French Colonial Corps Defeated by German Units

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  • The defeat of the French Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, ineffective advanced guards, and neglected fire superiority tactics, leading to reckless attacks.
  • German units out-gunned and outnumbered the French colonial infantry at Neufchâteau, resulting in the annihilation of French troops caught in the open.
  • Both sides attempted to gain fire superiority, but the Germans were able to achieve it and manoeuvre without severe casualties.
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Charbonneau explained that the defeat of the Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, the ineffectiveness of advanced guards in causing delay to advancing German units and that French offensive tactics neglected the importance of obtaining a superiority of fire, which had led to reckless attacks. The quality of the German opponents was not mentioned but German reconnaissance had been effective, communication between commanders and subordinates had not broken down, mutual support between neighbouring units had occurred and German artillery had provided continuous close fire support.[9] At Neufchâteau, the French colonial infantry had been out-gunned and outnumbered by German units, which had been able to engage all their forces quickly. The French XII Corps had a greater number of guns but was not able to overcome two German infantry battalions. German artillery had engaged the Colonial Brigade from close range but when in a hastily occupied defensive position, the French had nullified much of the German artillery-fire; French troops caught in the open had been annihilated. Both sides had attempted to gain fire superiority before advancing and once this had been achieved by the Germans, they had been able to manoeuvre without severe casualties.

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回答No.2

>Charbonneau explained that the defeat of the Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, the ineffectiveness of advanced guards in causing delay to advancing German units and that French offensive tactics neglected the importance of obtaining a superiority of fire, which had led to reckless attacks. ⇒シャーボノーは植民地軍団の敗因について説明した。それは、不完全な偵察調査や、ドイツ部隊の進軍に遅れを引き起こさせることに失敗した先発守備隊の無策に起因したのである。そして、フランス軍の戦術で重要な火器攻撃の優勢を取ることを軽視して、向こうみずな攻撃に至ったからである、と。 >The quality of the German opponents was not mentioned but German reconnaissance had been effective, communication between commanders and subordinates had not broken down, mutual support between neighbouring units had occurred and German artillery had provided continuous close fire support.[9] At Neufchâteau, the French colonial infantry had been out-gunned and outnumbered by German units, which had been able to engage all their forces quickly. ⇒敵軍の質には言及しなかったが、ドイツ軍の偵察は効果的であった。指揮官と部下の間のコミュニケーションは崩れることなく、近隣の部隊間の相互支持が行われて、砲兵隊は接近戦で火器攻撃の武器を注ぎ込み続けた。ヌフシャトーでは、フランス植民地の歩兵連隊は、火力でも部隊数でもドイツ部隊に劣っていたので、彼らの方は自前の軍隊をすばやくすべての会戦に投入参加させることができたのである。 >The French XII Corps had a greater number of guns but was not able to overcome two German infantry battalions. German artillery had engaged the Colonial Brigade from close range but when in a hastily occupied defensive position, the French had nullified much of the German artillery-fire; French troops caught in the open had been annihilated. Both sides had attempted to gain fire superiority before advancing and once this had been achieved by the Germans, they had been able to manoeuvre without severe casualties. ⇒フランス軍の第XII軍団は、大量の銃砲を持ってはいたが、ドイツ軍の2個歩兵大隊を駆逐することができなかった。ドイツ軍の砲兵隊は、近距離から植民地軍旅団と交戦したが、フランス軍が急遽守備陣地を占領したときドイツ軍の火器類の多くを無効にした。戸外で捕えられたフランス軍隊は、完敗した。両軍とも、進軍する前に砲火で優勢を得ようとしたが、ひとたびドイツ軍によってこれが達成されると、彼らはさほど深刻な犠牲者も出さずに、作戦行動を進めることができたのである。

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回答No.1

シャルボノーは、植民地軍団の敗退は偵察の失敗のためであり、ドイツ軍部隊の前進をおくらせるような攻撃援護がなく、攻撃戦術は火力優位の重要性を無視しており、無謀な攻撃を招いたと説明した。対戦したドイツ(軍)の質については触れなかった。ドイツ軍の偵察が効果的に行われ、指揮官と部下との意思疎通が壊れず、隣接する部隊間で物資補給が行われ、砲兵は絶えず火力補給を受けていた。[9] ヌフシャトーで、フランスの植民地歩兵は、直ちに兵力を集結できたドイツ軍部隊に対し銃砲でも兵員でも負けていた。 フランス12軍団は十分な銃砲を保有したが、ドイツ軍の2個歩兵大隊を超えるほどもなかった。ドイツ軍砲兵は急造の守備陣形だったが、植民地旅団を至近距離から後退させた。フランス軍はドイツ軍砲兵火力のほとんどを無にした。というのも、フランス軍は露呈して捕捉され全滅したためである。 両者とも、前進するまえに火力優勢を確保しようとしたが、ドイツ軍が多くの損害を出すことなく行動できたので、これを達成した。

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