High-density Artillery Support and Logistics at the Battle of Vimy Ridge| OKWAVE

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In February 1917, a German-born Canadian soldier deserted to the German side and helped confirm many of the suspicions held by the Germans, providing them with a great deal of useful information. By March 1917, the German forces were aware that a major attack was imminent and would include operations aimed at capturing Vimy Ridge. General of Infantry Ernst August Marx von Bachmeister, commanding the German 79th Reserve Division, reported in late-March that he believed the Canadian Corps was moving into an echelon formation and were preparing for a major attack. The Germans quickly developed plans to launch a pre-emptive operation, following the adage that the best defence is a good offence, intent on capturing the northern section of the Zouave Valley along the northernmost portion of the Canadian front. Heavy Canadian Corps artillery fire ultimately prevented the Germans from executing their pre-emptive attack. The preliminary phase of the Canadian Corps artillery bombardment began on 20 March 1917, with a systematic two-week bombardment of German batteries, trenches and strong points. The Canadian Corps paid particular attention to eliminating German barbed wire, a task made easier with the introduction of the No. 106 instantaneous fuse.

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Each German regiment held a zone approximately 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) wide as far back as the rear area. When the Canadian Corps attacked, each German company faced two or more battalions of approximately 1,000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept approximately 24 kilometres (15 mi) back instead of assembling close behind the second line according the defence-in-depth theory. The Canadian Corps' divisional artillery formations, totalling eight field brigades and two heavy artillery groups, were insufficient for the task at hand and were consequently reinforced with outside formations. Four heavy artillery groups, nine artillery field brigades, three divisional artillery groups and the artillery complement of the British 5th Division was attached to the Canadian Corps. In addition, ten heavy artillery groups of the flanking I and XVII Corps were assigned tasks in support of the Canadian Corps. The artillery batteries of I Corps were particularly important because they enfiladed German gun positions behind Vimy Ridge. In total, the British made available to the Canadian Corps twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of four hundred and eighty 18 pounder field guns, one hundred thirty-eight 4.5 inch howitzers, ninety-six 2 inch trench mortars, twenty-four 9.45 inch mortars, supported by 245 corps-level siege guns and heavy mortars.

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The French had identified about 800 German guns on the right bank capable of supporting the 34th, 54th, 9th and 33rd Reserve divisions, with the 10th and 5th divisions in reserve. At least 20 of the super-heavy shells hit Fort Douaumont, the sixth penetrating to the lowest level and exploding in a pioneer depot, starting a fire next to 7,000 hand-grenades. The 38th Division (General Guyot de Salins), 133rd Division (General Fenelon F.G. Passaga) and 74th Division (General Charles de Lardemelle) attacked at 11:40 a.m. The infantry advanced 50 metres (55 yd) behind a creeping field-artillery barrage, moving at a rate of 50 metres (55 yd) in two minutes, beyond which a heavy artillery barrage moved in 500–1,000 metres (550–1,090 yd) lifts, as the field artillery barrage came within 150 metres (160 yd), to force the German infantry and machine-gunners to stay under cover.

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The night before the attack, artillery harassed German positions while a gas section of Royal Engineers, employing Livens Projectors, fired more than 40 drums of gas directly into the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle to cause confusion. The defending German troops managed to drive back the initial Canadian assaults at around 4:00 am using small arms fire. The 10th Canadian Brigade attacked once again at 5:00 am, this time supported by a significant amount of artillery and the 24th British Division of I Corps to the north. The German defensive artillery fire was late and too light to cause the assaulting troops great difficulty, allowing the Canadian Corps to exploit wide gaps and break into the German positions. The 10th Canadian Brigade, assisted by snow and a westerly wind, fought hastily entrained German troops to capture the entire Pimple by 6:00 pm. By nightfall on 12 April 1917, the Canadian Corps was in firm control of the ridge. The corps suffered 10,602 casualties: 3,598 killed and 7,004 wounded.The German Sixth Army suffered an unknown number of casualties with approximately 4,000 men becoming prisoners of war. Four members of the Canadian Corps received Victoria Crosses, the highest military decoration awarded to British and Commonwealth forces for valour, for their actions during the battle:

