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. In July and August, German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had engaged in a manner analogous to an advance to contact during mobile operations, which had given the Germans several costly defensive successes. The counter-attacks in September had been assaults on reinforced field positions, due to the restrained nature of British infantry advances. The fine weather in early September had greatly eased British supply difficulties, especially in the delivery of huge amounts of artillery ammunition. Immediately after their infantry advances, the British had made time to establish a defence in depth, behind standing barrages. The British attacks took place in dry clear weather, with increased air support over the battlefield for counter-attack reconnaissance, contact patrol and ground-attack operations. Systematic defensive artillery support was forfeited by the Germans, due to uncertainty over the position of their infantry, just when the British infantry benefitted from the opposite. German counter-attacks were defeated with many casualties and on 28 September, Albrecht von Thaer, staff officer at Group Wytschaete, wrote that the experience was "awful" and that he did not know what to do. Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons by the ground-holding divisions. All machine-guns, including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone, to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards (230 m). The ground holding divisions were reinforced by the Stoss regiment of an Eingreif division being moved up behind each front division into the artillery protective line behind the forward battle zone, to launch earlier counter-attacks while the British were consolidating. The bulk of the Eingreif divisions were to be held back and used for a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after and for counter-attacks and spoiling attacks between British offensives. Further changes of the 4th Army defensive methods were ordered on 30 September.

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>In July and August, German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had engaged in a manner analogous to an advance to contact during mobile operations, which had given the Germans several costly defensive successes. The counter-attacks in September had been assaults on reinforced field positions, due to the restrained nature of British infantry advances. The fine weather in early September had greatly eased British supply difficulties, especially in the delivery of huge amounts of artillery ammunition. Immediately after their infantry advances, the British had made time to establish a defence in depth, behind standing barrages. ⇒7月と8月に、ドイツ軍の反撃(アイングリーフ)師団は、移動作戦活動中に接触を保ちながら進軍するのに似たような方法で反撃に従事して、高くはついたがドイツ軍にいくつか防御の成功をもたらした。英国軍歩兵連隊の進軍が持つ抑制的性質のために、9月の反撃は補強された野戦陣地に対する襲撃であった。9月上旬の晴天のおかげで、特に膨大な量の大砲弾薬の配送にかかる英国軍の供給困難が大いに緩和された。英国軍は、歩兵連隊が進んだ直後に、待機中の集中砲火の背後で、取り急ぎ縱深防御の設定を行った。 >The British attacks took place in dry clear weather, with increased air support over the battlefield for counter-attack reconnaissance, contact patrol and ground-attack operations. Systematic defensive artillery support was forfeited by the Germans, due to uncertainty over the position of their infantry, just when the British infantry benefitted from the opposite. German counter-attacks were defeated with many casualties and on 28 September, Albrecht von Thaer, staff officer at Group Wytschaete, wrote that the experience was "awful" and that he did not know what to do. ⇒晴天の中、英国軍の攻撃が起こったが、それは反撃のための斥候調査、接触パトロール、および地上攻撃における作戦行動のために戦場上空からの空中援護の増強をもって始まった。ドイツ軍歩兵連隊にとっては陣地上に不安があったので、砲兵隊による組織的防御の支援が強化されたが、それはちょうど英国軍歩兵連隊が対面からの(攻撃の)地の利を得たときであった。ドイツ軍の反撃は、多くの犠牲者を被って、打破された。そして、グループ・ウィッツチャエテの参謀将校アルブレヒト・フォン・テーアは、9月28日に、この経験は「惨憺たる状況」であって、何をどうすべきか分からない、と書いた。 >Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons by the ground-holding divisions. All machine-guns, including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone, to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards (230 m). The ground holding divisions were reinforced by the Stoss regiment of an Eingreif division being moved up behind each front division into the artillery protective line behind the forward battle zone, to launch earlier counter-attacks while the British were consolidating. ⇒ルーデンドルフは、地面保持師団による前方駐屯軍の強化を命じた。250ヤード(230m)おきに4門ないし8門の銃砲を備える非常線を張るために、支援隊や前線付き予備大隊の装備を含むすべての機関銃が前方地帯へ送られた。アイングリーフ師団のシュトース連隊を各々の前線師団の庇護下に前方の戦闘地帯背後の砲兵隊保護戦線へ動かすことによって地面保持師団が補強され、英国軍が地固めの強化をしているうちに、前倒しの反撃を開始した。 >The bulk of the Eingreif divisions were to be held back and used for a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after and for counter-attacks and spoiling attacks between British offensives. Further changes of the 4th Army defensive methods were ordered on 30 September. ⇒アイングリーフ師団の本体は、反撃の後一旦引き返し、翌日や後日の秩序立った打ち返しや、英国軍攻撃の合間の反撃、妨害攻撃のために使われることになっていた。9月30日に、第4方面軍による防御方法の更なる変更が命じられた。 ※全体的によく分かりません(特に前半部分)。誤訳の節はどうぞ悪しからず。

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    New smoke shells were fired when the creeping barrage paused beyond each objective, which helped to obscure the British infantry from artillery observers and German machine-gunners far back in the German defensive zone who fired through the British artillery barrages. Around Langemarck, the British infantry formed up close the German positions, too near for the German artillery to fire on for fear of hitting their infantry, although British troops further back at the Steenbeek were severely bombarded. British platoons and sections were allotted objectives and engineers accompanied troops to bridge obstacles and attack strong points. In the 20th Division, each company was reduced to three platoons, two to advance using infiltration tactics and one to mop up areas where the forward platoons had by-passed resistance by attacking from the flanks and from behind. In the II and XIX Corps areas, the foremost infantry had been isolated by German artillery and then driven back by counter-attacks. On 17 August, Gough ordered that the capture of the remainder of their objectives of 16 August would be completed on 25 August. Apart from small areas on the left of the 56th Division (Major-General F. A. Dudgeon), the flanks of the 8th Division and right of the 16th Division, the British had been forced back to their start line by German machine-gun fire from the flanks and infantry counter-attacks supported by plentiful artillery. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery-fire, which inflicted many losses. Dudgeon reported that there had been a lack of time to prepare the attack and study the ground, since the 167th Brigade had relieved part of the 25th Division after it had only been in the line for 24 hours; neither unit had sufficient time to make preparations for the attack. Dudgeon also reported that no tracks had been laid beyond Château Wood, that the wet ground had slowed the delivery of supplies to the front line and obstructed the advance beyond it. Pillboxes had caused more delays and subjected the attacking troops to frequent enfilade fire.