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The Royal Navy vessels on the Euphrates kept the Ottomans under fire while British troops managed to cross the Tigris. The British and Indian troops advanced across open ground but no crossing could be made across the river into Qurna itself. The British force retired. On the 6th, reinforced by the rest of the Norfolk Regiment, the 7th Rajputs and 120th Infantry and some mountain guns, they tried again. The Ottomans had moved back into positions they had lost in the previous engagement so the British and Indian troops had to re-take those positions. Again they drove the Ottomans back but could not cross the river into Qurna. On the 8th the 104th and 110th Infantry were sent up the Tigris to find a place to cross. They did, and in doing so cut the Ottomans off from retreat to the north while the gunboats kept up an effective bombardment of their positions in the town. The night of the 8th an Ottoman steamer sailed down the river with lights and sirens blazing. Lieutenant Commander Wilfrid Nunn of the British gunboat Espiegle took aboard three Ottoman officers. The Ottomans wanted to surrender the town and march away. Nunn, who was not in touch with Fry, insisted on unconditional surrender which upset the Ottomans. However they eventually agreed. On 9 December, the Ottoman commander, Colonel Subhi Bey, the Wali or Governor of Basra, surrendered his forces. Going into captivity were 42 Ottoman officers and 989 soldiers. The British/Indian losses were 27 soldiers killed and 242 wounded and two sailors killed and 10 wounded. Despite being more of a skirmish than a battle, the Battle of Qurna is important because it gave the British a secure front line in Southern Mesopotamia. Basra was secure, and the oil refineries at Abadan in Persia were safe. However, the Ottomans would try again at Shaiba and the British would later launch an offensive to take Baghdad. The Battle of Limanowa took place from 1 December to 13 December 1914, between the Austro-Hungarian Army and the Russian Army near the town of Limanowa (40 kilometres (25 mi) south-east of Kraków). The Austro-Hungarian high command had assumed that the German success would weaken Russian forces in the north and that the Galician front would remain quiet. Both these assumptions were incorrect. Though the Habsburg 2nd army offensive opened on 16 November and met early success, the Russians proved stronger than expected and their 4th Army yielded little ground. Meanwhile, further south the Russian 2nd Army advanced across the San river and moved into the Tarnów area by 20 November. Further north, the Habsburg 4th Army, supported by the 47th German Reserve Division, moved onto the offensive in the last days of November. In fierce battles around the towns of Łapanów and Limanowa, the Russian 3rd Army was beaten and forced to retreat east, ending its opportunity to reach Kraków. To avoid being surrounded, the Russian 8th Army also had to retreat, stopping its advance toward the Hungarian plains. Limanowa リマノバ

Austria-Hungary's third invasion of Serbia commenced on 6 November 1914, with intense artillery fire strafing a series of Serbian border towns. On 7 November, the Austro-Hungarian 5th and 6th armies attacked across the Drina. Outnumbered and in desperate need of ammunition, the Serbian Army offered fierce resistance but was forced to retreat. The 3rd Army fell back against a road by the Jadar River in an effort to block the Austro-Hungarian advance towards Valjevo, while the 1st Army retreated southward into the Serbian interior and the Užice Army managed to prevent the Austro-Hungarians from crossing the Drina. On 8 November, the Austro-Hungarians attacked the Serbian 2nd Army near Cer Mountain and came within 1.6 kilometres (0.99 mi) of the Serbian frontline, entrenching themselves at the foot of the mountain. The 2nd Army was given orders to hold the Austro-Hungarians down for as long as possible and, if its position became untenable, retreat towards the right bank of the Dobrava River and position itself so as to block the approach to Valjevo. Elsewhere, the Austro-Hungarians drove a wedge between the 1st and 3rd Army and forced another Serbian retreat. Later that day, the Serbian Government held a joint session with the Serbian Supreme Command with regard to Serbia's worsening military position. Putnik stressed that it was critical for Serbia to hold the Kolubara and the towns within its vicinity and suggested that the Serbs make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary if this proved impossible. This notion was rejected by the Prime Minister of Serbia, Nikola Pašić, who urged further resistance to the Austro-Hungarians and threatened the resignation of his government if peace discussions began. The session ended with the Serbian Government and Supreme Command agreeing to fight on. Putnik reasoned that Austro-Hungarian supply lines would become overstretched as their forces pressed deeper into Serbia while the Serbs would continue to hold the railheads in the Serbian interior. On 10 November, he ordered a general retreat from the Jadar and withdrew the Serbian 2nd Army to Ub and positioned the 1st and 3rd armies north and west of Valjevo. Meanwhile, the Užice Army took up positions to defend the town from which it took its name. The Austro-Hungarians pressed after the Serbs, hoping to capture the Obrenovac–Valjevo railroad. Clashes ensued and the Serbian Army managed to prevent the Austro-Hungarians from taking the railroad for a time. It quickly became clear to Putnik that he had underestimated the Austro-Hungarians, who managed to bring their heavy artillery through the muddy Serbian country roads. They established firing positions on the Serbian side of the Drina and began targeting the Serbian Army, which suffered heavy casualties.

