The Paris Peace Conference: House's Views
- Conflicting emotions at the Paris conference
- China's sense of betrayal and dissatisfaction
- German dissatisfaction and refusal to sign the treaty
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House's views Wilson's former friend Edward Mandell House, present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919: I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris. China Many in China felt betrayed as the German territory in China was handed to Japan. Wellington Koo refused to sign the treaty and the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was the only nation that did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony. The sense of betrayal led to great demonstrations in China like the May 4th movement and the fall of the nascent Chinese Republic's government[when?] and poisoned relations with the West. There was immense dissatisfaction with Duan Qirui’s government, which had secretly negotiated with the Japanese in order to secure loans to fund their military campaigns again the south. On 29 April, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived in Versailles. On 7 May, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "War Guilt Clause", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We know the full brunt of hate that confronts us here. You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie." Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour",soon afterwards withdrawing from the proceedings of the peace conference. Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty—particularly the provision that blamed Germany for starting the war—as an insult to the nation's honor. They referred to the treaty as "the Diktat" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Germany′s first democratically elected head of government, Philipp Scheidemann, resigned rather than sign the treaty. In a passionate speech before the National Assembly on 21 March 1919, he called the treaty a "murderous plan" and exclaimed, Which hand, trying to put us in chains like these, would not wither? The treaty is unacceptable.
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＞House's views Wilson's former friend ～ were lacking at Paris. ⇒ハウスの意見 ウィルソンの元友人エドワード・マンデル・ハウスは、1919年6月29日の日記に次のように書いている。 私は、運命の8か月間の後に、相反する感情を抱いてパリを離れます。振り返って会議を見ると、賛成すべきが多々あり、また後悔することも多々あります。何をすべきであったかを言うのは簡単ですが、それを行う方法を見つけ出すのはずっと困難です。この条約はいまだかつてなかったほどひどい、それを強制することはヨーロッパを際限のない混迷に巻き込むことになる、と言っている人々がいます。そのとおりだと認めます。しかしまた、帝国が粉砕されてその廃墟の上に何の障害もなく新しい国家が築かれることなど、あり得ないだろう、と言い返したいです。新しい国境を作ることは、新しい問題を作り出すことです。１つのことは（単独では収まらず）、必ず他に波及します。私は別の平和を優先すべきだったかも知れませんが、私が求めるような平和の要素はこのパリにはありませんでした。 ＞China Many in China ～ again the south. ⇒中国 中国内のドイツ領土が日本に渡されたため、多くの中国人が裏切られたように感じた。ウェリントン・クーがこの条約に署名することを拒否したことで、「パリ平和会議」で中国代表団は調印式で「ヴェルサイユ条約」に署名しなかった唯一の国であった。この裏切りの感覚が、中国の5月4日運動、初期の中国共和国政府の崩壊、および西洋との関係汚染のような、中国における大きなデモンストレーション（示威運動）につながったのである。ドゥアン・チルイ（段棋瑞？）の政府が、南部の軍事行動資金を調達するための融資を確保するため、日本と秘密裏に交渉していたことに対して大きな不満があった。 ＞On 29 April ～ the peace conference. ⇒4月29日、ウルリッヒ・グラフ・フォン・ブロックドルフ‐ランツァウ外相の指導の下、ドイツ代表団がヴェルサイユに到着した。5月7日、いわゆる「戦争罪の条項」を含む勝利者の条件に直面したとき、フォン・ブロックドルフ‐ランツァウは、クレメンソー、ウィルソン、ロイド=ジョージに対して次のように答えた。「ここでは憎悪の矛先がすべて私たちに向けられていることを我々は承知しています。あなた方は、唯一の戦争犯罪者であったことを告白するよう我々に要求しています。（しかし）私の口からそのような告白をするとしたら、それは嘘になります」。ドイツは交渉に参加することが許されなかったので、ドイツ政府は、不当な要求、「名誉の侵害」に対する抗議の意を表明し、そしてその直後に平和会議の諸手続から撤退した。 ＞Germans of all ～ treaty is unacceptable. ⇒あらゆる政治的暗部（という十字架）を背負わされたドイツ人は、条約 ― 特に戦争開始の責任をドイツに負わせる条項 ― を国家的名誉への侮蔑であるとして非難した。彼らは、この条約を「強制命令」と呼んだ。その条文が「承諾するかしないかはそちらの勝手だ、いやならやめろ（どうなるか知らんぞ）」というような基盤に立ってドイツに突きつけられているからである。ドイツで初めて民主的に選出された政府首脳フィリップ・シャイデマンは、条約に署名するのを拒んで、辞任した。1919年3月21日、彼は国会前の情熱的な演説をしてこの条約を「殺人計画」と呼び、「一体、我々をこのような鎖（束縛）の中に押し込めようとしながら、腐らない手があるだろうか？ こんな条約は容認できない」と叫んだ。
