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Belgian military planning was based on an assumption, that other powers would eject an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government intending to do more than protect its independence. The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that the British would fight to protect Belgian independence. A General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier de Selliers de Moranville who began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July. Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National redoubt of Belgium ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.

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>Belgian military planning was based on an assumption, that other powers would eject an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government intending to do more than protect its independence. The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that the British would fight to protect Belgian independence. ⇒ベルギーの軍事計画は、ある仮定に基づいていた。すなわち、他国の権力は侵略者を送り出すものだろうから、ドイツからの侵入が見込まれるからといって、それでフランスや英国が同盟国であることにはつながらない。ベルギー政府にとっては、独立を守ること以上のことを画策することにもならない。英仏協商の成立(1904年)によって、ベルギーに対する英国の態度が変わり、英国人はベルギーの独立を保護するために戦う気になるだろう、とベルギー人は認識するに至った。 >A General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier de Selliers de Moranville who began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July. Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National redoubt of Belgium ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. ⇒1910年に参謀本部が立ち上げられたが、陸軍総司令官ハリー・ユングブルート中将が1912年6月30日に引退して、交代も立てられなかった。1914年5月に、シュバリエ・ド・セリエ・ド・モランビーユ中将が交代して、軍の集結のための計画を立て始め、7月29日に鉄道当局の役員と会見した。ベルギー軍隊は、どの境界線にも対峙する準備の整っている「ベルギー国家要塞」の前の中央ベルギーに集まるものとした。一方、「リエージュ強化陣地」と「ナミュール強化陣地」は、前線の守備・確保のためにこれまでのままとした。 >On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur. ⇒兵士動員に関しては、国王が総司令官となって、どこに軍を集結させるかを選定した。新たな再軍備計画の混乱の中で、組織化も訓練も貧弱で行き届いていない兵士にとっては、侵略者との会戦が遅れる中央陣地はありがたかったことだろう。しかし軍としては、前線上にあって防衛するための防備隊も必要であった。攻撃型のフランス軍の理論に沿って、前線布陣への復帰を望む考え方の一派もあった。それでベルギー軍の作戦計画は、野戦方面軍はゲテ川の背後に集結し、2個師団が前方のリエージュとナミュールに布陣する、という折衷案になった。

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