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From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. [...] Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.

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以下のとおりお答えします。 ドイツの戦略、「シュリーフェン計画」について述べています。 >From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. ⇒フランス軍の防御能力の査定評価から、シュリーフェンは、ドイツ方面軍がベルギー経由でフランスを攻撃して成功するためには最低48.5個軍団が必要であるとの結論を出したが、モルトケは、わずか34個軍団でベルギーを通って西部戦線に展開し、攻撃することを計画した。 >The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. [...] Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines. ⇒シュリーフェン計画〔原文ママ〕は、1914年のドイツ軍戦略の評論である、と言うに等しい。なぜなら、それは、戦力不足のままフランスを侵略しようとしたモルトケの失敗を明確に予測したからである。〔...〕モルトケは、シュリーフェン計画の筋書きに従ったけれども、とはいえ、それはほんの一点だけであった。すなわち、この戦線での戦いをさらに進めるのに、シュリーフェン計画の軍隊が必要であることが痛いほどに明らかになった点のみで(従ったので)あった。

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