German Troops Infiltrated Northwards: The Battle at Neuve Chapelle

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  • German troops infiltrated northwards, capturing Neuve Chapelle, but were eventually forced back by bombers and bayonet charges.
  • The Indian attack on the Germans was stopped 200 yards south of the Port Arthur–Neuve Chapelle road.
  • The British offensive at Neuve Chapelle showed that trench defences could be breached if the attack was carefully prepared and disguised.
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German troops infiltrated northwards, before being forced back by bombers (The Grenadier Guards had objected to specialist grenade throwers usurping their name.) and bayonet charges but the Indian attack was stopped by the Germans, 200 yd (180 m) south of the Port Arthur–Neuve Chapelle road. Haig ordered more attacks that day, with similarly disappointing results. The German defences in the centre were quickly overrun on a 1,600 yd (1,500 m) front and Neuve Chapelle was captured by 10:00 a.m. At Haig's request, the British Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Sir John French, the British commander in France, released the 5th Cavalry Brigade to exploit the expected breakthrough. On the left of the attack, two companies of the German Jäger Battalion 11 (with c. 200 men and a machine-gun) delayed the advance for more than six hours until forced to retreat, which left no time to resume the advance. Although aerial photography had been useful, it was unable to efficiently identify German strong points. Primitive communications also meant that the British commanders had been unable to keep in touch with each other, the battle became uncoordinated and this disrupted the delivery of supplies. On 12 March, German forces commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht, launched a counter-attack which failed but forced the British to use most of their artillery ammunition; the British offensive was postponed on 13 March and abandoned two days later. The battle at Neuve Chapelle showed that trench defences could be breached if the attack was carefully prepared and disguised to achieve at least local surprise. After the initial shock, the German defenders recovered, just as the attackers were beset by delays, loss of communication and disorganisation. In his report at the end of March, Major-General Du Cane wrote that the First Army command system disintegrated after the village was captured. Although Haig claimed he had made his intent plain to his subordinates, he felt they had not grasped the "spirit" of the plan, and had failed to press on when initial objectives had been captured. One of the subordinate commanders later claimed that pressing on would have failed, due to the lack of ammunition. The British telephone system proved vulnerable to German artillery-fire and the movement of troops along communication trenches was delayed by far more than the most pessimistic expectations. Equilibrium between attack and defence quickly resumed, which could only be upset by another set-piece attack, after a delay for preparation which gave the defenders just as much time to reorganise.

