Nivelle Offensive and the Importance of Flanders to the British Government

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  • Nivelle agreed to a proviso that if the first two parts of the operation failed to lead to a breakthrough, they would be stopped so that the British could move their main forces north for the Flanders offensive, which Haig argued was of great importance to the British government.
  • Haig planned the Flanders offensive, with the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge set for 7 June. The British considered clearing the Belgian coast urgent due to the Germans' resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare.
  • An offensive at Ypres would improve the tactical situation, reduce wastage, and continue the wearing-out process of the German army.
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Nivelle agreed to a proviso that if the first two parts of the operation failed to lead to a breakthrough, they would be stopped so that the British could move their main forces north for the Flanders offensive, which Haig argued was of great importance to the British government. Haig wrote on 23 January that it would take six weeks to move British troops and equipment from the Arras front to Flanders and on 14 March he noted that the attack on Messines Ridge could be made in May. On 21 March, he wrote to Nivelle that it would take two months to prepare the attacks from Messines to Steenstraat but that the Messines attack could be ready in 5–6 weeks. On 16 May, Haig wrote that he had divided the Flanders operation into two phases, one to take Messines Ridge and the main attack several weeks later. British determination to clear the Belgian coast took on more urgency after the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917. On 1 May 1917, Haig wrote that the Nivelle Offensive had weakened the German army but that an attempt at a decisive blow would be premature. An offensive at Ypres would continue the wearing-out process, on a front where the Germans could not refuse to fight. Even a partial success would improve the tactical situation in the Ypres salient, reducing the exceptional "wastage" which occurred even in quiet periods. In early May, Haig set the timetable for the Flanders offensive, with 7 June the date for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge. Ypres is overlooked by Kemmel Hill in the south-west and from the east by a line of low hills running south-west to north-east. Wytschaete (Wijtschate) and Hill 60 are to the east of Verbrandenmolen, Hooge, Polygon Wood and Passchendaele (Passendale).

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＞Nivelle agreed to a proviso that if the first two parts of the operation failed to lead to a breakthrough, they would be stopped so that the British could move their main forces north for the Flanders offensive, which Haig argued was of great importance to the British government. Haig wrote on 23 January that it would take six weeks to move British troops and equipment from the Arras front to Flanders and on 14 March he noted that the attack on Messines Ridge could be made in May. On 21 March, he wrote to Nivelle that it would take two months to prepare the attacks from Messines to Steenstraat but that the Messines attack could be ready in 5–6 weeks. ⇒ニヴェーユは、作戦行動の最初の2つの部分が突破できないならば、フランドル攻撃のために英国軍の主要軍隊を北へ動かせるように、そこで一旦止まるという条件に同意した。そしてそれは、英国政府にとって非常に重要である、とヘイグは主張した。ヘイグは1月23日に、アラス前線からフランドルまで英国軍隊と器材を移動させるのに6週間かかると書き、3月21日には、メッシネス（ムスィヌ）・リッジへの攻撃は5月に実行できる点を注記した。3月14日に彼は、メッシネスからステーンストラートまでの攻撃を準備するために2ヵ月かかるが、メッシネス攻撃は5－6週間で準備できるだろう、とニヴェーユに書いた。 ＞On 16 May, Haig wrote that he had divided the Flanders operation into two phases, one to take Messines Ridge and the main attack several weeks later. British determination to clear the Belgian coast took on more urgency after the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917. On 1 May 1917, Haig wrote that the Nivelle Offensive had weakened the German army but that an attempt at a decisive blow would be premature. An offensive at Ypres would continue the wearing-out process, on a front where the Germans could not refuse to fight. ⇒ヘイグは、5月16日にフランドル作戦行動を、まずメッシネス・リッジを攻略し、その数週後に主要攻撃を実行する、という2つの段階に分けたと書いた。ドイツ軍が1917年2月1日に無制限の海底戦争を再開したあと、ベルギー沿岸を一掃するための英国軍の決意が緊急を要することとなった。ヘイグは1917年5月1日、ニヴェーユ攻撃はドイツ軍を弱体化したが、決定的な打撃を与える試みには時期尚早なので、イープル攻撃はドイツ軍にとって戦闘拒否ができない前線で消耗戦を続けることになるだろう、と書いた。 ＞Even a partial success would improve the tactical situation in the Ypres salient, reducing the exceptional "wastage" which occurred even in quiet periods. In early May, Haig set the timetable for the Flanders offensive, with 7 June the date for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge. Ypres is overlooked by Kemmel Hill in the south-west and from the east by a line of low hills running south-west to north-east. Wytschaete (Wijtschate) and Hill 60 are to the east of Verbrandenmolen, Hooge, Polygon Wood and Passchendaele (Passendale). ⇒部分的な成功でもイープル突出部の戦術的状況を改善して、休戦状態の期間でも生じる余分な「消耗」を減らすだろう。5月上旬にヘイグはフランドル攻撃の日程表を設定して、6月7日をもってメッシネス・リッジへの予備攻撃の日とした。イープルは、南西側ではケメル・ヒルから、東側では南西から北東に走る一連の低い丘から見渡される。それは、ヴェルブランデンモレン、フージ、ポリゴン・ウッド、およびパッシェンダエレ（パッセンダレ）であり、その東のウィッツチャエテ（ウィーチャテ）、および60番ヒルなどである。

