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Preparations for operations in Flanders began in 1915, with the doubling of the Hazebrouck–Ypres rail line and the building of a new line from Bergues–Proven which was doubled in early 1917. Progress on roads, rail lines, railheads and spurs in the Second Army zone was continuous and by mid-1917, gave the area the most efficient supply system of the BEF. Several plans and memoranda for a Flanders offensive were produced between January 1916 and May 1917, in which the writers tried to relate the offensive resources available to the terrain and the likely German defence. In early 1916, the importance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau for an advance further north was emphasised by Haig and the army commanders. On 14 February 1917, Colonel C. N. Macmullen of GHQ proposed that the plateau be taken by a mass tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; in April a reconnaissance by Captain G. le Q Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks. On 9 February, General Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army, suggested that Messines Ridge could be taken in one day and that the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau should be fundamental to the attack further north. He suggested that the southern attack from St. Yves to Mont Sorrel should come first and that Mont Sorrel to Steenstraat should be attacked within 48–72 hours. After discussions with Rawlinson and Plumer and the incorporation of Haig's changes, Macmullen submitted his memorandum on 14 February. With amendments the memorandum became the GHQ 1917 plan. A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig gave his objectives to his Army commanders: wearing out the enemy, securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier by the capture of Passchendaele ridge, followed by an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush, an attack along the coast with an amphibious landing. If manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first part of the plan might be fulfilled. On 30 April, Haig told Gough the Fifth Army commander, that he would lead the "Northern Operation" and the coastal force, although Cabinet approval for the offensive was not granted until 21 June.

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>Preparations for operations in Flanders began in 1915, with the doubling of the Hazebrouck–Ypres rail line and the building of a new line from Bergues–Proven which was doubled in early 1917. Progress on roads, rail lines, railheads and spurs in the Second Army zone was continuous and by mid-1917, gave the area the most efficient supply system of the BEF. Several plans and memoranda for a Flanders offensive were produced between January 1916 and May 1917, in which the writers tried to relate the offensive resources available to the terrain and the likely German defence. ⇒フランドルでの作戦行動に対する準備は、1915年にアゼブルク‐イープル鉄道線とベルゲス‐プロヴェンからの新しい線の建設を倍増することから始まって、1917年前半にそれは2倍になった。第2方面軍地帯の道路、鉄道線、兵站駅、および付け出し道の進展は連続的で、1917年中頃までにはこの地域にBEFで最も効率的な供給システムをもたらした。フランドル攻撃のための幾つかの計画と覚え書が1916年1月と1917年5月の間で作成されたが、その作者らは利用できる攻撃資源とそこの地形を関連づけようとした。ドイツ軍守備隊も同様であった。 >In early 1916, the importance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau for an advance further north was emphasised by Haig and the army commanders. On 14 February 1917, Colonel C. N. Macmullen of GHQ proposed that the plateau be taken by a mass tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; in April a reconnaissance by Captain G. le Q Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks. ⇒1916年前半に、ヘイグと軍指揮官によって更なる北進のためのゲルヴェルト台地の事前攻略の重要性が強調された。1917年2月14日、GHQ(総参謀本部)のC.N.マクマレン大佐は、砲兵隊を減らし、大規模な戦車攻撃によってこの台地を攻略することを提案した。しかし4月に、G.ル・Q.マーテル大尉の斥候調査によって、この地域は戦車に不向きであることが分かった。 >On 9 February, General Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army, suggested that Messines Ridge could be taken in one day and that the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau should be fundamental to the attack further north. He suggested that the southern attack from St. Yves to Mont Sorrel should come first and that Mont Sorrel to Steenstraat should be attacked within 48–72 hours. After discussions with Rawlinson and Plumer and the incorporation of Haig's changes, Macmullen submitted his memorandum on 14 February. With amendments the memorandum became the GHQ ⇒1917年2月9日、第4方面軍の指揮官、ローリンソン将軍は、メッシネス・リッジが1日で奪取できるので、ゲルヴェルト台地を攻略し、それをさらに北への攻撃の基本とすべきである、と提案した。彼は、サン・イーブからモン・ソレルまでに至る南の攻撃を最初にするべきで、そして、モン・ソレルからステーンストラートまでを48–72時間以内で攻撃するように提案した。ローリンソンやプルーマーとの議論、およびヘイグの変更の組み入れの後、マクマレンは2月14日に彼の覚え書を提出した。それに改正を加えた覚え書が1917年のGHQ計画になった。 >A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig gave his objectives to his Army commanders: wearing out the enemy, securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier by the capture of Passchendaele ridge, followed by an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush, an attack along the coast with an amphibious landing. If manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first part of the plan might be fulfilled. On 30 April, Haig told Gough the Fifth Army commander, that he would lead the "Northern Operation" and the coastal force, although Cabinet approval for the offensive was not granted until 21 June. ⇒「メッシネス・リッジの戦い」の1週後に、ヘイグは彼の方面軍指揮官に、彼の目的を指示した。彼らは敵を疲弊させることでベルギーの海岸を守り、パッシェンダエレ尾根の占領によってオランダの国境につながり、ルーラーへの進軍へと続け、さらに「ハッシュ作戦行動」の陸海空共同の上陸による沿岸攻撃へと続けた。もし、人的資源と大砲が不十分であったら、計画の最初の部分だけしか成し遂げられなかったかもしれない。4月30日に、ヘイグは第5方面軍指揮官のゴフに「北部の作戦行動」と沿岸の軍団の指揮を伝えたが、実は、攻撃のための内閣承認は6月21日まで与えられなかった。

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