Work by Belgian engineers to construct field defences around Antwerp had gone on since the beginning of the war and positions between the forts had been built, inundations formed and the foreground cleared of obstructions. The clearances proved unwise, since they made the forts visible, trenches could only be dug 1-foot (0.30 m) deep, because of the high water-table and had no overhead cover. During the German advance to Mechelen, most of the Belgian Army occupied the 4th Sector between the 3rd Sector and the Scheldt, only light forces held the 3rd Sector and the 4th Division held the sector around Dendermonde. The 1st and 2nd divisions were sent to the 3rd Sector and the 5th Division took up reserve positions behind them. The Belgian Army made a first sortie from Antwerp to help French and British troops engaged in fighting at the Sambre and at the Mons Canal. The operation was intended to distract the III Reserve and IX Reserve corps observing Antwerp and to cut German communications through Leuven and Brussels. After reconnaissance on 24 August, four divisions advanced southwards from Mechelen the next day, leaving one division of infantry and the Cavalry Division in reserve. The sortie was halted on 26 August, after receiving news of the withdrawal of the French and British and that Joseph Joffre, commander of the French army, did not intend to attack immediately and the Belgian forces returned to Antwerp. On the night of 25/26 August, the city was bombed by a German Zeppelin airship. Ten Belgian civilians were killed but the bombing failed to undermine the morale of the garrison. By 27 August reports to OHL led Moltke to believe that the Belgian army had lost its offensive capacity and ordered the brigade of the IV Reserve Corps at Brussels, to move south to rejoin the corps at Péronne. On 2 September German intelligence sources in Brussels reported that c. 40,000 British troops had landed at Ostend, occupied the coast westwards to Boulogne and reinforced the Belgian Army in Antwerp. Beseler attacked on 4 September, with three divisions on either side of the Scheldt towards Termonde, which captured the fortress and blew the bridges to the north. After the end of the first sortie, the Belgian field army joined the fortress troops in improving the defences between the forts, while the German besiegers consolidated their positions on an east–west line, about 8 miles (13 km) north of Brussels and 4–5 miles (6.4–8.0 km) away from the outer forts.

On 31 August Beseler was made responsible for the security of the German forces around Antwerp from relief attempts from the west. Landsturm battalions were transferred from the Generalgouverneur appointed to administer occupied Belgium, Field Marshal Von der Goltz and a division of the Marinekorps was ordered to the area. On 1 September, the Belgians received information that the Germans were preparing to advance towards the Belgian western flank, on the Scheldt at Dendermonde. The Belgian commanders had received reports that the IX Reserve Corps and the 6th Division of the III Reserve Corps, were being relieved by the Marine Division and Landwehr troops. The Germans had received agent reports of an imminent sortie from Antwerp, troops concentrations in western Belgium and northern France and the arrival of more British troops at Ostend. With the concentration of more troops and Landsturm at Brussels underway, the reports caused no alarm. The Belgian Army Command considered that the German attack on 4 September was a feint and began to plan another sortie, to induce the Germans to recall the troops being transferred to France and to disrupt German communications in central Belgium. German troop withdrawals were observed from 5–7 September. A frontal attack was considered to be impossible given the extent of the German trenches but an attack on the eastern flank was considered possible. Two divisions were to remain inside the Antwerp defences, while three divisions and cavalry were to attack towards Aarschot. Important crossings over the Demer and Dyle rivers were quickly taken, Aarschot was captured and by 10 September, the cavalry reached the city of Leuven. The German 6th Reserve Division and IX Reserve Corps were recalled to the region, joining the 30th Division of XV Corps from Alsace, which conducted operations against the sortie between 10–13 September around Brussels. The Belgian advance was stopped and the army retired to Antwerp on 13 September. At Antwerp, the German concentration of troops on the south-eastern side of the line had left a gap to the north from the Dender to the Dutch frontier. The gap spanned about 13 miles (21 km) at the confluence of the Dender and the Scheldt rivers at Dendermonde, through which the defenders of Antwerp retained contact with western Belgium and the Allied forces operating on the coast and in northern France.

After the Siege of Maubeuge in France, German super-heavy artillery was moved towards Antwerp which like Liège and Namur, would be untenable unless it could be incorporated into the main Allied front line, like the fortified regions of Verdun and Belfort in France. On 25 September the French General Staff (GQG) requested another sortie from Antwerp and the Belgian General Staff began to plan another operation. Signs of German preparations for a general attack on Antwerp, led to the forces intended for the sortie being reduced. The 5th Division, elements of the 4th Division and the Cavalry Division, which held the defences on the west side of the National Redoubt at Dendermonde and the Waasland, attacked German troops moving westward from Aalst. Although they succeeded in making a small advance, a counter-attack by the 37th Landwehr Brigade, supported by heavy artillery, led to the cancelling of the assault. On 28 September, the German bombardment of the Antwerp fortresses began. The German bombardment began on 28 September, with German siege guns directed by observation balloons on gun emplacements, flanking positions and magazines, which were the most vital parts of the forts, had by 6:00 p.m. on 29 September with extraordinary accuracy, made Fort Sint-Katelijne-Waver untenable and extensively damaged Fort Walem. Preparations to evacuate the Belgian Army to Ostend were begun by the Belgian Army Headquarters on 29 September and wounded, recruits, untrained men, prisoners of war, transport, equipment, ammunition and industrial machinery were gradually moved from Antwerp. The route out of the city crossed the Scheldt on two narrow pontoon bridges at the city centre and at Burcht. Trains had to run south along the right bank, cross the Rupel near German infantry positions only 10,000 yards (9,100 m) from the siege guns at Mechelen and then cross the railway bridge at Temse 12 miles (19 km) away. From 29 September – 7 October trains with lights extinguished, ran each night unopposed. The 4th Division assembled at Dendermonde, where a German attack was expected and the Cavalry Division guarded the river line, to protect the escape route between the Dender and the coast. Early on 29 September, the Belgian Prime Minister, Charles de Broqueville, informed the British that if all the outer forts were lost, the government and field army of 65,000 men would withdraw to Ostend and leave the 80,000 fortress troops to hold Antwerp for as long as possible. The next day, de Broqueville formally appealed to the British and French governments for help.

