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The left brigade had advanced easily to the intermediate line and then overcame small parties of German infantry concealed in shell-holes. A shelter was captured near the church in Poelcappelle amid sniper fire. Ferdan House was captured and the final objective consolidated. A defensive flank was thrown back to maintain touch with the 4th Division to the north, whose advance had been pushed back 400 yd (370 m) by German counter-attacks. A counter-attack in the 11th Division area at 1:00 p.m. was defeated and reinforcements allowed the new line to be established between the Steenbeek and the Langemarck–Winnipeg road. XIV Corps guarded the northern flank of the attack. The 4th Division attacked with two brigades at 6:00 a.m. The right brigade took Kangaroo Trench easily but was held up when the brigade reached the first objective, by German troops and small arms fire from Lemnos House. Troops on the extreme right combined with infantry of the 11th Division, to capture a pillbox on the Poelcappelle road. As they reached the next objective Ferdan House was outflanked, then the green line was consolidated amidst fire from 19 Metre Hill. The left brigade troops lost direction as they crossed the marshy ground about the Lauterbeek and were fired on from the flank, as they reached a road beyond 19 Metre Hill. After an hour's pause the advance resumed but machine-gun fire stopped the attack and the ground captured was consolidated. A German counter-attack at 3:00 p.m. made good progress until reinforcements drove it back. A gap on the boundary with the 29th Division to the north was filled as dark fell and another German counter-attack was spotted as the German infantry assembled and dispersed by artillery fire. A line Ferdan House–Kangaroo Huts–west of Tragique Farm–19 Metre Hill was consolidated. The 29th Division was to attack astride the Ypres–Staden railway and form a defensive flank overlooking the Broembeek, with troops from two brigades. The right brigade took Chinese House and 't Goed ter Vesten Farm, as it formed a flank along the junction with the 4th Division further south. As a German counter-attack forced back elements of the 4th Division the 29th Division troops stopped them with flanking machine-gun fire and drove them back, allowing the 4th Division to regain the lost ground.

North of the railway several pillboxes were captured by the left brigade and observation posts established. Wind, rain and low cloud stopped long-range air operations and severely restricted the British air effort over the battlefield. British air observers sent 49 zone calls and observed artillery fire on 26 targets. Five battlefield reconnaissances, ten contact patrols and two counter-attack patrols of those attempted succeeded, particularly those of 4 Squadron and 21 Squadron, which observed the flares of the attacking troops at the first and final objectives, on much of the front attacked and provided the infantry with a measure of air support despite the weather. Unternehmen Hohensturm, (Operation High Storm) a counter-attack planned for 4 October, was intended to recapture as much of the ridge on Groote Molen (Tokio) spur as possible. The German troops had assembled for the organised counter-attack, (Gegenangriff) when the British bombardment swamped them. Reserve Infantry Regiment 212 of the 45th Reserve Division supported by the 4th Guard Division, was caught in the open along with regiments from the 4th Bavarian Division; the Bavarians tried to counter-attack the Australians, who had overrun the German attack. After 29 September, the bulk of the Eingreif divisions were held back, battalions and a few regiments from the 8th and 22nd divisions at In der Ster, the 45th Reserve and 4th Bavarian divisions opposite Broodseinde Ridge and the 16th Division south of Poelcappelle. The Eingreif units were committed as reinforcements for the remnants of the front-holding divisions and suffered many losses from British artillery and machine-guns. The most successful counter-attack was made by an improvised force from the front-holding 19th Reserve Division and parts of the 17th Division, the local Eingreif division, which advanced up Reutelbeek valley, took Reutel and Cameron Covert and reinforced Polderhoek Château, before being stopped by British artillery and machine-gun fire. Sparse and poorly aimed shell-fire, ineffective counter-attacks and disorganisation demonstrated the severity of the German defeat.

