• ベストアンサー
※ ChatGPTを利用し、要約された質問です(原文:英文翻訳をお願いします。)

英文翻訳の要約

このQ&Aのポイント
  • 英文翻訳の要約文1
  • 英文翻訳の要約文2
  • 英文翻訳の要約文3

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率80% (9757/12147)
回答No.1

>Dispersed in front of the line were divisional sharpshooter (Scharfschützen) machine-gun nests called the Stützpunkt-Linie. Much of the Kampffeld north of the Ypres–Roulers railway, had fallen on 31 July. The Albrecht Stellung (second line) roughly corresponded to the British black line (second objective) of 31 July, much of which had been captured, except on the Gheluvelt plateau. ⇒「基地戦線」(Stutzpunkt-Linie)と呼ばれる、師団所属の狙撃兵の機関銃巣が戦線の前方に拡散していた。イープル-ルーラー鉄道北の野戦場の多くが、7月31日に陥落した。 大雑把に見て、アルブレヒト陣地(第2戦線)は、英国軍の7月31日攻撃での黒線部(第2標的)に対応するが、その多くは、ゲルヴェルト高原を除いて、攻略された。 >The line marked the front of the main battle zone (Grosskampffeld), which was about 2,500 yd (2,300 m) deep, behind which was the Wilhelm Stellung (third line) and most of the field artillery of the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm Stellung were the reserve battalions of the front-line regiments. The leading regiment of an Eingreif division was to advance into the zone of the front division, with its other two regiments moving forward in close support, from support and reserve assembly areas, further back in the Flandern Stellung. ⇒戦線によって、主要戦闘地帯の前線が画された。すなわち、それは奥行き約2,500ヤード(2,300m)で、その背後にウィルヘルム陣地(第3戦線)、および師団前線の野戦砲兵隊(だまり)のほとんどがあった。ウィルヘルム陣地のピルボックスには、前線連隊の数個予備大隊(だまり)があった。アイングリーフ師団の先導連隊は、フランドル陣地のずっと後方の集会地域における支援隊や予備隊からの掩護と密着して、前方へ移動する他の2個連隊とともに、前線師団の地帯に進軍することにしていた。 >Eingreif divisions were accommodated 9,800–12,000 yd (9,000–11,000 m) behind the front line and at the beginning of an attack, began their advance to assembly areas in the rückwärtige Kampffeld behind Flandern I Stellung, ready to intervene in the Grosskampffeld, for den sofortigen Gegenstoss (the instant-immediate counter-thrust). ⇒アイングリーフ師団は、前線の後方9,800-12,000ヤード(9,000-11,000 m)地点に宿営して、攻撃の最初にフランドル第I陣地の後ろの「後方野戦場」(ruckwartige Kampffeld) における集会地域に進軍し始めて、速成の猛反撃のために大野戦場(Grosskampffeld)に介入する準備を整えた。 >In an appreciation of 2 August, Group Ypres correctly identified the Wilhelm Stellung as the British objective on 31 July and predicted more attacks on the Gheluvelt plateau and further north towards Langemarck. In the Group Ypres area, only the 3rd and 79th Reserve divisions remained battle worthy, the other four having suffered c. 10,000 casualties. ⇒グループ・イープルは8月2日の評価理解において、ウィルヘルム陣地を英国軍の7月31日の標的として正しく認定し、ゲルヴェルト高原およびさらに北へ向ってランゲマルクに一層多くの攻撃があるものと予測した。グループ・イープル地域では、第3、第79予備師団だけは戦闘能力を残したが、他の4個師団は約10,000人の死傷者数を被った。 >On 4 August, a Group Wijtschate assessment concluded that the British attack needed to make progress, by forcing back the 52nd Division on the Gheluvelt plateau, where the defensive scheme had the front regiment of each division backed by the other two regiments in support and in reserve behind the front line. Crown Prince Rupprecht expressed concern on 5 August, that the weather conditions were rapidly exhausting the German infantry. ⇒8月4日、グループ・ヴィッツシャテの状況評価で、英国軍はゲルヴェルト高地の第52師団を押し戻すことによって前進攻撃を要求するものと結論された。その高地の防御計画としては、前線に各師団の連隊が構え、それを他の2個連隊が支援したり、前線背後に予備隊として控えたりしていた。ルプレヒト皇太子は、8月5日に、気象条件によってドイツ軍の歩兵連隊が急速に疲弊しつつある、という危惧の念を表明した。