In northern France, German troops engaged in mutual outflanking attempts, from the Aisne northwards since September, had reached Arras. Lens was captured by I Bavarian Reserve Corps on 5 October. Three German cavalry corps had attempted another flanking manoeuvre to the north and IV Cavalry Corps had reached Zwartberg and Mont des Cats near Ypres. The advance of the German army threatened to block the western retreat route of the Belgian army out of Antwerp. On 6 October discussions between the British and Belgians, led to a decision to withdraw the field army to the west bank of the Scheldt, where it could maintain contact with a relieving force and avoid the danger of being trapped on the east bank. On the night of 6/7 October the 1st, 3rd and 5th divisions crossed the river and joined the Cavalry, 4th and 6th divisions, as the eight forts of the inner ring were taken over by fortress troops. Intervening trenches between forts 2 and 7 were occupied by the two British naval brigades and the 4th and 7th Fortress regiments, with the Belgian 2nd Division and British Marine Brigade in reserve. The British forces under the command of Major-General Archibald Paris, were ordered by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill to continue the defence for as long as possible and to be ready to cross to the west bank rather than participate in a surrender. Early on 7 October, two battalions of Landwehr Regiment 37 were able to cross the Scheldt at Schoonaerde by boat, during a thick fog. The Belgian 6th Division made several counter-attacks which were repulsed and a bridge was built by the evening over which the rest of the Landwehr crossed. The width of the escape route from Antwerp, had been reduced to fewer than 12 miles (19 km), which led to the Belgian commanders ordering the field army to retreat behind the Terneuzen Canal, which ran from Ghent northwards to the Dutch border. The 1st and 5th divisions, which had lost most casualties and a brigade each of the 3rd and 6th divisions moved first and the remaining troops less the 2nd Division in Antwerp, formed a flank guard on the Scheldt and the Durme. The Belgian army headquarters moved to Zelzate 25 miles (40 km) further west. A Belgian improvised brigade was at Ghent and British troops in the area were requested to move to Ghent, after a German cavalry division was reported to be near Kruishoutem 12 miles (19 km) to the south-west. Later in the day German troops entered fort Broechem and the Massenhoven redoubt to the north unopposed, which widened the gap in the Antwerp defence perimeter to 14 miles (23 km) and began to move German super-heavy artillery over the Nete, which took until 8 October. At 11:25 p.m. on 7 October German 6-inch (150 mm) howitzers began to bombard the city.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Reserve Division had engaged the Russians' XXII Corps even further south, and after a fierce battle forced them to fall back southeastward; its commander wired Rennenkampf he had been attacked and defeated near Lyck, and could do nothing but withdraw. Rennenkampf ordered a counteroffensive in the north to buy time to reform his lines, managing to push the German XX Corps back a number of miles. However, the Germans did not stop to reform their lines but instead continued their advances in the south and north. This left the victorious Russian troops isolated but still able to retreat to new lines being set up in the east. Now the battle turned decisively in the Germans' favor. By 11 September the Russians had been pushed back to a line running from Insterburg to Angerburg in the north, with a huge flanking maneuver developing to the south. It was at this point that the threat of encirclement appeared possible. Rennenkampf ordered a general retreat toward the Russian border, which happened rapidly under the protection of a strong rear guard. It was this speed that enabled the retreating Russian troops to escape the trap Hindenburg had planned for them. The German commander had ordered his wings to quicken their march as much as possible, but a trivial accident—a rumor of a Russian counterattack—cost the Germans half a day's march, allowing the Russians to escape to the east. These reached Gumbinnen the next day, and Stallupönen on the 13th. The remains of the First Army retreated to the safety of their own border forts. Likewise, the Tenth Army was forced back into Russia. German casualties were about 40,000, Russian 100,000. This was a strategically significant victory for The Eighth Army, completely destroying the Second Army, mauling the First, and ejecting all Russian troops from German soil. Meanwhile, new German corps (under von der Goltz) were able to use this movement to safely move into position to harass the scattered remains of the Second Army, while far to the southwest the new German Ninth was forming up. It would not be long before they were able to face the Russians in a position of numerical superiority. However, this advantage was bought at a cost: the newly arrived corps had been sent from the Western front and their absence would be felt in the upcoming Battle of the Marne. Much of the territory taken by the Germans would later be lost to a Russian counterattack during 25–28 September. Around the same time far south on the Eastern Front, Russian forces routed the Austro-Hungarian army. It took another year before the German and Austro-Hungarian forces were finally able to reverse the Russian advances, pushing them out of Galicia and then Russian Poland.

The Battle of Krithia Vineyard (6–13 August 1915) was fought during the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. It was originally intended as a minor British action at Helles on the Gallipoli peninsula to divert attention from the imminent launch of the August Offensive, but instead, the British commander, Brigadier General H.E. Street, mounted a futile and bloody series of attacks that in the end gained a small patch of ground known as "The Vineyard".The original commander of the British VIII Corps at Helles, Lieutenant General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, had departed the peninsula in July, following the last Helles offensive—the Battle of Gully Ravine. His replacement, Lieutenant General Francis Davies, arrived in early August but had not yet assumed command of the corps when a series of diversions were due to be launched from Anzac and Helles to divert Ottoman attention from the planned landing at Suvla and the break out from Anzac. Consequently, the Helles diversion was planned and conducted by the VIII Corps' chief of staff, Brigadier General H.E. Street, who proved himself an able student of Hunter-Weston's battle strategy.Due to the shortage of artillery, the attack was split into two parts with the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division attacking on the afternoon of 6 August while two brigades of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division would attack the following day. They were facing four Ottoman divisions, three of which were fresh, while there were two more divisions in reserve. The 88th Brigade's attack managed to capture some Ottoman trenches, which were recaptured by the Ottoman 30th Regiment during a counter-attack. The British attacked again and once more captured some trenches, but the Ottomans counter-attacked again and drove them out. The British failed to hold any ground and the 88th Brigade was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. At around 9:40 am on the morning of 7 August the 42nd Division attacked on the right of the 88th Brigade's sector. The 127th Brigade managed to break through the line held by the Ottoman 13th Division, but were forced back by an Ottoman counter-attack. The Ottomans counter-attacked repeatedly from 7 August to 9 August and the fighting in the area continued until 13 August when it finally subsided. Afterwards, this sector of the Helles front would remain one of the busiest and most violent for the remainder of the campaign.Two Victoria Crosses were awarded to men of the 42nd Division during the fighting at Krithia Vineyard. The British casualties in the first 24 hours of fighting, covering the original attacks of the 88th Brigade and the two brigades of the 42nd Division, were 3,469. The total British casualties for the duration of the battle were probably in excess of 4,000. The Ottoman casualties for the period of the battle were estimated to be around 7,000.