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>German troops infiltrated northwards, before being forced back by bombers (The Grenadier Guards had objected to specialist grenade throwers usurping their name.) and bayonet charges but the Indian attack was stopped by the Germans, 200 yd (180 m) south of the Port Arthur–Neuve Chapelle road. Haig ordered more attacks that day, with similarly disappointing results. ⇒ドイツ軍が、爆撃や銃剣による攻撃で強制的に排撃されないうちに(「近衛歩兵手榴弾連隊」が専門の手榴弾投擲者が自分たちの名前を奪うことに反対して〔もたついて〕いるうちに)、北に侵入したので、インド軍攻撃隊がアーサー港‐ヌーヴ・シャペル道の南200ヤード(180 m)でドイツ軍によって食い止められた。ヘイグはその日、さらなる攻撃を命じたが、同様の残念な結果になった。 >The German defences in the centre were quickly overrun on a 1,600 yd (1,500 m) front and Neuve Chapelle was captured by 10:00 a.m. At Haig's request, the British Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Sir John French, the British commander in France, released the 5th Cavalry Brigade to exploit the expected breakthrough. On the left of the attack, two companies of the German Jäger Battalion 11 (with c. 200 men and a machine-gun) delayed the advance for more than six hours until forced to retreat, which left no time to resume the advance. ⇒中央部のドイツ軍防御隊は1,600ヤード(1,500 m)の前線ですぐに蹂躙され、ヌーヴ・シャペルは午前10時までに攻略された。ヘイグの要求で、英国軍元帥参謀総司令官ジョン・フレンチ卿、在仏英国軍司令官が、予想される突破口を活用するために第5騎兵旅団を開放した。攻撃隊の左側面では、ドイツ軍イェーガー大隊11の2個中隊(約200人の兵士と機関銃)の前進が6時間以上遅れ、退却を余儀なくされたため、進軍を再開する時間(的余裕)がなくなった。 >Although aerial photography had been useful, it was unable to efficiently identify German strong points. Primitive communications also meant that the British commanders had been unable to keep in touch with each other, the battle became uncoordinated and this disrupted the delivery of supplies. On 12 March, German forces commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht, launched a counter-attack which failed but forced the British to use most of their artillery ammunition; the British offensive was postponed on 13 March and abandoned two days later. ⇒航空写真は有用であったが、ドイツ軍の強化地点を効率的に特定することはできかった。通信手段も原始的で、英国軍の指揮官は互いに(直接)連絡を取り合うことができず、戦闘が調整されなくなり、これが物資の配達を混乱させることを意味した。3月12日、ルプレヒト皇太子が指揮したドイツ軍が反撃を開始した。反撃そのものは失敗したが、英国軍としては大砲の弾薬を大半使用せざるを得なかった。それで英国軍の攻撃は3月13日に延期され、2日後に放棄された。 >The battle at Neuve Chapelle showed that trench defences could be breached if the attack was carefully prepared and disguised to achieve at least local surprise. After the initial shock, the German defenders recovered, just as the attackers were beset by delays, loss of communication and disorganisation. In his report at the end of March, Major-General Du Cane wrote that the First Army command system disintegrated after the village was captured. Although Haig claimed he had made his intent plain to his subordinates, he felt they had not grasped the "spirit" of the plan, and had failed to press on when initial objectives had been captured. ⇒ヌーヴ・シャペルでの戦闘では、少なくとも局地の急襲を達成するよう慎重に準備そて偽装攻撃すれば、塹壕の防御隊を破る可能性のあることが示された。最初の襲撃の後、攻撃隊が遅延やコミュニケーションの喪失、および組織の混乱などに翻弄されているうちに、ドイツ軍防御隊は回復した。デュ・ケイン少将は、3月末の報告書で、村が攻略された後は第1方面軍の司令システムが崩壊した、と書いた。ヘイグは部下に対して意図を明白に伝えたと主張したが、部下はその計画の「精神」を把握しておらず、最初の標的が攻略されたとき、(計画の)遂行は失敗したと感じた。 >One of the subordinate commanders later claimed that pressing on would have failed, due to the lack of ammunition. The British telephone system proved vulnerable to German artillery-fire and the movement of troops along communication trenches was delayed by far more than the most pessimistic expectations. Equilibrium between attack and defence quickly resumed, which could only be upset by another set-piece attack, after a delay for preparation which gave the defenders just as much time to reorganise. ⇒後に、所属部隊の指揮官の一人は、(計画を)敢行することができなかったのは弾薬が不足していたためだったと主張した。英国軍の電話システムは、ドイツ軍の砲撃に対して脆弱であることが判明し、コミュニケーション塹壕に沿った軍隊の移動は最も悲観的な予想よりもさらに遅れた。攻撃と防御の均衡はすぐに回復したが、準備が遅れた分守備隊が再編成する時間を与えてしまった後なので、別途綿密な計画の上での攻撃によってしか相手を打ち負かすことはできない、という可能性(恐れ)があった。

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    A company which had lost direction in the dark and stumbled into La Boisselle, took 220 German prisoners but the division had 2,400 casualties. On 7 July, an attack by X Corps on Ovillers was delayed by a German attack, after a bombardment which fell on the 49th Division front near the Ancre, then concentrated on the British position in the German first line north of Thiepval. The survivors of the garrison were forced to retreat to the British front line by 6:00 a.m. A German attack on the Leipzig Salient at 1:15 a.m. from three directions, was repulsed and followed by a bombing fight until 5:30 a.m.; the British attack was still carried out and the rest of the German front line in the Leipzig Salient was captured. The 12th Division and a 25th Division brigade advanced on Ovillers, two battalions of the 74th Brigade on the south side of the Albert–Bapaume road reached the first German trench, where the number of casualties and continuous German machine-gun fire stopped the advance.

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