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質問

Hipper opened fire at 08:00 on 16 December 1914, eventually killing 108 and wounding 525 civilians. British public and political opinion was outraged that German warships could sail so close to the British coast, shelling coastal towns with impunity; British naval forces had failed to prevent the attacks and also failed to intercept the raiding squadron. The British fleet had sailed but the German ships escaped in stormy seas and low visibility, assisted by British communication failures. The Germans had made the first successful attack on Britain since the 17th century and suffered no losses but Ingenohl was unjustly blamed for missing an opportunity to inflict a defeat on the Royal Navy, despite him creating the chance by his offensive-mindedness. The British had let the raid occur and appeared to the public to have been surprised (having been forewarned by decoded wireless messages) and then to have failed to sink the German raiding force on its way back to Germany. In 1921, the official historian Julian Corbett wrote,
Two of the most efficient and powerful British squadrons...knowing approximately what to expect...had failed to bring to action an enemy who was acting in close conformity with our appreciation and with whose advanced screen contact had been established.
— Strachan
The British had escaped a potential disaster, because the British 1st Battlecruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty) was unsupported by the 2nd Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender), when it failed to make contact with the raiding force. The worst British failure was in the exploitation of the intelligence provided by the code breakers at Room 40 (Sir Alfred Ewing), that had given the British notice of the raid. Some intercepts decoded during the action had taken two hours to reach British commanders at sea, by when they were out of date or misleading. News of the sailing of the HSF was delivered so late that the British commanders thought that the Germans were on the way, when they were returning. At sea, Beatty had sent ambiguous signals and some commanders had not used their initiative. On 30 December, the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, gave orders that when in contact with German ships, officers were to treat orders from those ignorant of local conditions as instructions only but he refused Admiralty suggestions to loosen ship formations, for fear of decentralising tactical command too far.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞Hipper opened fire at 08:00 on 16 December 1914, eventually killing 108 and wounding 525 civilians. British public and political opinion was outraged that German warships could sail so close to the British coast, shelling coastal towns with impunity; British naval forces had failed to prevent the attacks and also failed to intercept the raiding squadron. The British fleet had sailed but the German ships escaped in stormy seas and low visibility, assisted by British communication failures.
⇒ヒッペルは1914年12月16日08時に砲撃を開始し、最終的に108人を殺害し、525人の民間人を負傷させた。ドイツ軍の軍艦は英国海岸のごく近くを航行でき、何の罰則もなく沿岸の町を砲撃できることに対して英国の世論や政治的意見が激怒した。英国海軍は攻撃を防ぐことができず、襲撃部隊を阻止することもできなかった。英国艦隊は航海に出ていたが、ドイツ軍艦船は嵐の海の視界不良のおかげで逃走し、英国軍の通信障害にも助けられた。

＞The Germans had made the first successful attack on Britain since the 17th century and suffered no losses but Ingenohl was unjustly blamed for missing an opportunity to inflict a defeat on the Royal Navy, despite him creating the chance by his offensive-mindedness. The British had let the raid occur and appeared to the public to have been surprised (having been forewarned by decoded wireless messages) and then to have failed to sink the German raiding force on its way back to Germany. In 1921, the official historian Julian Corbett wrote,
　Two of the most efficient and powerful British squadrons...knowing approximately what to expect...had failed to bring to action an enemy who was acting in close conformity with our appreciation and with whose advanced screen contact had been established.　— Strachan
⇒ドイツ軍は17世紀以来英国に対する最初の攻撃を成功させながら、しかも損失を被ることはなかった。ところが、インゲノールは彼の攻撃精神によって好機を作り出したにもかかわらず、英国海軍に敗北を食らわす機会を逃したことで不当に非難された。英国軍は、（解読した無線通信によって事前警告を受けていたが）ドイツ軍に襲撃するがままにさせたので、公共には急襲されたように見えた。しかし、その後彼らがドイツに戻る途中で、ドイツ軍襲撃部隊を沈めることには失敗した。1921年、公報史家ジュリアン・コーベットは次のように書いている。
　最も効率的で強力な英国軍のうちの2個戦隊が…何を予期すべきかおおよそ分かっていたが…私たちの評価見積にぴったり適合して戦闘行動することや高度な煙幕接触を確立した敵を戦闘行動におびき出すことには失敗した。—ストラチャン

＞The British had escaped a potential disaster, because the British 1st Battlecruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty) was unsupported by the 2nd Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender), when it failed to make contact with the raiding force. The worst British failure was in the exploitation of the intelligence provided by the code breakers at Room 40 (Sir Alfred Ewing), that had given the British notice of the raid. Some intercepts decoded during the action had taken two hours to reach British commanders at sea, by when they were out of date or misleading.
⇒英国軍は潜在的な災厄を免れたが、英国軍第1戦艦大隊（副提督デビッド・ビーティー卿）が第2戦艦大隊（副提督ジョージ・ウォレンダー卿）の支援を受けていなかったために、襲撃部隊との接触に失敗した。英国軍の最悪の失敗は、英国に対する急襲について通知した「部屋40」（アルフレッド・ユーイング卿）の暗号解読者によって提供された諜報の利用の仕方にあった。戦闘行動中に傍受解読されたことが英国海軍の指揮官に到達するのに2時間かかったこと自体が、すでに時を逸していたか、誤解を招いたかのいずれかであった。

＞News of the sailing of the HSF was delivered so late that the British commanders thought that the Germans were on the way, when they were returning. At sea, Beatty had sent ambiguous signals and some commanders had not used their initiative. On 30 December, the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, gave orders that when in contact with German ships, officers were to treat orders from those ignorant of local conditions as instructions only but he refused Admiralty suggestions to loosen ship formations, for fear of decentralising tactical command too far.
⇒HSF（ドイツ軍公海艦隊）の航海に関するニュースの配信があまりにも遅れたので、英国軍の司令官はドイツ軍がまだ帰国の途上にあると考えた。海上では、ビーティがあいまいな信号を送り、一部の司令官は何も発動していなかった。12月30日、母国艦隊の司令官であるジョン・ジェリコー卿提督は、ドイツ軍の船舶と接触した場合、現場の条件を知らない者からの命令は単なる助言（程度）として扱うよう命令を出したが、戦術的指揮権が分散し過ぎることを恐れて、船艦の編成体を緩めるようにとの海軍本部の提案を拒否したのである。

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