Metzeral fell several days later and on 22 June, the Germans retired from the west bank of the Fecht to a line from Mühlbach east to the Hilsenfirst. The French suffered 6,667 casualties and the 19th Reserve Division with attached units suffered 3,676. An attack on the Barrenkopf and Reichsackerkopf from 20 to 22 July failed but the Lingekopf was captured on 27 July; local fighting went on at the Barrenkopf into August. The supporting attacks had minimal artillery support, took less ground than the Tenth Army and cost another 37,500 casualties, about 40 percent of the casualties incurred in Artois. On 9 May, five French corps had attacked two German divisions on a 16 mi (25 km) front and advanced 2 mi (4 km) on the front of the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division between the Lorette Spur and La Targette. The 77th Division and the DM of XXXIII Corps penetrated between Carency and Neuville, overran Landwehr Regiment 39 and captured Hill 145, the highest point on Vimy Ridge The DM was then repulsed by local counter-attacks from Bavarian Infantry Regiment 7, which had been rushed forward from reserve. From 9 to 12 May the Tenth Army made the largest advance since trench warfare began, using the new tactics which caused the German defenders great difficulty, even on the flanks where the attacks were repulsed. The extent and tempo of the French plans proved too ambitious, given the material constraints affecting the Tenth Army and French munitions production. XXXIII Corps was forced off Vimy Ridge by German artillery-fire and flanking fire from Souchez and Neuville. Foch wrote a report in early August in which he explained that the failure to hold Hill 145 was due to XXXIII Corps and the Tenth Army reserves being too distant and not deployed according to a proper reinforcement plan. At the beginning of the attack the XXXIII Corps reserve was a brigade of the DM, with a regiment at Mont St Éloi, 2 mi (3 km) behind the front and a regiment at Acq 4 mi (6 km) back, to keep them out of German artillery range. Three battalions were sent forward at 1:00 p.m., half a battalion at 3:30 p.m. and the rest of the battalion at 4:00 p.m. to assist in consolidation and to be ready to defeat German counter-attacks, not to press on. The nearest Tenth Army reserve was the 18th Division, 7 mi (12 km) away. Foch wrote that no-one had expected the DM to advance 2 mi (4 km) in an hour. The slow and piecemeal arrival of reserves was made worse by the failure of the supporting attack to the north by the British First Army, which was defeated on 9 May at the Battle of Aubers Ridge, after which the British offensive was postponed until 16 May (the Battle of Festubert). The British Second Army was engaged against the German 4th Army, in the Second Battle of Ypres from 21 April to 25 May, which diverted British resources from the First Army.

Joffre had accepted claims by Castelnau, that up to 6.2–7.5 mi (10–12 km) of ground could be gained in twenty-four hours and rejected a methodical battle, which ... would entail a month of combat, with a maximum expenditure of ammunition; at what point would we be able to declare ourselves ready for attack? — Joseph Joffre Ammunition necessary for a methodical battle did not exist and the opportunity to attack the Germans, when so many divisions had been moved to the eastern front, could not be wasted. The offensive had been fought with unprecedented refinements of tactics and supply. Amendments to Note 5779 were suggested, to cover items like the use of 23,000 hand grenades in two days by the 53rd Division and the importance of attention to detail; Pétain of XXXIII Corps had ensured accurate preparatory bombardments and the tactical reflections written by Pétain were added to the thinking in Note 5779. The ideal characteristics of a network of jumping-off trenches and the time and labour necessary to build it were laid down, so that troops could advance simultaneously and reserve troops could be protected as they moved forward. Pétain wrote the plan for the Groupe d'armées du Centre, for the offensive of 25 September and his views were circulated through the French and British armies. The autumn offensive was fought as a breakthrough attempt, with changes to avoid the mistakes made in Artois in May and had significant tactical success but did not achieve a breakthrough, which led to the adoption of limited attacks in 1916. Krause wrote that the formulation Note 5779 showed that the French command system, was staffed by men who tried to improve the performance of the army and contradicts claims by Gudmundsson, that the Allied armies were too centralised to adapt. Lessons had been collected, analysed and distributed in a manner which combined top-down and bottom-up processes. A flaw in Note 5779, was persistence with a concept of rapid breakthrough, even after many soldiers considered that the war had become a siege and that none of the French offensives of 1915, had been intended to return to mobile warfare. Changes made to the plan for the Second Battle of Artois, had been intended to secure the capture Vimy Ridge as a jumping-off point, rather than to achieve a breakthrough and return to mobile warfare. In the autumn offensive which began on 25 September, with the Third Battle of Artois, Battle of Loos and the Second Battle of Champagne, the strategy was intended to make the Noyon salient untenable and regain a large portion of the occupied territories. Tactics used in the battles of May and June were revised and the creeping barrage became a standard method in all the Western Front armies.

