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After all,' says Buckland, it should be recollected that the question is not respecting the correctness of the Mosaic narrative, but of our interpretation of it,' proposition which can hardly be sufficiently reprobated. Such a doctrine, carried out unreservedly, strikes at the root of critical morality. It may, indeed, be sometimes possible to give two or three different interpretations to one and the same passage, even in a modern and familiar tongue, in which case this may arise from the unskilfulness of the writer or speaker who has failed clearly to express his thought. In a dead or foreign language the difficulty may arise from our own want of familiarity with its forms of speech, or in an ancient book we may be puzzled by allusions and modes of thought the key to which has been lost. But it is no part of the commentator's or interpreter's business to introduce obscurity or find difficulties where none exist, and it cannot be pretended that, taking it as a question of the use of words to express thoughts, there are any peculiar difficulties about understanding the first chapter of Genesis, whether in its original Hebrew or in our common translation, which represents the original with all necessary exactness. The difficulties arise for the first time, when we seek to import a meaning into the language which it certainly never could have conveyed to those to whom it was originally addressed. Unless we go the whole length of supposing the simple account of the Hebrew cosmogonist to be a series of awkward equivocations, in which he attempted to give a representation widely different from the facts, yet, without trespassing against literal truth, we can find no difficulty in interpreting his words. Although language may be, and often has been, used for the purpose, not of expressing, but concealing thought, no such charge can fairly be laid against the Hebrew writer.


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以下のとおりお答えします。 相変わらず、明快に訳しきれていない箇所のありますことをお詫びします。 「つまるところ、」バックランドは言います。「問題は、モーゼの話の正確さでなくて、私たちの解釈の正確さに関してであるということを想起すべきです」、と。これは、申し分のない形で否認することがほとんどできない提起です。そのような教義は、容赦なく遂行されて、重大な道徳の根幹に打撃を加えます。実際、現代でよく知られている弁舌でさえ、まったく同一のくだりに2つあるいは3つの異なる解釈を施すことが時々あり得ます。その場合それは、明確に自分の思想を示すことに失敗した作家や話者の無器用さから発生するのかもしれません。 死語や外国語では、発話の形式を熟知したいという私たちの願望から困難が発生するかもしれません。あるいは、古代の書物の中で、(理解への)鍵が失われた思想の暗示や様態によって戸惑わされることがあるかもしれません。しかし、何もないところに、不明瞭や困難の発見を導入するのは注釈者や翻訳者の仕事の一部ではありません。そして、思想を表現するための用語法の問題として取り上げ、創世記の第1章の理解について、その原本のヘブライ語でも、すべての必要な正確さをもって原文を表わしている私たちの一般翻訳においても、何ら特別の困難はない、などと装うことはできないのです。 私たちが言語に意味を移入しようと努める場合、初めは、本来的にそれが差し向けられている人々にしっかり伝えることができないという障害が発生します。もし、私たちがヘブライ人の宇宙進化論者の単純な説明を、文字上の真実に悖ってはいないくとも、事実とが大きく異なる主張をしようという一連の厄介な間違いがあると推測する、というようなことに長々と関わらなければ、彼の言葉を解釈するのに苦労することはあり得ません。言語は思想を表現するのでなく、それを隠すのに使用されるかもしれませんし、事実しばしばそれに使用されました。たとえそうではあっても、そんな非難をヘブライ人の作家に負わせるのは妥当とは言えないでしょう。 以上、ご回答まで。