As news arrived of the great success of the attack, Brigadier-General Charteris, head of GHQ Intelligence, went from Haig's advanced headquarters to the Second Army Headquarters to discuss a possible exploitation. Plumer declined the suggestion, as eight fresh German divisions were behind the battlefield with another six beyond them. Plumer preferred to wait until the expected German counter-attacks had been defeated, as Haig had directed. German artillery fire was heavy and the defences of the Flandern II and Flandern III stellungen could be garrisoned by German divisions behind the attack front. An attack on these fortifications would need artillery support, which would be limited, given that the British field artillery was behind a severely battered strip of muddy ground 2 mi (3.2 km) deep, firing close to the limit of their range. Later in the day, Plumer had second thoughts and ordered I Anzac Corps to push on to the Keiberg spur, with support from II Anzac Corps. Lieutenant-General Alexander Godley the II Anzac Corps commander, wanted to advance north-eastwards, towards Passchendaele village but Lieutenant-General William Birdwood of I Anzac Corps, wanted to wait until artillery had been brought up and supply routes improved. The X Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Thomas Morland proposed an attack northwards, from In de Ster into the southern flank of the Germans opposite I Anzac Corps, which was opposed by Major-General Herbert Shoubridge the 7th Division commander, due to uncertainty and the many casualties in the 21st Division on his right flank. At 2:00 p.m. Plumer decided that exploitation was not possible. At 10:30 a.m., Gough told the Fifth Army corps commanders to push on and to attack again at 5:00 p.m. but when reports arrived of a repulse of the 4th Division at 19 Metre Hill, at the junction of XVIII and XIV Corps, the attack was cancelled. The capture of the ridges was a great success, Plumer called the attack "... the greatest victory since the Marne" and the German Official History referred to "... the black day of October 4". There had been an average advance of 1,000 yd (910 m) and the 3rd Australian Division moved forward up to 1,900 yd (1,700 m).

The increased tempo of attack allowed by the systematic planning and decentralisation of responsibility from army to corps and divisions and the reduction of much of the planning to a routine, led to the time between attacks being further reduced. Faster attack preparations reduced the time available for artillery to prepare assaults, which combined with the return of heavy rain after 4 October, substantially to reduce British artillery support during the battles of Poelcapelle on 9 October and the First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October. As optimism at the possibility of advancing over the Passchendaele watershed increased the weather broke. Victoria Cross Acting Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Bent of the 7th Division, 1 October. Nine Victoria Crosses awarded during the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October. Acting Sergeant-Major James Ockendon, of the 29th Division. Acting Captain Clement Robertson, of the Royal Tank Regiment. Sergeant Charles Harry Coverdale, from the 11th Division. Acting Corporal Fred Greaves, of the 11th Division. Private Arthur Hutt, from the 48th Division. Sergeant Lewis McGee, of the Australian 3rd Division. Lance-Corporal Walter Peeler, from the Australian 3rd Division. Acting Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Pugh Evans, of the 21st Division. Private Thomas Henry Sage from the 37th Division. The Battle of Poelcappelle was fought in Flanders on 9 October 1917 by the British and German armies, during the First World War and marked the end of the string of highly successful British attacks in late September and early October, during the Third Battle of Ypres. Only the supporting attack in the north achieved a substantial advance. On the main front the German defences withstood the limited amount of artillery fire managed by the British after the attack of 4 October. The ground along the main ridges had been severely damaged by shelling and rapidly deteriorated in the rains, which began again on 3 October, turning some areas into a swamp. Dreadful ground conditions had more effect on the British, who needed to move large amounts of artillery and ammunition to support the next attack. Poelcappelle ポエルカペル

Haig wanted reserve formations of infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks to be ready to extend a successful attack. Gough and Plumer replied over the next couple of days, that they felt that Haig's proposals were premature and that exploitation would not be feasible until Passchendaele ridge had been captured from Passchendaele northwards to Westroosebeke. Gough and Plumer thought that this would probably take two more steps at three-day intervals and then another four days to repair roads over the captured ground. Haig considered that although a collapse of the German defence was a condition for exploitation of the attack due on 10 October which was not certain, he desired the arrangements to be made, since they would be available for a later date. At another conference on 2 October, Haig announced that operations at Ypres would continue for as long as the weather permitted, that six fresh divisions were being moved from quiet fronts to the Fifth Army and that the Canadian Corps was being moved to the Second Army. The arrangements to be made for immediate exploitation, should the attack intended for 10 October be as successful as hoped, were that each attacking division was to keep its reserve brigade lightly equipped and accompanied by two 60-pounder batteries, two 6-inch howitzer batteries and four field artillery brigades. If the infantry brigades conducting the morning attack reported a big success, their reserve brigades would continue the advance in the afternoon. The reserve brigades of the attacking divisions of I and II Anzac corps were to reach Drogenbroodhoek in the south, 3,000 yd (2,700 m) beyond Broodseinde, Passchendaele station on the Morslede road in the centre and gain touch with the Fifth Army on the Westroosebeke road north of Passchendaele. A reserve division of each corps was to be ready behind the front, which the Director-General of Transportation Major-General Nash, undertook to have on the battlefield in  3   1⁄2–4 hours, if given three hours' notice. The divisions in corps reserve would be ready by the following morning to advance beyond the reserve brigades, if German resistance crumbled.