そもそも国民が適当に投票していたり まともな政治家がないからと消去法で投票するから、更に国民が舐められるのではと思うのですが、この問題を解決するには 選挙システムがどういうふうになればいいのかなど 何か、こういう風になればもっと政治は良くなると思うことを教えて下さい。 無理ですとかは書かないでくださいね。 それだと未来永劫このままなので。 私としては、危機意識の低い人や既得権益に縛られている人、年齢が高すぎる人がごっそり減るといいなと思うのですが。 あとは、国民側も受け身だったり文句しか言わない人が多いのも問題かと。

Feizi Bey's troops began to arrive, as expected by the British, on the evening of 8 August. Von Sanders wanted to attack immediately but Feizi Bey objected, saying that the men were exhausted and without artillery support, so Von Sanders dismissed him. In his place he put Mustafa Kemal, the commander of the Ottoman 19th Division, which had been fighting at Chunuk Bair. Kemal assumed authority over the "Anafarta section" which spanned from Suvla south to Chunuk Bair. Kemal, who had proved aggressive and capable at ANZAC, held the high ground and was content to remain on the defensive at Suvla while he dealt with the threat to the Sari Bair ridge. The intensity of the fighting escalated at Suvla on 9 August but the opportunity for the British to make a swift advance had now disappeared. Around midday the gunfire set scrub alight on Scimitar Hill, and Ashmead-Bartlett, watching from Lala Baba, saw the British wounded trying to escape the flames: "I watched the flames approaching and the crawling figures disappear amidst dense clouds of black smoke. When the fire passed on little mounds of scorched khaki alone marked the spot where another mismanaged soldier of the King had returned to mother earth." Reinforcements were arriving, the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division had started coming ashore on the night of 8 August, and the 54th (East Anglian) Division arrived on 10 August, but command remained paralysed. Some of the reasons that Stopford gave for his inaction were surreal, such as that the Ottomans were "inclined to be aggressive." Hamilton finally cabled Kitchener that the IX Corps generals were "unfit" for command. Kitchener swiftly replied on 14 August, saying: "If you should deem it necessary to replace Stopford, Mahon and Hammersley, have you any competent generals to take their place? From your report I think Stopford should come home. This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers that will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom. If, therefore, any generals fail, do not hesitate to act promptly. Any generals I have available I will send you."Before receiving a response, Kitchener made Lieutenant-General Julian Byng available to command IX Corps. On 15 August Hamilton dismissed Stopford and, while Byng was travelling from France, replaced him with Major-General Beauvoir De Lisle, commander of the British 29th Division at Helles. Hammersley was also dismissed but Hamilton intended to retain Mahon in command of the 10th Division. However, Mahon was incensed that de Lisle, whom he disliked, was appointed above him and quit, saying "I respectfully decline to waive my seniority and to serve under the officer you name."

Consequently, the Fifth Army underwent a reorganisation resulting in an expansion to 16 divisions. Ten of these defended the existing battlefields (six at Helles, which had seen the bulk of the early fighting, and four at Anzac). Three divisions defended the Asian shore of the Dardanelles and three divisions of the Ottoman XVI Corps defended the Gulf of Saros north of Bulair at the neck of the peninsula. The Ottomans anticipated that the offensive would involve a breakout from Anzac but were unsure whether it would be north (towards Suvla) or south (towards Gaba Tepe). A new British landing was also considered likely but Suvla was not rated highly as a candidate, consequently, only a modest force of four battalions defended the area. The Ottoman commanders also dismissed the possibility of an assault against the Sari Bair range due to the rugged terrain. Only Mustafa Kemal, commander of the Ottoman 19th Division at Anzac, expected the attack against the heights but he was unable to convince his commanding officer, Esad Pasha to significantly strengthen the defenses there. Back in June he had made another attempt, through Captain Fahrettin Altay, then 3. Army chief of staff, to persuade Esad Pasha to beef up defenses further North, but had no result other than raising the ire of his commanding officer. To placate him, only one regiment, 14. was moved to the sector north of Anzac. The attack from the Anzac perimeter was directed against two peaks of the Sari Bair range; Chunuk Bair and Hill 971. Under the overall command of Major-General Alexander Godley, the attacking force included the New Zealand and Australian Division, the British 13th Division plus a couple of extra infantry brigades. The plan was for two assaulting columns to march out of Anzac on the night of 6 August. The right-hand column, comprising the New Zealand Infantry Brigade under Brigadier-General Francis Johnston, would head for Chunuk Bair. The left-hand column, commanded by Major-General Herbert Cox, heading for Hill 971 and neighbouring Hill Q, contained the Australian 4th Infantry Brigade of Brigadier-General John Monash and Cox's 29th Indian Brigade. Both objectives were expected to be captured by dawn. To distract the Ottomans from the impending offensive, on 6 August, at 5.30 p.m., an attack was made at Lone Pine by the infantry brigades of the Australian 1st Division. While the attack was ultimately successful in capturing the Ottoman trenches, it was counterproductive as a diversion as it attracted reinforcements to the north. Another costly diversion was carried out at Helles which resulted in a pointless struggle over a patch of ground known as Krithia Vineyard. As was the case at Lone Pine, the British action at Helles did not restrain the Ottomans from sending reinforcements north to the Sari Bair range.

