British Forces Face Challenges in the Battle of Ramadi

前へ 次へ
このQ&Aのポイント
  • Maude considered postponing the operation, but was advised by General Alexander Cobbe to go ahead on the grounds of the weather conditions and precautions taken.
  • The British faced the challenge of transporting their forces to Ramadi due to the extreme heat, opting for motor vehicles and night travel.
  • Despite encountering Turkish rifle fire and artillery, the British forces struggled to make progress in the Battle of Ramadi.
回答を見る
  • ベストアンサー

日本語訳をお願いいたします。

Maude considered postponing the operation, but was advised by General Alexander Cobbe to go ahead on the grounds that the weather was unlikely to get cooler in the immediate future and that all possible precautions were being taken to minimise the impact of the heat. A column was assembled at Fallujah consisting of the 7th (Ferozepore) Brigade, two cavalry squadrons, fourteen artillery pieces, four armoured cars and half a sapper and miner company. Three aircraft were also designated to support the force, which was led by Lt Col Charles Levenax Haldane. The biggest challenge facing the British was how to get the force to Ramadi, as the heat made it impossible to march there from Dhibban, even at night. It was decided to transport them in motor vehicles, ferrying them up to their attacking positions and hopefully delivering them in a fresh enough state to mount an attack. This marked the first serious effort to use motorised infantry in the Mesopotamian theatre. 127 Ford vans and lorries were employed to transport the men, 600 at a time, travelling by night and with tents to shelter against the sun during the daytime. Ice would also be carried to ensure that any cases of heatstroke could be treated immediately. Course of the battle Dhibban was occupied without a fight on the night of 7/8 July and the rest of the force arrived there from Falluja on 10 July. A small detachment remained behind to guard Dhibban while the rest pressed on to the Madhij Defile, 11 km (7 miles) to the west. They reached it in the late evening and occupied it without opposition, though Turkish rifle fire was encountered soon afterwards. At 01:00 on 11 July, the advance resumed to Mushaid Point, about 3.2 km (2 miles) east of Ramadi. The column did not reach it until 04:45 due to heavy sand along the route. As the force moved through gardens and farms on the outskirts of Ramadi, the Turks opened fire with six artillery guns, two machine guns, and numerous rifles. By this time two of the three British aircraft had developed mechanical problems due to the heat evaporating the water from their radiators and had been forced down. The armoured cars and infantry could make no progress in the face of artillery and machine-gun fire.

