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Eventually, the two opposing assaults (lines) inter-penetrated and individual American units exercised initiative and continued fighting despite being nominally behind enemy lines. Despite the revolution in Russia, fortune seemed to favor the Allies with the arrival of the Americans to France. However, these troops needed time to train before they could be combat effective. Recognizing the window of opportunity, General Ludendorff consolidated the manpower freed up from the Eastern Front to conduct Operation Michael in order to split the Allies' lines. The successes of the German Stormtroopers infiltration tactics earned Germany approximately 40 miles of territory. But the offensive lost momentum when it surpassed its supply lines. Up to this point, American General Pershing refused to hand over American divisions to either the British or French armies, insisting on keeping them together as one army. But in the face of the German onslaught, Pershing relented and sent a portion of his army to assist the French in blocking the German advance. :7–10Looking to defeat the British occupied in Flanders, Ludendorff sought to divert the Allies' French reserves away from the region. In his Operation Blucher, Ludendorff aimed some of his forces at the Chemin des Dames and took the French Sixth Army by surprise. Driving on, the Germans were soon at the Marne River, situated under 50 miles from Paris. With Marshal Ferdinand Foch unable to acquire British assistance, General Pershing's chief of operation, Colonel Fox Conner, recognized the gravity of the situation and ordered the 3rd Division to block them. :39–41 The 3rd Division occupied the main bridge on the south bank of the Marne that led in Chateau Thierry on May 31 as the French 10th Colonial Division rendezvoused with them from the north bank. The Americans positioned their machine guns to cover the French retreat, and had a unit led by Lt John Bissell situated north of the second bridge. The French spent the night adding explosives to the bridges to destroy them. Early the following morning, on June 1, the Germans advanced into Chateau Thierry from the north, forcing the French to the main bridge, which they defended with the support of American machine-gun fire. The French succeeded in destroying the bridge as the Americans kept up their fire on the Germans. Lt. Bissell's group was still on the north side of the Marne.

They worked their way back to the secondary bridge in-between American machine-gun fire and made it across, along with a group of Germans that were captured shortly afterwards. From the north of the Marne on June 2, the Germans engaged in heavy artillery and sniper fire against the Allies. They made an attempt to take the remaining bridge but were forced to end the assault as the casualties rose. :4After World War I, a memorial was built on Hill 204, 2 miles (3 km.) west of the town for which it is named. The Château-Thierry Monument, designed by Paul P. Cret of Philadelphia, was constructed by the American Battle Monuments Commission "to commemorate the sacrifices and achievements of American and French fighting men in the region, and the friendship and cooperation of French and American forces during World War I." There is also a monument in front of the Bronx County Courthouse in New York City that was presented by the American Legion on November 11, 1940. The monument consists of the "Keystone from an arch of the old bridge at Chateau Thierry," which the monument notes was "Gloriously and successfully defended by American troops." The first Filipino to die in World War I was Private Tomas Mateo Claudio who served with the U.S. Army as part of the American Expeditionary Forces to Europe. He died in the Battle of Chateau Thierry in France on June 29, 1918. The Tomas Claudio Memorial College in Morong Rizal, Philippines, which was founded in 1950, was named in his honor. The Battle of Soissons (also known as the Battle of the Soissonnais and of the Ourcq (French: Bataille du Soissonnais et de L'Ourcq) was a battle during World War I, waged from 18 to 22 July 1918, between the French (with American and British assistance) and German armies. Ferdinand Foch, the Allied Supreme Commander, launched the offensive on 18 July; 24 French divisions and 2 British and 2 U.S. divisions under French command, supported by approximately 478 tanks, sought to eliminate the salient that was aimed at Paris. The Allies suffered 107,000 casualties (95,000 French and 12,000 American), while the Germans suffered 168,000 casualties. The battle ended with the French recapturing most of the ground lost to the German Spring Offensive in May 1918. Adolf Hitler, the future Führer of Nazi Germany, earned and was awarded the Iron Cross First Class at Soissons on August 4th 1918. Soissons ソワソン