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Rawlinson had already finalised his plans in discussion with his Corps commanders (Butler, Monash, Sir Arthur Currie of the Canadian Corps and Lieutenant General Charles Kavanagh of the Cavalry Corps) on 21 July. For the first time, the Australians would attack side by side with the Canadian Corps. Both had a reputation for aggressive and innovative tactics and a strong record of success over the past two years. The tactical methods had been tested by the Australians in a local counter-attack at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July. The German defenders of Hamel were deeply dug in, and their position commanded a very wide field of fire. Similar positions had resisted capture for two months in the Battle of the Somme. The Australians had used surprise rather than weight at Hamel. The artillery had opened fire only at the moment the infantry and tanks advanced, and the Germans were rapidly overrun. A key factor in the final plan was secrecy. There was to be no pre-battle bombardment, only artillery fire immediately prior to the advance of Australian, Canadian, and British forces. The final plan for the Fourth Army involved 1,386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy guns, making up 27 medium artillery brigades and thirteen heavy batteries, in addition to the infantry divisions' artillery. The fire plan for the Fourth Army's artillery was devised by Monash's senior artillery officer, Major General C. E. D. Budworth. British sound ranging advances in artillery techniques and aerial photographic reconnaissance made it possible to dispense with "ranging shots" to ensure accurate fire. Budworth had produced a timetable which allowed 504 out of 530 German guns to be hit at "zero hour", while a creeping barrage preceded the infantry. This method was similar to the Feuerwalze which the Germans themselves had used in their Spring Offensive, but its effectiveness was increased by the surprise achieved. There were also to be 580 tanks. The Canadian and Australian Corps were each allocated a brigade of four battalions, with 108 Mark V fighting tanks, 36 Mark V "Star", and 24 unarmed tanks intended to carry supplies and ammunition forward. A single battalion of Mark V tanks was allocated to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps were allocated two battalions each of 48 Medium Mark A Whippet tanks. The Allies had successfully moved the Canadian Corps of four infantry divisions to Amiens without them being detected by the Germans.

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Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions. A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge. In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915. Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack.

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Consequently, the British 5th Infantry Division and supplementary artillery, engineer and labour units reinforced the four Canadian divisions. This brought the nominal strength of the Canadian Corps to about 170,000 men, of whom 97,184 were Canadian.　In January 1917, three Canadian Corps officers accompanied other British and Dominion officers attending a series of lectures hosted by the French Army regarding their experiences during the Battle of Verdun.　The French counter offensive devised by General Robert Nivelle had been one of a number of Allied successes of 1916. Following extensive rehearsal, eight French divisions had assaulted German positions in two waves along a 9.7-kilometre (6 mi) front. Supported by exceedingly strong artillery, the French had recovered lost ground and inflicted heavy casualties on five German divisions.　On their return from the lectures, the Canadian Corps staff officers produced a tactical analysis of the Verdun battles and delivered a series of corps and divisional-level lectures to promote the primacy of artillery and stress the importance of harassing fire and company and platoon flexibility.　The report of 1st Canadian Division commander Arthur Currie highlighted the lessons he believed the Canadian Corps could learn from the experiences of the French.

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By 26 September the ground-holding divisions had been reorganised so that the regiments were side-by-side, covering a front of about 1,000 yd (910 m) each with the battalions one-behind-the-other, the first in the front line, one in support and the third in reserve, over a depth of 3,000 yd (2,700 m). Each of the three ground-holding divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau had an Eingreif division in support, double the ratio on 20 September. On 25 September, a German attack on the front of the 20th Division (XIV Corps) was prevented by artillery fire but on the X Corps front south of I Anzac Corps, a bigger German attack took place. Crown Prince Rupprecht had ordered the attack to recover ground on the Gheluvelt Plateau and to try to gain time for reinforcements to be brought into the battle zone to bolster the defensive system. Two regiments of the 50th Reserve Division attacked either side of the Reutelbeek, with the support of 44 field and 20 heavy batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for one division. The attack on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front from the Menin road to Polygon Wood, to recapture pillboxes and shelters in the Wilhelmstellung 500 yd (460 m) away, had been due to begin at 5:15 a.m. but the barrage fell short onto the German assembly area and the German infantry had to fall back until it began to creep forward at 5:30 a.m. The German infantry managed to advance on the flanks, about 100 yd (91 m) near the Menin road and 600 yd (550 m) north of the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner, with the help of a number of observation and ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage, which obstructed the supply of ammunition to the British defenders, before fire from the 33rd Division troops being attacked and the 15th Australian Brigade along the southern edge of Polygon wood, forced them under cover, after recapturing some of the Wilhelmstellung pillboxes near Black Watch Corner. A number of attempts to reinforce the attacking troops failed, due to British artillery observers isolating the advanced German troops with artillery barrages.

