible approach. While the first stage would remain unchanged, during the second stage of the battle he might attack directly by swinging his line slightly northeast, with only one division attacking Gaza to create a gap for Desert Column, depending on whether the hostile Atawineh defences were reinforced by units from the Hareira detachment.
⇒4月10日、オスマントルコ軍の布陣に関して新しい情報を受けた後に、ドーベルは、より柔軟な接近作戦を取り入れるために計画を修正した。最初の攻撃段階で変化がないままなら、第2段階までの間で、敵軍のアタウィネフ防衛隊がハレイラの分遣隊からの部隊によって補強されたかどうかによっては、砂漠縦隊向けに隙間を空けるために1個師団だけでガザを攻撃して、戦線をわずかに北東に振って直接攻撃することにした。
＞Or he might send most of his force to the coastal side of Gaza to make an attack there. By 16 April Murray had moved his advanced GHQ EEF in a railway train, from El Arish to Khan Yunis, and was in telephone communication with Dobell's Eastern Force battle headquarters at Deir el Belah, 5 miles (8.0 km) south of the Wadi Ghuzzee. Meanwhile, Chetwode moved his Desert Column headquarters from near In Seirat to Tel el Jemmi.
⇒あるいは、ガザの沿岸側で攻撃させるために、そこへ大部分の軍団を送ることもあり得た。4月16日までに、マレイは、彼の先進のEEF（エジプト遠征軍）本部を鉄道でエル・アリシュからカーン・ユヌスまで動かして、ワジ・グゼーの5マイル（8キロ）南のディエル・エル・ベラフにいるドーベルの東部軍団戦争本部と電話でコミュニケーションをとった。一方、チェトウォードは、砂漠縦隊本部をイン・セイラトの近くからテル・エル・ジェミに動かした。
＞Just after 19:00, the infantry divisions marched towards the Wadi Ghuzzee crossings, while the Anzac Mounted Division left Deir el Belah at 18:30 with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade leading the night march. At 04:30 on 17 April the Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment led the way across the Wadi Ghuzzee at the Shellal ford, followed by the remainder of the Anzac Mounted Division.
⇒19時ちょっと過ぎ、歩兵師団はワジ・グゼー横断に向かって進軍したが、その間、アンザック騎馬師団は、夜間行軍を先導するニュージーランド騎馬旅団とともに、18時30分にディエル・エル・ベラフを去った。4月17日4時30分、カンタベリー騎馬ライフル連隊がシェラルの浅瀬でワジ・グゼーを渡る道を先導して、アンザック騎馬師団の残りが続いた。
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