Confusion and Chaos: Lost in the Darkness
- During the war, morale was low and navigation in the dark led to soldiers getting lost.
- Both British and German troops ended up in the wrong positions, resulting in several German soldiers being captured.
- Dangerous conditions persisted in the artillery lines, with ammunition delivery under constant enemy fire.
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Morale plummeted and moving about after dark led to working parties, runners, reliefs and ration parties getting lost and wandering around until exhausted. No man's land was not wired on this part of the front and British and German troops blundered into the wrong positions, Germans being taken prisoner on six occasions. Some dug-outs in Regina Trench were usable but conditions in the artillery lines were as bad as the front line, with ammunition being delivered by pack horse under German artillery fire. "Elephant" shelters (the materials for which took ten men to carry forward and 24 hours to build) were placed in the front-line, sunk below trench and shell-hole parapets. Larger shelters were dug into the sides of roads further back and only a minimal number of troops kept in the front zone.
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＞Morale plummeted and moving about after dark led to working parties, runners, reliefs and ration parties getting lost and wandering around until exhausted. No man's land was not wired on this part of the front and British and German troops blundered into the wrong positions, Germans being taken prisoner on six occasions. ⇒士気は急落し、（日中の移動は自殺行為であるからといっても）日没後に動き回ることは、作業部隊、伝令、援軍、割当て配給係などが迷子になったり、倒れるまでほっつき歩くような事態に至った。この前線に接する中間地帯は鉄線の敷設がなく、英国軍もドイツ軍隊も、間違った位置に足を踏み入れることがあった。そして、6回の出来事でドイツ兵が捕虜になった。 ＞Some dug-outs in Regina Trench were usable but conditions in the artillery lines were as bad as the front line, with ammunition being delivered by pack horse under German artillery fire. "Elephant" shelters (the materials for which took ten men to carry forward and 24 hours to build) were placed in the front-line, sunk below trench and shell-hole parapets. Larger shelters were dug into the sides of roads further back and only a minimal number of troops kept in the front zone. ⇒「レジナ・トレンチ」（女王の塹壕）にある待避壕には使えるものがあったが、しかし、砲兵隊の戦線は前線同様に状況が悪く、弾薬はドイツ軍の砲火をくぐって駄馬によって届けられた。「ゾウ（巨大）」避難所（10人がかりで資材を運び、24時間かけて建造された）が最前線に設置されて、塹壕と砲弾痕の胸壁の下に沈められた。より大きな避難所がさらに後ろの道路脇に掘られて、軍隊の最小数だけが前線地帯に詰めていた。
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Steel-reinforced concrete dug-outs for infantry squads and artillery-observation posts were standard designs and all woodwork was made to a pattern. The line was 90 miles (140 km) long and built for a garrison of twenty divisions, one every 4.5 miles (7.2 km). Telephone cables were deeply buried and light railways built to carry supplies to the defences. The position had two trenches about 200 yards (180 m) apart, with sentry garrisons to occupy the front trench. The main line of defence was the second line, which was equipped with dug-outs for most of the front garrison. Fields of barbed-wire up to 100 yards (91 m) deep, were fixed with screw pickets in three belts 10–15 yards (9.1–13.7 m) wide and 5 yards (4.6 m) apart, in a zig-zag so that machine-guns could sweep the sides placed in front of the trench system. Artillery observation posts and machine-gun nests were built in front of and behind the trench lines.