Lt-Col Giffard, who had arrived with 2/2nd KAR and now took command over all present British forces, consequently saw a good opportunity to finally encircle and crush the Schutztruppe. The German forces began to move northeast towards the Lioma-Muanhupa road at 9.00 on 31 August, after regrouping during the night. In order to speed up their advance, they left behind seriously wounded and sick Schutztruppe personnel as well as prisoners. These were later captured by the British. The German vanguard was once again formed by the columns of Müller and Göring, the main body was led by Gen. Maj. Kurt Wahle, while Hptm. Stemmermann was left in charge of the rearguard. Lettow-Vorbeck would freely move through the force to oversee its advance and take command wherever he was most needed. Even though they sent out patrols to learn about the Schutztruppe's location throughout the night, the British only received reports about Lettow-Vorbeck's movement at 10.00. Thereupon Giffard ordered 2/2nd KAR and half of 3/2nd KAR to move eastwards, and 1/2nd KAR to march west in order to engage and encircle the German forces between them. 1/1st KAR, badly shaken by the previous day's fighting, was to remain at Lioma to guard the British baggage and reserve ammunition, while the other half of 3/2nd KAR was held as mobile reserve. Two companies of 2/2nd KAR came up against the German vanguard's flank on the Lioma-Muanhupa road around 12.00, immediately starting a stubborn, but stagnant firefight with Abt Müller and Abt Göring. Other elements of the 2/2nd and 3/2nd KAR attempted to flank this vanguard and attack the German main body in order to scatter its carriers and capture its supplies, which would have meant a heavy logistical blow for the Schutztruppe. Well covered by the bush and the rugged hills, however, the German main body evaded the British to the west and managed to move eastwards along the road, and then on a trail into the northern hills. After encountering 2/2nd and 3/2nd KAR, Lettow-Vorbeck initially assumed that he could possibly destroy them with a determinded counter-attack using all his forces; this plan was dropped, however, when it became clear that the German main body had already too far advanced northwards to be called back for an assault. Meanwhile, unknown to the Germans, 1/2nd KAR marched southwest along the Lioma-Muanhupa road, and encountered parts of the Schutztruppe's rearguard by 14.30. Completely surprising the defenders, 1/2nd KAR managed to overrun a whole enemy field hospital largely unopposed.

The Battle of Mont Saint-Quentin was a battle on the Western Front during World War I. As part of the Allied counteroffensives on the Western Front in the late summer of 1918, the Australian Corps crossed the Somme River on the night of August 31, and broke the German lines at Mont Saint-Quentin and Péronne. The British Fourth Army's commander, General Henry Rawlinson, described the Australian advances of August 31 – September 4 as the greatest military achievement of the war. During the battle Australian troops stormed, seized and held the key height of Mont Saint-Quentin (overlooking Péronne), a pivotal German defensive position on the line of the Somme. The Allies were pursuing the Germans, and the greatest obstacle to crossing the Somme River in pursuit was Mont Saint-Quentin which, situated in a bend of the river, dominated the whole position. The Mont was only 100 metres high but was a key to the German defence of the Somme line, and the last German stronghold. It overlooked the Somme River approximately 1.5 kilometres north of Péronne. Its location made it an ideal observation point, and strategically, the hill's defences guarded the north and western approaches to the town. Australian forces faced the German LI Corps, part of 2nd Army, under General Max von Boehn. According to Australian official historian Charles Bean, "German archives show that the 51st Corps anticipated the offensive... The line divisions were ordered to increase their depth and the counter-attack divisions to 'stand to.'" Bean states that LI Corps controlled the 5th Royal Bavarian Division, 1st Reserve Division and 119th Division. The German 94th Infantry Regiment (part of the IV Reserve Corps) was also involved in the battle. The offensive was planned by General John Monash; Monash planned a high-risk frontal assault which required the Australian 2nd Division to cross a series of marshes to attack the heights. This plan failed when the assaulting troops could not cross the marshes. After this initial setback, Monash manœuvred his divisions in the only free manœuvre battle of any consequence undertaken by the Australians on the Western Front. "The gaps in the wire near Anvil Wood were death traps", reads the caption of a contemporary photograph of the battlefield. Australians of the Second Division crossed to the north bank of the Somme River on the evening of 30 August. At 5 am on 31 August 1918, supported by artillery, two significantly undermanned Australian battalions, charged up Mont St Quentin ordered by Monash to 'scream like bushrangers'. モン・サン＝カンタン　The Battle of Mont Saint-Quentin