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The Canadian Corps remained in the Ypres Salient in a stationary yet aggressive status until the beginning of September when the corps was transferred to the Somme. In the aftermath of the battle and in the wake of the death of Major-General M.S. Mercer, Canadian Corps commander Julian Byng was forced to address the politically sensitive topic of appointing a new 3rd Canadian Division commander. Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence Sam Hughes telegraphed Byng and insisted that his son, 1st Canadian Brigade commander Brigadier-General Garnet Hughes, be given command of the 3rd Canadian Division. To the fury of the minister, Byng instead promoted 2nd Canadian Brigade commander Brigadier-General Louis Lipsett, a highly regarded pre-war British regular, to the post.

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In 1908 Moltke began to alter the plans for operations on the left wing of the German armies to face France and allocated the XIV Corps for the protection of Upper Alsace and several Landwehr brigades for the security of the Upper Rhine. Subsequent plans added forces to the region and by 1909 the 7th Army had three corps and a reserve corps, with two corps from Wissembourg to Saverne and Strasbourg, one corps on the left of the Rhine from Colmar to Mulhouse and the reserve corps on the right bank of the Rhine. The 6th Army was to assemble between Metz and Sarrebourg in Lorraine, which massed eight corps on the left wing, which with fortress garrisons and Landwehr troops, changed the ratio of forces between the left and right wings from 7:1 to 3:1. Moltke added forces to the left wing after concluding that a French offensive into Alsace and Lorraine and particularly from Belfort had become certain. The 7th Army was to defeat an offensive in Alsace and cooperate with the 6th Army to defeat an offensive in Lorraine. After 1910, the 7th Army was to attack with the 6th Army, towards the Moselle below Frouard and the Meurthe; provision was also made for the movement of troops to the right wing of the German armies, by reserving trains and wagons in the region.

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Heavier equipment bogged in churned mud so had to be brought forward by wagons along roads and tracks, many of which were under German artillery observation from Passchendaele ridge, rather than being moved cross-country. The I Anzac Corps had 205 heavy artillery pieces, one gun for every 9 metres (9.8 yd) of front and many field artillery brigades with 18-pdr guns and 4.5-inch howitzers, which with the guns of the other attacking corps were moved forward 2,000 yd (1,800 m) from 20–24 September. Assembled forward of the artillery were heavy Vickers machine-guns of the divisional machine-gun companies, 56 for the creeping machine-gun barrage and 64 "SOS" guns for emergency barrages against German counter–attacks and to prolong the barrage towards the final objective. The frontages of VIII and IX Corps were moved northwards so that X Corps could take over 600 yd (550 m) of front up to the southern edge of Polygon Wood, which kept each of the frontages of the two Australian divisions of I Anzac Corps to 1,000 yd (910 m). The 39th Division took over from the 41st Division ready to attack Tower Hamlets (on the Bassevillebeke spur), the 33rd Division replaced the 23rd Division beyond the Menin Road and the 5th and 4th Australian divisions replaced the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions in Polygon Wood. A German attack on 25 September between Menin Road and Polygon Wood occurred as the 33rd Division was taking over from the 23rd Division and for a time threatened to delay preparations for the British operation, due next day. Some ground was captured by the Germans and part of it was then recaptured by the 33rd Division. Plumer ordered that the flank guard protecting the I Anzac Corps on 26 September be formed by the 98th Brigade of the 33rd Division while the 100th Brigade recaptured the lost ground. Plan of attack Dispersed and camouflaged German defences, using shell-hole positions, pillboxes and the holding back of much of the German infantry for counter-attacks, had meant that as British advances became weaker and disorganised by losses, fatigue, poor visibility and the channelling effect of waterlogged ground, they met more and fresher German defenders.

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The Germans sprung a surprise on the Canadians by exploding four large mines under trenches of the 2nd Canadian Division covering the spur at the eastern outskirts of the ruins of Hooge and a company of the Canadian 28th (North West) Battalion was wiped out in the explosions. The Canadians managed to hold their position and prevent the Germans from reaching their support line but Byng ultimately decided to leave the Hooge trenches in German hands and to concentrate on regaining Mount Sorrel and Tor Top. To dissuade the Germans from more attacks on the left flank of the Canadian Corps, the dismounted British 2nd Cavalry Brigade came on loan to the Canadian Corps as a counter-attack force.