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The Treaty of Versailles (French: Traité de Versailles) was the most important of the peace treaties that brought World War I to an end. The Treaty ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. It was signed on 28 June 1919 in Versailles, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand which directly led to World War I. The other Central Powers on the German side of World War I signed separate treaties. Although the armistice, signed on 11 November 1918, ended the actual fighting, it took six months of Allied negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. The treaty was registered by the Secretariat of the League of Nations on 21 October 1919. Of the many provisions in the treaty, one of the most important and controversial required "Germany [to] accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war (the other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles). This article, Article 231, later became known as the War Guilt clause. The treaty required Germany to disarm, make ample territorial concessions, and pay reparations to certain countries that had formed the Entente powers. In 1921 the total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion marks (then $31.4 billion or ￡6.6 billion, roughly equivalent to US $442 billion or UK ￡284 billion in 2018). At the time economists, notably John Maynard Keynes (a British delegate to the Paris Peace Conference), predicted that the treaty was too harsh—a "Carthaginian peace"—and said the reparations figure was excessive and counter-productive, views that, since then, have been the subject of ongoing debate by historians and economists from several countries. On the other hand, prominent figures on the Allied side such as French Marshal Ferdinand Foch criticized the treaty for treating Germany too leniently. The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left no one content: Germany was neither pacified nor conciliated, nor was it permanently weakened. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to the Locarno Treaties, which improved relations between Germany and the other European powers, and the re-negotiation of the reparation system resulting in the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and the indefinite postponement of reparations at the Lausanne Conference of 1932. Although it is often referred to as the "Versailles Conference", only the actual signing of the treaty took place at the historic palace. Most of the negotiations were in Paris, with the "Big Four" meetings taking place generally at the Quai d'Orsay.
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The British military historian Correlli Barnett claimed that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he claimed, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Germany had imposed on a defeated Russia in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion marks. Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany′s economy had been restored to its pre-war status. Barnett also claims that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany′s eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former Austrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the treaty "much enhanced" German power. Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again. By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".The British historian of modern Germany, Richard J. Evans, wrote that during the war the German right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them. Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles. Evans further noted that the parties of the Weimar Coalition, namely the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the social liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Christian democratic Centre Party, were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to claim as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equalled opposition to the Weimar Republic.
