German Strategy Reconsidered
- Germany's strategy of Vernichtungsstrategie and a dictated peace was beyond their resources.
- Falkenhayn planned to detach Russia or France from the Allied coalition through diplomatic and military action.
- A strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie) aimed to make the war too costly for the Allies, forcing one enemy to negotiate an end to the war.
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Falkenhayn reconsidered German strategy, because Vernichtungsstrategie and a dictated peace against France and Russia, were beyond German resources. Falkenhayn intended to detach Russia or France from the Allied coalition, by diplomatic as well as military action. A strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie), would make the cost of the war was too great for the Allies to bear, until one enemy negotiated an end to the war. The remaining belligerents would have to come to terms or face the German army concentrated on the remaining front and capable of obtaining a decisive victory. Mad minute In 2010, Sheldon wrote that a mad minute of accurate rapid rifle-fire, was held to have persuaded German troops that they were opposed by machine-guns. This was a false notion, picked out of a translation of Die Schlacht an der Yser und bei Ypern im Herbst 1914 (1918), which the Official Historians used in lieu of authoritative sources, during the writing of the 1914 volumes of the British Official History, the first editions of which were published in 1922 and 1925, The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. — Sheldon Sheldon wrote that the translation was inaccurate and ignored many references to the combined fire of rifles and machine-guns, The British, most of whom had experience gained through long years of campaigning against cunning opponents in close country, let the attackers get to close range then, from hedges, houses and trees, opened up with withering rifle and machine-gun fire from point blank range. — Sheldon typical of German regimental histories. The British fired short bursts at close range, to conserve ammunition. Sheldon also wrote that German troops knew the firing characteristics of machine-guns and kept still until French Hotchkiss M1909 and Hotchkiss M1914 machine-guns, which had ammunition in 24- and 30-round strips, were reloading. Kindermord BEF casualties August–December 1914 Month Losses August 14,409 September 15,189 October 30,192 November 24,785 December 11,079 Total 95,654 Sheldon wrote that a German description of the fate of the new reserve corps as Kindermord (massacre of the innocents), in a communiqué of 11 November 1914, was misleading. Claims that up to 75 percent of the manpower of the reserve corps were student volunteers, who attacked while singing Deutschland über alles began a myth. After the war, most regiments which had fought in Flanders, referred to the singing of songs on the battlefield, a practice only plausible when used to identify units at night.
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＞Falkenhayn reconsidered German strategy, because Vernichtungsstrategie and a dictated peace against France and Russia, were beyond German resources. Falkenhayn intended to detach Russia or France from the Allied coalition, by diplomatic as well as military action. A strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie), would make the cost of the war was too great for the Allies to bear, until one enemy negotiated an end to the war. The remaining belligerents would have to come to terms or face the German army concentrated on the remaining front and capable of obtaining a decisive victory. ⇒ファルケンハインは、ドイツ軍の戦略を再検討した。なぜなら、フェアニヒトゥンクストラテギー（殲滅戦略）と、フランス軍やロシア軍の強圧的和平はドイツ軍の（人的物的）資源を超えたからである。ファルケンハインは外交と軍事行動によって連合国軍からロシア軍かフランス軍を分離することを意図した。敵の一方が戦争の終結を切り出すまで消耗戦略を引きずるのは、連合国軍にとって戦争負担のコストが高すぎたことであろう。残りの会戦国は、話をつけて仲直りをするのでなければ、残りの戦線に集中して決定的な勝利を得そうなドイツ軍に直面しなければならないことになる。 ※この段落、推測で訳しましたので、誤訳があるかも知れません。その節は悪しからず。 ＞Mad minute In 2010, Sheldon wrote that a mad minute of accurate rapid rifle-fire, was held to have persuaded German troops that they were opposed by machine-guns. This was a false notion, picked out of a translation of Die Schlacht an der Yser und bei Ypern im Herbst 1914 (1918), which the Official Historians used in lieu of authoritative sources, during the writing of the 1914 volumes of the British Official History, the first editions of which were published in 1922 and 1925, The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. — Sheldon ⇒無謀な覚え書 2010年、シェルドンは機関銃で対抗しているドイツ軍を説得させるために、正確な速射銃が発砲されたという、無謀な覚え書を書いた。