Despite considerable difficulty, the field artillery was moved to within 4,000 yd (3,700 m) of the final objective and ample ammunition and field stores were brought forward. XIV Corps had 49 batteries of 312 × 18-pounder guns in groups, one for each division, the Guards group having 23 batteries; the medium and heavy artillery being grouped similarly. The arrangements agreed by Haig, Gough and Plumer on 2 October, the effect of the victory of 4 October and the disarray of the German defenders, led to the attack planned for 10 October being advanced to 9 October, with a second attack being arranged for 12 October. Attacking a front of 13,500 yd (12,300 m), it was intended to capture Passchendaele ridge in two stages. The first objective (red line) would be captured by a morning attack, which if successful and the cause of a general withdrawal by the Germans, would be followed-up by the reserve brigades of the attacking divisions, which would advance to the second objective (blue line) in the afternoon. On 7 October Haig cancelled the afternoon attack to the blue line due to the wet weather. On the southern flank of the attack, X Corps was to attack to hold German reserves around Becelaere and Gheluvelt. To the north, I Anzac Corps was to advance on the right flank of the main attack, with the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, the 4th and 5th Australian divisions being in reserve. Further north, II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand and 3rd Australian divisions in reserve, was to attack two objectives, the 66th Division advancing along the main ridge, north of the Ypres–Roulers railway to just short of Passchendaele village and the 49th Division on either side of the Ravebeek stream, up Wallemolen spur to the Bellevue pillboxes. If the first objectives were reached, the reserve brigades were to attack the second objectives in the afternoon. The second objectives were 800–1,000 yd (730–910 m) ahead of the red line, beyond the village and the main ridge respectively. The reserve divisions were ready to move rapidly forward, by train from west of Ypres to continue the attack the next day. On the Fifth Army front, XVIII Corps with a brigade each from the 48th and 11th divisions, was to advance 1,200 yd (1,100 m) up Poelcappelle spur and towards Westroosebeke on the main ridge.

XIV Corps was to advance to the south edge of Houthoulst Forest with the 4th, 29th and Guards divisions, as the French First Army conformed on its left. Raids and artillery bombardments were arranged along the rest of the front, to deceive the Germans as to the objectives of the attacks. German defensive preparations Main article: 4th Army defensive changes: September–November 1917 Opposite I Anzac Corps the 233rd Division held the line, with the 220th Division as its counter-attack (Eingreif) division. To the north against II Anzac Corps, were the 195th Division and part of 16th Division, with the 20th Division and 45th Reserve Divisions as Eingreif divisions; further north was the 227th Division. The 18th Division held Flandern I Stellung near Poelcappelle and the 119th Division held Houthoulst Forest. The Germans were also hampered by the weather but as their positions were on the edge of the beaten zone, routes to their front line were in better condition until closer to the front. A German soldier wrote, The ground was unbelievably boggy, we just hardly got forward. The man to my front threatened to disappear in the darkness, so I moved quicker, only to get stuck up to my knees in the morass.... but then the man behind me got stuck as well in the filthy mess.... At long last the two of us were extracted from the bog. — Fähnrich Britten On 7 October, the 4th Army headquarters rescinded the policy of a reinforced front defence zone, to avoid another disaster like 4 October. Front line regiments were dispersed again, with their reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line. More artillery was to be used against British artillery, to protect the Eingreifdivisionen as they advanced. The Eingreifdivisionen were placed closer to the front line, to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. On 9 October Ludendorff issued a memorandum to all Western Front divisions, complaining that Eingreifdivisionen were being misused. Dispersal, poorly timed attacks, disorganisation and poor co-ordination with the artillery, had led to high casualties. Ludendorff emphasised that the reserve units of ground holding divisions, should conduct hasty attacks (Gegenstöße) to push attackers out of their area.

