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英文翻訳をお願いします。

German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899 such a manoeuvre was intended to rapidly pass through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants to the plan, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.

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ドイツ軍の戦略は、1891年以降フランスに対しては攻撃作戦を優先し、ロシアに対しては防衛を優先した。ドイツ軍の計画は、数的劣勢、移動と集結の速度、および近代兵器の膨大な増加の影響などによって決定づけられた。特にフランス軍とロシア軍が、ドイツとの前線で防備を現代化したあとは、ドイツ軍にとって正面からの攻撃は高コストになって長引きがちとなり、限定的な戦果しかあげられない状況に至った。 1891–1906年(在任)の、ドイツ帝国総司令官(Oberste Heeresleitung OHL参謀統帥)アルフレッド・フォン・シュリーフェンは、フランス軍の防備前線を避け、地域の数的優勢があって迅速かつ決定的な勝利を得られそうな北部側面を攻撃する計画を考案した。1898–1899年、迅速にアントワープ・ナミュール間のベルギーを通り抜けて、北からパリを脅かすような作戦行動を企てたのである。 1906年、青年ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケがシュリーフェンの跡を継いだが、フランスがドイツの推測どおりになるかどうか定かでなかった。モルトケは、布陣と集結の計画を勘案して、「ヴェステア」(西部戦線軍)での動員が予定されている約1,700,000人の兵士から数個師団をフランス前線に対峙する左翼に適宜追加することによって、中央部への突撃攻撃、または両側面からの包囲攻撃をやりくりすることにした。 ドイツ軍の主要部隊はさらにベルギーを通って進軍し、フランス南部を攻撃するものとすれば、フランス軍は左翼側で包囲されて、ミューズ、エーン、ソンム、オアーズ、マルヌ、セーヌに推し戻され、中央フランスに撤退することはできなくなるだろう。フランス軍は大打撃を受けるか、北からの作戦行動が、中央部またはロレーヌの共通境界線におけるドイツ軍勝利の条件を生み出すはずである。

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  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. German strategy would need to become more opportunistic and Moltke modified German plans to make them less rigid to enable this, making the offensives of 1914 the opening moves of what was expected to be a long war with no certainty of victory. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer (western army). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France and the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. [...] Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.

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  • 回答No.2

一点補足です。 「青年ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケ」 は、「ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケ(小モルトケ)」。 作家の 大デュマ、小デュマのような意味合いだと思いました。

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  • 日本語訳して下さい 。

    Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.

  • 以下の英文を訳して下さい。

    Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung OHL) from 1891–1906 devised a number of plans that called for winning a decisive battle against the French army in Germany, Belgium or France as the war-situation required. Aufmarsch I West was a contingency plan for a Franco-German war, in which France (due to fewer numbers) would be on the defensive and Germany would attack by invading Belgium between Antwerp and Namur and then advancing south to breach the Verdun–Marne–Paris defensive area. German forces would then hold there until rail-supply could be restored and sufficient stocks of ammunition and food built up, in preparation for a second offensive operation. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and became convinced that an isolated Franco-German war was impossible and that Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces would not be available to defend the Franco-German border as originally planned. Under Moltke, Aufmarsch I was retired but in 1914 he attempted to apply the offensive strategy of Aufmarsch I to the deployment plan Aufmarsch II and the two-front war it anticipated,

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    The Battle of the Frontiers was a series of battles fought along the eastern frontier of France and in southern Belgium shortly after the outbreak of World War I. The battles resolved the military strategies of the French Chief of Staff General Joseph Joffre with Plan XVII and an offensive interpretation of the German Aufmarsch II deployment plan by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The German concentration on the right (northern) flank, to wheel through Belgium and attack the French in the rear, was delayed by the movement of General Charles Lanrezac's Fifth Army towards the north-west to intercept them and the presence of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on his left flank. The Franco-British were driven back by the Germans, who were able to invade northern France. French and British rearguard actions delayed the German advance, allowing the French time to transfer their forces to the west to defend Paris, resulting in the First Battle of the Marne.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    European imperialist and colonialist powers had apprehensions about Jihad before 1914; Clemenceau had predicted it in 1912, if war broke out between the Great Powers. In August 1914, Charles Lutaud, the Governor of Algeria expected a rebellion and on 5 November, tried to forestall the Ottoman call to arms, by presenting the Ottomans as German puppets. The French were assisted by Royal Navy code breaking, to anticipate landings from German U-boats and negate the intriguing of the Central Powers. French prestige after the Moroccan Crises, reduced the likelihood of attempts to overthrow the colonial regime and German prisoners of war, were used as forced labour in Morocco and Algeria, to display French military prowess. Most of the French regular troops were sent to France in 1914 and replaced by Territorial troops in Morocco but on the frontier of Algeria and Libya, Senussi operations against the Italian army led the French to allow the garrisons of Ghadames and Ghat to retreat into Algeria and then be rearmed to re-capture Ghadames in January 1915, as part of the French policy of drawing Italy into the war.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    The 5th Army would begin a big offensive with limited objectives, to seize the Meuse Heights on the right bank of the river, from which German artillery could dominate the battlefield. By being forced into a counter-offensive against such formidable positions, the French Army would "bleed itself white". As the French were weakened, the British would be forced to launch a hasty relief offensive, which would also be a costly defeat. If such defeats were not enough to force negotiations on the French, a German offensive would mop up the last of the Franco-British armies and break the Entente "once and for all". In a revised instruction to the French army of January 1916, the General Staff had stated that equipment could not be fought by men.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    The Kamerun Campaign took place in the German colony of Kamerun in the African theatre of the First World War when the British, French and Belgians invaded the German colony from August 1914 to March 1916. Most of the campaign took place in Kamerun but skirmishes also broke out in British Nigeria. By the Spring of 1916, following Allied victories, the majority of German troops and the civil administration fled to the neighbouring neutral colony of Spanish Guinea (Río Muni). The campaign ended in a defeat for Germany and the partition of its former colony between France and Britain.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    The British and French benefitted from superior numbers, which enabled the Allied commanders to relieve divisions after shorter periods in the line. Severe criticism of General Sir Douglas Haig and General Henry Rawlinson during and since the war, for persisting with attacks on October, was challenged in 2009 by Philpott, who put the British share of the battle into the context of strategic subordination to French wishes, Joffre's general Allied offensive and the continuation of French attacks south of Le Transloy, which had to be supported by British operations and by more recent writing of the ordeal inflicted on the German armies.