iwano_aoi
質問者

お礼

回答ありがとうございました。

全文を見る
すると、全ての回答が全文表示されます。

関連するQ&A

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    Companies of the support battalions were located at the back of the forward zone with half in the pillboxes of the Albrecht Stellung. Dispersed in front of the Albrecht Stellung were divisional sharpshooter machine-gun nests. The Albrecht Stellung marked the front of the main zone with the Wilhelm Stellung (third line), located a further 2,000 yards (1,800 m) away, marking the rear of the main zone. This zone contained most of the field artillery supporting the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm Stellung were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments in divisional reserve. The rearward zone, located between the Wilhelm Stellung and the Flandern I Stellung, contained the support and reserve assembly areas for the Eingreif divisions. The German failures at the Battle of Verdun in December 1916 and at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the forward zones had been overrun and the garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the main battle zone, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons, reinforced if need be by the Eingreif divisions. The Germans planned a rigid defence of the front system and forward zone supported by counter-attacks. Local withdrawals according to the concept of elastic defence, was rejected by Lossberg the new 4th Army Chief of Staff, who believed that they would disorganise troops moving forward to counter-attack. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were man traps but evacuate them as soon as the battle began and move forward and to the flanks to avoid British fire and to counter-attack. A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons were separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth once an attack had been repulsed. German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of thirty-six MG08/15 machine-guns per regiment, which gave German units more means for fire and manoeuvre.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    The 4th Army held a front of 25 miles (40 km) with three Gruppen, composed of a corps headquarters and a varying complement of divisions; Group Staden, based on the headquarters of the Guards Reserve Corps was added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions, Group Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of the Menin road, with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were stationed behind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. About 5 miles (8.0 km) further back, were four more Eingreif divisions and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them, another two in Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) reserve. The Germans were anxious that the British would attempt to exploit the victory at the Battle of Messines, with an advance to the Tower Hamlets spur, beyond the north end of Messines Ridge. On 9 June, Crown Prince Rupprecht proposed a withdrawal to the Flandern line east of Messines. Construction of defences began but were terminated after Fritz von Loßberg was appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. Loßberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and ordered that the current front line east of the Oosttaverne line be held rigidly. To this end, the Flandern Stellung (Flanders Position) along Passchendaele Ridge, in front of the Flandern line, would become the Flandern I Stellung and a new Flandern II Stellung would run west of Menin and north to Passchendaele. Construction of a Flandern III Stellung east of Menin northwards to Moorslede was also begun. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by the front position, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction); between the German defences lay the villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendale.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    By 26 September the ground-holding divisions had been reorganised so that the regiments were side-by-side, covering a front of about 1,000 yd (910 m) each with the battalions one-behind-the-other, the first in the front line, one in support and the third in reserve, over a depth of 3,000 yd (2,700 m). Each of the three ground-holding divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau had an Eingreif division in support, double the ratio on 20 September. On 25 September, a German attack on the front of the 20th Division (XIV Corps) was prevented by artillery fire but on the X Corps front south of I Anzac Corps, a bigger German attack took place. Crown Prince Rupprecht had ordered the attack to recover ground on the Gheluvelt Plateau and to try to gain time for reinforcements to be brought into the battle zone to bolster the defensive system. Two regiments of the 50th Reserve Division attacked either side of the Reutelbeek, with the support of 44 field and 20 heavy batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for one division. The attack on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front from the Menin road to Polygon Wood, to recapture pillboxes and shelters in the Wilhelmstellung 500 yd (460 m) away, had been due to begin at 5:15 a.m. but the barrage fell short onto the German assembly area and the German infantry had to fall back until it began to creep forward at 5:30 a.m. The German infantry managed to advance on the flanks, about 100 yd (91 m) near the Menin road and 600 yd (550 m) north of the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner, with the help of a number of observation and ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage, which obstructed the supply of ammunition to the British defenders, before fire from the 33rd Division troops being attacked and the 15th Australian Brigade along the southern edge of Polygon wood, forced them under cover, after recapturing some of the Wilhelmstellung pillboxes near Black Watch Corner. A number of attempts to reinforce the attacking troops failed, due to British artillery observers isolating the advanced German troops with artillery barrages.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いいたします。

