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Austria's army had since then longed to achieve these strategic prizes and force Italy into an armistice. Straußenburg's army group commanders, Conrad von Hötzendorf (the former Austrian Chief of Staff) and Svetozar Boroević von Bojna, both wished to make a decisive assault against the Italians, but could not agree about the location of the attack. Conrad wanted an attack from the South Tyrolean Alps towards the Asiago Plateau and Vicenza. Boroević first favored a defensive action, but then when pressed preferred a frontal attack along the Piave River. Straußenburg himself was in favour of an attack on the western part of the front (the "Giudicarie" sector) leading to Brescia. Conrad and Boroević had a dislike for each other, and Straußenburg and the emperor, unable to decide between these two strong personalities, divided the army equally between them, reserving only a small part of the forces for a diversionary action on the Giudicarie sector. The preparation of the offensive began in February 1918, after a meeting in Bolzano between the Austrian and German high commands. It was strongly recommended by the Germans, as Ludendorff hoped that it could force the increasing American forces in France to be diverted to the Italian front, so Straußenburg modeled the attack after Erich Ludendorff's offensive on the Western Front. The Austro-Hungarians, differently from their previous success at Caporetto and from the subsequent attempts to breakthrough on Monte Grappa, did not prepare the attack as a pinpoint one, but as an all-out frontal attack, employing the entire residual strength of their army all along the front. The Austro-Hungarian formations were trained to employ the tactics developed by the Germans on the Western Front for Operation Michael, as Austrian officers returning from the Eastern Front were extensively trained alongside their German counterparts. There were also innovations on the Italian side. Analyzing the defeat of Caporetto, the staff of Armando Diaz concluded that the main tactical causes of it were the lack of mobility of Italian units, caught in a too rigid defensive scheme, the too centralized command and control system, and the lack of depth of Italian defences, where too many soldiers were simply stuck on the frontline. The new schemes prepared for the battle led to the abolition of the continuous entrenchment and in the development of a highly mobile defence system, in which even the smaller units were allowed to freely move between previously recognized strongpoints, independently decide to retreat or counterattack, or directly call the support of the artillery.

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>Austria's army had since then longed to achieve these strategic prizes and force Italy into an armistice. Straußenburg's army group commanders, Conrad von Hötzendorf (the former Austrian Chief of Staff) and Svetozar Boroević von Bojna, both wished to make a decisive assault against the Italians, but could not agree about the location of the attack. Conrad wanted an attack from the South Tyrolean Alps towards the Asiago Plateau and Vicenza. Boroević first favored a defensive action, but then when pressed preferred a frontal attack along the Piave River. Straußenburg himself was in favour of an attack on the western part of the front (the "Giudicarie" sector) leading to Brescia. ⇒オーストリア方面軍は、この戦略で戦勝をして、イタリアを休戦に追い込みたいとしていた。ストラウゼンブルクの方面軍グループの指揮官、コンラッド・フォン・ヘッツェンドルフ(元オーストリア軍参謀長)とスフェトツァル・ボロエビッチ・フォン・ボイナは、両者ともイタリア軍に対する決定的な攻撃を望んだが、攻撃の位置については同意できなかった。コンラッドは、南チロルアルプスからアシアゴ高原とビセンツァへの攻撃を望んでいた。ボロエビッチはまず守備行動を支持したが、押された場合にはピアヴェ川沿いの前線攻撃を良しとした。ストラウゼンブルク自身は、ブレシアにつながる前線の西部(「ジウディカリエ」地区)に対する攻撃を支持していた。 >Conrad and Boroević had a dislike for each other, and Straußenburg and the emperor, unable to decide between these two strong personalities, divided the army equally between them, reserving only a small part of the forces for a diversionary action on the Giudicarie sector. The preparation of the offensive began in February 1918, after a meeting in Bolzano between the Austrian and German high commands. It was strongly recommended by the Germans, as Ludendorff hoped that it could force the increasing American forces in France to be diverted to the Italian front, so Straußenburg modeled the attack after Erich Ludendorff's offensive on the Western Front. ⇒コンラッドとボロエビッチはお互いに牽制し合っていたが、ストラウゼンブルクと皇帝は、この2人の強い個性の間でどちらとも決めかねて、彼らの間に方面軍を等分に分け、ジウディカリエ地区に対抗措置を講じるためには軍隊のほんの一部を確保していた。1918年2月、ボルツァーノでオーストリア軍とドイツ軍の高位司令官同士の会合の後攻撃の準備が始まった。ドイツ軍は、ルーデンドルフが望むように、フランスにおける米国軍の増加を強制的にイタリア前線へ迂回させることを強く推奨して、ストラウゼンブルクはエーリッヒ・ルーデンドルフの言う西部前線攻撃後の(ジウディカリエ)攻撃をモデル化した。 >The Austro-Hungarians, differently from their previous success at Caporetto and from the subsequent attempts to breakthrough on Monte Grappa, did not prepare the attack as a pinpoint one, but as an all-out frontal attack, employing the entire residual strength of their army all along the front. The Austro-Hungarian formations were trained to employ the tactics developed by the Germans on the Western Front for Operation Michael, as Austrian officers returning from the Eastern Front were extensively trained alongside their German counterparts. There were also innovations on the Italian side. ⇒オーストリア=ハンガリー軍は、先行のカポレット戦での成功や、続いてモンテ・グラッパを突破しようとした試みとは異なり、正確に目標を定めた集中攻撃を準備するのではなく、すべての前線に亘って余っている軍力を使い、全前線的な攻撃を準備した。オーストリア=ハンガリーの軍隊編成は、東部戦線から帰還したオーストリア軍の将校がドイツの部隊と一緒に広範な訓練を受けているので、「ミハエル作戦行動」のために西部戦線でドイツ軍が開発した戦術を採用するように訓練された。(ただし)イタリア軍側にも改革があった。 >Analyzing the defeat of Caporetto, the staff of Armando Diaz concluded that the main tactical causes of it were the lack of mobility of Italian units, caught in a too rigid defensive scheme, the too centralized command and control system, and the lack of depth of Italian defences, where too many soldiers were simply stuck on the frontline. The new schemes prepared for the battle led to the abolition of the continuous entrenchment and in the development of a highly mobile defence system, in which even the smaller units were allowed to freely move between previously recognized strongpoints, independently decide to retreat or counterattack, or directly call the support of the artillery. ⇒アルマンド・ディアスの役職らはカポレット戦での敗北を分析して、過度で厳格な防御体制にこだわったイタリア軍部隊は可動性が欠如したこと、司令と統制システムが一局集中的であったこと、イタリア軍防衛施設においては奥行きが欠如したこと、そして、そのためにただ多くの兵士が前線部分に詰め込んだだけだったこと、などが主な戦術的敗因であったとした。戦闘のために準備された新しい計画は、継続的な塹壕待機を廃止し、より小さな部隊であっても、あらかじめ認められた強化地点間を自由に移動し、独立して退却または反撃を決定する、あるいは砲兵隊の支援を直接求める、といった高度に可動性の防衛体制の開発につながった。

