The Importance of the Shorter Defensive Position| OKWAVE

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Mihiel Salient. The new fortified areas were intended to be precautionary measures (Sicherheitskoeffizient) built to be used as rallying-positions (Eventual-Stellungen, similar to ones built on the Russian front) and to shorten the Western Front to economise on troops and create more reserves. The Siegfriedstellung had the potential to release the greatest number of troops and was begun first; Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided its course on 19 September and construction began on 27 September. Withdrawal to the Siegfriedstellung was debated by Ludendorff and other senior German commanders over the winter of 1916–1917. An offensive in the new year with 21 divisions was discussed on 19 December but it was considered that such a force could not achieve a decisive result. An Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) memorandum of 5 January, noted that offensive preparations by the French and British were being made all along the Western Front so as to keep the site of a spring offensive secret.

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On 25 June, Erich Ludendorff, the First Quartermaster General, suggested to Crown Prince Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm Stellung, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht Stellung. On 30 June, the army group Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl, suggested a withdrawal to the Flandern I Stellung along Passchendaele ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentières in the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Sehnen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge could be held, if it was made the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) of the German defensive effort. Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans could see the area from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg's judgement was accepted and no withdrawal was made. Main article: Battle of Messines (1917) The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. The German positions had observation over Ypres and unless captured, would enable observed enfilade artillery-fire against a British attack eastwards from the salient. Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging mines under the German positions on the ridge. By June 1917, 21 mines had been filled with nearly 1,000,000 long tons (1,000,000 t) of explosives. The Germans knew the British were mining and had taken some counter-measures but they were taken by surprise at the extent of the British effort. Two of the mines failed to detonate but 19 went off on 7 June, at 3:10 a.m. British Summer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before dark and the British had fewer losses than expected, the plan having provided for up to 50 percent in the initial attack. Battle of Messines (1917) 　メセンの戦い

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Belated awareness of the significance of the building work along the base of the Noyon Salient, has also been given as a reason for a cautious pursuit deliberately chosen, rather than an inept and failed attempt to intercept the German retirement. In Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical (1907), Haig had described the hasty retreat of a beaten enemy and an organised withdrawal by a formidable force, capable of rapidly returning to the attack, to defeat a disorganised pursuit. In the case of an organised withdrawal, Haig described a cautious follow up by advanced guards, in front of a main force moving periodically from defensive position to defensive position, always providing a firm base on which the advanced guards could retire. The conduct of the Anglo-French pursuit conformed to this model. General Franchet d'Espérey proposed a hasty offensive to Nivelle, which was rejected in favour of strengthening the main French front on the Aisne.

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Falkenhayn had begun to remove divisions from the armies on the Western Front in June, to rebuild the strategic reserve but only twelve divisions could be spared. Four divisions were sent to the 2nd Army on the Somme, which had dug a layered defensive system based on the experience of the Herbstschlacht. The situation before the beginning of the battle on the Somme was considered by Falkenhayn to be better than before previous offensives and a relatively easy defeat of the British offensive was anticipated. No divisions were moved from the 6th Army, which had 17 1⁄2 divisions and a large amount of heavy artillery, ready for a counter-offensive when the British offensive had been defeated.

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The obvious difficulties of the Germans on the Ancre front, made it important to prevent the Germans from withdrawing to the new defences being built behind the Noyon salient (eventually known as the Hindenburg Line/Siegfriedstellung) in their own time. A retirement could disrupt the British offensive at Arras and Franco-British planning gained urgency as a German withdrawal became likely in February and March, according to the results of air reconnaissance, agent reports and gleanings from prisoners. Reaching a good position for an attack on the Bihucourt line (R. II Stellung) which ran from Ablainzevelle to west of Logeast Wood, west of Achiet le Grand, western outskirts of Bapaume, Rocquigny, le Mesnil en Arrousaise to Vaux Wood, the Fifth Army objective was to be attacked three days before the Arras offensive and the army then to advance to St Léger, to meet the Third Army and trap the Germans in their positions south-west of Arras.