Eingreif units should not be used to reinforce ground-holding divisions for hasty counter-attacks but were to be used only for properly organised counter-attacks (Gegenangriffe). As far as possible the Eingreifdivisionen were to avoid casualties, unless lost ground was tactically important enough to recapture.In the X Corps area to the south, the 15th Brigade of the 5th Division attacked Polderhoek Château. The brigade reached the château ruins behind a creeping barrage and engaged the pillboxes in the vicinity but mud clogged many weapons. German machine-gun fire from Gheluvelt forced the brigade back to the start line and a new attack prepared for the night was later cancelled. Further north the 95th Brigade attacked astride the Reutelbeek, advanced past Cameron Covert and was then stopped by German machine-gun fire. (The 21st Division, between the 5th and 7th Division, was not part of the attack.) Two battalions of the 22nd Brigade of the 7th Division managed to assemble on time, despite the sodden ground and advanced at 5:20 a.m. to the blue line, which had been the final objective of the 21st Division in the attack of 4 October. Within 30 minutes, green flares on the objective (blue line) showed that it had been captured. A report arrived that the commanding ground around Reutel had been captured and that many Germans had been shot while fleeing. The advance had been held up at Juniper Cottage and German guns in a gap near Judge Copse also held up the infantry; a reserve platoon was sent up but was also unable to clear the Copse. Eventually two companies captured the area by attacking from the south-east. The Germans shelled the area all night and all next day but no counter-attack was attempted. In the I Anzac Corps area north of X Corps, the 1st Australian Division raided Celtic Wood and only fourteen of 85 men returned unwounded. The 2nd Australian Division was to cover the right flank of the 66th Division south of the Ypres–Roulers railway, by pivoting to its right. The 6th Australian Brigade on the right flank, attacked towards Daisy and Dairy woods on a 1,200 yd (1,100 m) front but were quickly stopped by German machine-gun fire, until later in the day when the woods were outflanked from the north and the objective was reached.

Two battalions of the 5th Australian Brigade advanced 1,200 yd (1,100 m) to the north-west end of the Keiberg Spur; the battalions were under strength and were unable properly to mop up German troops who had been by-passed. German reinforcements infiltrated behind the Australians, endangering them with encirclement. Before troops from the 66th Division could come up, the Australian brigade withdrew 800 yd (730 m) with many casualties; during the withdrawal, British troops were seen advancing north of the railway. By the time reinforcements were ready to attempt another advance to support them, the British troops had also retired and the 5th Australian Brigade consolidated on the first objective. The main attack was conducted by the II Anzac Corps. Two brigades each from 66th Division and the 49th Division, assembled behind Frezenberg and Potijze, about 2.5 mi (4.0 km) from the jumping off line. The brigades were expected to cover the distance in five hours but the dark, rain, state of the ground and fitful German artillery fire caused serious delays. Both divisions reported at 2:30 a.m. that some battalions would not be ready for zero hour at 5:20 a.m. and that all of the 197th Brigade on the right flank would be late. Staff officers were sent out to hurry on every man capable of going faster, rather than keeping units together. When the creeping barrage began, the troops who had arrived spread out and followed the barrage. The creeping barrage was difficult to follow, because much of the field artillery was out of action, some of the rest fired inaccurately from unstable platforms and many high-explosive shells were smothered by the mud. The battalions of the 197th Brigade, 66th Division on the right, advanced quickly on sandy going despite lagging far behind the creeping barrage. German infantry from the 195th Division were found in shell holes and many were taken prisoner as the British reached the final objective (blue line) at 10:00 a.m., a patrol finding Passchendaele village empty. Soon after arriving at the final objective, the rain stopped and in the better visibility, German machine-guns and field artillery began to fire from the right flank.

Little German resistance was encountered on the right, except from a German pillbox at Egypt House, whence the Guards pulled their right flank back under sniper fire, as they waited for Newfoundland troops of 29th Division to come up. The left brigade bypassed a German strongpoint and reached the final objective, taking the strongpoint later in the afternoon. Consolidation was hampered by German snipers in Houthoulst Forest and German aircraft appeared over the new front line, which was 2,500 yd (2,300 m) forward on the Veldhoek–Vijwegen spur. No counter-attack was made until the evening, beyond the right flank on the 29th Division front, which withdrew a short distance. On the left of the Guards Division, German troops massing at the junction with the French 2nd Division to the north, were dispersed by machine-gun fire from gunners, who had advanced to the final objective with the infantry and by British artillery fire. The French First Army, between the British Fifth Army to the south and the Belgian Army further north, had attacked on 31 July, south of the inundations and advanced to the west of Wydendreft and Bixschoote. On 1 August, the French division on the left flank had captured ground from the Martjevaart and St Jansbeek to Drie Grachten. The axis of the French advance was along the banks of the Corverbeek, towards the south and south-eastern fringes of Houthulst Forest, the villages of Koekuit and Mangelaere and blockhouses and pillboxes, which connected the forest with the German line southwards towards Poelcappelle. On the left flank, the French were covered by the Belgian Army, which held the ground about Knocke and the Yser inundations. On 9 October, the French 2e Division d'Infanterie of I Corps, was to attack towards Houthulst Forest, in conjunction with the British XIV Corps attack on Poelcappelle. The French artillery subjected the German defences east and south-east of Houthulst Forest, to a three-day bombardment. At 5.30 a.m., a creeping-barrage began to move very slowly forwards over a "sea" of mud. The artillery-fire was so effective, that despite an extremely slow infantry advance, the French objectives were reached by 10:00 a.m. with few casualties.