On 16 May Haig resumed the offensive with the Battle of Festubert, which was fought on the right flank of the Aubers Ridge battlefield, where British troops were ordered to press on to local objectives only after consolidating. By the morning of 17 May, the German 14th Division was forced to retire to a new breastwork dug .75 mi (1.21 km) behind the original front position, connecting the Stützpunktlinie (strongpoint line) behind the front line, with the result that British bombardments and attacks met only small parties of rearguards. The Quadrilateral was captured at about 10:15 a.m. on 17 May after an extensive bombardment led to a large number of German troops surrendering. Reinforcements doubled the German firepower in the new position, from which in the afternoon British attempts to continue the advance were repulsed. Low cloud and rain obscured the battlefield and it took three days for the British to identify the new line. A series of attacks by four British divisions from 18–25 May achieved minor advances of the British line but found that the captured positions had been registered by German artillery, which maintained a heavy bombardment, which forced the British back at some places and inflicted many casualties. The fighting cost the British 16,644 casualties and the Germans c. 5,500. Fighting continued until 25 May for local objectives against German reinforcements, which were not available to oppose the French further south. The eight days, that Foch thought necessary to capture ground on the flanks of XXXIII Corps, took five weeks to achieve. Small advances were made but the Germans were able to improve their defences relatively easily, in dips and behind slopes. Artillery reinforcements were registered as they arrived on obvious avenues of attack, which required only notification by flare signals from the front line to commence firing. The Tenth Army also received substantial reinforcements of artillery but these made only a small net increase, due to losses from German artillery fire, mechanical failures and premature detonations. Infantry reinforcements were only marginally greater than losses. Artillery ammunition for the 355 heavy and 805 field guns was much greater for the second general attack, with 718,551 shells available from 16 to 18 June, compared to 265,430 fired from 3 to 9 May. The preliminary bombardment was to begin on 10 June and concentrate on certain areas to conceal the imminence of an infantry attack. On the day of the attack, the artillery was to destroy defences repaired by the Germans overnight and conduct counter-battery fire until the last moment, as a deception, then fall on the German front defences as the French infantry advanced, to mislead the Germans and get the infantry across no man's land before a German barrage began.

The Franco-British attack on 9 May had been on a front of 16 mi (25 km) and in June three supporting attacks were planned by the French Second, Sixth and Seventh armies, along with an attack by the British near Zillebeke in Flanders. The preliminary bombardment was due to begin on 13 June and XXI Corps was to attack from the Lorette Spur towards Bois de Givenchy, XX Corps was to complete the capture of Neuville and the Labyrnthe and XXIII Corps was shifted slightly north to attack Souchez, Château Carleul, Côte 119 and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. IX Corps was moved from the northern boundary of the Tenth Army and placed between XXXIII Corps and XX Corps to take Vimy Ridge. During minor attacks in early June, the IX Corps divisions had gained little success and in one attack the infantry went to ground and refused to continue, which if repeated would leave the XXXIII Corps vulnerable to another advance into a salient. The artillery preparation was carefully observed from the front line and IX Corps troops were issued flares to signal to the artillery, who reported a highly accurate bombardment, particularly on the 5 Chemins crossroads and a derelict mill, which were the principal German defensive works opposite. On 15 June the commander of the 17th Division on the right of the IX Corps, wrote to General Curé, the corps commander, that preparations were incomplete and had not conformed to Note 5779, leaving the jumping-off trenches 200–300 metres (220–330 yd) from the German front line, rather than the 160 yd (150 m) or fewer laid down and that the infantry were already exhausted. In the rest of the Tenth Army the situation was the same, with infantry being set to hours of digging under German counter-bombardments. It was also discovering that the accuracy of French artillery-fire, was not sufficient make it effective. An attack on 13 June, by a regiment of the 70th Division on the sugar refinery, captured a small length of the German front trench, where they were bombarded by French artillery. An attack on 14 June took another short length of trench but the regiment had to be relieved by part of the 13th Division during the night of 15/16 June. Reports from the IX and XX corps on the southern flank, described accurate French artillery fire and XXI Corps on the Lorette Spur had a commanding view of German defences. Maistre the corps commander, had made artillery observation a specialist role for trained men, who kept close to the infantry to ensure efficient liaison. It was soon discovered that the Germans had put barbed wire 55 yd (50 m) in front of the front line, rather than just in front and special bombardments were fired to cut the wire, after which patrols went forward to check the results, despite German counter-bombardments. On the 43rd Division front, it was discovered that field artillery was only shifting the barbed wire around and not damaging cheveaux de frise but modern 155mm guns were used in time to create several gaps in the wire.

In the Second Action of Givenchy (15–16 June), IV Corps of the British First Army, attacked north-west of La Bassée with the 7th, 51st and Canadian divisions after a 60-hour bombardment, in which an attempt to alleviate an acute ammunition shortage was made by relying on artillery observation and tactical reconnaissance by reinforced RFC squadrons. No covering fire was available for the attack and the German defenders were seen to have manned the front line before the advance began. The Germans opened massed small-arms fire but were not able to prevent the British from entering the German front trench, where a bombing fight began. German infantry were well-supplied with hand grenades but the British were isolated by cross-fire along no man's land and were pushed back as they ran out of ammunition, the last troops retiring at 4:00 a.m. A new attack on 15 June, using all of the artillery ammunition left was delayed by thick mist and the difficulty in reorganising the infantry but went ahead at 4:45 p.m. and took the German front line. The advance was stopped until the line was consolidated but the British and Canadian troops who had not been pinned down in their own trenches were forced back by a German counter-attack at 8:00 p.m. after which further attacks were cancelled. The British Second Army conducted the First Attack on Bellewaarde on 16 June with the 3rd Division, which took the German first line easily at 4:15 a.m. The second and third waves rushed forward and ran into the British bombardment, which was not seen by the gunners due to the amount of mist and smoke created by the bombardment. The British still managed to reach the German second line and three German counter-attacks had only managed to push the 3rd Division back to the first line, when the British ran short of ammunition. Support from a brigade of the 14th Division to exploit the success, was delayed by German artillery-fire and fewer than two battalions of the 3rd Division managed to advance at 3:30 p.m., up a flat open slope and were repulsed with many casualties. At 6:00 p.m. the German front trench from Menin road to Railway Wood was consolidated, which was short of Bellewaarde ridge and the German observation posts along it. Joffre criticised British "inaction", which enabled the Germans to concentrate resources against the Tenth Army. The British First Army attacked in the Battle of Aubers Ridge, in support of the French offensive further south. North of La Bassée Canal, British artillery fire increased against the II Bavarian and XIX Saxon corps and at 6:00 a.m., an attack began against the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and broke into the first line north of Fromelles. Fighting continued into the evening, when the trenches were recaptured. More British attacks occurred at Richbourg l'Avoué and at times penetrated to the German first line before being repulsed. Little ground was captured, none was held against German counter-attacks and German troops were soon sent south to reinforce the Arras front.

