The Battle of Passchendaele: A Plan for the Flanders Offensive
- Plumer produced a revised plan for the Flanders offensive, aiming to capture Messines and Pilckem ridges and advance onto the Gheluvelt Plateau.
- Colonel Macmullen proposed a massed tank attack to take the Gheluvelt Plateau, but the terrain was deemed unsuitable for tanks.
- The GHQ 1917 plan, developed by Plumer, Rawlinson, and Haig, included the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge and the Flanders offensive to wear down the German army, secure the Belgian coast, and connect with the Dutch frontier.
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Plumer produced a revised plan, in which in the first stage, Messines and Pilckem ridges would be captured, with an advance some distance onto the Gheluvelt Plateau; soon afterwards, an attack would be made across the Gheluvelt Plateau, to Passchendaele and beyond. Plumer believed that a force of 35 divisions and 5,000 guns would be necessary, which was far greater than the amount of artillery in the BEF. Haig also asked for an assessment from Colonel Macmullen on the General Headquarters staff, who proposed that the Gheluvelt Plateau be taken by a massed tank attack, reducing the need for artillery. In April, a reconnaissance by Captain Giffard LeQuesne Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks, because of narrow defiles between the three woods obstructing the approaches on the high ground and the broken state of the terrain. The tanks would have to detour north of Bellewaarde lake to Westhoek then wheel right at the German Albrecht Stellung. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions: the front line, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). In between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. Plumer produced a second revision of his plan; Messines Ridge and the west end of the Gheluvelt Plateau would be attacked first and then Pilckem Ridge a short while later. The Fourth Army commander, General Henry Rawlinson proposed a plan to take Messines Ridge, then the Gheluvelt Plateau and Pilckem Ridge within 47–72 hours. On 14 February after discussions with Rawlinson, Plumer and Haig, Macmullen submitted a memorandum which became the GHQ 1917 plan. On 7 May, Haig set the timetable for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge (7 June) and the Flanders offensive some weeks later. A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig informed his army commanders that his objectives were to wear down the German army, secure the Belgian coast and connect with the Dutch frontier.
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＞Plumer produced a revised plan, in which in the first stage, Messines and Pilckem ridges would be captured, with an advance some distance onto the Gheluvelt Plateau; soon afterwards, an attack would be made across the Gheluvelt Plateau, to Passchendaele and beyond. Plumer believed that a force of 35 divisions and 5,000 guns would be necessary, which was far greater than the amount of artillery in the BEF. ⇒プルーマーは修正計画を製作した。そして、最初の段階で、ゲルヴェルト台地まである程度の距離の進軍をしてメッシネスとピルケム尾根を攻略するものとした。その後すぐに、攻撃をゲルヴェルト台地の全域で行い、パッシェンデールへ向かう、あるいは、それを越えることとする。プルーマーは、35個の師団と5,000丁の銃砲が必要であると思っていたが、それはBEFの擁する砲兵隊の数量よりはるかに大きかった。 ＞Haig also asked for an assessment from Colonel Macmullen on the General Headquarters staff, who proposed that the Gheluvelt Plateau be taken by a massed tank attack, reducing the need for artillery. In April, a reconnaissance by Captain Giffard LeQuesne Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks, because of narrow defiles between the three woods obstructing the approaches on the high ground and the broken state of the terrain. ⇒ヘイグはまた、総司令部付スタッフのマクミューレン大佐から評価を求めたところ、彼は、砲兵隊の必要数を減らして、戦車攻撃によってゲルヴェルト台地を奪取することを提案した。（しかし）4月のジファール・ルケズヌ・マーテル大尉による調査で、3つの森の間が狭い隘路であり、高地と壊れた地形状態によって接近が妨げられるため、同地域は戦車にとって不適当であるとわかった。 ＞The tanks would have to detour north of Bellewaarde lake to Westhoek then wheel right at the German Albrecht Stellung. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions: the front line, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). ⇒戦車は、ベレワーデ湖の北を迂回してウェストホークに行き、それからドイツ軍のアルブレヒト陣地で右へ旋回しなければならないだろう。1917年中頃から、イープルの東地域は、6か所のドイツ軍の防御陣地によって守られていた。すなわち、最前線、アルブレヒト陣地（第2戦線）、ウィルヘルム陣地（第3戦線）、フランドル第I陣地（第4戦線）、フランドル第II陣地（第5戦線）、およびフランドル第III陣地（工事中）である。 ＞In between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. Plumer produced a second revision of his plan; Messines Ridge and the west end of the Gheluvelt Plateau would be attacked first and then Pilckem Ridge a short while later. The Fourth Army commander, General Henry Rawlinson proposed a plan to take Messines Ridge, then the Gheluvelt Plateau and Pilckem Ridge within 47–72 hours. ⇒ドイツ軍守備隊の陣地の中や間に、ゾンネベケやパッシェンデールというベルギーの村がある。プルーマーは、彼の計画について2回目の改訂版を作った。