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British attacks in January 1917, had taken place against exhausted German troops holding poor defensive positions left over from the fighting in 1916; some troops had low morale and showed an unusual willingness to surrender. The army group commander Generalfeldmarschall Crown Prince Rupprecht, advocated a withdrawal to the Siegfriedstellung on 28 January, which was initially refused but then authorised on 4 February and the first "Alberich day" was set for 9 February. The British attacks in the Actions of Miraumont from 17–18 February and anticipation of further attacks, led Rupprecht on 18 March to order a withdrawal of about 3 miles (4.8 km) on a 15-mile (24 km) front of the 1st Army to the R. I Stellung, from Essarts to Le Transloy on 22 February. The withdrawal caused some surprise to the British, despite the interception of wireless messages from 20–21 February.

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The 5th Army would begin a big offensive with limited objectives, to seize the Meuse Heights on the right bank of the river, from which German artillery could dominate the battlefield. By being forced into a counter-offensive against such formidable positions, the French Army would "bleed itself white". As the French were weakened, the British would be forced to launch a hasty relief offensive, which would also be a costly defeat. If such defeats were not enough to force negotiations on the French, a German offensive would mop up the last of the Franco-British armies and break the Entente "once and for all". In a revised instruction to the French army of January 1916, the General Staff had stated that equipment could not be fought by men.

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On 22/23 February, the Germans fell back another 3 mi (4.8 km) on a 15 mi (24 km) front. The Germans then withdrew from much of the R. I Stellung to the R. II Stellung on 11 March, forestalling a British attack, which was not noticed by the British until dark on 12 March; the main German withdrawal from the Noyon salient to the Hindenburg Line (Operation Alberich) commenced on schedule on 16 March.[Defensive positions held by the German army on the Somme after November 1916 were in poor condition, the garrisons were exhausted and censors of correspondence from front-line soldiers reported tiredness and low morale. The situation left the German command doubtful that the army could withstand a resumption of the battle.

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Retirement from Passchendaele Ridge On 23 March, Haig had ordered Plumer to make contingency plans to shorten the line along the Ypres Salient and release troops for the other armies. On 11 April, Plumer authorised a withdrawal of the southern flank of the Second Army and ordered the VIII and II corps in the Passchendaele Salient to retreat the next day into the Battle Zone, behind outposts left in the Forward Zone of the British defensive system. The divisional commanders were ordered that the Forward Zone must be held and that the Germans must not be given the impression that a withdrawal was in progress. At noon on 12 April, the VIII Corps ordered the infantry retirement to begin that night and the 59th Division was withdrawn and transferred south, to be replaced by part of the 41st Division. The II Corps had begun to withdraw its artillery at the same time as VIII Corps on the night of 11/12 April and ordered the 36th and 30th divisions to conform to the VIII Corps withdrawal which were complete by 13 April, without German interference; VIII Corps HQ was transferred to reserve. During 13 April, General Headquarters (GHQ) discussed the retirements in the Lys valley, which had lengthened the British front line and Plumer agreed to a retirement in the Ypres Salient to the Mt Kemmel, Voormezeele (2.5 mi (4.0 km) south of Ypres), White Château (1 mi (1.6 km) east of Ypres) to Pilckem Ridge defence line but ordered only that artillery ammunition be carried to the rear; the 4th Army reported on 14 April, that the British were still occupying the Passchendaele Salient. The next day was quiet in the salient and the withdrawal of the II Corps and XXII Corps divisions was covered by the outposts in the original front line and artillery, which was divided into some active batteries which fired and a greater number of batteries kept silent, camouflaged and not to fire except in an emergency. Plumer gave orders to begin the retirement by occupying the line before the night of 15/16 April, while maintaining the garrisons in the outpost line and holding the Battle Zone with a few troops as an intermediate line. During the night of 15/16 April, the outpost line garrisons were to be withdrawn behind the new front line at 4:00 a.m. and the intermediate line in front of the Battle Zone was to be held as long as possible, to help the troops in the new line to get ready.

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Only around Armentières were the German defences on lower ground. The possibility of a withdrawal to more easily defensible ground, was rejected by Joffre, the French Generalissimo and all the Allied commanders preferred to improve their positions by advancing. With this in mind, the French and British made far less effort to improve their defences, which conceded another advantage to the Germans, who could attack positions protected by far less extensive barbed wire barriers and few deep-mined dug-outs than their own. Allowing such positions to relapse into quiet fronts was rejected by the British, who instituted sniping, unpredictable artillery bombardments and raids, which provoked German retaliation; the British conducted three attacks against five by the Germans and numerous raids.