これは誤った概念であり、英国公報史の執筆中に公報史家たちが権威ある情報源の代わりに使用したドイツ史「1914年秋のイーゼルの会戦」からの翻訳抜粋（1918）で、その最初の版は1922年と1925年に出版された。 英国軍・フランス軍の砲兵隊は、でき得る限りの速射で、しかも浮遊する藪、垣根、壁の破片である煙の薄膜を越えて発砲し、機関銃を操って弾丸をブンブン唸らせていた。―シェルドン ＞Sheldon wrote that the translation was inaccurate and ignored many references to the combined fire of rifles and machine-guns, The British, most of whom had experience gained through long years of campaigning against cunning opponents in close country, let the attackers get to close range then, from hedges, houses and trees, opened up with withering rifle and machine-gun fire from point blank range. — Sheldon typical of German regimental histories*. The British fired short bursts at close range, to conserve ammunition. Sheldon also wrote that German troops knew the firing characteristics of machine-guns and kept still until French Hotchkiss M1909 and Hotchkiss M1914 machine-guns, which had ammunition in 24- and 30-round strips, were reloading. ⇒この翻訳は不正確で、ライフル銃と機関銃を組み合わせた発砲に関する多くの言及を無視している、とシェルドンは書いている。 英国軍は、その多くが接近する田園で狡猾な敵対者との長年にわたる野戦を通じて経験を積んでいたので、攻撃隊を射程内に近づけてから、垣根、家屋、木々から、機関銃で盲目の照準による砲撃を始めて、敵を怖気づかせるのであった。―シェルドン ドイツ軍の連隊史の典型*。英国軍は弾薬を節約するために近距離から短弾を発射した。 シェルドンはまた、ドイツ軍は機関銃の射撃特性を知っており、24砲弾と30砲弾で弾薬を補給していたフランス軍のホッチキスM1909型とホッチキスM1914型の機関砲が再装填されるまで静止していたとも書いている。 ＊前に欠落があるようですが、このまま訳しておきます。 ＞Kindermord BEF casualties August–December 1914 Month Losses August：14,409 September：15,189 October：30,192 November：24,785 December：11,079 Total：95,654 ⇒「キンデルモード」（罪のない者の虐殺） BEFの死傷者 1914年8月－12月 月：損失 8月：14,409人 9月：15,189人 10月：30,192人 11月：24,785人 12月：11,079人 合計：95,654人 ＞Sheldon wrote that a German description of the fate of the new reserve corps as Kindermord (massacre of the innocents), in a communiqué of 11 November 1914, was misleading. Claims that up to 75 percent of the manpower of the reserve corps were student volunteers, who attacked while singing Deutschland über alles began a myth. After the war, most regiments which had fought in Flanders, referred to the singing of songs on the battlefield, a practice only plausible when used to identify units at night. ⇒シェルドンは、1914年11月11日のコミュニケ（公式声明）で、ドイツの新しい予備軍団の運命「キンデルモード」（罪のない者の虐殺）に関する記述は誤解を招くものである、と書いている。予備軍団の人力の最大75パーセントが学生の志願兵であり、いたるところでドイツの神話を歌いながら攻撃した、と主張している。戦後、フランドルで戦った大部分の連隊は、戦場で歌う歌に言及していたが、これは夜間に部隊を特定するのに慣れているときにのみできた習慣であった。 ＊この段落、誤訳があるかも知れませんが、その節はどうぞ悪しからず。
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Military analysts and historians disagree on the strategic significance of the battle, although most describe it as a British tactical and operational success. In 1919, Ludendorff wrote that the British victory cost the German army dear and drained German reserves. Hindenburg wrote that the losses at Messines had been very heavy and that he regretted that the ground had not been evacuated; in 1922, Kuhl called it one of the worst German tragedies of the war. In 1920 Haig's Dispatches described the success of the British plan, organisation and results but refrained from hyperbole, referring to the operation as a successful preliminary to the main offensive at Ypres. In 1930, Liddell Hart thought the success at Messines inflated expectations for the Third Battle of Ypres and that because the circumstances of the operations were different, attempts to apply similar tactics resulted in failure. In 1938 Lloyd George called the battle an apéritif and in 1939, G. C. Wynne judged it to be a "brilliant success", overshadowed by the subsequent tragedy of the Battles of Passchendaele. The Official Historian called it a "great victory" in 1948 and Prior and Wilson (1997) called the battle a "noteworthy success" but then complained about the decision to postpone exploitation of the success on the Gheluvelt plateau. Ashley Ekins referred to the battle as a great set-piece victory, which was also costly, particularly for the infantry of II Anzac Corps, as did Christopher Pugsley, referring to the experience of the New Zealand Division. Heinz Hagenlücke called it a great British success and wrote that the loss of the ridge, had a worse effect on German morale than the number of casualties. Jack Sheldon called it a "significant victory" for the British and a "disaster" for the German army, which was forced into a "lengthy period of anxious waiting".
