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英文の和訳で困っています 和訳を教えてください

英文の和訳で困っています 和訳を教えていただきたいです よろしくお願いします!! Churchill’s proposal was not regarded as unrealistic in the rest of the West but as unwelcome. After 17 June the proposal from Churchill of 11 May 1953 to work at the highest level with the Kremlin towards an arrangement on a neutral all-German solution was robbed of any basis. The victors of the Second World War remained Allies, true to their principles, against Germany even through the period of 17 June 1953, particularly since they were dealing primary with the security and consolidation of their areas of interest in relation to the German partial states

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  • ddeana
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チャーチルの提案は、他西側諸国に非現実的と見なされたのではなく受け入れがたいものであったのです。 6月17日以後、中立的ドイツ統一提案に関する協定に向けたクレムリンとのトップレベル協議をすべきとの1953年5月11日付けのチャーチルからの提案は、根拠を奪われたのでした。 第二次世界大戦の戦勝国は、ドイツ部分的統合に関し、なによりもまず彼らの興味の対象であった安全保障と整理について話し合っていたので、1953年6月17日時点でさえ原則に基づき反ドイツ同盟国のままでした。

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米仏はチャーチルの提案を非現実的とみなしていたわけではない。歓迎していなかったのだ。 中間的な統一ドイツによる解決を目指してクレムリンと最高レベルでの協議をしようという1953年5月11日のチャーチルの提案は、6月17日以降、すべての基盤を失った。 第二次世界大戦の戦勝国は原則から変わらず、対ドイツの連合国だった。これは1953年6月17日を迎えた時点でもそうであったし、東西ドイツの関連で注目される地域の安全保障と編入先が主として協議されるようになって以降は特にそうだった。

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  • 回答No.1
  • sayshe
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チャーチルの提案は、西側の他の国々の中では、非現実的と見なされたのではなく、歓迎できないものと見なされました。 6月17日以後、中立の全ドイツの解決に関する合意を目指してクレムリンと最高レベルで交渉すると言う1953年5月11日のチャーチルの提案は、あらゆる基盤を奪われました。 第2次世界大戦の戦勝国は、特に、彼らが、ドイツの部分的な州に関して彼らの関心のある地域の安全保障と整理統合を主に処理していたので、1953年6月17日の期間を通してさえ、連合国にとどまり、ドイツに対して、彼らの原則に忠実なままでした。

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