メッシネス・リッジとゲルヴェルト台地の西端は最初に攻撃して、少し後にピルケム・リッジを攻撃することとした。第4方面軍の指揮官ヘンリー・ローリンソン将軍は、まずメッシネス・リッジ、それからゲルヴェルト台地とピルケム・リッジを47–72時間内に奪取する計画を提案した。 ＞On 14 February after discussions with Rawlinson, Plumer and Haig, Macmullen submitted a memorandum which became the GHQ 1917 plan. On 7 May, Haig set the timetable for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge (7 June) and the Flanders offensive some weeks later. A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig informed his army commanders that his objectives were to wear down the German army, secure the Belgian coast and connect with the Dutch frontier. ⇒ローリンソン、プルーマー、ヘイグとの議論の後の2月14日に、マクミューレンが覚え書を提出し、それがGHQの1917年計画になった。ヘイグは5月7日に、予備的にメッシネス・リッジ（6月7日）を攻撃し、その数週後にフランドル攻勢をかけるようなタイムテーブルを設定した。ヘイグは、「メッシネス・リッジの戦い」の1週後に、ドイツ軍を疲弊させること、ベルギーの海岸を守ること、およびオランダ国境との接続をつけること、これが今次の戦の目的である、と彼の方面軍指揮官らに知らせた。
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The 4th Army held a front of 25 miles (40 km) with three Gruppen, composed of a corps headquarters and a varying complement of divisions; Group Staden, based on the headquarters of the Guards Reserve Corps was added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions, Group Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of the Menin road, with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were stationed behind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. About 5 miles (8.0 km) further back, were four more Eingreif divisions and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them, another two in Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) reserve. The Germans were anxious that the British would attempt to exploit the victory at the Battle of Messines, with an advance to the Tower Hamlets spur, beyond the north end of Messines Ridge. On 9 June, Crown Prince Rupprecht proposed a withdrawal to the Flandern line east of Messines. Construction of defences began but were terminated after Fritz von Loßberg was appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. Loßberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and ordered that the current front line east of the Oosttaverne line be held rigidly. To this end, the Flandern Stellung (Flanders Position) along Passchendaele Ridge, in front of the Flandern line, would become the Flandern I Stellung and a new Flandern II Stellung would run west of Menin and north to Passchendaele. Construction of a Flandern III Stellung east of Menin northwards to Moorslede was also begun. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by the front position, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction); between the German defences lay the villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendale.
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After dawn, aerodromes were periodically to be attacked by small formations of low-flying fighters and by day bombers from high-altitude. German defensive preparations Main article: German defensive preparations: June–July 1917 From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions the front position, Albrechtstellung (second position), Wilhemstellung (third position), Flandern I Stellung (fourth position), Flandern II Stellung (fifth position) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). Between the German defence positions, lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. "Elastic" defence tactics had been rejected by the 4th Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Fritz von Loßberg, who believed that a tactical withdrawal by trench garrisons would disorganise the counter-attacking reserves, leading to the loss of the sector and danger to flanking units. Loßberg ordered the front line of sentry groups (Postengraben) to be held rigidly; British attacks would exhaust themselves and then be repulsed by local German reserves or by Eingreif divisions. Loßberg also judged that there was little prospect of British attacks being delayed by their need to move artillery forward and build supply routes. The British had a huge mass of artillery and the infrastructure necessary to supply it with ammunition, much of it built opposite the Flandern I Stellung in the period between the attack at Messines and 31 July. German defensive tactics had been costly but succeeded on the front of XIX Corps on 31 July and against II Corps on the Gheluvelt Plateau on 31 July and during August, although the counter-attacks had been stopped in their turn by British artillery fire, when they reached areas where observation and communications between British infantry and artillery had been restored. Ludendorff later wrote that losses in the August battles had been unexpectedly high. The pause in British operations in early September helped to mislead the Germans. General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind.