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  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    The Battle of Passchendaele (Third Battle of Ypres, Flandernschlacht and Deuxième Bataille des Flandres) was a campaign of the First World War, fought by the Allies against the German Empire. The battle took place on the Western Front, from July to November 1917, for control of the ridges south and east of the Belgian city of Ypres in West Flanders, as part of a strategy decided by the Allies at conferences in November 1916 and May 1917. Passchendaele lay on the last ridge east of Ypres, 5 miles (8.0 km) from a railway junction at Roulers, which was vital to the supply system of the German 4th Army. The next stage of the Allied plan was an advance to Thourout–Couckelaere, to close the German-controlled railway running through Roulers and Thourout. Further operations and a British supporting attack along the Belgian coast from Nieuwpoort, combined with Operation Hush (an amphibious landing), were to have reached Bruges and then the Dutch frontier. The resistance of the 4th Army, unusually wet weather, the onset of winter and the diversion of British and French resources to Italy, following the Austro-German victory at the Battle of Caporetto (24 October – 19 November), enabled the Germans to avoid a general withdrawal, which had seemed inevitable in early October. The campaign ended in November, when the Canadian Corps captured Passchendaele, apart from local attacks in December and the new year. In 1918, the Battle of the Lys and the Fifth Battle of Ypres were fought before the Allies occupied the Belgian coast and reached the Dutch frontier. A campaign in Flanders was controversial in 1917 and has remained so. The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, opposed the offensive, as did General Ferdinand Foch the French Chief of the General Staff. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), did not receive approval for the Flanders operation from the War Cabinet until 25 July. The Battle of Passchendaele Third Battle of Ypres, パッシェンデールの戦い（第三次イープルの戦い）

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Total British losses from January to March 1917 in France were given as 67,217, French losses given were 108,000 and German losses were 65,381. The first attack of the Nivelle Offensive by the British First and Third armies came at Arras, north of the Hindenburg Line on 9 April and inflicted a substantial defeat on the German 6th Army, which occupied obsolete defences on forward slopes. Vimy Ridge was captured and further south, the greatest depth of advance since trench-warfare began was achieved, surpassing the success of the French Sixth Army on 1 July 1916. German reinforcements were able to stabilise the front line, using both of the defensive methods endorsed in the new German training manual and the British continued the offensive, despite the difficulties of ground and German defensive tactics, in support of the French offensives further south and then to keep German troops in the area while the Messines Ridge attack was being prepared. German casualties were c. 85,000, against British losses of 117,066 for the Third and First armies.

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