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  • 質問No.9649153
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The Director of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver, established a code breaking organisation to decipher German signals, using cryptographers from academic backgrounds and making use of the windfalls taken from the German ships. At first, the inexperience of the cryptanalysts in naval matters led to errors in the understanding of the material and this lack of naval experience caused Oliver to make personal decisions about the information to be passed to other departments, many of which, particularly the Operations Department, had reservations about the value of Room 40. The transfer of an experienced naval officer, Commander W. W. Hope, remedied most of the deficiencies of the civilians' understanding. On 14 October, Oliver became Chief of the Naval War Staff, but continued to treat Room 40 more as a fiefdom and a source for the informal group of officers around the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, which received decoded messages but had insufficient authority to use them to best advantage.
German ships had to report their position every night by wireless and British listening posts along the east coast took cross-bearings to find the positions of the ships when they transmitted. This signals intelligence meant that the British did not need wasteful defensive standing patrols and sweeps of the North Sea but could economise on fuel and use the time for training and maintenance. The Admiralty also uncovered the German order of battle and tracked the deployment of ships, which gave them an offensive advantage. The lack of a proper war staff at the Admiralty and poor liaison between Room 40, Oliver and the operations staff, meant that the advantage was poorly exploited in 1915. (It was not until 1917 that this was remedied.) When German ships sailed, information from Room 40 needed to be passed on quickly but Oliver found it hard to delegate and would not routinely supply all decrypts; commanders at sea were supplied only with what the Admiralty thought they needed. Information could reach the Grand Fleet late, incomplete or mistakenly interpreted. When Jellicoe asked for a decryption section to take to sea, he was refused on security grounds. With the German High Seas Fleet (HSF) confined to port after the British success at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the Commander-in-Chief of the HSF planned a raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby on the east coast of England, with the I Scouting Group (Admiral Franz von Hipper), a battlecruiser squadron of three battlecruisers and a large armoured cruiser, supported by light cruisers and destroyers.

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>The Director of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver, established a code breaking organisation to decipher German signals, using cryptographers from academic backgrounds and making use of the windfalls taken from the German ships. At first, the inexperience of the cryptanalysts in naval matters led to errors in the understanding of the material and this lack of naval experience caused Oliver to make personal decisions about the information to be passed to other departments, many of which, particularly the Operations Department, had reservations about the value of Room 40.
⇒海軍本部の諜報部長であるヘンリー・オリバー海軍少将は、学識経歴豊かな暗号学者を頼み、ドイツ軍艦船からタナボタ式に得たものを利用して、ドイツ軍の信号を解読するための暗号読破組織を設立した。最初は、海軍問題に関する暗号解読者の経験不足が資料の理解に誤りをもたらし、この海軍経験の不足により、オリバーは他の部門に渡される情報について個人的な決定を下したので、これらの部門、特に「作戦行動部門」は「部屋40」の信憑性に危惧を抱いた。

>The transfer of an experienced naval officer, Commander W. W. Hope, remedied most of the deficiencies of the civilians' understanding. On 14 October, Oliver became Chief of the Naval War Staff, but continued to treat Room 40 more as a fiefdom and a source for the informal group of officers around the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, which received decoded messages but had insufficient authority to use them to best advantage.
⇒経験豊富な海軍将校W.W.ホープ司令官の移籍により、民間人の理解の不備のほとんどが改善された。10月14日、オリバーは海軍参謀本部長になったが、依然「部屋40」を管轄し続け、海軍大臣ウィンストン・チャーチル周辺の非公式(私的)な将校らに対する情報源を扱い続けた。ただし海軍にとってそれは、最大限優先的に利用する根拠としては不十分であった。
※一部推測で訳しました。誤訳の節はどうぞ悪しからず。

> German ships had to report their position every night by wireless and British listening posts along the east coast took cross-bearings to find the positions of the ships when they transmitted. This signals intelligence meant that the British did not need wasteful defensive standing patrols and sweeps of the North Sea but could economise on fuel and use the time for training and maintenance. The Admiralty also uncovered the German order of battle and tracked the deployment of ships, which gave them an offensive advantage.
⇒ドイツ軍の船艦は、毎晩無線で位置を報告する必要があり、東海岸沿いの英国軍のリスニングポスト(聴音哨・情報収集拠点)は、彼らの送信時の船艦の位置を見つけるためにクロスベアリング(十字形方位探知器?)を使用した。この信号諜報法(機能)により、英国軍は防御用に無駄な継続的巡視行動や北海の掃海を必要とせず、燃料を節約し、訓練とメンテナンスに時間を費やすことができた。海軍本部はまた、ドイツ軍の戦闘順序を明らかにし、船の配備を追跡したので、それによって攻撃上優位に立った。

>The lack of a proper war staff at the Admiralty and poor liaison between Room 40, Oliver and the operations staff, meant that the advantage was poorly exploited in 1915. (It was not until 1917 that this was remedied.) When German ships sailed, information from Room 40 needed to be passed on quickly but Oliver found it hard to delegate and would not routinely supply all decrypts; commanders at sea were supplied only with what the Admiralty thought they needed. Information could reach the Grand Fleet late, incomplete or mistakenly interpreted.
⇒海軍本部に適切な戦争スタッフがいないことと、オリバーと作戦スタッフの間の貧弱なつながりは、1915年に英国軍の優位性が十分に活用されなかったことを意味した(このことは1917年まで改善されないままであった)。ドイツ軍の船艦が出航するとき、「部屋40」からの情報を迅速に伝える必要があったが、オリバーは権限を委任するのが難しいと判断し、すべての暗号解読を定期的に提供することはしなかった。海上の司令官には、海軍本部が必要と考えたものだけが提供された。(ということで)大艦隊に情報が遅れて届くとか、不完全であるとか、誤って解釈される可能性があった。

>When Jellicoe asked for a decryption section to take to sea, he was refused on security grounds. With the German High Seas Fleet (HSF) confined to port after the British success at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the Commander-in-Chief of the HSF planned a raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby on the east coast of England, with the I Scouting Group (Admiral Franz von Hipper), a battlecruiser squadron of three battlecruisers and a large armoured cruiser, supported by light cruisers and destroyers.
⇒ジェリコーが暗号解読部門を海上に持って行くように頼んだが、それはセキュリティ上の理由で拒否された。1914年に英国軍が「ヘリゴランド湾の戦い」で成功した後、ドイツ軍公海艦隊(HSF)は港湾に限定されたため、HSFの指揮官フリードリッヒ・フォン・インゲノール提督は次のような襲撃を計画した。すなわちそれは、第I斥候隊グループ(フランツ・フォン・ヒッペル提督)、3隻の戦艦、および軽巡洋艦と駆逐艦に支援される1隻の大型装甲巡洋艦の戦隊をもって英国の東海岸のスカボロー、ハートルプール、およびウィットバイを急襲することであった。
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iwano_aoi

お礼率 88% (2709/3045)

回答ありがとうございました。
投稿日時:2019/09/16 22:46
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