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On 25 June, Erich Ludendorff, the First Quartermaster General, suggested to Crown Prince Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm Stellung, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht Stellung. On 30 June, the army group Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl, suggested a withdrawal to the Flandern I Stellung along Passchendaele ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentières in the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Sehnen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge could be held, if it was made the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) of the German defensive effort. Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans could see the area from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg's judgement was accepted and no withdrawal was made. Main article: Battle of Messines (1917) The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. The German positions had observation over Ypres and unless captured, would enable observed enfilade artillery-fire against a British attack eastwards from the salient. Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging mines under the German positions on the ridge. By June 1917, 21 mines had been filled with nearly 1,000,000 long tons (1,000,000 t) of explosives. The Germans knew the British were mining and had taken some counter-measures but they were taken by surprise at the extent of the British effort. Two of the mines failed to detonate but 19 went off on 7 June, at 3:10 a.m. British Summer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before dark and the British had fewer losses than expected, the plan having provided for up to 50 percent in the initial attack. Battle of Messines (1917) メセンの戦い
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Preparations for operations in Flanders began in 1915, with the doubling of the Hazebrouck–Ypres rail line and the building of a new line from Bergues–Proven which was doubled in early 1917. Progress on roads, rail lines, railheads and spurs in the Second Army zone was continuous and by mid-1917, gave the area the most efficient supply system of the BEF. Several plans and memoranda for a Flanders offensive were produced between January 1916 and May 1917, in which the writers tried to relate the offensive resources available to the terrain and the likely German defence. In early 1916, the importance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau for an advance further north was emphasised by Haig and the army commanders. On 14 February 1917, Colonel C. N. Macmullen of GHQ proposed that the plateau be taken by a mass tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; in April a reconnaissance by Captain G. le Q Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks. On 9 February, General Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army, suggested that Messines Ridge could be taken in one day and that the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau should be fundamental to the attack further north. He suggested that the southern attack from St. Yves to Mont Sorrel should come first and that Mont Sorrel to Steenstraat should be attacked within 48–72 hours. After discussions with Rawlinson and Plumer and the incorporation of Haig's changes, Macmullen submitted his memorandum on 14 February. With amendments the memorandum became the GHQ 1917 plan. A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig gave his objectives to his Army commanders: wearing out the enemy, securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier by the capture of Passchendaele ridge, followed by an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush, an attack along the coast with an amphibious landing. If manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first part of the plan might be fulfilled. On 30 April, Haig told Gough the Fifth Army commander, that he would lead the "Northern Operation" and the coastal force, although Cabinet approval for the offensive was not granted until 21 June.
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The German defensive success on the Gheluvelt Plateau left the British in the centre open to enfilade-fire from the right, that contributed to the higher number of losses after the advance had stopped and Gough was criticised for setting objectives that were too ambitious, causing the infantry to lose the barrage and become vulnerable to the German afternoon counter-attacks. Prior and Wilson wrote that the failure had deeper roots, since successive attacks could only be spasmodic, as guns were moved forward, a long process that would only recover the ground lost in 1915. This was far less than the results Haig had used to justify the offensive, in which great blows would be struck, the German defences would collapse and the British would be able safely to advance beyond the range of supporting artillery to the Passchendaele and Klercken ridges, towards Roulers and Thourout and the Belgian coast. The German counter-bombardments and Eingreif divisions had not crumpled, leaving only the possibility of a slow tactical success, rather than a strategic triumph. In 2008, Harris called the attack on 31 July a remarkable success compared to 1 July 1916, with only about half the casualties and far fewer fatalities, inflicting about the same number on the Germans, prisoner interrogations convincing Haig that the German army had deteriorated. The relative failure on the Gheluvelt Plateau and the repulse in the centre from the red line and parts of the green line by German counter-attacks did not detract from this, other counter-attacks being defeated. Had the weather been dry during August the German defence might have collapsed and the geographical objective of the offensive, to re-capture the Belgian coast might have been achieved. Much rain fell on the afternoon of 31 July and the rain in August was unusually severe, having a worse effect on the British, who had more artillery and a greater need to get artillery-observation aircraft into action in the conditions of rain and low cloud. Mud paralysed manoeuvre and the Germans were trying to hold ground rather than advance, that was an easier task regardless of the weather.