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The Second Army Report Centre at Locre Château was linked by buried cable to each corps report centre, corps heavy artillery headquarters, divisional artillery headquarters, RFC squadrons, balloon headquarters, survey stations and wireless stations. Responsibility for counter-battery fire was given to a counter-battery staff officer with a small staff, who concentrated exclusively on the defeat of the German artillery. A conference was held each evening by the counter-battery staffs of divisions and corps, methodically to collate the day's reports from observation aircraft and balloons, field survey companies, sound ranging sections and forward observation officers. Each corps had a counter-battery area, which was divided into zones and allotted to heavy artillery groups. Each heavy artillery group headquarters divided their zones into map squares, which were allotted to artillery batteries, required to be ready swiftly to open fire on them. The attacking corps organised their heavy artillery within the army plan according to local conditions. II Anzac Corps created four counter-battery groups, each with one heavy artillery group and IX Corps arranged four similar groups and five bombardment groups, one for each of the three IX Corps divisions making the initial attack and two (with the heaviest howitzers) in reserve, under the control of the corps heavy artillery commander. A Heavy Artillery Group Commander was attached to each divisional artillery headquarters, to command the heavy artillery once the infantry attack began. Field artillery arrangements within corps also varied, in IX Corps groups and sub-groups were formed so that infantry brigades had an artillery liaison officer and two sub-groups, one with six 18-pounder batteries and one with six 4.5-inch howitzer batteries.

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Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.

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The Battle of Hill 70 was a battle of World War I between the Canadian Corps and five divisions of the German 6th Army. The battle took place along the Western Front on the outskirts of Lens in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France between 15 and 25 August 1917. The objectives of the assault were to inflict casualties and to draw German troops away from the 3rd Battle of Ypres, rather than to capture territory. The Canadian Corps executed an operation to capture Hill 70 and then establish defensive positions from which combined small-arms and artillery fire, some of which used the new technique of predicted fire, would repel German counter-attacks and inflict as many casualties as possible. The goals of the Canadian Corps were only partially accomplished; the Germans were prevented from transferring local divisions to the Ypres Salient but failed to draw in troops from other areas. A later attempt by the Canadian Corps to extend its position into the city of Lens failed but the German and Canadian assessments of the battle concluded that it succeeded in its attrition objective. The battle was costly for both sides and many casualties were suffered from extensive use of poison gas, including the new German Yellow Cross shell containing the blistering agent sulfur mustard (mustard gas).The industrial coal city of Lens, France had fallen under German control in October 1914 during the Race to the Sea. Consequently, the Germans also controlled the heights at Hill 70 to the north of the city and Sallaumines Hill to the southeast, both of which had commanding views over the surrounding area as well as the city itself. Hill 70 was a treeless expanse at the end of one of the many spurs. In September 1915, the British had overrun the hill during the Battle of Loos but had not managed to hold it. The British First Army commander General Henry Horne ordered the Canadian Corps to relieve I Corps from their position opposite the city of Lens on 10 July 1917 and directed Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie to develop a plan for capturing the town by the end of July 1917. Battle of Hill 70 : 70高地の戦い

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Due to the distances that had to be covered by incoming units, the difficulties in communications and ever present enemy fire, the time allowed for assembly proved inadequate and the attack was postponed until 7:00 am. The signal to attack was to be six simultaneous green rockets. Some rockets misfired and did not burst, resulting in an uneven assault whereby each unit moved from their start lines at different times. The four attacking battalions suffered heavy losses as they advanced over open ground in broad daylight. The attackers failed to regain any lost territory but managed to close a 550 metres (600 yd) gap in the line and advance the Canadian front about 910 metres (1,000 yd) from the positions it had retreated to after the German assault.

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Fifth Army See also: Capture of Wurst Farm The Fifth Army attacked on the left of the Second Army to capture the Wilhemstellung, with V Corps on the right and XVIII Corps on the left, to finish the capture of the line from Schuler Farm to Langemarck and then advance 500–800 yd (460–730 m) east towards Poelcappelle; XIV Corps formed the northern flank with the 20th Division. V Corps had more field guns than the I Anzac Corps to the right and fewer heavy guns, so only a three-layer barrage was possible. A creeping barrage by 18-pounder field guns was to move at the same speed as that of the Second Army. 18-pounder and 4.5-inch howitzer fire were to comb the area in front of the creeping barrage, from 100–400 yd (91–366 m) deep and a neutralising barrage by 6-inch howitzers and 60-pounder guns was to sweep ground 450–1,200 yd (410–1,100 m) in front of the creeping barrage. Artillery not needed for counter-battery fire was to put standing barrages on the most dangerous German positions, like Hill 37 and Hill 40 and German assembly areas in the dips behind Zonnebeke and Gravenstafel. The 9th and 55th Divisions of V Corps were to attack on fronts of 1,800 yd (1,600 m) over ground held by the right of the German 121st Division and the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, which had also changed hands twice in August. The large numbers of strong points, pillboxes and fortified farms east of the Hanebeek and Steenbeek streams were mostly intact, despite numerous attempts to smash them with artillery fire. The artillery brought to the Ypres salient in September went to the Second Army so the Fifth Army adopted a new infantry formation, where moppers-up were reorganised into small groups of up to half a platoon, moving with the leading assault waves, to capture specific strong-points and then garrison them. XVIII Corps adopted the same practice, which became standard in the Fifth Army soon after the battle. The 9th Division was confronted by the morass of the Hanebeek valley, where the stream had been choked by frequent bombardment and turned into a swamp and water-filled shell-holes.