  • 英語
  • 回答数2
  • ありがとう数1

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率80% (9725/12097)
回答No.2

＞Maude considered postponing the operation, but was advised by General Alexander Cobbe to go ahead on the grounds that the weather was unlikely to get cooler in the immediate future and that all possible precautions were being taken to minimise the impact of the heat. A column was assembled at Fallujah consisting of the 7th (Ferozepore) Brigade, two cavalry squadrons, fourteen artillery pieces, four armoured cars and half a sapper and miner company. Three aircraft were also designated to support the force, which was led by Lt Col Charles Levenax Haldane. ⇒モードは作戦行動を延期することを考慮したけれども、アレキサンダー・コッブ将軍から、直近の未来に天候がより涼しくなることがありそうもない地面で進めるように、そして、熱の衝撃を最小化することにあらゆる可能な用心をするように、という忠告を受けた。ファルージャで第7（フェロゼポア）旅団、騎兵2個大隊、14門の大砲、4台の装甲車、および地雷工兵半個中隊からなる、1個縦隊が集会した。また、チャールズ・レヴェナックス・ホールデーン中佐の率いる3機の航空機が、この軍団の支援機として指名された。 ＞The biggest challenge facing the British was how to get the force to Ramadi, as the heat made it impossible to march there from Dhibban, even at night. It was decided to transport them in motor vehicles, ferrying them up to their attacking positions and hopefully delivering them in a fresh enough state to mount an attack. This marked the first serious effort to use motorised infantry in the Mesopotamian theatre. 127 Ford vans and lorries were employed to transport the men, 600 at a time, travelling by night and with tents to shelter against the sun during the daytime. Ice would also be carried to ensure that any cases of heatstroke could be treated immediately. ⇒英国軍に直面していた最大の難題は、いかにして軍団をラマディにたどりつかせるかであった。それというのも、熱暑のせいで、ディバンからそこまで行進することは夜でさえ不可能だからであった。それで、彼らを自動車で輸送して、攻撃陣地まで運ぶこと、望むらくは、彼らが攻撃に取りかかるのに十分元気な状態で送り届ける、ということが決められた。このことは、メソポタミアという現場で自動車になれた歩兵を使うためには重大な努力が要ることを最初に示した。一度に600人を輸送するために、フォード車127型バンとトラックが使用され、夜間に移動し、昼間の間はテントで太陽光をさえぎった。どんな場合の熱射病も直ちに手当てができることを保証するために、氷もまた運ばれた。 ＞Course of the battle Dhibban was occupied without a fight on the night of 7/8 July and the rest of the force arrived there from Falluja on 10 July. A small detachment remained behind to guard Dhibban while the rest pressed on to the Madhij Defile, 11 km (7 miles) to the west. They reached it in the late evening and occupied it without opposition, though Turkish rifle fire was encountered soon afterwards. At 01:00 on 11 July, the advance resumed to Mushaid Point, about 3.2 km (2 miles) east of Ramadi. ⇒戦いの推移 ディバンは7月7/8日の夜に、戦いなしで占拠され、軍団の残りが7月10日にファルージャから到着した。その一行が、そこから11キロ（7マイル）西のマドヒジ峡谷に押し進む一方、小規模な派遣隊がディバンを護衛するため後に残った。彼らは夕方遅くそこに到達して、反対なしでそこを占拠したが、そのすぐ後にトルコ軍のライフル砲火に遭遇した。7月11日の深夜1時、ラマディの約3.2キロ（2マイル）東の、ムシャイド・ポイントに向かう進軍が再開された。 ＞The column did not reach it until 04:45 due to heavy sand along the route. As the force moved through gardens and farms on the outskirts of Ramadi, the Turks opened fire with six artillery guns, two machine guns, and numerous rifles. By this time two of the three British aircraft had developed mechanical problems due to the heat evaporating the water from their radiators and had been forced down. The armoured cars and infantry could make no progress in the face of artillery and machine-gun fire. ⇒縦隊はルートに沿って進んだが、砂による重い足取りのため午前4時45分になってようやくそこに到達した。軍隊がラマディの郊外の庭園や農場を通って移動するとき、トルコ軍が6門の大砲、2丁の機関銃、それとたくさんのライフルで射撃を始めた。この時までには、英国軍の航空機3機のうち2機が、ラジエーターから水蒸気を噴出して熱のためのメカニカルな問題が沸きあがって、やむなく下降した。装甲車と歩兵は、大砲や機関銃の砲火に直面して全然進むことができなかった。

iwano_aoi
質問者

お礼

回答ありがとうございました。

その他の回答 (1)

  • wel135
  • ベストアンサー率43% (16/37)
回答No.1

英語初心者ですが翻訳します。 マウスは手術を延期することを考慮したが、天気が暑くなりそうでないという理由で気象庁は天気が暑くなり、あらゆる可能な予防措置が取られなければならないと忠告した。 ファルージャには7人の部隊員、2人の騎兵隊、14人の砲兵部隊、4代の機甲歩兵4人、工兵部隊員、工兵会社などが集まっていた。 世代の航空機はまた、陸軍中将のチャールズ・レバー那須ホールデンが率いる部隊を支援するため、指名された。 英国が直面した最も大きな挑戦はライブバンがダイブバンでそこまで行進することを不可能にするために、ラマディに力を与える方法だった。 彼らを自動車運送手段に運搬することに決定して、攻撃する姿勢で彼らを攻撃することに決定して、彼らを攻撃するため、新鮮な状態で引き渡すことにした。 これはメソポター劇場で兵器を使用した歩兵を使用するための最初の真摯な努力だった。 127人のフォードトラックと貨物車が男性を輸送するために雇用され、昼には600人ずつ、夜間には日光浴をできるようにテントを張っていた。 熱中症はまた、熱中症患者が直ちに治療することができるようにするため、運搬されるのだ。 コース・オブ・ウォー ダイパバンは7月7日夜7時半に戦わずしており、残りの軍隊は7月10日にファルージャでそこに到着した。 残りの隊員たちはダイパイディフィー日(7マイル)を西に向かっているダイディディフィーの仕事を守るために後ろに退いた。 彼らは遅い夕方にそこに到着したが、トルコの銃乱射事件がすぐ、発生したが、反対なしにはそれを占領した。 7月11日午前11時30分にRamadiPointの東側約3.2km地点に位置したMushaidPointに戻った。 その柱は道に沿って重い砂のために4:45分まで届かなかった。 ラマディ外郭の定員と農場を通じて軍隊が移動したことによって、トルコ人たちは大砲6個、機関銃2台、歩兵銃で射撃を開始した。 この時期に二つの英国航空機は放熱器で水を蒸発させて強制的に落とし、機械的な問題を起こした。 機甲部隊と歩兵たちは、テポドンの銃撃戦で何の進展も見えないのだ。