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The effectiveness of the British mines, barrages and bombardments was improved by advances in artillery survey, flash-spotting and centralised control of artillery from the Second Army headquarters. British attacks from 8–14 June advanced the front line beyond the former German Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line. The Battle of Messines was a prelude to the much larger Third Battle of Ypres campaign, the preliminary bombardment for which began on 11 July 1917.In 1916, the British planned to clear the German army from the Belgian coast to prevent them from using the coastal ports as bases from which to attack merchant ships and troop transports in the North Sea and English Channel. In January 1916, General Sir Herbert Plumer recommended to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig the capture of Messines Ridge (part of the southern arc of the Ypres Salient) before an operation to capture the Gheluvelt plateau further north. The Flanders campaign was postponed because of the Battle of Verdun in 1916 and the demands of the Battle of the Somme. When it became apparent that the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) (16 April – 9 May 1917) had failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives, Haig instructed the Second Army to capture the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge as soon as possible. Haig intended to force the Germans to move troops away from the French armies on the Aisne front, where demoralisation amid the failure of the Nivelle Offensive had led to mutinies. British operations in Flanders would relieve pressure on the French Army and the capture of Messines Ridge would give the British control of the strategically important ground on the southern flank of the Ypres Salient, shorten the front, deprive the Germans of observation over British positions further north.
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Tactical developments The preliminary operation to capture Messines ridge (7–14 June) had been followed by a strategic pause as the British repaired their communications behind Messines ridge, completed the building of the infrastructure necessary for a much larger force in the Ypres area and moved troops and equipment north from the Arras front. After delays caused by local conditions, the Battles of Ypres had begun on 31 July with the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, which was a substantial local success for the British, taking a large amount of ground and inflicting many casualties on the German defenders. The German defence had nonetheless recovered some of the lost ground in the middle of the attack front and restricted the British advance on the Gheluvelt Plateau further south. British attacks had then been seriously hampered by unseasonal heavy rain during August and had not been able to retain much of the additional ground captured on the plateau on 10, 16–18, 22–24 and 27 August due to the determined German defence, mud and poor visibility. Sir Douglas Haig ordered artillery to be transferred from the southern flank of the Second Army and more artillery to be brought into Flanders from the armies further south, to increase the weight of the attack on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The principal role was changed from the Fifth to the Second Army and the boundary between the Second and Fifth armies was moved north towards the Ypres–Roulers railway, to narrow the frontages of the Second Army divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau. A pause in British attacks was used to reorganise and to improve supply routes behind the front line, to carry forward 54,572 long tons (55,448 t) of ammunition above normal expenditure, guns were moved forward to new positions and the infantry and artillery reinforcements which arrived, practised for the next attack. The unseasonal rains stopped, the ground began to dry and the cessation of British attacks misled the Germans, who risked moving some units away from Flanders.