French artillery bombarded the German lines overnight and then abated until 6:00 a.m. when a bombardment, slowly increasing in intensity began on the fronts of VII, XIV and I Bavarian Reserve corps, which from mid-morning reached the extent of Trommelfeuer. Lulls in the fire were ruses to prompt German infantry to emerge from shelter, only to be caught in more Trommelfeuer; the German artillery reply was sparse. The French infantry assembled unseen and the advance began after several mines were sprung, obtaining a measure of surprise. The main French attack was received at 11:00 a.m. on the left of XIV Corps and against I Bavarian Reserve Corps, from Lens to Arras, as a second attack began against the centre of XIV Corps along the Béthune–Lens road, which was repulsed by a counter-attack. The 28th Division on the Lorette Spur, was forced out of the front trenches, with many losses and in the evening a battalion of Jäger was sent forward. Further south, the villages of Ablain-St. Nazaire (Ablain) and Carency were held against determined French attacks. By noon 2.5 mi (4 km) of the German front defences had fallen and the French had penetrated up to a depth of 1.9 mi (3 km). In the I Bavarian Reserve Corps area (General Karl von Fasbender), the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division (General Kress von Kressenstein) south of Carency, was pushed back to a line from Cabaret Rouge to Neuville-St. Vaast (Neuville) and French troops advanced as far as artillery positions around Givenchy-en-Gohelle (Givenchy), where reinforcements arrived at noon and managed to forestall a new French attack. To the south, the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division (Lieutenant-General Göringer) managed to repulse the French in hand-to-hand fighting and then enfilade the French further north, who had broken through at La Targette. Crown Prince Rupprecht applied to Falkenhayn, for the two divisions in OHL reserve and the 115th Division (Major-General von Kleist) was moved behind the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division. The 58th Division (Lieutenant-General von Gersdorf) went into the 6th Army reserve and closed up to Lens, as artillery also released from the OHL reserve came forward. On the southern flank of the breakthrough, French attacks were also pushing slowly through the network of trenches known as the Labyrnthe. North of Ecurie, Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 12 took over more ground to the north and prevented the French from widening the breakthrough and in Neuville St. Vaast a counter-attack by a battalion of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 10 retook the east end of the village and many of the field guns which had been lost earlier. A defence line was improvised between Neuville and La Folie to the north and was used to engage the French troops further north with flanking fire. Bavarian Infantry Regiment 7 was rushed up from reserve to counter-attack the French on Vimy Ridge.

The French were pushed back from the heights of Hill 145 and Hill 119 (the Pimple) by 1:00 p.m. At the east end of the Lorette Spur the 28th Division was forced out of the first position. By afternoon, the left flank of XIV Corps had been uncovered near Carency. Rupprecht intended to use the remnants of the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division and the 115th Division to counter-attack and regain the lost positions. Instead, the 115th Division was sent to defend the right flank of the I Bavarian Reserve Corps and the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division was found to be too depleted to attack. Troops managed to counter-attack at Souchez and retook some ground, before being stopped by massed French artillery-fire around 8:00 p.m. By evening, Rupprecht knew that twelve French divisions had attacked four German divisions but believed that the French could be driven back. OHL sent the 117th Division to Douai and Rupprecht subordinated two regiments of the 58th Division to the I Bavarian Reserve Corps, for the counter-attack at Souchez. Artillery was sent to the east of Vimy Ridge, to support the attack. During the night, a French attack captured the front trenches astride the Béthune–Lens road and Lieutenant-General von Haenisch sent the last corps reserve to the 29th Division (Lieutenant-General Isbert); a counter-attack in the morning recovered the trenches. To the south-west of Carency, the trench to Souchez was lost, which left Carency almost surrounded. Rupprecht and Haenisch planned to counter-attack from Souchez to Neuville, with the I Bavarian Reserve Corps and the 58th and 115th divisions, rather than retire. At 4:00 p.m. French attacks began on the Lorette Spur and at Carency but were not able to push back the defenders. At 7:00 p.m., the 58th Division began the German counter-attack, with parts of the 115th Division to the south and at first made good progress, before being stopped by French defensive fire. The 28th Division headquarters began to fear that the line between Ablain and Carency would fall. On 10 May, the I Bavarian Reserve Division managed to retain its positions despite French attacks, particularly at Neuville on the right flank but several counter-attacks supported by parts of IV Corps and the 115th Division, recovered only small parts of the village. Next day, Fasbender doubted that the line from Ablain to Carency could be held and asked for more reinforcements. Falkenhayn released the 117th Division (General Kuntze) and sent the VIII Corps headquarters with the 16th Division to Douai as a replacement OHL reserve. To avoid a retirement, which would lead to the loss of the Lorette Spur, Rupprecht met the corps commanders and issued a standfast order, encouraged by the quietude of the French during the morning of 11 May. French attacks in the afternoon were poorly co-ordinated and repulsed with many casualties.