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The British and French benefitted from superior numbers, which enabled the Allied commanders to relieve divisions after shorter periods in the line. Severe criticism of General Sir Douglas Haig and General Henry Rawlinson during and since the war, for persisting with attacks on October, was challenged in 2009 by Philpott, who put the British share of the battle into the context of strategic subordination to French wishes, Joffre's general Allied offensive and the continuation of French attacks south of Le Transloy, which had to be supported by British operations and by more recent writing of the ordeal inflicted on the German armies.

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This suggestion was opposed by the French and Italian delegations and the British General Staff, at least covertly and was discarded. The new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front during the spring of 1917, could break the German front and lead to a decisive victory. The Nivelle plan was welcomed by the British, despite many in the Cabinet and War Office being sceptical, because a French attack would mean a lesser burden falling on the British. Haig was ordered to co-operate with Nivelle but secured French agreement that in the event the offensive failed, the British would attack in Flanders with French support. On 9 April, British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary attack at the Battle of Arras and the Nivelle Offensive began on 16 April. The French attack gained ground at great cost but no breakthrough leading to open warfare and the decisive defeat of the German army occurred, leading to Nivelle being replaced by Philippe Petain, a collapse in morale and mutinies in the French armies. While the French recuperated, offensive action on the Western Front could only come from the BEF. It was not until June 1917 that the principle of a Flanders campaign was approved by the British Cabinet and more grudgingly by the Prime Minister, against his preference for an Italian campaign. Haig ordered General Herbert Plumer, the commander of the Second Army which occupied the Ypres Salient, to produce a plan in late 1916. Haig was dissatisfied with the limited scope of Plumer's plan for the capture of Messines Ridge and Pilkem Ridge – the name used in military circles for the higher ground around the small hamlet of Pilckem (Pilkem), within the dorp (village) of Boesinghe (Flemish: Boezinge). By early 1917, Haig felt that Nivelle's ambitious attempt at a decisive battle would either force the Germans to abandon the Belgian coast or that the German 4th Army in Flanders, would have divisions taken away to replace losses further south.

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The Arras sector then returned to the stalemate that typified most of the war on the Western Front, except for attacks around Lens, culminating in the Canadian Battle of Hill 70 in August.At the beginning of 1917, the British and French were still searching for a way to achieve a strategic breakthrough on the Western Front. The previous year had been marked by the costly success of the Franco–British offensive astride the river Somme, while the French had been unable to take the initiative because of intense German pressure at Verdun until after August 1916. Both battles consumed enormous quantities of resources while achieving virtually no strategic gains on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the cost to Germany of containing the Anglo-French attacks had been high, and given that the material preponderance of the Entente and its allies could only be expected to increase in 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided on a defensive strategy on the Western Front for that year. This impasse reinforced the French and British commanders' belief that to end the stalemate they needed a breakthrough; while this desire may have been the main impetus behind the offensive, the timing and location were heavily influenced by a number of political and tactical factors.

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On 9 April the Fourth Army began a bombardment of the Hindenburg Line, with such heavy artillery that it had in range, as the Third and First armies began the offensive at Arras to the north. Fighting on the Fourth Army front, for the remaining outpost villages, went on until the end of April. German air operations over the winter concentrated on reconnaissance to look for signs of Anglo-French offensive preparations, which were found at Messines, Arras, Roye, the Aisne and the Champagne region. By March the outline of the Anglo-French spring offensive had been observed from the air. German air units were concentrated around Arras and the Aisne, which left few to operate over the Noyon Salient during the retirement. When the retirement began British squadrons in the area were instructed to keep German rearguards under constant observation, harass German troops by ground attacks and to make long-range reconnaissances to search the area east of the Hindenburg Line, for signs of more defensive positions and indications that a further retreat was contemplated.

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The British prolonged the Arras offensive into mid-May, despite uncertainty about French intentions, high losses and diminishing success as they moved divisions northwards to Flanders. The British captured Messines Ridge on 7 June and spent the rest of the year on the offensive in the Third Battle of Ypres (31 July – 10 November) and the Battle of Cambrai (20 November – 8 December). The difficulties of the French armies became known in general to the Germans but the cost of the defensive success on the Aisne made it impossible to reinforce the Flanders front and conduct more than local operations on the Aisne and in Champagne. The French conducted limited attacks at Verdun in August, which recaptured much of the remaining ground lost in 1916 and the Battle of La Malmaison in October, which captured the west end of the Chemin des Dames and forced the Germans to withdraw to the north bank of the Ailette. While the Germans were diverted by the British offensive in Flanders, French morale recovered, after Pétain had 40–62 mutineers shot as scapegoats and introduced reforms, such as better food, more pay and more leave to improve the welfare of French troops.