  1. カテゴリ
  2. 学問・教育
  3. 語学
  4. 英語

関連するQ&A

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    However, artillery ammunition was limited and was to mainly target the Labyrinth group of Ottoman defences. The mounted divisions were to isolate Gaza by stopping the Gaza garrison retiring, or any reinforcements from Huj and Hareira areas, attempting to reinforce Gaza. They were to pursue any hostile force that showed signs of retiring, and if necessary support the main assault on Gaza, which was to be carried out by the 53rd (Welsh) Division. This division was to be reinforced if necessary by the 161st (Essex) Brigade of the 54th (East Anglian) Division. At 18:00 Murray, the commander in chief of the EEF, established his headquarters in the carriage of a railway train at El Arish. On 25 March, the Anzac Mounted Division moved out of their bivouacs in two columns. The first column, consisting of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 22nd Mounted Yeomanry Brigades, marched up the beach from Bir Abu Shunnar at 02:30, to establish a line just south of the Wadi Ghuzzeh.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    The Ottoman Empire constructed a branch railway line from the Jaffa–Jerusalem railway at Ramleh running south to reach Sileh about 275 miles (443 km) from the Suez Canal during the autumn of 1914. The 100 miles (160 km) stretch of the railway to Beersheba was opened on 17 October 1915. By May 1916 it had been extended on to Hafir El Auja then south across the Egyptian frontier, to almost reached the Wadi el Arish in December 1916 when the Battle of Magdhaba was fought. German engineers directed the construction of stone Ashlar bridges and culverts along this railway line built to move large numbers of troops long distances quickly and keep them supplied many miles from base. Ottoman military town of Hafir el Aujah, the Principal Desert Base Any attack on the Suez Canal would require artillery and a bridging train to be dragged across the desert. Two Ottoman divisions plus one more in reserve, with camel and horse units, were ready to depart in mid-January. The advance across the Sinai took ten days, tracked by British aircraft, even though German aircraft stationed in Palestine in turn aided the Ottomans and later flew some bombing missions in support of the main attack. Kress von Kressenstein's force moved south by rail, continuing on foot via el Auja carrying iron pontoons for crossing and attacking the Suez Canal at Serapeum and Tussum. It was known at Force in Egypt headquarters that the 10th, 23rd and 27th Division had assembled near Beersheba. By 11 January Nekhl had been occupied by a small Ottoman force. On 13 January 1915 it was known to the British that strong columns were passing through el Auja and El Arish. On 25 January one regiment was reported to be approaching Qantara. The next day a force of 6,000 soldiers was reported 25 miles (40 km) east of the Little Bitter Lake at Moiya Harab when defenders at Qantara were fired on by part of the approaching force. On 27 January the El Arish to Qantara road was cut 5 miles (8.0 km) to the east and Baluchistan and Kubri posts were attacked. The force had moved towards the Suez Canal in three echelons; the main group along the central route with smaller forces on the northern and southern routes. The northern group of about 3,000 men moved via Magdhaba to El Arish and thence along the northern route towards Port Said. The central group of about 6,000 or 7,000 men moved via the water cisterns at Moiya Harab and the wells at Wady um Muksheib and Jifjafa towards Ismailia. This was at the midpoint of the Suez Canal near the vital British railway and water pumping equipment. The main force marched from Beersheba through El Auja and Ibni, between the Maghara and Yelleg hills to Jifjafa and Ismailia. The third group of about 3,000 moved via Nekl southwards towards the town of Suez at the southern end of the Suez Canal.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    On the day before the attack a Turkish report suggested that there were not more than two divisions close to Beersheba. The plan required a massive material effort. The cross-Sinai railway was doubled, and extra branch lines constructed. A 500,000 gallon reservoir was built, to protect the water supply. New Bristol Fighters were supplied to the RFC in the desert, winning back control of the air, and preventing the Germans from flying low level reconnaissance. The British force was split into three. The striking wing consisted of the Desert Mounted Corp, containing the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisons and the 7th Mounted Brigade and XX Corps, with four infantry divisions and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. This