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After Scheidemann′s resignation, a new coalition government was formed under Gustav Bauer. President Friedrich Ebert knew that Germany was in an impossible situation. Although he shared his countrymen's disgust with the treaty, he was sober enough to consider the possibility that the government would not be in a position to reject it. He believed that if Germany refused to sign the treaty, the Allies would invade Germany from the west—and there was no guarantee that the army would be able to make a stand in the event of an invasion. With this in mind, he asked Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies resumed the war. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff, Wilhelm Groener—concluded the army could not resume the war even on a limited scale. However, rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener inform the government that the army would be in an untenable position in the event of renewed hostilities. Upon receiving this, the new government recommended signing the treaty. The National Assembly voted in favour of signing the treaty by 237 to 138, with five abstentions (there were 421 delegates in total). This result was wired to Clemenceau just hours before the deadline. Foreign minister Hermann Müller and colonial minister Johannes Bell travelled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on 9 July by a vote of 209 to 116.Conservatives, nationalists and ex-military leaders condemned the treaty. Politicians of the Weimar Republic who supported the treaty, socialists, communists, and Jews were viewed with suspicion as persons of questionable loyalty.[citation needed] It was rumored that Jews had not supported the war and had played a role in selling Germany out to its enemies. Those who seemed to benefit from a weakened Germany and the newly formed Weimar Republic were regarded as having "stabbed Germany in the back". Those who instigated unrest and strikes in the critical military industries on the home front or who opposed German nationalism were seen to have contributed to Germany's defeat.[citation needed] These theories were given credence by the fact that when Germany surrendered in November 1918, its armies were still on French and Belgian territory. Furthermore, on the Eastern Front, Germany had already won the war against Russia and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In the West, Germany had seemed to have come close to winning the war with the Spring Offensive earlier in 1918. Its failure was blamed on strikes in the arms industry at a critical moment of the offensive, leaving soldiers with an inadequate supply of materiel. The strikes were regarded by nationalists as having been instigated by traitors, with the Jews taking most of the blame.
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Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was the Great Depression of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" of National Socialism and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations". Ewa Thompson points out that the treaty allowed numerous nations in Central and Eastern Europe to liberate themselves from oppressive German rule, a fact that is often neglected by Western historiography, more interested in understanding the German point of view. In nations that found themselves free as the result of the treaty—such as Poles or Czechs—it is seen as a symbol of recognition of wrongs committed against small nations by their much larger aggressive neighbours. Regardless of modern strategic or economic analysis, resentment caused by the treaty sowed fertile psychological ground for the eventual rise of the Nazi Party.[citation needed] The German historian Detlev Peukert wrote that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during the interwar period, and though not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany. Rather, Peukert argued that it was widely believed in Germany that Versailles was a totally unreasonable treaty, and it was this "perception" rather than the "reality" of the Versailles treaty that mattered. Peukert noted that because of the "millenarian hopes" created in Germany during World War I when for a time it appeared that Germany was on the verge of conquering all of Europe, any peace treaty the Allies of World War I imposed on the defeated German Reich were bound to create a nationalist backlash, and there was nothing the Allies could have done to avoid that backlash. Having noted that much, Peukert commented that the policy of rapprochement with the Western powers that Gustav Stresemann carried out between 1923 and 1929 were constructive policies that might have allowed Germany to play a more positive role in Europe, and that it was not true that German democracy was doomed to die in 1919 because of Versailles. Finally, Peukert argued that it was the Great Depression and the turn to a nationalist policy of autarky within Germany at the same time that finished off the Weimar Republic, not the Treaty of Versailles. French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of Germans in the Sudetenland and in Posen-West Prussia were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented.
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The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a peace treaty signed on March 3, 1918 between the Russian SFSR and the Central Powers, but prior to that on February 9, 1918, the Central Powers signed an exclusive protectorate treaty (German: Brotfrieden, "peace for bread") with the Ukrainian People's Republic as part of the negotiations that took place in Brest-Litovsk, Grodno Governorate (now Brest, Belarus) recognizing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian republic. Although not formally annexing the territory of the former Russian Empire, Germany and Austria-Hungary secured food-supply support in return for providing military protection. The Quadruple Alliance recognized Ukraine as a neutral state.Because of the civil unrest in the Russian Republic culminating in the October Revolution the Ukrainian People's Republic declared its independence under the government of the General Secretariat of Ukraine. In its declaration the General Secretariat announced elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly to be held on January 9, 1918 and the first convocation on January 22 of the same year. On December 17, 1917 Vladimir Lenin as the head of the Sovnarkom released an ultimatum in which he accused the Central Rada of disorganizing the frontlines, stopping "any troops going into the region of the Don, the Urals, or elsewhere", sheltering political enemies such as the members of the Cadet party and ones who sided with Kaledine, as well as a requirement to "put an end to the attempts to crush the armies of the Soviet and of the Red Guard in Ukraine". Lenin gave 24 hours' notice to the government of what he called "the independent and bourgeois Republic of the Ukraine" to respond. Having Soviet armies already in Ukraine, the government of Ukraine had to act quickly to preserve the sovereignty of the state. The Ukrainian Central Rada expressed a desire for a peace treaty with foreign countries and its recognition worldwide. Since the representatives of the British and French Empires did not wish to recognize its sovereignty considering it as a part of their major ally, the Russian Empire, the treaty would give a chance for some recognition in face of the Central Powers.
