戦場における交通困難と疲弊

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  • 第一次世界大戦の戦場において、交通困難と疲弊が生じました。
  • 特にII Anzac Corpsの後方エリアでは、泥のような地面が通行困難となりました。
  • この状況により、砲兵や弾薬の移動が妨げられ、作戦に支障が生じました。
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和訳をお願いします。

According to the Official Historian, the Corps Chief Engineers and divisional Commanders Royal Engineers (CRE), considered that the ground conditions did not create serious transport difficulties to the front line until 4 October and in some places up to 12 October, except in some areas where the ground became impassable, particularly in the area behind II Anzac Corps, near the Steenbeek and its tributaries, which was described as "a porridge of mud". Duck-board tracks extended to 1 mi (1.6 km) short of the front line, beyond which was a taped row of stakes, illuminated with lamps at night but pack animals trampled many of the tracks and stakes into the mud. Extension of the plank roads behind the I and II Anzac Corps, proved impossible during the rain which began on 4 October, the planks sinking or floating away. The field artillery of II Anzac Corps, was not able to move forward as planned from west of the Steenbeek to the Zonnebeke–Winnipeg road. Platforms were improvised to keep them out of the mud but the failure to move forward left them 6,000 yd (5,500 m) from the morning objective, 1,000 yd (910 m) out of range of the German field artillery beyond Passchendaele. The field batteries for the 66th Division were placed beyond Frezenburg, along the Zonnebeke road 1 mi (1.6 km) short of the intended positions. Conditions for the gunners deteriorated rapidly, with dugouts flooding in the rain. A sharp increase in illness led to breakdowns in the system of reliefs, just when the workload was at its height. Instead of the usual 90 field pieces in the 66th Division, one field brigade only got 25 guns into action and the other was unable to fire until after the attack began. The 49th Division field guns were still along the Wieltje–Gravenstafel road, west of the Steenbeek, with only a few forward on the other side behind Hill 35. Transport of ammunition by pack animal, was only possible to guns kept within 100–150 yd (91–137 m) of roads. Journeys previously an hour long took from 6–16 hours and the ammunition arrived coated with slime. The effect of the rain was not uniform and further north, in the area of XIV Corps and the French First Army, the ground had not been damaged as much by shell-fire.

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  • Nakay702
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>According to the Official Historian, the Corps Chief Engineers and divisional Commanders Royal Engineers (CRE), considered that the ground conditions did not create serious transport difficulties to the front line until 4 October and in some places up to 12 October, except in some areas where the ground became impassable, particularly in the area behind II Anzac Corps, near the Steenbeek and its tributaries, which was described as "a porridge of mud". Duck-board tracks extended to 1 mi (1.6 km) short of the front line, beyond which was a taped row of stakes, illuminated with lamps at night but pack animals trampled many of the tracks and stakes into the mud. ⇒公報史家によると、軍団の工兵隊長および英国王立陸軍工兵隊(CRE)師団の司令官らは、「泥のかゆ」と評されたシュテーンベークおよびその支流の近くで、特に第IIアンザック軍団の背後の地域で通れなくなった幾つかの地域を除いて、10月4日までは、さらに幾つかの場所で10月12日になるまでは、地面条件が前線に重大な輸送の難題を引き起こすようなことはない、と考えた。敷板の通路は、前線の1マイル(1.6キロ)手前まで拡張し、その先は柵柱の列にひもをつけて、夜はランプで照明されたけれども、荷役動物が多くの敷板や柵柱を踏みしだいて、泥に沈めた。 >Extension of the plank roads behind the I and II Anzac Corps, proved impossible during the rain which began on 4 October, the planks sinking or floating away. The field artillery of II Anzac Corps, was not able to move forward as planned from west of the Steenbeek to the Zonnebeke–Winnipeg road. Platforms were improvised to keep them out of the mud but the failure to move forward left them 6,000 yd (5,500 m) from the morning objective, 1,000 yd (910 m) out of range of the German field artillery beyond Passchendaele. ⇒第I、第IIアンザック軍団の背後の板道路の拡張は、10月4日に始まった雨の間は板が沈没したり流動したりするので、不可能と判明した。第IIアンザック軍団の野戦砲は、計画されたようにシュテーンベークの西からゾンネベケ-ウィニペグ道へ前方移動することはできなかった。プラットフォーム(砲床)は、泥を被らないように臨時の手立てをして維持したが、朝の標的から離れて6,000ヤード(5,500m)前方へ移動すること、パッシェンデールの先にあるドイツ軍野戦砲の射程外1,000ヤード(910m)地点へ移動することは失敗した。 >The field batteries for the 66th Division were placed beyond Frezenburg, along the Zonnebeke road 1 mi (1.6 km) short of the intended positions. Conditions for the gunners deteriorated rapidly, with dugouts flooding in the rain. A sharp increase in illness led to breakdowns in the system of reliefs, just when the workload was at its height. Instead of the usual 90 field pieces in the 66th Division, one field brigade only got 25 guns into action and the other was unable to fire until after the attack began. ⇒第66師団のための野戦砲はフレツェンブルクを越え、意図された位置の1マイル(1.6キロ)手前のゾンネベケ道沿いに置かれた。待避壕に雨が殺到して、砲手のための条件が急速に悪化した。疾病の急増が救援システムの崩壊を引き起こしたが、時あたかも最大量の仕事が山積する時であった。第66師団にとって、通常の90門の野戦砲の代わりに、1個の野戦旅団が攻撃用に25門の大砲を得ただけで、他は攻撃が始まる後まで砲火することができなかった。 >The 49th Division field guns were still along the Wieltje–Gravenstafel road, west of the Steenbeek, with only a few forward on the other side behind Hill 35. Transport of ammunition by pack animal, was only possible to guns kept within 100–150 yd (91–137 m) of roads. Journeys previously an hour long took from 6–16 hours and the ammunition arrived coated with slime. The effect of the rain was not uniform and further north, in the area of XIV Corps and the French First Army, the ground had not been damaged as much by shell-fire. ⇒第49師団の野戦砲は、まだシュテーンベーク西のヴィールチェ-グラヴェンシュタフェル道に沿って置かれ、ほんの2, 3門だけが前方の35番ヒルの後ろ側にあった。荷役動物による弾薬の輸送は、道路から100-150ヤード(91-137m)以内に保持された銃砲に届ける場合のみ可能であった。以前なら1時間の旅程が、6-16時間かかり、しかも到着した弾薬はドロだらけになっていた。雨の影響は均一ではなく、ずっと北の第XIV軍団やフランス第1方面軍の地域では、地面が砲弾によってさほど多く損われることはなかった。

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