  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The Hebrew race, their works, and their books, are great facts in the history of man; the influence of the mind of this people upon the rest of mankind has been immense and peculiar, and there can be no difficulty in recognising therein the hand of a directing Providence. But we may not make ourselves wiser than God, nor attribute to Him methods of procedure which are not His. If, then, it is plain that He has not thought it needful to communicate to the writer of the Cosmogony that knowledge which modern researches have revealed, why do we not acknowledge this, except that it conflicts with a human theory which presumes to point out how God ought to have instructed man? The treatment to which the Mosaic narrative is subjected by the theological geologists is anything but respectful. The writers of this school, as we have seen, agree in representing it as a series of elaborate equivocations -- a story which palters with us in a double sense.' But if we regard it as the speculation of some Hebrew Descartes or Newton, promulgated in all good faith as the best and most probable account that could be then given of God's universe, it resumes the dignity and value of which the writers in question have done their utmost to deprive it. It has been sometimes felt as a difficulty to taking this view of the case, that the writer asserts so solemnly and unhesitatingly that for which he must have known that he had no authority. But this arises only from our modern habits of thought, and from the modesty of assertion which the spirit of true science has taught us. Mankind has learnt caution through repeated slips in the process of tracing out the truth.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    The early speculator was harassed by no such scruples, and asserted as facts what he knew in reality only as probabilities. But we are not on that account to doubt his perfect good faith, nor need we attribute to him wilful misrepresentation, or consciousness of asserting that which he knew not to be true. He had seized one great truth, in which, indeed, he anticipated the highest revelation of modern enquiry -- namely, the unity of the design of the world, and its subordination to one sole Maker and Lawgiver. With regard to details, observation failed him. He knew little of the earth's surface, or of its shape and place in the universe; the infinite varieties of organized existences which people it, the distinct floras and faunas of its different continents, were unknown to him. But he saw that all which lay within his observation bad been formed for the benefit and service of man, and the goodness of the Creator to his creatures was the thought predominant in his mind. Man's closer relations to his Maker is indicated by the representation that he was formed last of all creatures, and in the visible likeness of God. For ages, this simple view of creation satisfied the wants of man, and formed a sufficient basis of theological teaching, and if modern research now shows it to be physically untenable, our respect for the narrative which has played so important a part in the culture of our race need be in nowise diminished. No one contends that it can be used as a basis of astronomical or geological teaching, and those who profess to see in it an accordance with facts, only do this sub modo, and by processes which despoil it of its consistency and grandeur, both which may be preserved if we recognise in it, not an authentic utterance of Divine knowledge, but a human utterance, which it has pleased Providence to use Providence a special way for the education of mankind.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    We pass to the account of the creation contained in the Hebrew record. And it must be observed that in reality two distinct accounts are given us in the book of Genesis, one being comprised in the first chapter and the first three verses of the second, the other commencing at the fourth verse of the second chapter and continuing till the end. This is so philologically certain that it were useless to ignore it. But even those who may be inclined to contest the fact that we have here the productions of two different writers, will admit that the account beginning at the first verse of the first chapter, and ending at the third verse of the second, is a complete whole in itself. And to this narrative, in order not to complicate the subject unnecessarily, we intend to confine ourselves. It will sufficient for our purpose to enquire, whether this account can be shown to be in accordance with our astronomical and geological knowledge. And for the right understanding of it the whole must be set out, so that the various parts may be taken in connexion with one another.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It should be borne in mind,' says Dr. Buckland, that the object of the account was, not to state in what manner, but by whom the world was made.' Every one must see that this is an unfounded assertion, inasmuch as the greater part of the narrative consists in a minute and orderly description of the manner in which things were made. We can know nothing as to the object of the account, except from the account itself. What the writer meant to state is just that which he has stated, for all that we can know to the contrary. Or can we seriously beleive that if appealed to by one of his Hebrew hearers or readers as to his intention, he would have replied, My only object in what I have written is to inform you that God made the world; as to the manner of His doing it, of which I have given so exact an account, I have no intention that my words should be taken in their literal meaning? We come then to this, that if we sift the Mosaic narrative of all definite meaning, and only allow it to be the expression of the most vague generalities, if we avow that it admits of no certain interpretation, of none that may not be shifted and altered as often as we see fit, and as the exigencies of geology may require, then may we reconcile it with what science teaches. This mode of dealing with the subject has been broadly advocated by a recent writer of mathematical eminence, who adopts the Bucklandian hypothesis, a passage from whose work we shall quote.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    It is obvious, then, to start with, that by Mind we may mean two very different things, according as we contemplate it in our own individual selves, or as manifested by other beings. For if I contemplate my own mind, I have an imme diate cognizance of a certain flow of thoughts and feelings, which are the most ultimate things — and, indeed, the only things— of which I am cognizant. But if I contemplate Mind in other persons or organisms, I can have no such immediate cognizance of their thoughts and feelings ; I can only infer the existence of such thoughts and feelings from the activities of the persons or organisms which appear to manifest them. Thus it is that by Mind we may mean either that which is subjective or that which is objective. Now throughout the present work we shall have to consider Mind as an object ; and therefore it is well to remember that our only instrument of analysis is the observation of activities which we infer to be prompted by, or associated with, mental antecedents or accompaniments analogous to those of which we are directly conscious in our own subjective experience. That is to say, starting from what I know subjectively of the operations of my own individual mind, and of the activi ties which in my own organism these operations seem to prompt, I proceed by analogy to infer from the observable activities displayed by other organisms, the fact that certain mental operations underlie or accompany these activities.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    In positing the evidence' of Choice as my objective (or ejective) criterion of Mind, I do not think it necessary to enter into any elaborate analysis of what constitutes this evidence. In a subsequent chapter I shall treat fully of what I call the physiology or objective aspect of choice ; and then it will be seen that from the gradual manner in which choice, or the mind element, arises, it is not practically possible to draw a definite line of demarcation between choosing and non-choosing agents. Therefore, at this stage of the enquiry I prefer to rest in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as implying a distinction which common sense has always drawn, and probably always will draw, between mental and non-mental agents. It cannot be correctly said that a river chooses the course of its flow, or that the earth chooses an ellipse wherein to revolve round the sun. And similarly, however complex the operations may be of an agent recog nized as non-mental — such, for instance, as those of a calcu lating machine — or however impossible it may be to predict the result of its actions, we never say that such operations or actions are due to choice ; we reserve this term for operations or actions, however simple and however easily the result may be foreseen, which are performed, either by agents who in virtue of the non-mechanical nature of these actions prove themselves to be mental, or by agents already recognized as mental — i.e., by agents who have already proved themselves to be mental by performing other actions of such a non- mechanical or unforeseeable nature as we feel assured can only be attributed to choice. And there can be no reasonable doubt that this common-sense distinction between choosing aud non-choosing agents is a valid one. Although it may be difficult or impossible, in particular cases, to decide to which of the two categories this or that being should be assigned, this difficulty does not affect the validity of the classification — any more, for instance, than the difficulty of deciding whether Limulus should be classified with the crabs or with the scorpions affects the validity of the classification which marks off the group Crustacea from the group Arachnida.