  • 和訳をお願いします。

    At the outbreak of World War I, 80% of the German army was deployed as seven field armies in the west according to the plan Aufmarsch II West. However, they were then assigned to execute the retired deployment plan Aufmarsch I West, also known as the Schlieffen Plan. This would march German armies through northern Belgium and into France, in an attempt to encircle the French army and then breach the 'second defensive area' of the fortresses of Verdun and Paris and the Marne river. Aufmarsch I West was one of four deployment plans available to the German General Staff in 1914. Each plan favoured certain operations, but did not specify exactly how those operations were to be carried out, leaving the commanding officers to carry those out at their own initiative and with minimal oversight.[clarification needed] Aufmarsch I West, designed for a one-front war with France, had been retired once it became clear it was irrelevant to the wars Germany could expect to face; both Russia and Britain were expected to help France, and there was no possibility of Italian nor Austro-Hungarian troops being available for operations against France. But despite its unsuitability, and the availability of more sensible and decisive options, it retained a certain allure due to its offensive nature and the pessimism of pre-war thinking, which expected offensive operations to be short-lived, costly in casualties, and unlikely to be decisive. Accordingly, the Aufmarsch II West deployment was changed for the offensive of 1914, despite its unrealistic goals and the insufficient forces Germany had available for decisive success. Moltke took Schlieffen's plan and modified the deployment of forces on the western front by reducing the right wing, the one to advance through Belgium, from 85% to 70%. In the end, the Schlieffen plan was so radically modified by Moltke, that it could be more properly called the Moltke Plan.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    Since the 1960s the "futility" view (that the battle was an Anglo-French disaster) has been criticised as a myth. In recent years a nuanced version of the original orthodoxy has arisen, which does not seek to minimise the human cost of the battle but sets it in the context of industrial warfare, compares it to the wars in the United States from 1861–1865 and Europe from 1939–1945 and describes the development of the armies of 1914 into modern all-arms organisations, using the scientific application of fire-power on land and in the air, to defeat comparable opponents in a war of exhaustion. Little German and French writing on this topic has been translated, leaving much of the continental perspective and detail of German and French military operations inaccessible to the English-speaking world.

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    The Third Battle of Ypres became controversial while it was being fought and has remained so, with disputes about the predictability of the August deluges and for its mixed results, which in much of the writing in English, is blamed on misunderstandings between Gough and Haig and on faulty planning, rather than on the resilience of the German defence.Operations in Flanders, Belgium had been desired by the British Cabinet, Admiralty and War Office since 1914. Douglas Haig succeeded John French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force on 19 December 1915. A week after his appointment, Haig met Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon, who emphasised the importance of obtaining control of the Belgian coast, to end the threat from German naval forces based in Bruges. In January 1916, Haig ordered General Henry Rawlinson to plan an attack in the Ypres Salient. The need to support the French army during the Battle of Verdun 21 February – 18 December 1916 and the demands of the Somme battles 1 July – 18 November 1916, absorbed the British Expeditionary Force's offensive capacity for the rest of the year. On 22 November Haig, Chief of the Imperial General Staff William Robertson, First Sea Lord Admiral Henry Jackson and Dover Patrol commander Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon, wrote to General Joffre urging that the Flanders operation be undertaken in 1917, which Joffre accepted.In late 1916 and early 1917, military leaders in Britain and France were optimistic that the casualties they had inflicted on the German army at the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Somme and on the Eastern Front had brought the German army close to exhaustion, although the effort had been immensely costly. At the conference in Chantilly in November 1916 and a series of subsequent meetings, the Entente agreed on an offensive strategy to overwhelm the Central Powers by means of simultaneous attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts. The Prime Minister David Lloyd George, sought to limit British casualties and proposed an offensive on the Italian front. British and French artillery would be transferred to Italy to add weight to the offensive.