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Position of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation The Treaty of Kars is overtly rejected by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The ARF specifically condemns the treaty as a "gross violation of international law" and argues that, because the three Transcaucasian republics were under the control of Moscow in 1921, their independent consent was questionable. The ARF also questions the validity of the treaty based on the authorities of the sides that concluded it. They contend that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had no legal authority to sign international treaties. In addition, they argue that because the USSR was not founded until 1922, and therefore not a recognized state, it was also "not a subject of international law and, naturally, its government had no authority to enter into international treaties." Aftermath of the 2015 Russian Sukhoi Su-24 shootdown Following the shootdown of the Russian Sukhoi Su-24 over the Syria–Turkey border in November 2015 and the rise of Russo-Turkish tensions, members of the Communist Party of Russia proposed annulling the Treaty of Moscow and by extension the Kars treaty. Initially, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered this action in order to send a political message to the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, Moscow ultimately decided against it in its effort to de-escalate tensions with Ankara. Genoa Conference (1922) The Genoa Economic and Financial Conference was a formal international conclave of 34 nations held in Genoa, Italy from 10 April to 19 May 1922. It was planned by British prime minister David Lloyd George to resolve the major economic and political issues facing Europe, and to deal with the pariah nations of Germany and Russia, both of which had been excluded from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The conference was particularly interested in developing a strategy to rebuild defeated Germany, as well as central and eastern Europe, and to negotiate a relationship between European capitalist economies and the new Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia. However Russia and Germany signed a separate agreement at Rapallo and the result at Genoa was a fiasco with few positive results. The conference did come up with a proposal for resuming the gold standard that was largely put in place by major countries. Genoa Conference (1922) ジェノア会議
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The delegates of the Commonwealth and British Government had mixed thoughts on the treaty, with some seeing the French policy as being greedy and vindictive. Lloyd George and his private secretary Philip Kerr believed in the treaty, although they also felt that the French would keep Europe in a constant state of turmoil by attempting to enforce the treaty. Delegate Harold Nicolson wrote "are we making a good peace?", while General Jan Smuts (a member of the South African delegation) wrote to Lloyd-George, before the signing, that the treaty was unstable and declared "Are we in our sober senses or suffering from shellshock? What has become of Wilson's 14 points?" He wanted the Germans not be made to sign at the "point of the bayonet". Smuts issued a statement condemning the treaty and regretting that the promises of "a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty". Lord Robert Cecil said that many within the Foreign Office were disappointed by the treaty. The treaty received widespread approval from the general public. Bernadotte Schmitt wrote that the "average Englishman ... thought Germany got only what it deserved" as a result of the treaty. However, public opinion changed as German complaints mounted. The surrendering of the German High Seas Fleet following the armistice, its internment, and eventual scuttling at Scapa Flow meant that Britain's primary war goal was achieved prior to the signing of the treaty. As a result, British policy towards Germany began diverging from France's almost from the moment the guns fell silent and focused on establishing Germany as a bulwark against the threat posed by the new Soviet Union. By the 1930s, Lloyd George's position on the treaty has changed. In 1938, he published his memoir titled The Truth About the Peace Treaties, in which he repudiated the terms of the treaty that bore his signature. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, following the German re-militarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, stated that he was "pleased" that the treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".