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During the Battle of the Somme German forces suffered 537,919 casualties, of which 338,011 losses were inflicted by the French and 199,908 losses by the British. In turn German forces inflicted 794,238 casualties on the Entente. Doughty wrote that French losses on the Somme were "surprisingly high" at 202,567 men, 54% of the 377,231 casualties at Verdun. Prior and Wilson used Churchill's research and wrote that the British lost 432,000 soldiers from 1 July – mid-November (c. 3,600 per day) in inflicting c. 230,000 German casualties and offer no figures for French casualties or the losses they inflicted on the Germans. Sheldon wrote that the British lost "over 400,000" casualties. Harris wrote that total British losses were c. 420,000, French casualties were over 200,000 men and German losses were c. 500,000, according to the "best" German sources.
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Sheffield wrote that the losses were "appalling", with 419,000 British casualties, c. 204,000 French and perhaps 600,000 German casualties. In a commentary on the debate about Somme casualties, Philpott used Miles's figures of 419,654 British casualties and the French official figures of 154,446 Sixth Army losses and 48,131 Tenth Army casualties. German losses were described as "disputed", ranging from 400,000–680,000. Churchill's claims were a "snapshot" of July 1916 and not representative of the rest of the battle. Philpott called the "blood test" a crude measure compared to manpower reserves, industrial capacity, farm productivity and financial resources and that intangible factors were more influential on the course of the war.
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In 2007, Sheldon wrote that although German casualties from 1 June – 10 November were 217,194, a figure available in Volume III of the Sanitätsbericht (1934), Edmonds may not have included them as they did not fit his case. Sheldon recorded 182,396 slightly wounded and sick soldiers not struck off unit strength, which if included would make 399,590 German losses. The British claim to have taken 24,065 prisoners has not been disputed. In 1940, C. R. M. F. Cruttwell recorded 300,000 British casualties and 400,000 German. Wolff in 1958, gave German casualties as 270,713 and 448,688 British. In 1959, Cyril Falls estimated 240,000 British, 8,525 French and 260,000 German casualties. John Terraine followed Falls in 1963 but did not accept that German losses were as high as 400,000. A. J. P. Taylor in 1972, wrote that the Official History had performed a "conjuring trick" on these figures and that no one believed these "farcical calculations". Taylor put British wounded and killed at 300,000 and German losses at 200,000. In 1977, Terraine argued that twenty percent needed to be added to the German figures for some lightly wounded men, who would have been included under British definitions of casualties, making German casualties c. 260,400. Terraine refuted Wolff (1958), who despite writing that 448,614 British casualties was the total for the BEF in the second half of 1917, neglected to deduct 75,681 British casualties for the Battle of Cambrai given in the Official Statistics, from which he quoted or "normal wastage", averaging 35,000 per month in "quiet" periods. Prior and Wilson in 1997, gave British losses as 275,000 and German casualties just under 200,000. Hagenlücke in 1997, gave c. 217,000 German casualties. Sheffield wrote in 2002, that Holmes's guess of 260,000 casualties on both sides seemed about right. Night action of 1/2 December 1917 and Action on the Polderhoek Spur On the night of 24/25 November, two battalions of the 8th Division advanced the line to the ridge crest and a German counterattack on 30 November was a costly failure.