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  • kknow
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オーストリアの軍隊は、この戦略賞を獲得し、イタリアを休戦国にしようとしていました。Straußenburgの陸軍グループの指揮官であるConrad vonHötzendorf(元オーストリア参謀)とSvetozarBoroevićvon Bojnaはどちらもイタリア人に対する決定的な攻撃を望んだが、攻撃の位置については同意できなかった。Conradは南チロルアルプスからAsiago PlateauとVicenzaへの攻撃を望んでいました。ボロエビッチはまず守備陣を支持したが、押されたときにはピアヴェ川沿いの正面攻撃が好まれた。Straußenburg自身は、ブレシアにつながる正面の西部(Giudicarie)部門に対する攻撃を支持していた。コンラッドとボロエヴィッチはお互いに嫌悪感を持っていました。ストゥルーゼンブルクと皇帝は、この2人の強い人格の間で決めることができず、Giudicarieセクターに対抗措置を講じるために軍隊のほんの一部を確保していた。攻撃の準備は、1918年2月、ボルツァーノでオーストリアとドイツの高位司令部間の会合の後に始まりました。Ludendorffがフランスのアメリカ軍の増加を強制的にイタリアのフロントに迂回させることを望むように、ドイツ軍が強く推奨したので、StraußenburgはErich LudendorffがWestern Frontで攻撃した後の攻撃をモデル化した。 オーストリア・ハンガリー人は、カポレトでの前回の成功とは異なり、モンテ・グラッパでの突破口を突破しようと試みたのとは異なり、攻撃を最善のものとして準備するのではなく、全面的な正面攻撃として、すべて前部に沿って。オーストリア - ハンガリーの部隊は、東部戦線から帰還したオーストリアの将校がドイツの部隊と一緒に広範囲に訓練されているため、ミハエル戦オペレーションのために西部戦線でドイツ人が開発した戦術を採用するように訓練されました。イタリア側にもイノベーションがありました。Caporettoの敗北を分析して、Armando Diazのスタッフは、それが主な戦術的原因は、過度の厳格な防御体制で捉えられたイタリア軍ユニットの可動性の欠如、統一されたコマンドと制御システム、あまりにも多くの兵士が前線に立ち往生していたイタリアの防衛の深さの欠如。戦闘のために準備された新しい計画は、継続的な敵視を廃止し、より小さなユニットであっても、以前に認められた強固な地点間を自由に移動し、独立して退却または反撃を決定する、高度に可動性の防衛システムの開発につながった。砲兵の支援を直接呼びます。

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