    The 3rd Bavarian, 1st Bavarian and 5th Bavarian Reserve divisions held the southern area and the 15th and 16th divisions were to be withdrawn. French attacks on 18 June, were smaller and optimism rose that the offensive was ending. OHL ordered that the defences were to be thinned quickly, to provide a new strategic reserve. The 6th Army headquarters and Lochow protested that the troop reductions were premature and on 24 June, Lochow predicted more attacks, emphasised the need for a flow of fresh divisions and that the number of casualties required consideration of a retirement to the new defence line behind Vimy Ridge. Until the end of June, the Germans tried to restore their front positions but failed to regain the Lorette Spur and the French artillery maintained a bombardment from Angres to Souchez. The 12th Division was brought forward to reinforce the area and French attacks on 25 July and 27 June were repulsed by counter-attacks. In the old 16th Division area south of Souchez, the 11th Division gradually recaptured the area lost on 16 June. Fighting at the Labyrnthe continued until 24 June, when the 3rd Bavarian Division restored the old front line. The exhausted 52nd Reserve Infantry Brigade was relieved on 25 June and on 28 June Armee-Gruppe Lochow was dissolved and replaced by the VI Corps headquarters (General von Pritzelwitz). The Arras front remained the most important area on the German Western Front and Falkenhayn planned to send divisions from the Eastern Front to protect against another Franco-British offensive. Rupprecht claimed that the 6th Army could hold its ground without reinforcement and the redeployments were cancelled. During July skirmishing took place around Souchez but the French offensive was not resumed. In August, the Western Army was reorganised, more units moved into reserve and a programme of trench digging was begun along all of the Western Front. On 11 March, Major Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen was appointed Chef des Feldflugwesens (Chief of Field Air Forces) and began to increase the size of Die Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches (Imperial German Flying Corps), with the formation of five new air units in Germany to provide replacements and expedite the introduction of the new Fokker E.I aircraft.New links between air units and the army were created, by the appointment of a staff officer for aviation to each army and in April, armed C-class aircraft began to reach front-line units. Reconnaissance aircraft detected increased movement behind the French Tenth Army front and more C-class aircraft were sent to the 6th Army, from the armies in quiet areas of the Western Front.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    Brigadier-General Coffin decided that it was too late to stop the attack and sent a company of the reserve battalion to fill the gap to the south, which was not enough to stop German enfilade fire, so the Brigade consolidated on the reverse slope and held the crest with Lewis-gun posts. Pockets of ground lost to German counter-attacks were regained by British counter-attacks. British artillery barrages made it impossible for German infantry advance further in this area. XIX Corps attacked with 15th Division on the right, next to the II Corps boundary along the Ypres–Roulers railway and 55th Division north to just short of St Julien. Their objective was the black line up the bare slope of Frezenberg Ridge, then across the valley of the Steenbeek to the green line on the far side. If German resistance collapsed, reserve brigades were to advance to the red line beyond Gravenstafel. The advance went well but then increasing resistance from fortified farms caused delays. Several tanks managed to follow the British infantry and attack strong-points like Bank Farm and Border House, allowing the advance to continue. After a pause for consolidation on the black line, the reserve brigades of the XIX Corps divisions began their advance to the green line a mile beyond, as the sun came out and a mist formed. On the right the advance encountered enfilade fire, from the area not occupied by 8th Division beyond the Ypres–Roulers railway. The 164th Brigade of 55th Division had a hard fight through many German strong-points but took Hill 35 and crossed the Wilhelm (second) line, an eventual advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m). Patrols pressed beyond the Zonnebeek–Langemarck road, one platoon taking fifty prisoners at Aviatik Farm on Gravenstafel spur. XVIII Corps reached the first objective and after an hour moved down to the Steenbeek, one of the muddiest parts of the battlefield, behind a smoke and shrapnel barrage. The 39th and 51st Divisions then established themselves on the stream for 3,000 yards (2,700 m), from St Julien to the Pilckem–Langemarck road.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    On 28 March the British precautionary line of resistance was moved forward to a line Germaine–Caulaincourt–Bernes–Marquaix–Lieramont–Nurlu–Equancourt–Bertincourt while the outposts of cavalry, cyclists and some infantry mostly paused. On the army boundary with the French the 32nd Division kept two brigades in line and one in reserve. Each brigade in the line had two infantry companies in outposts held by platoons backed by their battalions and the artillery close enough to cover the outposts. By late March each British corps in the pursuit had diverted a minimum of one division to work on road repairs and bridging, the thaw making the effect of German demolitions far worse. In the Fifth Army area, repair work was concentrated on the railway up the Ancre valley, the Candas–Acheux line, two light railways and the Albert–Bapaume, Hamel–Achiet le Petit–Achiet le Grand and Serre–Puisieux–Bucquoy–Ablainzevelle roads, most of the labour coming from front-line divisions.