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The captured ground was hard to move over and difficult to defend, as much of it was of the shell-torn wilderness left by the 1916 Battle of the Somme. Elsewhere the transport infrastructure had been demolished and wells poisoned during the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917. The initial German jubilation at the successful opening of the offensive soon turned to disappointment as it became clear that the attack had not been decisive. Marix Evans wrote in 2002, that the magnitude of the Allied defeat was not decisive, because reinforcements were arriving in large numbers, that by 6 April the BEF would have received 1,915 new guns, British machine-gun production was 10,000 per month and tank output 100 per month. The appointment of Foch as Generalissimo at the Doullens Conference had created formal unity of command in the Allied forces. In the British Official History (1935) Davies, Edmonds and Maxwell-Hyslop wrote that the Allies lost c. 255,000 men of which the British suffered 177,739 killed, wounded and missing, 90,882 of them in the Fifth Army and 78,860 in the Third Army, of whom c. 15,000 died, many with no known grave. The greatest losses were to 36th (Ulster) Division, with 7,310 casualties, the 16th (Irish) Division, with 7,149 casualties and 66th (2nd East Lancashire) Division, 7,023 casualties. All three formations were destroyed and had to be taken out of the order of battle to be rebuilt. Six divisions lost more than 5,000 men. German losses were 250,000 men, many of them irreplaceable élite troops. German casualties, from 21 March – 30 April, which includes the Battle of the Lys, are given as 348,300. A comparable Allied figure over this longer period, is French: 92,004 and British: 236,300, a total of c. 328,000. In 1978 Middlebrook wrote that casualties in the 31 German divisions engaged on 21 March were c. 39,929 men and that British casualties were c. 38,512. Middlebrook also recorded c. 160,000 British casualties up to 5 April, 22,000 killed, 75,000 prisoners and 65,000 wounded; French casualties were c. 80,000 and German casualties were c. 250,000 men. In 2002, Marix Evans recorded 239,000 men, many of whom were irreplaceable Stoßtruppen; 177,739 British casualties of whom 77,000 had been taken prisoner, 77 American casualties and 77,000 French losses, 17,000 of whom were captured. The Allies also lost 1,300 guns, 2,000 machine-guns and 200 tanks. In 2004, Zabecki gave 239,800 German, 177,739 British and 77,000 French casualties. R. C. Sherriff's play Journey's End (first produced 1928) is set in an officers' dugout in the British trenches facing Saint-Quentin from 18 to 21 March, before Operation Michael. There are frequent references to the anticipated "big German attack" and the play concludes with the launch of the German bombardment, in which one of the central characters is killed.
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At 07:58, Stettin and Frauenlob arrived, reversing the situation so that the British destroyers were obliged to retreat towards Arethusa and Fearless. Stettin withdrew, since the German destroyers had escaped but Frauenlob was engaged by Arethusa. Arethusa was better armed but two of its four 4 in (100 mm) guns jammed and another was damaged by fire. Frauenlob—armed with ten 10.5 cm (4.1 in) guns—caused considerable damage before a shell from one of Arethusa's two 6 in (150 mm) guns destroyed her bridge, killing 37 men including the captain, forcing her to withdraw and return to Wilhelmshaven badly damaged. At 08:12, Tyrwhitt returned to the original plan to sweep the area from east to west. Six returning German destroyers were sighted which turned to flee, when one—V-187—turned back. The German ship had seen two cruisers, Nottingham and Lowestoft from Goodenough's squadron ahead and tried to pass through the British destroyers by surprise; V-187 was surrounded by eight destroyers and sunk. As British ships began to rescue survivors from the water, the German light cruiser Stettin approached and opened fire, forcing the British to abandon the rescue, leaving behind British sailors. The British submarine E4 had observed the action and launched a torpedo at Stettin but missed; Stettin attempted to ram the submarine, which dived to escape. When E4 resurfaced the larger ships had gone and the submarine rescued the British crewmen afloat in small boats with the German survivors. The Germans were left behind with a compass and direction toward the mainland as the submarine was too small to take them. At 08:15, Keyes—with Lurcher and another destroyer—sighted two four-funnelled cruisers. Still unaware that additional British ships were involved, he signalled Invincible that he was chasing two German cruisers. Goodenough received the signal, abandoned his search for enemy vessels to attack and steamed to assist Keyes against his own ships, Lowestoft and Nottingham. Keyes being chased by four more enemy cruisers, attempted to lure them towards Invincible and New Zealand, reporting them as enemy ships. Eventually, Keyes recognised Southampton and the ships attempted to rejoin Tyrwhitt. The British submarines were still unaware that the other ships were present and at 09:30, a British submarine fired two torpedoes at Southampton; the submarine missed and then escaped when Southampton tried to ram. Lowestoft and Nottingham remained out of communication range; separated from the rest of their squadron, they took no further part in the action.
