• ベストアンサー
  • すぐに回答を!

これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。

これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。助けてください。よろしくお願いします。 Schumacher saw German unity as a precondition for the unification of Europe, and in the long run be was correct: the unification of Germany in 1990 became the basis for the ‘enlargement’ of the European Union towards the East that took place later in 2004-7. As long as Germany remained split, Europe was divided. The Minister of the Interior, Gustav Heinemann, resigned on account of the policy of German rearmament that actually meant the militarization of the Federal Republic. Heinemann considered peace in Europe to be threatened by this and saw a deepening in the division of Germany.

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 英語
  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数31
  • ありがとう数1

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1

Schumacher(シューマッハー)はドイツ統合をヨーロッパ統一の前提条件と考えていた。そして長い目で見ればそれは正しかった。つまり1990年にドイツが統合し、その後2004ー7におこる欧州連合の東側に向けての拡大の基礎を築いた。 ドイツが(東西に)分かれている限り、ヨーロッパは分断されていた。 内務大臣Gustav Heinemannは、連邦共和国の軍事化を意味するドイツの再武装化政策が理由で辞任した。 Heinemannはこれがヨーロッパの平和の脅威だと考えた、そしてドイツの分裂は深刻なものと考えていた。 >in the long run be was ここがちょっと変なような気がしますbeじゃなくitとか。。。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

質問者からのお礼

とてもわかりやすかったです ありがとうございました!!

関連するQ&A

  • これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。

    これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。助けてください。よろしくお願いします。 At the end of August 1950 the US High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, to whom the Federal Chancellor was distantly related, received a memorandum from Adenauer. From the start he had sought a close attachment to the Western powers. A German military contribution would be useful in this. The Social Democrats, however, voiced their fundamental opposition to this, led by Kurt Schumacher, who rightly predicted that the one-sided policy of Western integration would reduce the prospects for a unification of Germany and would also therefore damage European unification.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was the Great Depression of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" of National Socialism and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations". Ewa Thompson points out that the treaty allowed numerous nations in Central and Eastern Europe to liberate themselves from oppressive German rule, a fact that is often neglected by Western historiography, more interested in understanding the German point of view. In nations that found themselves free as the result of the treaty—such as Poles or Czechs—it is seen as a symbol of recognition of wrongs committed against small nations by their much larger aggressive neighbours. Regardless of modern strategic or economic analysis, resentment caused by the treaty sowed fertile psychological ground for the eventual rise of the Nazi Party.[citation needed] The German historian Detlev Peukert wrote that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during the interwar period, and though not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany. Rather, Peukert argued that it was widely believed in Germany that Versailles was a totally unreasonable treaty, and it was this "perception" rather than the "reality" of the Versailles treaty that mattered. Peukert noted that because of the "millenarian hopes" created in Germany during World War I when for a time it appeared that Germany was on the verge of conquering all of Europe, any peace treaty the Allies of World War I imposed on the defeated German Reich were bound to create a nationalist backlash, and there was nothing the Allies could have done to avoid that backlash. Having noted that much, Peukert commented that the policy of rapprochement with the Western powers that Gustav Stresemann carried out between 1923 and 1929 were constructive policies that might have allowed Germany to play a more positive role in Europe, and that it was not true that German democracy was doomed to die in 1919 because of Versailles. Finally, Peukert argued that it was the Great Depression and the turn to a nationalist policy of autarky within Germany at the same time that finished off the Weimar Republic, not the Treaty of Versailles. French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of Germans in the Sudetenland and in Posen-West Prussia were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented.

  • これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。

    これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。助けてください。よろしくお願いします。 The Federal Chancellor created a new West German state in a growing Western economic community. Thus he also became the Chancellor of a divided Germany, an outcome that is not often referred to by German historians. The way Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’ developed contributed to an escalation in the formation of blocs. In this area he was ahead of his ‘opponent’ Ulbricht in fact and in timing. As early as March 1949 ― even before the founding of the Federal Republic ― and on several occasions in the summer and autumn of 1950, be expressed his readiness to contribute militarily within the framework of a European Army.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Colonies and dependencies Main article: German colonial empire Europe Upon its founding in 1871, the German Empire controlled Alsace-Lorraine as an "imperial territory" incorporated from France after the Franco-Prussian War. It was held as part of Germany's sovereign territory. Africa Germany held multiple African colonies at the time of World War I. All of Germany's African colonies were invaded and occupied by Allied forces during the war. Cameroon, German East Africa, and German Southwest Africa were German colonies in Africa. Togoland was a German protectorate in Africa.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    As foreign minister Briand formulated an original proposal for a new economic union of Europe. Described as Briand's Locarno diplomacy and as an aspect of Franco-German rapprochement, it was his answer to Germany's quick economic recovery and future political power. Briand made his proposals in a speech in favor of a European Union in the League of Nations on 5 September 1929, and in 1930, in his "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union" for the Government of France. The idea was to provide a framework to contain France's former enemy while preserving as much of the 1919 Versailles settlement as possible. The Briand plan entailed the economic collaboration of the great industrial areas of Europe and the provision of political security to Eastern Europe against Soviet threats. The basis was economic cooperation, but his fundamental concept was political, for it was political power that would determine economic choices. The plan, under the Memorandum on the Organization of a System of European Federal Union, was in the end presented as a French initiative to the League of Nations. With the death of his principal supporter, German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, Briand's plan was never adopted but it suggested an economic framework for developments after World War II that eventually resulted in the European Union.

  • 英文を和訳して下さい。

    The British military historian Correlli Barnett claimed that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he claimed, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Germany had imposed on a defeated Russia in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion marks. Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany′s economy had been restored to its pre-war status. Barnett also claims that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany′s eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former Austrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the treaty "much enhanced" German power. Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again. By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".The British historian of modern Germany, Richard J. Evans, wrote that during the war the German right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them. Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles. Evans further noted that the parties of the Weimar Coalition, namely the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the social liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Christian democratic Centre Party, were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to claim as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equalled opposition to the Weimar Republic.

  • これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。

    これらの文がうまく訳せなくて困っています。助けてください。よろしくお願いします。 Of course for this there also needed to be favourable conditions and a fellow player: Walter Ulbricht, whose policy, with its Socialist Eastern state, played into the hands of Adenauer’s idea of isolation and distancing. Ulbricht was equally opposed to a unification of Germany at the expense of the GDR system. The Korean War was favourable for Adenauer’s policy of the militarization of the Federal Republic, drawing international attention and seemingly making a West German contribution necessary. As a quid pro quo Adenauer demanded sovereignty for his partial state.