However, the German Army stationed in the area of St. Mihiel lacked sufficient manpower, firepower and effective leadership to launch a counter-attack of its own against the Allies. With Allied offensives to the north, the Germans decided to pull out of the St. Mihiel Salient and consolidate their forces near the Hindenburg Line. The order to evacuate the area was given on 8 September. The Allied forces discovered the information on a written order to Army Group Gallwitz. Allied tank support Although the AEF was new to the French theater of war, it trained hard for nearly a year in preparation for fighting against the German armies. In June 1917 Pershing ordered the creation of a tank force to support the AEF's infantry. As a result, by September 1918, Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton Jr. had finished training two tank battalions – 144 French-built Renault FT light tanks organized as the 344th and 345th Battalions of the United States Tank Corps – at Langres, France for an upcoming offensive at the St. Mihiel salient. "Due to the serious resistance of the enemy, especially along the eastern edge of the FORET d’ARGONNE and in the vicinity of CHEPPY and VARENNES, and due also the lack of support of the Infantry, all the Tanks had contrary to plan entered the action before evening of the first day. The 344th Battalion supporting the advance of the 28th and 35th Divisions left the positions of departure and advanced ahead of the Infantry at H-hour (5:30 a.m.) On the morning of the 26th, Colonel G. S. Patton, Jr., commanding the Brigade of Tanks, was wounded while getting Tanks forward and rallying disorganized Infantrymen to attack enemy resistance. Major Sereno E. Brett, commanding the 344th Battalion, was then placed in command of the Brigade." Patton was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his "extraordinary heroism" that day. In addition to the 144 AEF tanks, the attack was joined by 275 French tanks (216 FTs and 59 Schneider CA1 and Saint-Chamond tanks) of the French 1st Assault Artillery Brigade; a total of 419 tanks. Battle The Saint-Mihiel offensive began on 12 September with a threefold assault on the salient. The main attack was made against the south face by two American corps. On the right was the I Corps (from right to left the 82nd, 90th, 5th, and 2nd Divisions in line with the 78th in reserve) covering a front from Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle west toward Limey; on the left, the IV Corps (from right to left the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line with the 3rd in reserve) extending along a front from Limey west toward Marvoisin.

8th Aero Squadron 9th Balloon Company 3rd Division (Corps Reserve) – Maj Gen Beaumont B Buck V Corps – Maj Gen George H Cameron Headquarters Observation Group 99th Aero Squadron 7th Balloon Company 26th Division – Maj Gen Clarence R Edwards 88th Aero Squadron 104th Aero Squadron 6th Balloon Company 15th Colonial Division (French) 8th Balloon Company 4th Division – Maj Gen John L Hines 8th Brigade what 4th Field Artillery Brigade remainder of Div in reserve 12th Balloon Company US Army Reserve 35th Division – Maj Gen Peter E. Traub 80th Division – Maj Gen Adelbert Cronkhite 91st Division – Maj Gen William H Johnston "Open attack at St. Mihiel" (Jonas, 1927) Aftermath The American V Corps location was at the northwestern vertices, the II French Colonial Corps at the southern apex, and the American IV and I Corps at the southeastern vertices of the salient. Furthermore, General Pershing's intent was obvious; to envelope the salient by using the main enveloping thrusts of the attack against the weak vertices. The remaining forces would then advance on a broad front toward Metz. This pincer action, by the IV and V Corps, was to drive the attack into the salient and to link the friendly forces at the French village of Vigneulles, while the II French Colonial Corps kept the remaining Germans tied down." "One reason for the American forces' success at St. Mihiel was General Pershing's thoroughly detailed operations order. Pershing's operation included detailed plans for penetrating the Germans' trenches, using a combined arms approach to warfare. His plan had tanks supporting the advancing infantry, with two tank companies interspersed into a depth of at least three lines, and a third tank company in reserve. The result of the detailed planning was an almost unopposed assault into the salient. The American I Corps reached its first day's objective before noon, and the second day's objective by late afternoon of the second". "Another reason for the American success was the audacity of the small unit commanders on the battlefield. Unlike other officers who commanded their soldiers from the rear, Colonel Patton and his subordinates would lead their men from the front lines. They believed that a commander's personal control of the situation would help ease the chaos of the battlefield."