Air reconnaissance observed huge numbers of French guns and troops arriving at Doullens station, which showed that the French offensive would continue. A counter-attack to capture Ecurie, to disrupt the French artillery effort was considered and rejected due to the shortage of troops. Only at Neuville could troops assemble unseen and have good artillery observation. The 15th Division (Major-General Vollbrecht) at Neuville, was reinforced with troops from the 115th Division and attacked at 8:30 p.m. on 22 May; despite a 1st Trench Mortar Battalion bombardment and flame thrower support, the attack was a costly failure. To the south, the defence of the Labyrnthe continued, with frequent attacks to recover the first position in the centre, to relieve the right flank, which had been enveloped on three sides but without which Neuville could not be held. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Brigade 2 managed to assemble troops for a counter-attack towards the Lossow-Arkaden and advanced for about 160 yd (150 m) before being repulsed. French attacks in the opposite direction up to six times each day also failed, except for some ground on the Thélus road on the evening of 11 May. German reinforcements which had just arrived, were rushed forward to block the French advance on Thélus. The British attacked on the night of 15/16 May, south of Neuve Chapelle and by 20 May, had advanced 1.9 mi (3 km) and drawn in German reinforcements, which were able to defeat British attacks from 20–21 May over the Estaires–La Bassée road. The French offensive had severely eroded the 6th Army, which had used up all the fresh units sent from the OHL reserve in France. The 2nd Guard Reserve Division was diverted to VII Corps opposite the British and units worn out by the French supporting attacks beyond Artois were needed, before they had been rested. Only the tired 111th Division, 123rd Division and 8th Bavarian Reserve Division remained in the OHL reserve. Artillery reinforcements increased the firepower of the 6th Army, from 100 heavy howitzers and 74 heavy guns to 209 heavy howitzers and 98 heavy guns by 22 May, with plenty of ammunition. From 9–19 May, the 6th Army had fired 508,000 field artillery and 105,000 heavy shells. On 19 May, Krafft von Delmensingen, the 6th Army Chief of Staff, was replaced by Colonel von Wenge and sent to Italy with the new Alpenkorps. At the Lorette Spur, the 117th Division was sent forward to relieve the 28th Division on 18 May, from the Schlammulde (Muddy Hollow) to Ablain and the south end of Souchez. Most of the trenches had been demolished and those near the river were 2 ft (0.61 m) deep in water.

The first serious Allied attempt at the ridges of the Anafarta Hills to the east was made on the night of 8 August, following intervention from Hamilton but on the morning of 9 August, the Ottoman reinforcements had begun to arrive and the British were driven back. The fighting concentrated around Scimitar Hill which protruded northwards from the Anafarta Spur and dominated the southern approach to the Tekke Tepe ridge. Scimitar Hill had been captured then abandoned on 8 August; attempts to retake the hill on 9 and 10 August, were thwarted by the Ottomans. The gunfire was so intense it set the undergrowth ablaze and many of the wounded were incinerated where they lay. As the fighting developed, the landing was reinforced by the arrival of the British 53rd Division on 9 August, followed by the 54th Division on 10 August. Stopford now had four divisions under his corps command but was faced by a similar strength of Ottoman defenders. The 53rd Division was mauled in another attack on Scimitar Hill on 10 August. On 15 August Hamilton sacked Stopford and a number of division and brigade commanders. The command of IX Corps was given to Major-General Beauvoir De Lisle, commander of the 29th Division until Lieutenant-General Julian Byng could travel from France to assume command.Once the battles of 21 August had finished, the front lines at Suvla and Anzac remained static for the remainder of the campaign. Localised fighting continued but no more major advances were attempted. Many soldiers suffered or perished due to the hostile conditions they endured as a result of their poor preparation and training. Disease transmitted by mosquitoes and the lack of fresh water and shelter hampered the efforts of the division as the men were too weak to fight to their best ability. The insufficient knowledge had an impact of their advancement as their enemy were more familiar to the terrain and could ambush the division successfully. A combination of factors caused their success to be mixed.As the shape of the new front line firmed, General Hamilton planned one further attack to try to link the Suvla landing to Anzac. This required the capture of a group of hills; Scimitar Hill and the 'W' Hills from Suvla and Hill 60 from the new Anzac sector. The attacks were to commence on 21 August. At Suvla, de Lisle had his 29th Division and the 2nd Mounted Division which had been moved to Suvla as additional reinforcements. The 29th Division was to attack Scimitar Hill while the 11th Division was to take the W Hills on the south of the Anafarta Spur. The 2nd Mounted Division was in reserve near Lala Baba on the far side of the salt lake. This attack was the largest mounted by the Allies at Gallipoli. Scimitar Hill was captured briefly but the attackers were driven off or killed by the defensive fire from the Ottomans higher up the spur. Once again the undergrowth ignited, burning many of the wounded. The 2nd Mounted Division were called to join the attack and advanced, marching in extended formation, straight across the salt lake, under fire the whole way. For a second time the hill was captured, briefly, before being lost for the final time. The attack of the 11th Division towards the W Hills was held up by strong Ottoman defences. In the Anzac sector, Hill 60 had been unoccupied on the morning of 7 August, when Australian scouts passed across but the Ottomans swiftly occupied and fortified the hill. The Battle of Hill 60 lasted for eight days and while the summit was eventually reached, the Allies were unable to completely dislodge the sacrificially fighting Ottoman defenders.