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Military analysts and historians disagree on the strategic significance of the battle, although most describe it as a British tactical and operational success. In 1919, Ludendorff wrote that the British victory cost the German army dear and drained German reserves. Hindenburg wrote that the losses at Messines had been very heavy and that he regretted that the ground had not been evacuated; in 1922, Kuhl called it one of the worst German tragedies of the war. In 1920 Haig's Dispatches described the success of the British plan, organisation and results but refrained from hyperbole, referring to the operation as a successful preliminary to the main offensive at Ypres. In 1930, Liddell Hart thought the success at Messines inflated expectations for the Third Battle of Ypres and that because the circumstances of the operations were different, attempts to apply similar tactics resulted in failure. In 1938 Lloyd George called the battle an apéritif and in 1939, G. C. Wynne judged it to be a "brilliant success", overshadowed by the subsequent tragedy of the Battles of Passchendaele. The Official Historian called it a "great victory" in 1948 and Prior and Wilson (1997) called the battle a "noteworthy success" but then complained about the decision to postpone exploitation of the success on the Gheluvelt plateau. Ashley Ekins referred to the battle as a great set-piece victory, which was also costly, particularly for the infantry of II Anzac Corps, as did Christopher Pugsley, referring to the experience of the New Zealand Division. Heinz Hagenlücke called it a great British success and wrote that the loss of the ridge, had a worse effect on German morale than the number of casualties. Jack Sheldon called it a "significant victory" for the British and a "disaster" for the German army, which was forced into a "lengthy period of anxious waiting".
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The British had to move their artillery forward into the area devastated by shellfire and soaked by the return of heavy rain, restricting the routes on which guns and ammunition could be moved, which presented German artillery with easier targets. In the next British attack on 9 October, after several days of rain, the German defence achieved a costly success, holding the approaches to Passchendaele village, which was the most tactically vital ground. Tactical developments The Battle of Broodseinde was the third of the British elaborated form of "bite and hold" attacks in the Passchendaele campaign, (Third Battle of Ypres) conducted by the Second Army (General Herbert Plumer) after the reorganisation caused by the costly but successful defence of the Gheluvelt Plateau by the German 4th Army. The unseasonal heavy rains in August had hampered British attempts to advance more than German attempts to maintain their positions. The plateau ran along the southern edge of the Ypres Salient and formed an obstacle to further eastward attacks, obstructing the Allied advance out of the salient. The battle followed the Battle of Menin Road on 20 September and the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September, which had captured much the plateau and inflicted many casualties on the German defenders. There had been at least 24 German counter-attacks since the Battle of Menin Road and more after the Battle of Polygon Wood, particularly on 30 September and 1 October, when larger German organised counter-attacks (Gegenangriffe) were made and had been costly failures. On 28 September, Sir Douglas Haig had met Plumer and the Fifth Army commander General Hubert Gough to explain his intentions, in view of the victories of 20 and 26 September, the fine weather, disarray among the German defenders and the limited prospect of German reinforcements arriving from the Russian front. Haig judged that the next attack, due on 6 October, would conclude the period of strictly limited advances. The following step would be a deeper advance, with provision made for exploitation. Haig wanted XV Corps on the Belgian coast and the amphibious force of Operation Hush readied, in case of a general withdrawal by the Germans.
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The attack was not planned as a breakthrough operation, because Flandern I Stellung, the fourth German defensive position, lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front line and was not an objective on the first day. The Fifth Army plan was a more ambitious version of the earlier plans devised by Rawlinson and Plumer, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m) on the first day. Major-General J. Davidson, Director of Operations at GHQ, wrote in a memorandum that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives" and suggested reverting to a 1,750 yards (1,600 m) advance, to increase the concentration of British artillery. Gough stressed the need to plan to exploit an opportunity to take ground left temporarily undefended; this was more likely in the first attack, which would have the benefit of long preparation. After discussions at the end of June, Haig and Plumer, the Second Army commander, endorsed the Fifth Army plan. Battle of Pilckem Ridge The British attack began at 3:50 a.m. on 31 July; the attack was to commence at dawn but a layer of unbroken low cloud, meant that it was still dark when the infantry advanced. The main attack, by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, confronted the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding (Stellungsdivisionen) and Eingreif divisions. The attack had most success on the northern flank, in front of XIV Corps and the French First Army. In this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 2,500–3,000 yards (2,300–2,700 m) to the line of the Steenbeek stream. In the centre, XVIII Corps and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the Steenbeek to consolidate and sent fresh troops towards the Green and Red lines on the XIX Corps front, for an advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m). Group Ypres counter-attacked the flanks of the British break-in, supported by all available artillery and aircraft around noon.
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