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The Kampf battalion usually had three companies in the front system (which had three lines of breastworks called "Ia", "Ib" and "Ic") and one in the Sonne (intermediate) line (with a company of the support battalion, available for immediate counter-attack) between the front system and the Höhen (second) line on the ridge crest. The other three companies of the support battalion sheltered in the Höhen (second) line. About 32 machine-gun posts per regimental sector were dispersed around the defensive zone. The German defence was intended to be mobile and Stosstrupps in "Ic" the third breastwork, were to conduct immediate counter-attacks to recapture "Ia" and "Ib". If they had to fall back, the support battalions would advance to restore the front system, except at Spanbroekmolen Hill, which due to its importance was to be held at all costs (unbedingtes Halten). Aerial photograph of Messines, 2 June 1917. On 8 May, the British preliminary bombardment began and on 23 May became much heavier. The breastworks of the front defences were demolished and concrete shelters on both sides of the ridge were systematically destroyed. Air superiority allowed the British artillery observation aircraft to cruise over the German defences, despite the defensive efforts of Jagdgeschwader 1 (the Richthofen Circus). On 26 May, the German front garrisons were ordered to move forward 50 yards (46 m) into shell-holes in no-man's-land at dawn and return to their shelters at night. When the shelters were destroyed, shell-hole positions were made permanent as were those of the companies further back. Troops in the Höhen (second) line were withdrawn behind the ridge and by the end of May, the front battalions changing every two days instead of every five, due to the effect of the British bombardment.
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By mid-morning the mist had cleared, allowing German machine-gunners and artillery to pin the British down around Grote Molen spur and Frezenburg ridge, forestalling a British attack intended for 10:00 a.m.. Around noon, British aircraft on counter-attack patrols, began to send wireless messages warning of German infantry advancing towards all of the front attacked. Similar reports from the ground began in the early afternoon. In the centre German infantry from the 236th Division, 234th Division and 4th Bavarian Division were advancing north of Becelaere–Broodseinde–Passchendaele Ridge, while the 17th Division advanced south of Polygon wood. British artillery immediately bombarded these areas, disrupting the German deployment and causing the German attacks to be disjointed. A German officer later wrote of severe delays and disorganisation caused to German Eingreif units by British artillery-fire and air attacks. A counter-attack either side of Molenaarelsthoek was stopped dead at 3:25 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. German troops advancing around Reutel to the south were heavily bombarded, as were German artillery positions in Holle Bosch, ending the German advance. A German attack then developed near Polderhoek, whose survivors managed to reach the British infantry and were seen off in bayonet fighting. Observation aircraft found German troops massing against Tower Hamlets, on the Bassevillebeek spur and artillery and machine-gun barrages stopped the attack before it reached the British infantry. At 6:50 p.m. the Germans managed to organise an attack from Tower Hamlets to north of Polygon Wood; such German infantry as got through the barrages were "annihilated" by the British infantry. German counter-attacks were only able to reach the new front line and reinforce the remnants of the front divisions. The 236th Division (Eingreif) attacked south of the Ypres–Roulers railway and 4th Bavarian Division (Eingreif) for 2,000 yd (1,800 m) to the north, with field artillery and twelve aircraft attached to each division and the 234th Division in support.
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From 10 to 16 June the French fired 497,122 shells with less effect than the 265,430 rounds fired from 3 to 9 May. The Germans had managed to fire a heavy artillery barrage of c. 100,000 shells, which stopped the French infantry attack and prevented troops moving up in support. Attempts to repeat the surprise of 9 May by ruses failed and a German counter-barrage had begun in no man's land within two minutes of the French infantry advance. The experience of the attacks on 16 June demonstrated that the effect of counter-battery fire, neutralising fire and changes in the pattern and timing of artillery-fire made no difference if the German wire was uncut when the infantry advance began. German field defences were dug in increasing quantity and complexity during the offensive and German artillery became much more active, as more guns and much more ammunition arrived at the battlefront. A considerable tactical advantage had been gained by the French, who had regained 6 sq mi (16 km2) of ground. The new German defences around the area were on ground overlooked from the Lorette Spur, were more costly to defend and made Vimy Ridge more vulnerable to attack. The apparent lost opportunity on 9 May, when Vimy Ridge was captured in the first rush, led the French army commanders to conclude that more of the same could achieve a breakthrough if better organised, which formed the basis of the planning for the autumn offensives in Artois and Champagne. Pétain wrote that the attack on 9 May showed that a breakthrough was possible and that it could be achieved by careful preparation of communication trenches, jumping-off trenches and assembly positions, if the German defences were carefully reconnoitred and sufficiently bombarded by artillery. Since the defenders could close a gap quickly it would be necessary to maintain momentum, with reserve troops following up the attacking force closely. Attacks in open country were preferable to being bogged down in fighting for obstacles like villages and woods and the attack should be on a broad front, to allow centres of resistance to be outflanked and to disperse German fire power over a wider area. German analysis of the battle was collected in a memorandum of June 1915 and led to renewed emphasis on infantry shelters, deep enough to be invulnerable to heavy artillery and to increase the number of defensive positions behind the front, which would slow an advance and delay subsequent attacks, by forcing the attacker to move artillery into range. On 7 June a copy of Note 5779 was captured on the Artois front and the local corps commander ordered that intensive digging be undertaken and stipulated that reserve positions were to be as solidly built as front line defences.