The Bulgarians, using information from escaped prisoners of war, determined that Entente forces would engage in hostile actions west of lake Ohrid, in Monastir, Dobro Pole or Human. On 27 August, the 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian Divisions stationed at Dobro Pole were ordered to make emergency preparations, as new evidence indicated a frontal assault on Dobro Pole along with a secondary attack on Human. By 7 September, Dobro Pole was reinforced by one machine gun company, six battalions and ten heavy howitzers, the head of Army Group Scholtz General Friedrich von Scholtz then stated that the defensive measures made the defense of the front feasible. Scholtz had failed to take into account the departure of Bulgarian chief of staff Nikola Zhekov and his subsequent replacement by Georgi Todorov. Widespread insubordination and desertions also plagued the Bulgarian troops who refused to participate in fortification works; poor rations and fatigue contributed to the low morale. A day prior to the Entente offensive, General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey laid out the final plan for the operation. The first phase consisted of a combined Franco-Serbian attack on the positions of the 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian Divisions, which was expected to create a breach of the front line in the area of Dobro Pole, while also posing a danger to the Bulgarian supply lines on river Vardar. Τhe 1,875 metres (6,152 ft) Dobro Pole ("Good Field") peak dominated the region, providing excellent observation points for the defenders. Dobro Pole was surrounded by a well-developed system of trenches which, in combination with the rough terrain, made the area impassable for wheeled transport. Dobro Pole was, however, lower and less steep than the mountains on other parts of the front that averaged 2,000 metres (6,600 ft). A second Anglo-Franco-Hellenic force would then attack the Bulgarian 1st Army between the Vardar river and Lake Doiran, preventing it from forming new defensive positions in the area. The initial advance would allow the Armée d'Orient to progress in support of other units first to Prilep, Disma and Borran. In the meantime, an Anglo-Hellenic force would strike Mount Belasica, occupying the Rupel Pass. The Doiran sector had previously been subject to two major Entente offensives known as the First Battle of Doiran (August 1916) and Second Battle of Doiran (April–May 1917). Both engagements ended in decisive Bulgarian victories, forcing the Allies to limit their operations to small raids and harassing fire. Between 1916 and July 1918, Bulgarian defenses around Doiran underwent a period of considerable reorganization under the personal supervision of General Vladimir Vazov.