force contained 47,500 infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 242 guns. On the left of the British line was XXI corps, containing three infantry divisions and two brigades, a total of 35,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 218 guns. The Yeomanry Mounted Division (5,000 cavalry) guarded the gap between the two main forces. The Turks had nine infantry divisions and one cavalry division spread along from the coast to Gaza, a total of between 35,000 and 45,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 500 artillery guns. Kress von Kressenstein reported his own Eighth Army, at Gaza, to be around 25,000 strong, so the lower overall figures is probably correct, as the British found under 5,000 men at Beersheba. A key element of the British plan was a genuine attack at Gaza. The artillery bombardment of Gaza started on 27 October, four days before the attack at Beersheba. That attack was made on 31 October (battle of Beersheba). While two of the infantry divisions attacked the strong south-west defences of the town, the cavalry attacked from the east, seizing the town after a dramatic cavalry charge by the Australian Light Horse. The plan now required an attack at Gaza, while the forces at Beersheba prepared for their next attack. It was hoped that the follow-up attack could happen on either 3 or 4 November. According the attack at Gaza was launched on the night of 1/2 November. A two stage attack succeeded in pushing back the Turkish lines west of Gaza, but at the cost of 2,700 casualties (350 dead, 340 missing and 2,000 wounded). The Turks were forced to move a reserve division into the defences around Gaza.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Kavallerie-Brigade (17. and 18. Dragoner-Regiment) commanded by Ernst Graf von Schimmelmann, and the 18. Kavallerie-Brigade (15. and 16. Husaren-Regiment) commanded by Walther von Printz. Garnier decided to attack the British at dawn with dismounted cavalry. Néry is set in a north-south oriented valley around a small river, which feeds into the River Autonne to the north; it is overlooked from the east and west by high bluffs. The main landmark was a sugar factory, just south of the village, where L Battery were billeted; the cavalry regiments were stationed in and around the village proper. Dawn on 1 September came with heavy fog lying in the valley; the force had been awakened and prepared for a move at 4.30 am, but due to the terrible visibility it was decided to wait an hour and a half for the mist to clear, and the men stood down to rest, water the horses, and prepare breakfast. The teams for the artillery were left harnessed to their guns, but with the limbers lowered to take the weight off the horses. At 5.25 am, a patrol from the 11th Hussars, which had been sent out to the south-east, encountered a strong force of enemy cavalry and escaped back to the village; the regiment quickly took up dismounted defensive positions along the eastern edge of the village, though the commander of the 5th Dragoon Guards refused to believe an attack was imminent. At 5.40 am, firing began from the heights overlooking the village from the east, supported by machine-guns and light artillery. This was the advanced guard of the 4th Cavalry Division, which had been surprised to encounter a British force, and signalled that it had unexpectedly "been surrounded by considerable hostile forces". The commander, General von Garnier, sized up the situation and quickly ordered a dismounted attack on the village. The effects of the fire from the heights were dramatic; the riderless horses of the 2nd Dragoon Guards took fright and bolted along the road northwards, whilst the artillery was immobilised and forced to remain in the firing line. One of the first casualties was the commander of the battery, Major Sclater-Booth, who was knocked unconscious as he ran towards the guns; the second-in-command of the battery, Captain Bradbury, took charge, and managed to get three guns moved into firing positions, facing twelve field guns on the ridge to the east. Two were quickly knocked out, leaving only one gun, under the direction of Captain Bradbury assisted by Sergeant Nelson and three other men. It kept up a steady fire, drawing the attention of the German artillery away from the cavalry, until its ammunition was almost exhausted; Bradbury was hit by a shell whilst trying to fetch more ammunition, and fatally wounded. The gun continued firing under Nelson and Battery Sergeant-Major Dorrell, but finally fell silent sometime before 8am, when reinforcements arrived.