  • 和訳の問題です。

    1.Competition, we have learned, is neither good nor evil in itself; it is a force which to be studied and may be compared to a stream whose strength and direction have to be observed, that banks may be raised up within which it may do its work harmlessly and beneficially. 一応自分で訳してみたのですが、まったく意味不明の訳になってしまいました。どなたかこの英文の正しい訳を教えてください。あと三行めの「that」って「it is a force that」ってつながるんでしょうか。よろしくお願いします。

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    Believing as we do that if the value of the Bible as a book of religious instruction is to be maintained it must be not by striving to prove it scientifically exact, at the expense of every sound principle of interpretation and in defiance of common sense,but by the frank recognition of the erroneous views of nature which it contains, we have put to analyse some of the popular conciliation theories. The inquiry can't be deemed a superfluous one, nor one which in the interests of theology had better be let alone. Physical science goes on unconcernedly pursuing its own paths. Theology,the science whose object is the dealing of Got with man as a moral being,maintains but[but=only] a shivering existence,shouldred and jostled by the sturdy growths of modern thought, and bemoaning itself for the hostlity which it encounters.Why should this be,unless because theologians persist in clinging to theories of God's produre towards man , which havelong been seen to be untenable? If,relinquishing theories,they would be contest to inpuire from the history of man what this procedure has actually been,the so-called difficulties of theology would,for the most part,vanish of themselves.

  • 和訳お願い致します。

    In truth,however,if we refer to the plans of conciliation proposed,we find them at variance with each other and mutually destructive.The conciliators are not agreed among themselves,and each holds the views of the other to be untenable and unsafe, The ground is perpetually being shifted as the advance of geological science may require.The plain meaning of the Hebrew record is unscrupulously tampered with,in general the pith of the whole process lies in divesting the text of all meaning whatever.We are told that,Scripture not being designed to teach us natural philosophy,it is in vain to attempt to make out a cosmogony from its statements. If the first chapter of Genesis conveys to us no information concerning the origin of the world, it's statements can't indeed be contradicted by modern discovery.But it is absurd to call this harmony. Statements such as that above quoted are,we conceive, little calculated to be serviceable to the interests of theology ,still less to religion and morality .

  • 英文和訳お願い致します!長文ですが分かる方いましたらよろしくお願い致し

    英文和訳お願い致します!長文ですが分かる方いましたらよろしくお願い致します><; Thus far, we have argued that the language faculty incorporates , a set of universal principles which guide the child in acquiring a grammar. However, it clearly cannot be the case that all aspects of the grammar of language are universal; if this were so, all natural language grammars would be the same and there would be no grammatical learning involved in language acquisition (i.e. no need for children to learn anything about the grammar of sentences in the language they are acquiring ), only lexical learning(viz. learning the lexical items/words in the language and their idiosyncratic linguistic properties, e.g. whether a given item has an irregular plural or past-tense form). But although there are universal principles which determine the broad outlines of the grammar of natural languages, there also seem to be language-particular aspects of grammar which children have to learn as part of the task of acquiring their native language. Thus, language acquisition involves not only lexical learning but also some grammatical learning. Lets take a closer look at the grammatical learning involved, and what it tells us about the language acquisition process. Clearly, grammatical is not going to involve learning those aspects of grammar which are determined by universal (hence innate) grammatical operations and principles. Rather , grammatical learning will be limited to those parameters ( i.e. dimensions or aspects ) of grammar which are subject to language particular variation (and hence vary from one language to another). In other words, grammatical learning will be limited to parametrised aspects of grammar (i.e. those aspects of grammar which are subject to parametric variation from one language to another).