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By 26 September the ground-holding divisions had been reorganised so that the regiments were side-by-side, covering a front of about 1,000 yd (910 m) each with the battalions one-behind-the-other, the first in the front line, one in support and the third in reserve, over a depth of 3,000 yd (2,700 m). Each of the three ground-holding divisions on the Gheluvelt Plateau had an Eingreif division in support, double the ratio on 20 September. On 25 September, a German attack on the front of the 20th Division (XIV Corps) was prevented by artillery fire but on the X Corps front south of I Anzac Corps, a bigger German attack took place. Crown Prince Rupprecht had ordered the attack to recover ground on the Gheluvelt Plateau and to try to gain time for reinforcements to be brought into the battle zone to bolster the defensive system. Two regiments of the 50th Reserve Division attacked either side of the Reutelbeek, with the support of 44 field and 20 heavy batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for one division. The attack on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front from the Menin road to Polygon Wood, to recapture pillboxes and shelters in the Wilhelmstellung 500 yd (460 m) away, had been due to begin at 5:15 a.m. but the barrage fell short onto the German assembly area and the German infantry had to fall back until it began to creep forward at 5:30 a.m. The German infantry managed to advance on the flanks, about 100 yd (91 m) near the Menin road and 600 yd (550 m) north of the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner, with the help of a number of observation and ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage, which obstructed the supply of ammunition to the British defenders, before fire from the 33rd Division troops being attacked and the 15th Australian Brigade along the southern edge of Polygon wood, forced them under cover, after recapturing some of the Wilhelmstellung pillboxes near Black Watch Corner. A number of attempts to reinforce the attacking troops failed, due to British artillery observers isolating the advanced German troops with artillery barrages.
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On 12 July, a new trench was dug from the east side of the wood and linked with those on the western fringe, being completed by dawn on 13 July. German attempts at 8:30 p.m. to advance into the wood, were defeated by French and British artillery-fire. Rawlinson ordered XIII Corps to take the wood "at all costs" and the 30th Division, having lost 2,300 men in five days, was withdrawn and replaced by the 18th Division, the 55th Brigade taking over in the wood and trenches nearby. After a two-hour bombardment on 13 July, the 55th Brigade attacked at 7:00 p.m., a battalion attempting to bomb up Maltz Horn Trench to the strong point near the Guillemont track.
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Large numbers of machine-guns were organised to fire offensive and defensive barrages and signal detachments were organised to advance with the infantry. An observation balloon was reserved for messages by signal lamp from the front line, as insurance against the failure of telephone lines and message-runners. The divisional trench mortar batteries were to bombard the German front line opposite the 142nd Brigade, where it was too close for the artillery to shell without endangering British troops. Wire-cutting began in mid-May, against considerable local retaliation by German artillery. At the end of May the two attacking brigades began training at Steenvoorde, on practice courses built to resemble the German positions to be attacked, using air reconnaissance photographs to mark the positions of machine-gun posts and hidden barbed wire. Divisional intelligence summaries were used to plan the capture of German company and battalion headquarters. The 140th Brigade with four tanks attached, was to occupy White Château and the adjacent part of Damstrasse, while the 142nd Brigade attacked the spoil heaps and the canal bank to the left. On 1 June, the British artillery began the intense stage of preparatory bombardment for trench-destruction and wire cutting and the two attacking brigades assembled for the attack from 4–6 June. British fighter aircraft tried to prevent German aircraft observing for their artillery, by dominating the air from the British front line to the German balloon line, about 10,000 yards (9,100 m) beyond. Better aircraft like the Bristol Fighter, S.E.5a and the naval Sopwith Triplane had entered service since Arras and matched the performance of the German Albatros D.III and Halberstadt D.II fighters.