Over the XIV Corps area, aircraft from 9 Squadron flew through the barrage to observe the infantry advance and had five aircrew casualties. Aircraft of the army wing, made reconnaissance flights over the German lines and shot down four German fighters, for one loss and one pilot wounded. The 233rd Division, opposite I Anzac Corps did not need the support of the 220th (Eingreif) Division. To counter-attack the II Anzac Corps, the 16th Division and 195th Division in the front line were supported by parts of the 20th Division and 45th Reserve Division. The 240th (Eingreif) Division was sent forward at midday, to support the 6th Bavarian Division near Polecappelle. The division moved forward on approach routes which were under an "enormous" weight of fire and managed to regain some captured ground. At 7:00 p.m. the British attacked again, the battle eventually subsiding with minor gains of ground by each side. After numerous German counter-attacks during the night, the final positions of the British divisions except near Reutel, opposite Passchendaele and near Houthoulst Forest, were the same as their starting positions. The writers of Der Weltkrieg, the German Official History considered that the battle was a costly defensive success. On Passchendaele Ridge and the Wallemolen Spur, inadequate artillery support, the German pillboxes and extensive uncut barbed-wire of the Flandern I Stellung (Flanders I Position), rain, mud, shell-hole machine-gun nests and counter-attacks, led the attackers being forced back towards their start lines. The brigades from the 66th and 49th divisions of the II Anzac Corps, began the attack exhausted from the conditions of the approach march and some units had not arrived when the attack began, although on the right of the 66th Division, German troops surrendered readily to the depleted British battalions. In I Anzac Corps, the Australian divisions were under strength after the attack of 4 October and the strain of holding the front until the attack. From 30 September – 14 October, BEF shell consumption (most being fired at Ypres) fell from 2.5 million–1.6 million shells by the field artillery, 510,000–350,000 shells by the medium artillery and 153,000–119,000 shells by the heavy artillery, although German accounts mention "heavy", "indescribably heavy" and "drumfire" bombardments.

In the Ravebeek valley in the 66th Division area, some of the wounded drowned in shell-holes, which had filled with rain. On 12 October an Australian officer found, The slope .... was littered with dead, both theirs and ours.... Here I found about fifty men alive, of the Manchesters.... Some had been there four days already.... — Lieutenant W. G. Fisher The next day he reported that ... some of the Manchesters were there yet, seven days wounded and not looked to.... Our men gave all their food and water away, but that was all they could do. — Lieutenant W. G. Fisher (13 October) The New Zealand Division found wounded of the 49th Division, ... famished and untended on the battlefield.... Those that could not be brought back were dressed in the muddy shell holes.... On the morning of the 12th many of these unfortunate men were still lying upon the battlefield, and not a few had meantime died of exposure in the wet and cold weather.... Even before the attack, dressing stations and regimental aid posts as well as the battlefield itself were crowded with the wounded of the 49th Division. — Colonel H. Stewart In 2014, Robert Perry wrote that Second Army casualties in the attack had been 1,253 in the 2nd Australian Division (I Anzac Corps) and about 5,700 men in the II Anzac Corps, 3,119 losses in the 66th Division and 2,585 casualties in the 49th Division. J. E. Edmonds, the British official historian, quoted from the German Official History, that German losses were very recht (considerable) and that the ordeal "bore no relation to the advantage obtained.". Calculations of German losses by Edmonds have been severely criticised ever since. In volume XIII of Der Weltkrieg (1942), the German official historians recorded 35,000 casualties, including 13,000 missing for the ten-day reporting period from 1–10 October. Subsequent operations Main article: First Battle of Passchendaele The 66th Division repulsed a counter-attack on 10 October. Numerous British divisional reliefs took place before 12 October and a dummy German raid was reported that morning. The First Battle of Passchendaele took place on 12 October. The attack took ground in the north but early gains around Passchendaele were mostly lost to German counter-attacks. The battle was a German defensive success, although costly to both sides. British attacks were postponed until the weather improved and communications behind the front had been restored. Two German divisions intended for Italy were diverted to Flanders, to replace "extraordinarily high" losses. Victoria Cross Corporal W. Clamp, 6th Green Howards. Private F. G. Hancock, 4th Worcesters. Sergeant J. Lister, 1st Lancashire Fusiliers. Sergeant J. Molyneux, 2nd Royal Fusiliers. Lance-Sergeant J. H. Rhodes, 3rd Grenadier Guards.