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The original Allied estimate of casualties on the Somme, made at the Chantilly Conference on 15 November 1916, was 485,000 British and French casualties and 630,000 German. A German officer wrote, Somme. The whole history of the world cannot contain a more ghastly word. — Friedrich Steinbrecher In 1931, Wendt published a comparison of German and British-French casualties which showed an average of 30 percent more Allied casualties to German losses on the Somme. In the first 1916 volume of the British Official History (1932), J. E. Edmonds wrote that comparisons of casualties were inexact, because of different methods of calculation by the belligerents but that British casualties were 419,654, from total British casualties in France in the period of 498,054, French Somme casualties were 194,451 and German casualties were c. 445,322, to which should be added 27 percent for woundings, which would have been counted as casualties using British criteria; Anglo-French casualties on the Somme were over 600,000 and German casualties were under 600,000.
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Mason wrote in 2000 that there had been 378,000 French and 337,000 German casualties. In 2003, Clayton quoted 330,000 German casualties, of whom 143,000 were killed or missing and 351,000 French losses, 56,000 killed, 100,000 missing or prisoners and 195,000 wounded. Writing in 2005, Doughty gave French casualties at Verdun, from 21 February to 20 December 1916 as 377,231 men of 579,798 losses at Verdun and the Somme; 16 percent of Verdun casualties were known to have been killed, 56 percent wounded and 28 percent missing, many of whom were eventually presumed dead. Doughty wrote that other historians had followed Churchill (1927) who gave a figure of 442,000 casualties by mistakenly including all French losses on the Western Front. (In 2014, Philpott recorded 377,000 French casualties, of whom 162,000 men had been killed, German casualties were 337,000 men and a recent estimate of casualties at Verdun from 1914 to 1918 was 1,250,000 men).
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The German defensive success on the Gheluvelt Plateau left the British in the centre open to enfilade-fire from the right, that contributed to the higher number of losses after the advance had stopped and Gough was criticised for setting objectives that were too ambitious, causing the infantry to lose the barrage and become vulnerable to the German afternoon counter-attacks. Prior and Wilson wrote that the failure had deeper roots, since successive attacks could only be spasmodic, as guns were moved forward, a long process that would only recover the ground lost in 1915. This was far less than the results Haig had used to justify the offensive, in which great blows would be struck, the German defences would collapse and the British would be able safely to advance beyond the range of supporting artillery to the Passchendaele and Klercken ridges, towards Roulers and Thourout and the Belgian coast. The German counter-bombardments and Eingreif divisions had not crumpled, leaving only the possibility of a slow tactical success, rather than a strategic triumph. In 2008, Harris called the attack on 31 July a remarkable success compared to 1 July 1916, with only about half the casualties and far fewer fatalities, inflicting about the same number on the Germans, prisoner interrogations convincing Haig that the German army had deteriorated. The relative failure on the Gheluvelt Plateau and the repulse in the centre from the red line and parts of the green line by German counter-attacks did not detract from this, other counter-attacks being defeated. Had the weather been dry during August the German defence might have collapsed and the geographical objective of the offensive, to re-capture the Belgian coast might have been achieved. Much rain fell on the afternoon of 31 July and the rain in August was unusually severe, having a worse effect on the British, who had more artillery and a greater need to get artillery-observation aircraft into action in the conditions of rain and low cloud. Mud paralysed manoeuvre and the Germans were trying to hold ground rather than advance, that was an easier task regardless of the weather.
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As a result, Kress von Kressenstein was able to extricate most of his troops and heavy guns from the immediate battle area during the day. Although it has been stated that "British reserves hammered" the Germans and Ottomans to a halt on 5 August, it appears one of the infantry divisions was reluctant to leave their defences; neither infantry division were trained in desert warfare and found the sand dunes extremely difficult to negotiate. They could not match the pace and endurance of the well-trained German and Ottoman force and were hampered by water supply problems.
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