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With the ground still frozen, assembly trenches could not be dug, so it was decided that the troops would assemble in the open for the attack. The artillery of II Corps began a destructive and wire-cutting bombardment on 14 February, using the new fuze 106 against the German wire, which proved an effective wire-cutter, although fog and mist made aiming and observation of the results difficult. At zero hour, four siege groups were to begin a bombardment of rear lines and machine-gun nests and four counter-battery groups were to neutralise German artillery within range of the attack. Artillery tactics were based on the experience of 1916, with a creeping barrage fired by half of the 18-pounders, beginning 200 yards (180 m) in front of the infantry and moving at 100 yards (91 m) in three minutes.
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Surplus field artillery brigade headquarters planned forward moves for the guns and were kept ready to replace casualties. It was expected that much of the artillery would need to switch rapidly from the bombardment plan to engage counter-attacking German infantry. It was planned that the Forward Observation Officers of the divisions in the first attack onto the ridge would control the artillery which had remained in place and the reserve divisions advancing down the far slope to the Oosttaverne line would control the artillery hidden close to the front line and the artillery which advanced into no-man's-land. Franks planned to neutralise German guns within 9,000 yards (8,200 m) of the attack front. On the flanks of the British attack front of 17,000 yards (16,000 m), 169 German guns had been located, for which 42 British guns (25 percent of the German total) were set aside. The 299 German guns in the path of the attack were each to be engaged by a British gun, a formula which required 341 British guns and howitzers to be reserved for counter-battery fire. Every 45 yards (41 m) of front had a medium or heavy howitzer for bombardment, which required 378 guns, with 38 super-heavy guns and howitzers (5 percent) deployed with the field artillery that was due to fire the creeping and standing barrages. Franks devised a bombardment timetable and added arrangements for a massed machine-gun barrage. The 756 medium and heavy guns and howitzers were organised in forty groups and the 1,510 field guns and howitzers in sixty-four field artillery brigades within the attacking divisions and thirty-three Army field artillery brigades, divided among the three attacking corps.
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German defensive changes: late 1917 On 7 October, the 4th Army again dispersed its troops in the front defence zone. Reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif divisions were organised to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery fire to reduce British artillery fire was to be increased, to protect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced. All of the German divisions holding front zones were relieved and an extra division brought forward, as the British advances had lengthened the front line. Without the forces necessary for a counter-offensive south of the Gheluvelt plateau towards Kemmel Hill, Rupprecht began to plan for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even at the risk of uncovering German positions further north and the Belgian coast. Battle of Poelcappelle The French First Army and British Second and Fifth armies attacked on 9 October, on a 13,500 yards (12,300 m) front, from south of Broodseinde to St. Jansbeek, to advance half of the distance from Broodseinde ridge to Passchendaele, on the main front, which led to many casualties on both sides. Advances in the north of the attack front were retained by British and French troops but most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spurs was lost to German counter-attacks. General William Birdwood later wrote that the return of heavy rain and mud sloughs was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground. Kuhl concluded that the fighting strained German fighting power to the limit but that the German forces managed to prevent a breakthrough, although it was becoming much harder to replace losses. First Battle of Passchendaele Passchendaele:パッシェンデール The First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October, was another Allied attempt to gain ground around Passchendaele. Heavy rain and mud again made movement difficult and little artillery could be brought closer to the front. Allied troops were exhausted and morale had fallen.
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