• ベストアンサー
  • 困ってます

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 英語
  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数75
  • ありがとう数1

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率81% (8882/10925)

>Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. ⇒平時のフランス軍は、計画XVIIの下で約2,000,000人の兵士から成る5個の野戦方面軍を構成することになっており、各方面軍には、それに配属される予備師団群とその側面につく予備師団群がついていた。方面軍はエピナル、ナンシーおよびヴェルダン–ムジエール周辺のドイツ軍前線に対峙して集結し、メネウルドとコマーシ周辺に予備軍として1個方面軍が待機することになっていた。1871年以降、鉄道敷設については、ドイツ軍が利用できる13路線に対して、フランスの総司令部には16路線を与えられていたが、フランス軍としては、ドイツ軍の意図が明らかになるまで待つことも可能であった。 >The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army. ⇒フランス軍の兵員配置は、ロレーヌにおいて、またはベルギー経由でやって来る、ドイツの攻撃を迎え撃つための準備をしておくことを意図した。ドイツ軍は予備軍を利用すると予想されたが、またベルギーおよびミューズ川・サンブル川の南を通って進軍するのに足る軍隊だけを西部方面軍として残して、大規模なドイツ方面軍をロシアに接する境界線に動員することも予期された。フランス諜報部は、ドイツ総司令部の1905年の机上演習地図を入手したが、それによると、ドイツ軍隊はナミュールより北には行かず、ベルギーの城砦を包囲する計画が、ベルギー軍に対する防御措置であると想定された。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

質問者からのお礼

回答ありがとうございました。

関連するQ&A

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with "Groups of Reserve Divisions" attached to each army and a Group of Reserve Divisions on each of the extreme flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a map exercise of the German general staff of 1905, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and with a group of reserve divisions on the southern and northern flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General Staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army, and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a map exercise of the German general staff of 1905, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

  • 和訳をお願いします。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Joseph Joffre, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the French army since 1911 and the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy met on 1 August, to agree that the military conduct of the war should exclusively be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German but not the Belgian frontier. Joffre sent warning orders to the covering forces near the frontier, requiring the VII Corps to prepare to advance towards Mühlhausen (French: Mulhouse) to the north-east of Belfort and XX Corps to make ready to begin an offensive towards Nancy. As soon as news arrived that German troops had entered Luxembourg, the Fourth Army was ordered to move between the Third and Fifth armies, ready to attack to the north of Verdun. Operations into Belgium were forbidden, to deny the Germans a pretext until 4 August, when it was certain that German troops had already violated the Belgian border. To comply with the Franco-Russian Alliance, Joffre ordered an invasion of Alsace-Lorraine on for 14 August, although anticipating a German offensive through Belgium.

  • 文翻訳をお願いします。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army. A German attack from south-eastern Belgium towards Mézières and a possible offensive from Lorraine towards Verdun, Nancy and St. Dié was anticipated; the plan was a development of Plan XVI and made more provision for the possibility of a German offensive through Belgium. The First, Second and Third armies were to concentrate between Épinal and Verdun opposite Alsace and Lorraine, the Fifth Army was to assemble from Montmédy to Sedan and Mézières and the Fourth Army was to be held back west of Verdun, ready to move east to attack the southern flank of a German invasion through Belgium or south against the northern flank of an attack through Lorraine. No formal provision was made for combined operations with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but joint arrangements had been made and during the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911, the French had been told that six divisions could be expected to operate around Maubeuge.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Belgian military planning was based on an assumption, that other powers would eject an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government intending to do more than protect its independence. The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that the British would fight to protect Belgian independence. A General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier de Selliers de Moranville who began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July. Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National redoubt of Belgium ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.

  • 日本語訳をお願い致します。

    The Siege of Antwerp (Dutch: Beleg van Antwerpen, French: Siège d'Anvers, German: Belagerung von Antwerpen) was an engagement between the German and the Belgian, British and French armies around the fortified city of Antwerp during World War I. German troops besieged a garrison of Belgian fortress troops, the Belgian field army and the British Royal Naval Division in the Antwerp area, after the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914. The city, which was ringed by forts known as the National Redoubt, was besieged to the south and east by German forces. The Belgian forces in Antwerp conducted three sorties in late September and early October, which interrupted German plans to send troops to France, where reinforcements were needed to counter the French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). A German bombardment of the Belgian fortifications with heavy and super-heavy artillery began on 28 September. The Belgian garrison had no hope of victory without relief and despite the arrival of the Royal Naval Division beginning on 3 October, the Germans penetrated the outer ring of forts. When the German advance began to compress a corridor from the west of the city along the Dutch border to the coast, through which the Belgians at Antwerp had maintained contact with the rest of unoccupied Belgium, the Belgian Field Army commenced a withdrawal westwards towards the coast. On 9 October, the remaining garrison surrendered, the Germans occupied the city and some British and Belgian troops escaped to the Netherlands to the north and were interned for the duration of the war. Belgian troops from Antwerp withdrew to the Yser river, close to the French border and dug in, to begin the defence of the last unoccupied part of Belgium and fought the Battle of the Yser against the German 4th Army in October and November 1914. The Belgian Army held the area until late in 1918, when it participated in the Allied liberation of Belgium. The city of Antwerp was defended by numerous forts and other defensive positions, under the command of the Military Governor General Victor Deguise, and was considered to be impregnable. Since the 1880s, Belgian defence planning had been based on holding barrier forts on the Meuse (Maas) at Liège and at the confluence of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers at Namur, to prevent French or German armies from crossing the river, with the option of a retreat to the National redoubt at Antwerp, as a last resort, until the European powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality could intervene. The Siege of Antwerp アントワープ包囲

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The Second Army had to attack methodically after artillery preparation but managed to push back the German defenders. Intelligence reports identified a main line of resistance of the German 6th Army and 7th Army, which had been combined under the command of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, close to the advanced French troops and that a counter-offensive was imminent. On 16 August, the Germans opposed the advance with long-range artillery fire and on 17 August, the First Army reinforced the advance on Sarrebourg. When the Germans were found to have left the city Joffre ordered the Second Army to incline further to the north, which had the effect of increasing the divergence of the French armies.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Joseph Joffre, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the French army since 1911 and the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy met on 1 August, to agree that the military conduct of the war should exclusively be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German but not the Belgian frontier. Joffre sent warning orders to the covering forces near the frontier, requiring the VII Corps to prepare to advance towards Mühlhausen (French: Mulhouse) to the north-east of Belfort and XX Corps to make ready to begin an offensive towards Nancy. As soon as news arrived that German troops had entered Luxembourg the Fourth Army was ordered to move between the Third and Fifth armies, ready to attack to the north of Verdun. Operations into Belgium were forbidden to deny the Germans a pretext until 4 August when it was certain that German troops had already violated the Belgian border. To comply with the Franco-Russian Alliance Joffre ordered an invasion of Alsace-Lorraine on for 14 August, although anticipating a German offensive through Belgium.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    At the outbreak of World War I, the Belgian army was in the middle of a reorganisation. Historically, Belgium had a reputation for neglecting its military. During the 19th century, military reform had been a major political issue as successive governments remained unsure of whether the signatory nations of the 1839 Treaty of London would intervene to guarantee Belgian neutrality if the country were invaded. Belgian politicians were also aware of the rapid expansion of French and German armies during the period. From the 1880s onwards, the Belgian government embarked on an ambitious series of fortress construction but failed to expand or reform the military itself. In 1902, the regular army stood at just 42,800 men with a potential post-mobilisation strength of 180,000.