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In the end, two mines were blown before the attack, while three mines and two Wombat charges were fired to support the attack, including those forming a northern flank. Trench raiding involved making small-scale surprise attacks on enemy positions, often in the middle of the night for reasons of stealth. All belligerents employed trench raiding as a tactic to harass their enemy and gain intelligence. In the Canadian Corps trench raiding developed into a training and leadership-building mechanism. The size of a raid would normally be anything from a few men to an entire company, or more, depending on the size of the mission.The four months before the April attack saw the Canadian Corps execute no fewer than 55 separate trench raids. Competition between units even developed with units competing for the honour of the greatest number of prisoners captured or most destruction wrought. The policy of aggressive trench raiding was not without its cost. A large-scale trench raid on 13 February 1917, involving 900 men from the 4th Canadian Division, resulted in 150 casualties. An even more ambitious trench raid on 1 March 1917, once again by the 4th Canadian Division, failed and resulted in 637 casualties including two battalion commanders and a number of company commanders killed.

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In addition, only half of the available artillery was committed at any one point in time with the intensity of the barrage expressly varied as to confuse the Germans and preserve some level of secrecy. Phase two lasted the entire week beginning 2 April 1917 and employed the entire artillery arsenal at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, massing the equivalent of one heavy gun for every 18 metres (20 yd) and one field gun for every 9.1 metres (10 yd). The German soldiers came to refer to the week before the attack as 'the week of suffering'. By the Germans' own account, their trenches and defensive works were almost completely demolished. Furthermore, German health and morale suffered from the stress of remaining at the ready for eleven straight days under extremely heavy artillery bombardment. Compounding German difficulties was the inability of ration parties to bring food supplies to the front lines. On 3 April, General von Falkenhausen ordered his reserve divisions to prepare to relieve frontline divisions over the course of a long drawn-out defensive battle, in a manner similar to the Battle of the Somme. However, the divisions were kept 24 kilometres (15 mi) from the battlefield to avoid being shelled.

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Despite considerable difficulty, the field artillery was moved to within 4,000 yd (3,700 m) of the final objective and ample ammunition and field stores were brought forward. XIV Corps had 49 batteries of 312 × 18-pounder guns in groups, one for each division, the Guards group having 23 batteries; the medium and heavy artillery being grouped similarly. The arrangements agreed by Haig, Gough and Plumer on 2 October, the effect of the victory of 4 October and the disarray of the German defenders, led to the attack planned for 10 October being advanced to 9 October, with a second attack being arranged for 12 October. Attacking a front of 13,500 yd (12,300 m), it was intended to capture Passchendaele ridge in two stages. The first objective (red line) would be captured by a morning attack, which if successful and the cause of a general withdrawal by the Germans, would be followed-up by the reserve brigades of the attacking divisions, which would advance to the second objective (blue line) in the afternoon. On 7 October Haig cancelled the afternoon attack to the blue line due to the wet weather. On the southern flank of the attack, X Corps was to attack to hold German reserves around Becelaere and Gheluvelt. To the north, I Anzac Corps was to advance on the right flank of the main attack, with the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, the 4th and 5th Australian divisions being in reserve. Further north, II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand and 3rd Australian divisions in reserve, was to attack two objectives, the 66th Division advancing along the main ridge, north of the Ypres–Roulers railway to just short of Passchendaele village and the 49th Division on either side of the Ravebeek stream, up Wallemolen spur to the Bellevue pillboxes. If the first objectives were reached, the reserve brigades were to attack the second objectives in the afternoon. The second objectives were 800–1,000 yd (730–910 m) ahead of the red line, beyond the village and the main ridge respectively. The reserve divisions were ready to move rapidly forward, by train from west of Ypres to continue the attack the next day. On the Fifth Army front, XVIII Corps with a brigade each from the 48th and 11th divisions, was to advance 1,200 yd (1,100 m) up Poelcappelle spur and towards Westroosebeke on the main ridge.

High-density Artillery Support and Logistics at the Battle of Vimy Ridge

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High-density Artillery Support and Logistics at the Battle of Vimy Ridge

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