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    The 114th Brigade reached the wood quickly behind the barrage and dug in at the first objective. Further west, the battalion of the 113th Brigade lost the barrage but managed to reach the first objective, despite cross-fire and shelling by British guns. Various German parties surrendered and despite the chaos, it appeared that the German defence of the wood had collapsed. The artillery schedule could not be changed at such short notice and the German defence had two hours to recover. The advance to the second objective at 6:15 a.m. was delayed and conditions in the wood made it difficult to keep up with the barrage; an attack on an area called Hammerhead was forced back by a German counter-attack.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    A 2nd Division battalion was ordered to prepare a raid for the night of 4/5 February. The raiding-party was to have two officers and 60 men and stretcher-bearers, for an attack on a salient at the junction of Guard and Desire Support trenches, to take prisoners or documents, destroy machine-guns, study the state of the trenches and the way the Germans were holding the line. Stokes mortars were to be used for bombardment but no artillery was to be fired before the raid; when it began the artillery was to fire a box barrage, to isolate the objective. White suits were provided, in case of snow on the ground and all means of identification were to be removed by the raiders, who were told to give name, rank and number only if captured. A deputy was to be chosen to take over if the raid leader became a casualty.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    They were supported by 12 heavy mountain howitzers in two Austrian batteries, two 10-cm long guns in a German battery (from Pasha I) and two Ottoman field artillery batteries. Further, the Ottoman 53rd Infantry Division, which had been garrisoned at Jaffa, was ordered to march south to Gaza, but was not expected before the morning of 27 March. Kress von Kressenstein, the commander of the Ottoman defences, moved his headquarters from Beersheba to Tel esh Sheria where it remained until June. However, by 20 March the British considered the Ottoman Army defending Gaza and dominating the coastal route from Egypt to Jaffa, to be "steadily deteriorating." Indeed it had been reported that Kress von Kressenstein complained of "heavy losses" caused by deserters, and between the EEF victory at Rafa in early January and the end of February, 70 deserters had arrived in the EEF lines.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    During the six months stalemate following the Second Battle of Gaza, the el Buqqar ridge had been the objective of Desert Column/Desert Mounted Corps strategic marches on 5–7, 10 May and 2–3, 6–7, 14 and 24–5 June. On 19 July, the Anzac Mounted Division with the Australian Mounted Division advanced towards el Buqqar to engage an Ottoman force of two regiments of cavalry supported by infantry and four light guns, occupying the area. The 1st Light Horse Brigade attacked the force capturing 11 prisoners before the Ottoman force withdrew behind entrenchments. One of the prisoner described the attacking force as part of the Ottoman 16th Division which had been protecting a new corps commander while he made a personal reconnaissance. By the next morning the area was clear of Ottoman troops. Ottoman patrols were dispersed from el Buqqar ridge on 21 and 29 September, and on 12–14 October. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade took over from the 5th Mounted Brigade, duties of Outpost Brigade on 16 October when it was noted dawn occurred at 05:00 and dusk at 17:30. On 18 October the day posts of 3rd Light Horse Brigade were relieved by the 5th Mounted Brigade at 09:00. The Australian Mounted Division with the 7th Mounted Brigade attached was to cover a reconnaissance by officers of the XXI Corps. By 11:50 the 7th Mounted Brigade was holding a line east of Khalasa to Ibn Saiid, the 4th Light Horse Brigade was holding Points 840, 820, 810, 790 and 770 while the 5th Mounted Brigade held points 730, 630, 550 and 300, with the Australian Mounted Divisional headquarters at Khor el Asram and the 3rd Light Horse Brigade in reserve. There was no opposition during the establishment of this line, and indeed Ottoman units "were very quiet all day more so than on any other reconnaissance." At 14:10 Ottoman infantry and cavalry were sighted at Abu Irgeig and Notts battery went into action against them, when two bell tents at Irgeig railway station and station buildings were hit. The outpost line was withdrawn at 17:30 without incident. While the XXI Corps continued to hold the front line south of Gaza, extending eastwards from the Mediterranean Sea, the XX Corps and Desert Mounted Corps held the Wadi Ghazzeh and eastwards.