  • お手数ですが、次の英文を訳して下さい。

    Tactical developments The preliminary operation to capture Messines ridge (7–14 June) had been followed by a strategic pause as the British repaired their communications behind Messines ridge, completed the building of the infrastructure necessary for a much larger force in the Ypres area and moved troops and equipment north from the Arras front. After delays caused by local conditions, the Battles of Ypres had begun on 31 July with the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, which was a substantial local success for the British, taking a large amount of ground and inflicting many casualties on the German defenders. The German defence had nonetheless recovered some of the lost ground in the middle of the attack front and restricted the British advance on the Gheluvelt Plateau further south. British attacks had then been seriously hampered by unseasonal heavy rain during August and had not been able to retain much of the additional ground captured on the plateau on 10, 16–18, 22–24 and 27 August due to the determined German defence, mud and poor visibility. Sir Douglas Haig ordered artillery to be transferred from the southern flank of the Second Army and more artillery to be brought into Flanders from the armies further south, to increase the weight of the attack on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The principal role was changed from the Fifth to the Second Army and the boundary between the Second and Fifth armies was moved north towards the Ypres–Roulers railway, to narrow the frontages of the Second Army divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau. A pause in British attacks was used to reorganise and to improve supply routes behind the front line, to carry forward 54,572 long tons (55,448 t) of ammunition above normal expenditure, guns were moved forward to new positions and the infantry and artillery reinforcements which arrived, practised for the next attack. The unseasonal rains stopped, the ground began to dry and the cessation of British attacks misled the Germans, who risked moving some units away from Flanders.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Battle of Gheluvelt On 28 October, as the 4th Army attacks bogged down, Falkenhayn responded to the costly failures of the 4th and 6th armies by ordering the armies to conduct holding attacks while a new force, Armeegruppe Fabeck (General Max von Fabeck) was assembled from XV Corps and the II Bavarian Corps, the 26th Division and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, under the XIII Corps headquarters. The Armeegruppe was rushed up to Deûlémont and Werviq, the boundary between the 6th and 4th armies, to attack towards Ypres and Poperinghe. Strict economies were imposed on the 6th Army formations further south, to provide artillery ammunition for 250 heavy guns allotted to support an attack to the north-west, between Gheluvelt and Messines. The XV Corps was to attack on the right flank, south of the Menin–Ypres road to the Comines–Ypres canal and the main effort was to come from there to Garde Dieu by the II Bavarian Corps, flanked by the 26th Division. Battle of Gheluvelt (1 November 1914) On 29 October, attacks by the XXVII Reserve Corps began against I Corps north of the Menin Road, at dawn, in thick fog. By nightfall, the Gheluvelt crossroads had been lost and 600 British prisoners taken. French attacks further north, by the 17th Division, 18th Division and 31st Division recaptured Bixschoote and Kortekeer Cabaret. Advances by Armeegruppe Fabeck to the south-west against I Corps and the dismounted Cavalry Corps further south, came to within 1.9 mi (3 km) of Ypres along the Menin road and brought the town into range of German artillery. On 30 October, German attacks by the 54th Reserve Division and the 30th Division, on the left flank of the BEF at Gheluvelt, were repulsed but the British were pushed out of Zandvoorde, Hollebeke and Hollebeke Château as German attacks on a line from Messines to Wytschaete and St Yves were repulsed. The British rallied opposite Zandvoorde with French reinforcements and "Bulfin's Force" a command improvised for the motley of troops. The BEF had many casualties and used all its reserves but the French IX Corps sent its last three battalions and retrieved the situation in the I Corps sector. On 31 October, German attacks near Gheluvelt broke through until a counter-attack by the 2nd Worcestershire restored the situation.