At 02:00, 894 metal tubes dug into a reverse slope similar to Livens projectors (Gaswurfminen), were triggered electrically to simultaneously fire canisters containing 600 ml (21 imp fl oz; 20 US fl oz) of chlorine-arsenic agent and diphosgene, smothering the Italian trenches in the valley in a dense cloud of poison gas. Knowing that their gas masks could protect them only for two hours or less, the defenders fled for their lives, though 500–600 were still killed. Then the front was quiet until 06:00 when all the Italian wire and trenches to be attacked were bombarded by mortars. At 06:41, 2,200 guns opened fire, many targeting the valley road along which reserves were advancing to plug the gap. At 08:00 two large mines were detonated under strong points on the heights bordering the valley and the infantry attacked. Soon they penetrated the almost undefended Italian fortifications in the valley, breaching the defensive line of the Italian Second Army between the IV and XXVII Corps. To protect the attackers' flanks Alpine Troops infiltrated the strong points and batteries along the crests of the adjoining ridges, Mount Matajur and the Kolovrat Range, laying out their telephone lines as they advanced to maintain contact with their artillery. They made good use of the new German model 08/15 Maxim light machine gun, light trench mortars, mountain guns, flamethrowers and hand grenades. The attackers in the valley marched almost unopposed along the excellent road toward Italy, some advanced 25 kilometres (16 mi) on the first day. The Italian army beat back the attackers on either side of the sector where the central column attacked, but Below's successful central penetration threw the entire Italian army into disarray. Forces had to be moved along the Italian front in an attempt to stem von Below's breakout, but this only weakened other points along the line and invited further attacks. At this point, the entire Italian position was threatened. The Italian 2nd Army commander Luigi Capello was commanding while bedridden with fever. Realizing that his forces were ill-prepared for this attack and were being routed, Capello requested permission to withdraw back to the Tagliamento.

https://togetter.com/li/906158　https://togetter.com/li/846297 ＞＞アメリカ陸軍やドイツ国防軍は戦功本位の抜擢人事をしてるのに、日本陸軍は戦時でも官僚的な順送り人事をガチでやってるんですよ これは事実なんですか 前線で戦う兵士をとうの軍人自身が見下す軍団が戦争中もずっと続いていた日本の背景は何でしょう

The Battle of Krithia Vineyard (6–13 August 1915) was fought during the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. It was originally intended as a minor British action at Helles on the Gallipoli peninsula to divert attention from the imminent launch of the August Offensive, but instead, the British commander, Brigadier General H.E. Street, mounted a futile and bloody series of attacks that in the end gained a small patch of ground known as "The Vineyard".The original commander of the British VIII Corps at Helles, Lieutenant General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, had departed the peninsula in July, following the last Helles offensive—the Battle of Gully Ravine. His replacement, Lieutenant General Francis Davies, arrived in early August but had not yet assumed command of the corps when a series of diversions were due to be launched from Anzac and Helles to divert Ottoman attention from the planned landing at Suvla and the break out from Anzac. Consequently, the Helles diversion was planned and conducted by the VIII Corps' chief of staff, Brigadier General H.E. Street, who proved himself an able student of Hunter-Weston's battle strategy.Due to the shortage of artillery, the attack was split into two parts with the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division attacking on the afternoon of 6 August while two brigades of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division would attack the following day. They were facing four Ottoman divisions, three of which were fresh, while there were two more divisions in reserve. The 88th Brigade's attack managed to capture some Ottoman trenches, which were recaptured by the Ottoman 30th Regiment during a counter-attack. The British attacked again and once more captured some trenches, but the Ottomans counter-attacked again and drove them out. The British failed to hold any ground and the 88th Brigade was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. At around 9:40 am on the morning of 7 August the 42nd Division attacked on the right of the 88th Brigade's sector. The 127th Brigade managed to break through the line held by the Ottoman 13th Division, but were forced back by an Ottoman counter-attack. The Ottomans counter-attacked repeatedly from 7 August to 9 August and the fighting in the area continued until 13 August when it finally subsided. Afterwards, this sector of the Helles front would remain one of the busiest and most violent for the remainder of the campaign.Two Victoria Crosses were awarded to men of the 42nd Division during the fighting at Krithia Vineyard. The British casualties in the first 24 hours of fighting, covering the original attacks of the 88th Brigade and the two brigades of the 42nd Division, were 3,469. The total British casualties for the duration of the battle were probably in excess of 4,000. The Ottoman casualties for the period of the battle were estimated to be around 7,000.