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From spring 1916, the British had deployed five tunnelling companies along the Vimy Ridge and during the first two months of their tenure of the area, 70 mines were fired, mostly by the Germans. Between October 1915 and April 1917 an estimated 150 French, British and German charges were fired in this 7 kilometres (4.3 mi) sector of the Western Front. In May 1916, Operation Schleswig-Holstein, a German infantry attack, forced the British back 640 metres (700 yd), to stop British mining by capturing the shaft entrances. From June 1916, the Germans withdrew many miners to work in coal mines in Germany. In the second half of 1916, the British constructed strong defensive underground positions and from August 1916, the Royal Engineers developed a mining scheme for a big infantry attack on the Vimy Ridge proposed for autumn 1916, although this was postponed. After September 1916, when the Royal Engineers had completed their network of defensive galleries along most of the front line, offensive mining largely ceased although activities continued until 1917. The British gallery network beneath Vimy Ridge eventually grew to a length of 12 kilometres (7.5 mi). The Canadian Corps was posted to the northern part of Vimy Ridge in October 1916 and preparations for an attack were revived in February 1917. British tunnelling companies created extensive underground networks and fortifications.

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Over the winter, German deception operations were conducted and indications of an offensive through Switzerland diverted French attention at the end of 1916. The British were occupied by reports of troops and heavy artillery moving into Flanders and increased numbers of agent reports of troop movements from Lille, Tourcoing and Courtrai. Until January 1917, the British took seriously a possible limited offensive towards the Channel ports and made Flanders the subject of most of their long-range reconnaissance flights. Rupprecht, the northern army group commander on the Western Front, was made responsible for planning the devastation of the infrastructure within the Noyon Salient and the retirement to new defensive positions along the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line), codenamed the Alberich Bewegung (Operation Alberich/Alberich Manoeuvre).

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After the Battle of the Ancre (13–18 November 1916), British attacks on the Somme front were stopped during inclement weather. For the rest of the year and early January 1917, military operations by both sides were mostly restricted to surviving the rain, snow, fog, mud fields, waterlogged trenches and shell-holes. As preparations for the offensive at Arras continued, the British attempted to keep German attention on the Somme front. The Fifth Army was instructed by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to prepare systematic attacks to capture portions of the German defences. Short advances could progressively uncover the remaining German positions in the Ancre valley, threaten the German hold on the village of Serre to the north and expose German positions beyond to ground observation.

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After 26 February 1917, when an Anglo-French Congress at Calais decided on a spring offensive, Murray received strong encouragement. The decision by the Supreme War Council was given increased impetus for "Allied activity" on 8 March when the Russian Revolution began. By 11 March Baghdad in Mesopotamia had been occupied by British Empire forces, and an offensive in Macedonia had been launched. In April the Battle of Arras was launched by the British, and the French launched the Nivelle offensive. Britain's three major war objectives now were to maintain maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea, while preserving the balance of power in Europe and the security of Egypt, India, and the Persian Gulf. The latter could be secured by an advance into Palestine and the capture of Jerusalem. A further advance would ultimately cut off the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia from those on the Arabian Peninsula and secure the region.

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Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced a return to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on 9 January 1917 and engineered the dismissal of the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and other opponents of the policy the next day. The policy was to resume on 1 February, with the intention of sinking 600,000 long tons (610,000 t) of shipping per month and knocking Britain out of the war in 5–12 months. Optimistic claims by the navy were less important to the decision, than the "desperate" position of the western armies and the decrepitude of Germany's allies. Another front in the west was to be opened by the resumption of air attacks on Britain. New aircraft had become available to replace airships, which had become too vulnerable to British counter-measures in 1916. Planning began in late 1916 and Operation Türkenkreutz began in May 1917. As part of the defensive strategy for the Western Front, five defensive positions were planned to form the basis of the Abwehrschlacht (defensive battle) expected in 1917.

The Importance of the Shorter Defensive Position

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The Importance of the Shorter Defensive Position

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