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    German troops were also to be strafed by British aircraft from low altitude. The French First Army was to extend the attack north, from the Kortebeek to Drie Grachten aiming to reach the St. Jansbeck. German defensive preparations Main article: German defensive preparations: June–July 1917 The German 4th Army operation order for the defensive battle had been issued on 27 June. German infantry units had been reorganised on similar lines to the British, with a rifle section, assault troop section, a grenade-launcher section and a light machine-gun section. Field artillery in the Eingreif divisions had been organised into artillery assault groups, which followed the infantry, to engage the attackers with observed or direct fire. Each infantry regiment of the 183rd Division, based around Westroosebeke behind the northern flank of Group Ypres, had a battalion of the divisional field artillery regiment attached. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions: the front line, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). In between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. On 31 July, the German defence in depth had begun with a front system of three breastworks: Ia, Ib and Ic, each about 220 yd (200 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no-man's-land. About 2,200 yd (2,000 m) behind these works was the Albrecht Stellung (artillery protective line), the rear boundary of the forward battle zone (Kampffeld). Companies of the support battalions, (25 percent Sicherheitsbesatzung to hold the strong-points and 75 percent Stosstruppen to counter-attack towards them), were placed at the back of the Kampffeld, half in the pill-boxes of the Albrecht Stellung, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence-in-depth, once the enemy attack had been repulsed.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    A second breastwork Wohngraben begun as part of a general strengthening of the Western Front earlier in the year, about 200 yards (180 m) behind the front line was nearly finished. The Wohngraben had dug-outs underneath to accommodate 20–30 men and was connected to the front breastwork by communication trenches. Close to the front the communication trenches were solidly built, with concrete shelters and were ready to be used as flanking trenches in the event of a breakthrough. The second line of defence was far enough back from the front line for shells falling on one not to affect the other and the front breastwork became a line of sentry-posts and the second the accommodation for the main garrison, which was to move forward during an attack to hold the front line at all costs. Further back about 700–1,000 yards (640–910 m) from the front breastwork, a line of concrete machine-gun posts known as Stützpunktlinie had been built about 1,000 yards (910 m) apart, as rallying points for the infantry if an attack broke through the front position. Opposite Rue du Bois were emplacements at La Tourelle, Ferme du Bois (Apfelhof) and Ferme Cour d'Avoué (Wasserburg). Battalion frontages were held by two companies of about 280 men on a frontage of 800–1,000 yards (730–910 m), with one company in support 2,000 yards (1,800 m) to the rear and the fourth company in reserve another 2,000–4,000 yards (1,800–3,700 m) back. The new communication trenches were arranged so that the support companies could easily block a break-in from the flanks; most of the field artillery of 6–12 four-gun field batteries and several heavy batteries in each division, were on Aubers Ridge 2,500–4,000 yards (2,300–3,700 m) behind the front line, between Lorgies and Gravelin. A second line of gun positions between La Cliqueterie Farm, Bas Vailly, Le Willy and Gravelin about 2,500 yards (2,300 m) behind the forward battery positions had been built so that the guns could be moved back temporarily, until enough reinforcements had arrived from Lille and La Bassée to counter-attack and reoccupy the front line. Intelligence about the newly strengthened German positions was not available or given insufficient attention where known. No surprise was achieved because the British bombardment was wholly insufficient to break the German wire and breastwork defences or knock out the German front-line machine-guns. German artillery and free movement of reserves were also insufficiently suppressed. Trench layout, traffic flows and organisation behind the British front line did not allow for easy movement of reinforcements and casualties. British artillery equipment and ammunition were in poor condition: the first through over-use, the second through faulty manufacture. It soon became impossible to tell where British troops were; accurate artillery fire was impossible.