  • 英文を日本語訳をお願いします。

    These had to be located by careful reconnaissance on foot as the country was very rough and due to the low cloud and mist aerial reconnaissance could not be used. Artillery was also severely hampered by the rough terrain making it virtually impossible to produce effective artillery fire support. On the plain the operations of the XXI Corps were carried out without any of the difficulties suffered by the XX Corps. The XXI Corps moved its right forward from the Wadi Deir Ballut to Ras el Ain and secured a commanding position near Abu Tellul and Musallabeh which overlooks the Jordan Valley and the Beisan to Jericho road. Their final objective was a line north of the Wadi Deir Ballut (which becomes the Wadi el Jib) and the Wadi Abu Lejja where it enters the Nahr el Auja north of Mulebbis an advance of 4.5 miles (7.2 km). After the passage of the Nahr el Auja an advance had reached El Haram near ancient Arsuf making it possible to take the Ottoman positions in enfilade. The attack was carried out by infantry from the 232nd Brigade and 234th Brigade of the 75th Division and the 162nd Brigade of the 54th (East Anglian) Division closely supported by artillery in a creeping barrage. One section followed close behind the infantry leaving the rest of the battery in action and as soon as the leading section was able to open fire the four other guns moved forward to join it. Deir el Ballut was taken about at 14:00 on 10 March and by 11:00 on 11 March all the ground to the south of the Wadi had been evacuated by the Ottoman forces leaving behind 112 soldiers who were taken prisoner and about 40 dead at a cost to the two infantry divisions of 104 casualties. The final line captured was found to be overlooked on all sides so a slight retirement to the heights just to the south was made and the positions consolidated. Elsewhere objectives had not all been gained but the depth of the advance in the centre was 5 miles (8.0 km) over a 14-mile (23 km) front at a cost of over 1,300 casualties; only 169 prisoners had been captured. The new line established by these infantry corps remained almost the same for six months; until the general advance in September 1918. The success of these infantry operations provided a sufficiently large base to support the Transjordan operations which began at the end of the month with the first Transjordan attack on Amman.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Due to the excellent observation possessed by the Germans, zero hour had been chosen for dawn at 3:50 a.m. but with mist and unbroken cloud at 500–800 feet (150–240 m), it was still dark when the British bombardment began. The shelling was maintained for six minutes, while the British infantry crossed the 200–300 yards (180–270 m) of no man's land, then the barrage began to creep forward at a rate of 100 yards (91 m) in four minutes. The attack extended from opposite Deûlémont in the Second Army area, to the boundary with the Fifth Army, to convince the Germans that a serious effort was being made to capture the Warneton–Zandvoorde line. The II Anzac Corps took the German outpost line west of the Lys river. The New Zealand Division captured La Basseville, south-west of Warneton, in street fighting with the German garrison, who eventually withdrew towards Warneton and the 3rd Australian Division captured outposts and strong points of the Warneton line near Gapaard. To the north, IX Corps with the 39th and 19th divisions, advanced 500 yards (460 m) astride the Wambeke and Roosebeke streams and down the Oosttaverne spur between them, to the blue line (first objective) 1,000–1,500 yards (910–1,370 m) forward. The 19th Division attacked from Bee Farm in the south to Forret in the north. Two battalions of the 37th Division were attached to the right flank of the 19th Division to capture the blue line, from July to Bee Farms and revert to the command of the 37th Division for the next phase, for an attack south of July Farm. The 19th Division attack was conducted by the 56th Brigade, with three attacking battalions and one in reserve. Each battalion assembled in the front line and the support battalions took post in the old British front line, which had been made redundant by the Battle of Messines in June, then advanced to occupy the vacated front-line positions, when the attack began. Artillery support came from the 19th divisional artillery, the left group of the 37th divisional artillery and two 6-inch batteries of the IX Corps heavy artillery; a machine-gun barrage was to be fired by about 30 machine-guns.

注目のQ&A

カテゴリ

専門家に質問してみよう

職業から探して質問する

あなたにピッタリな商品が見つかる！ OKWAVEセレクト

質問する