Joffre had accepted claims by Castelnau, that up to 6.2–7.5 mi (10–12 km) of ground could be gained in twenty-four hours and rejected a methodical battle, which ... would entail a month of combat, with a maximum expenditure of ammunition; at what point would we be able to declare ourselves ready for attack? — Joseph Joffre Ammunition necessary for a methodical battle did not exist and the opportunity to attack the Germans, when so many divisions had been moved to the eastern front, could not be wasted. The offensive had been fought with unprecedented refinements of tactics and supply. Amendments to Note 5779 were suggested, to cover items like the use of 23,000 hand grenades in two days by the 53rd Division and the importance of attention to detail; Pétain of XXXIII Corps had ensured accurate preparatory bombardments and the tactical reflections written by Pétain were added to the thinking in Note 5779. The ideal characteristics of a network of jumping-off trenches and the time and labour necessary to build it were laid down, so that troops could advance simultaneously and reserve troops could be protected as they moved forward. Pétain wrote the plan for the Groupe d'armées du Centre, for the offensive of 25 September and his views were circulated through the French and British armies. The autumn offensive was fought as a breakthrough attempt, with changes to avoid the mistakes made in Artois in May and had significant tactical success but did not achieve a breakthrough, which led to the adoption of limited attacks in 1916. Krause wrote that the formulation Note 5779 showed that the French command system, was staffed by men who tried to improve the performance of the army and contradicts claims by Gudmundsson, that the Allied armies were too centralised to adapt. Lessons had been collected, analysed and distributed in a manner which combined top-down and bottom-up processes. A flaw in Note 5779, was persistence with a concept of rapid breakthrough, even after many soldiers considered that the war had become a siege and that none of the French offensives of 1915, had been intended to return to mobile warfare. Changes made to the plan for the Second Battle of Artois, had been intended to secure the capture Vimy Ridge as a jumping-off point, rather than to achieve a breakthrough and return to mobile warfare. In the autumn offensive which began on 25 September, with the Third Battle of Artois, Battle of Loos and the Second Battle of Champagne, the strategy was intended to make the Noyon salient untenable and regain a large portion of the occupied territories. Tactics used in the battles of May and June were revised and the creeping barrage became a standard method in all the Western Front armies.

そもそも国民が適当に投票していたり まともな政治家がないからと消去法で投票するから、更に国民が舐められるのではと思うのですが、この問題を解決するには 選挙システムがどういうふうになればいいのかなど 何か、こういう風になればもっと政治は良くなると思うことを教えて下さい。 無理ですとかは書かないでくださいね。 それだと未来永劫このままなので。 私としては、危機意識の低い人や既得権益に縛られている人、年齢が高すぎる人がごっそり減るといいなと思うのですが。 あとは、国民側も受け身だったり文句しか言わない人が多いのも問題かと。

The Battle of Bukoba was the first victory for Entente forces in German East Africa, coming after the disastrous battles of Tanga and Jassin. The British objective was the destruction of the Bukoba wireless station. Due to Bukoba's location on the shore of Lake Victoria, it was decided that the raid should take the form of an amphibious assault. The raid was launched from Kisumu in British East Africa on 21 June 1915. Amongst the units chosen for the attack were the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 25th (Frontiersmen) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, more commonly known by their nickname the 25th 'Frontiersmen'. This unusual unit had been created by Colonel Daniel Patrick Driscoll as an irregular skirmish force shaped by his experiences during the Second Boer War, and drawn largely from his peacetime paramilitary group, the Legion of Frontiersmen. A number of big game hunters were recruited to the force by Driscoll—most notably Frederick Selous, who was 64 when he joined and who died in action at the age of 65. Upon reaching the objective at Bukoba the attackers were accidentally landed in a large swamp and were pinned down by fierce rifle and machine gun fire from the German positions. Finally managing to escape the swamp, the British force was then stalled by snipers. The attack continued for a further two days in the town; however, casualties were light on both sides. The Frontiersmen took the town on 23 June. An Australian member of the unit, Lieutenant Wilbur Dartnell, climbed to the top of the town hall and removed the German Imperial Ensign from the flagpole as a symbolic gesture of victory. Bukoba fort and the wireless station were destroyed, the British also captured hundreds of rifles and 32,000 rounds of ammunition. Due to their status as an 'irregular' unit, the Frontiersmen were granted permission to loot the town by General Stewart. This predictably turned into a disaster, with the 25th robbing, raping and burning much of the town with such ferocity that the incident became known as the "Sack of Bukoba". It was later claimed by an embarrassed high command that no looting had taken place. The aim of the raid, the destruction of the wireless station, was counterproductive for the British as it deprived them of the possibility of intercepting German transmissions. Bukoba was abandoned. After the battle, the 25th Battalion was ordered to guard the Uganda Railway between Nairobi and Mombasa, which was coming under heavy attack from German forces. During this period Wilbur Dartnell was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for an action which took place near Maktau on 3 September 1915. Bukoba　ブコバ