  • 和訳をお願いします。

    The Septemberprogramm (German: [zɛpˈtɛmbɐpʁoˌɡʁam]) was the plan for the territorial expansion of Imperial Germany, prepared for Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, at the beginning of World War I (1914–18). The Chancellor's private secretary, Kurt Riezler, drafted the Septemberprogramm on 9 September 1914, in the early days of the German attack in the west, when Germany expected to defeat France quickly and decisively. The extensive territorial conquests proposed in the Septemberprogramm required making vassal states of Belgium and France and seizing much of the Russian Empire. The Septemberprogramm was not effected because France withstood the initial German attack, and the war devolved into a trench-warfare stalemate, and ultimately ended in German defeat. As geopolitics, the Septemberprogramm itself is a documentary insight to Imperial Germany's war aims, and shows the true scope of German plans for territorial expansion in two directions, east and west. Historian Fritz Fischer wrote that the Septemberprogramm was based on the Lebensraum philosophy, which made territorial expansion Imperial Germany's primary motive for war. Jonathan Steinberg has suggested that if the Schlieffen Plan had worked, and produced a decisive German victory, like the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Septemberprogramm would have been implemented, thus establishing German hegemony in Europe. The Septemberprogramm was a list of goals for Germany to achieve in the war. France should cede some northern territory, such as the iron-ore mines at Briey and a coastal strip running from Dunkirk to Boulogne-sur-Mer, to Belgium or Germany. France should pay a war indemnity of 10 billion German Marks, with further payments to cover veterans' funds and to pay off all of Germany's existing national debt. This would prevent French rearmament, make the French economy dependent on Germany, and end trade between France and the British Empire. France will partially disarm by demolishing its northern forts. Belgium should be annexed to Germany or, preferably, become a "vassal state", which should cede eastern parts and possibly Antwerp to Germany and give Germany military and naval bases. Luxembourg should become a member state of the German Empire. Buffer states would be created in territory carved out of the western Russian Empire, such as Poland, which would remain under German sovereignty. Germany would create a Mitteleuropa economic association, ostensibly egalitarian but actually dominated by Germany. Members would include the new buffer states. The German colonial empire would be expanded. The German possessions in Africa would be enlarged into a contiguous German colony across central Africa (Mittelafrika) at the expense of the French and Belgian colonies. Presumably to leave open future negotiations with Britain, no British colonies were to be taken, but Britain's "intolerable hegemony" in world affairs was to end. The Netherlands should be brought into a closer relationship to Germany while avoiding any appearance of coercion.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    However, when it seemed that Germany was on the verge of victory, the Chancellor began to revise his statements. In his Septemberprogramm, Bethmann Hollweg called for Luxembourg to become a German federal state, and for that result to be forced upon the Luxembourgish people once Germany achieved victory over the Triple Entente. Given this promise, it came as a great relief to most Luxembourgers that the British and French halted the German advance at the Battle of the Marne in mid-September. The result for the combatant nations was trench warfare, but, for Luxembourg, it was the indefinite continuation of German occupation.

  • 日本語訳をお願い致します。

    Two great issues lay as impediments to convocation of a multilateral convention to plan the economic reconstruction of Europe. One was the issue of reparations, regarded as the primary matter of contention between the Triple Entente powers of France and Great Britain in the postwar era. At issue was whether the terms of economic reparations in the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, were to be enforced or amended. On the one hand was the British view that massive reconstruction costs laid upon Germany would undermine European economic recovery and thereby the market for British exports of manufactured goods. The French, on the other hand, believed that if Germany were allowed to skirt the severe financial obligations detailed in the peace treaty, its economic rise would be massively accelerated and its political and military hegemony on the European continent rapidly restored. France, among the main battlegrounds of the European conflagration, was particularly hard-hit and in need of external funds for reconstruction; Germany, on the other hand, was seen as having largely escaped the destruction of infrastructure and economic capacity during the war and currently engaged in systematic underestimation of their ability to pay. The political and economic weakness of Germany was emphasized by its new Weimar government, which effectively made the argument that it would be unable to maintain the specified payment schedule. Germany's position came to be regarded as an axiomatic truth by political decision-makers in London and Washington, DC, as well as elsewhere throughout, despite quiet indications from some German authorities themselves that some substantial portion of the reparations bill could be safely managed. German politicians sought to minimize the country's tax burden through the acquisition of foreign loans and the reduction of the overall reparations bill. British, American, and Swiss bankers were for their own part adamant that necessary loans would not be available until a final, achievable reparations bill and repayment schedule could be agreed upon by all main parties in the dispute. In the meantime, German authorities attempted to raise the foreign currency necessary for reparations by dumping paper currency unbacked by gold on the market, triggering a hyperinflation paralyzing the country's economy, which had a desired subsidiary effect of helping make the case that the current schedule of reparations was untenable. It was hoped by Germany, Britain, and the United States and feared by France that the Genoa Conference would provide an opportunity for downward revision of the reparations schedule set forth by treaty.