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Ottoman officials informed the German government that the country needed time to prepare for conflict. Germany provided financial aid and weapons shipments to the Ottoman Empire. After pressure escalated from the German government demanding that the Ottoman Empire fulfill its treaty obligations, or else Germany would expel the country from the alliance and terminate economic and military assistance, the Ottoman government entered the war with the recently acquired cruisers from Germany, the Yavuz Sultan Selim (formerly SMS Goeben) and the Midilli (formerly SMS Breslau) launching a naval raid on the Russian port of Odessa, thus engaging in a military action in accordance with its alliance obligations with Germany.
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In June 1919, the Allies declared that war would resume if the German government did not sign the treaty they had agreed to among themselves. The government headed by Philipp Scheidemann was unable to agree on a common position, and Scheidemann himself resigned rather than agree to sign the treaty. Gustav Bauer, the head of the new government, sent a telegram stating his intention to sign the treaty if certain articles were withdrawn, including Articles 227, 230 and 231.[nb 1] In response, the Allies issued an ultimatum stating that Germany would have to accept the treaty or face an invasion of Allied forces across the Rhine within 24 hours. On 23 June, Bauer capitulated and sent a second telegram with a confirmation that a German delegation would arrive shortly to sign the treaty. On 28 June 1919, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the immediate impetus for the war), the peace treaty was signed. The treaty had clauses ranging from war crimes, the prohibition on the merging of Austria with Germany without the consent of the League of Nations, freedom of navigation on major European rivers, to the returning of a Koran to the king of Hedjaz.The treaty stripped Germany of 25,000 square miles (65,000 km2) of territory and 7 million people. It also required Germany to give up the gains made via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and grant independence to the protectorates that had been established. In Western Europe Germany was required to recognize Belgian sovereignty over Moresnet and cede control of the Eupen-Malmedy area. Within six months of the transfer, Belgium was required to conduct a plebiscite on whether the citizens of the region wanted to remain under Belgian sovereignty or return to German control, communicate the results to the League of Nations and abide by the League's decision. To compensate for the destruction of French coal mines, Germany was to cede the output of the Saar coalmines to France and control of the Saar to the League of Nations for 15 years; a plebiscite would then be held to decide sovereignty. The treaty "restored" the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France by rescinding the treaties of Versailles and Frankfurt of 1871 as they pertained to this issue. The sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein was to be resolved by a plebiscite to be held at a future time (see Schleswig Plebiscites).
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In March 1935, Germany reintroduced conscription followed by an open rearmament programme, the official unveiling of the Luftwaffe (air force), and signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that allowed a surface fleet 35% of the size of the Royal Navy. The resulting rearmament programs was allotted 35 billion Reichsmarks over an eight year period. Territorial On 7 March 1936, German troops entered and remilitarized the Rhineland. On 12 March 1938, following German pressure to the collapse the Austrian Government, German troops crossed into Austria and the following day Hitler announced the Anschluss: the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following year, on 23 March 1939, Germany annexed Memel from Lithuania.According to David Stevenson, since the opening of French archives, most commentators have remarked on French restraint and reasonableness at the conference, though Stevenson notes that "[t]he jury is still out", and that "there have been signs that the pendulum of judgement is swinging back the other way." In his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian peace", a misguided attempt to destroy Germany on behalf of French revanchism, rather than to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which Germany had accepted at the armistice. He stated: "I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible." Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and used in his passionate book arguments that he and others (including some US officials) had used at Paris. He believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay, and that these would produce drastic instability. French economist Étienne Mantoux disputed that analysis. During the 1940s, Mantoux wrote a posthumously published book titled The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes in an attempt to rebut Keynes' claims. More recently economists have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small army saved it so much money it could afford the reparations payments. It has been argued (for instance by historian Gerhard Weinberg in his book A World At Arms) that the treaty was in fact quite advantageous to Germany. The Bismarckian Reich was maintained as a political unit instead of being broken up, and Germany largely escaped post-war military occupation (in contrast to the situation following World War II). In a 1995 essay, Weinberg noted that with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and with Russia withdrawn from Europe, that Germany was now the dominant power in Eastern Europe.
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