Bombardment began at 4:30 am, from land, sea and air. 14 Allied planes participated in softening up the Ottoman defenses, one of the first such combined actions in military history. Both attacks began well with the capture of the first Ottoman trench but descended into chaos and confusion as, in a repeat of the April and May Helles battles, the troops advanced too far, lost contact and came under artillery and machine gun fire. The next morning confusion and panic resulted in a disorderly retreat which was eventually halted but Hunter-Weston ordered the advance to resume and sent the battered Royal Naval Division in again. The line was stabilised. By the end of the battle, one third of the 52nd Division had become casualties. General Egerton was temporarily dismissed from his command of the division for protesting at the treatment of his troops. In late June General Hunter-Weston departed his command of the British VIII Corps, suffering some indeterminate ailment. This marked the end of Helles as the main front at Gallipoli. The British attempted no more major offensives there for the remainder of the campaign. Weber Paşa, having lost Liman Paşa's confidence was sent back to Germany. The fighting now concentrated along the Sari Bair range and at a new landing at Suvla. In support of this new offensive in August, a diversionary attack was made at Helles which resulted in heavy fighting around Krithia Vineyard. Helles was finally evacuated on 8 January 1916. The Battle of Ngaundere or Battle of Ngaoundéré was a small engagement fought between German and British forces on 29 July 1915 during the Kamerun campaign of World War I. It resulted in a German defeat and British occupation of the town. Following the Allied victory and German surrender at the Second Battle of Garua, the commander of French and British forces in the area, General Cunliffe, was confident in pushing deeper into the German colony of Kamerun. He moved a detachment of his force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Webb-Bowen 150 miles southeast to the town of Ngaundere on the road leading from the north of the colony to the central plateau where the new German capital and concentration of military forces was. The small advance unit under the command of Captain Fowle arrived at Ngaundere on 29 June 1915 after marching through a severe storm that produced a tornado. When the main body of the unit arrived, the storm still lingered over the town. As a result, the British troops were able to surprise soldiers stationed at many of the German outposts and take them captive before any fighting occurred. At some of the outposts however, fighting did occur resulting in light casualties to the British unit. After the German force had been driven from Ngaundere, it launched a counterattack which the British repulsed. Ngaundere ヌガウンデレ

The expulsion of German forces from their outposts in Ngaundere meant that significant resistance in the north of Kamerun would be absent. It allowed General Cunliffe's columns the freedom to move further south into the central plateau of the colony. The British did pursue the German forces who had once occupied Ngaundere who withdrew to Tangere. The British took this position without a fight on 12 July and repulsed a German attempt to recapture it on 23 July. The German force withdrew once again in the direction of Tibati. However, due to heavy rains and the remaining German stronghold at Mora, Cunliffe would not continue his advance southward until October. His force arrived on 23 August to assist in the Siege of Mora which would last until the end of the campaign. The Battle of Otavi fought between the militaries of the Union of South Africa and German Southwest Africa on 1 July 1915 was the final battle of the South West Africa Campaign of World War I. The battle, fought between Otavi mountain and Otavifontein, was a delaying action led by the German Major Hermann Ritter. Ritter's forces intended to buy the main German force at Tsombe several days so as they could harden their positions there. In the end, Botha's forces were able to rout Ritter's troops, leading to an overall breakdown in the German lines that brought the campaign to an end. By mid 1915 the South African advance in German Southwest Africa had gained considerable ground and efforts at negotiating a ceasefire had failed. Rather than seek a decisive battle, the German commander Victor Franke had decided to resort to keeping his army as intact as possible so as to maintain a German claim to the territory after the end of the war. Rather than resort to guerrilla warfare or attempt to break out of German Southwest Africa, Franke decided to retreat along the railway and build up defenses around Tsombe. With the South African army under Louis Botha rapidly approaching, Franke decided to leave a delaying force under his second in command Major Hermann Ritter at Otavifontein. The delaying force was tasked with holding up Botha for as long as possible so that the main force at Tsombe could concentrate its forces and solidify its defenses there. Botha began his advance on June 18, learning from intercepted communications that the Germans were retreating up the railway but would not retreat farther than Namutoni. Botha split his 13,000 troops into four columns with one on each flank and two under his personal command driving up along the railway. With a swift advance, the South Africans began to surround the German positions and Botha's central columns managed to reach Otavi by July 1. The Battle of Otavi オタヴィの戦い