The sector was divided into two 14 kilometres (8.7 mi) defensive areas, protected by the Mountain Division and the 9th Infantry Division respectively. Bulgaria established combat security outposts at a distance of 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) from the enemy trenches, while also reinforcing the defenses of the dominant Dub and Kala Tepe mountains. Similarly to Dobro Pole the defenses consisted of a series of mutually supporting trenches, with built in observation posts, machine gun positions and artillery pieces. D'Espèrey expected to march the Allied Army of the Orient through the towns of Demir Hisar, Rupel, Petrici, Blagusa, Gradec, Štip and Belessa finally seizing Skopje. Units stationed at Katsania and Tetovo would prevent a Bulgarian flanking maneuver, while the main body of the force would widen the breach both in Štip and Prilep. In case of a collapse of the front between Dobro Pole and Tzena, the Bulgarian 1st Army and the German 11th Army. Armies would either be annihilated or, in less favorable circumstances, perform an organised retreat to a new defensive line on river Crna. The prevention of such a retreat was to be achieved by a rapid, penetrating attack on Gradsko, Dren Planina (mk) and Visoka. Subsequent operations On 20 September, the 17th and 122nd French Colonial Divisions along with the 1st Serbian Army crossed river Crna. News of a breakthrough at Dobro Pole prompted the defenders of Doiran to abandon their positions and rush to the defense of their homeland, in order to prevent a future occupation by the Entente. On 21 September, the Allies became aware of the Bulgarian withdrawal after observing a series of fires and munition dump explosions on the Bulgarian positions, a pursuit by the British XII Corps was launched immediately. The Serbian advanced guard approached Krivolak, thus creating a wedge between the 1st Bulgarian and 11th German Armies in an effort to force the latter to retire towards Albania. The 2nd Bulgarian Army headed towards the Kosturino Pass avoiding direct engagement with the Allies. At 17:30 p.m. on 22 September, the Italian 35th Division under General Ernesto Mombelli joined the offensive, seizing Hill 1050 stronghold from the 302nd German Division and taking 150 prisoners. Fighting took place in Kanatlarci and along the Monastir–Prilep road, in Cepik, Kalabak and Topolčani as the Allies continued to advance towards Prilep. At 14:00 p.m. on 23 September, General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey announced that the initial plan of the operation was to be modified.

Allenby reported to the War Office on 31 March that 5 miles (8.0 km) of railway track and culverts had been destroyed south of Amman Station and a bridge blown up, and that the object of the raid had been achieved by cutting the Hejaz Railway. He took this decision despite the principal objective of destroying the large viaduct at Amman, had not been achieved. But it was increasingly less likely that it could be as Chaytor's force began to have difficulty defending itself from strong German and Ottoman counter-attacks. Chaytor's force was therefore ordered to withdraw to Es Salt. When darkness fell on 30 March, the front line troops received the order to retreat and an infantryman concluded: "none of us sorry to leave behind forever, we hope, a nightmare of a most terrible nature." The retirement from Amman started on 30 March with the wounded beginning to be sent back to the Jordan Valley. The wounded moved along the main road via Es Salt, but Es Salt was under attack from German and Ottoman units from the north west (the direction of the road from Nablus via Jisr ed Damieh) and the only bridge across the Jordan River not destroyed by a 9 feet (2.7 m) flood was at Ghoraniyeh. By 31 March there were over 240 wounded in the divisional collecting stations such as Birket umm Amud 10.5 miles (16.9 km) from the front line. All available means including sand carts sent by infantry in the 60th (London) Division, were employed and these wounded were on their way by the evening; about 50 of them walking. The last convoy of wounded which left Amman at 23:00 found 20 camels carrying wounded which had begun their journey six hours earlier, bogged and exhausted at Suweileh. Nine of them were unable to move and ambulance personnel were left to attend to the wounded throughout the night. By daylight, light horse troopers warned them that the Ottoman cavalry was close. Five camels managed to continue but the remaining four were too exhausted. Of the eight wounded, six were placed on horses, but two who appeared to be mortally wounded were left behind when Ottoman cavalry got between the covering party and the ambulance men and began firing on the group. All escaped but the two seriously wounded and three men of the 2nd Light Horse Field Ambulance mounted on donkeys who were taken prisoner. Only one of these men survived to the end of the war; the other two dying in captivity.

From Es Salt, thousands of Armenian and Bedouin refugees and others joined the withdrawing columns carrying their belongings on their backs or pushing them in carts, some of the aged and footsore given a lift in the horse-drawn limber wagons. The front lines were still engaged when the withdrawal began. It was necessary, firstly to move the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade back from Hill 3039, across the Wadi Amman. They received their orders at 18:00 to withdraw to the cross road at the western end of the plateau just above the village of Ain es Sir. By 23:00 all wounded had been started on their journey back to the Jordan Valley and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade commenced to recross the Wadi Amman at midnight; reaching the cross roads at 04:00 on 31 March. An outpost line was set up across the country between Ain es Sir and Amman and the whole day was spent in concentrating Chaytor's and Shea's force – mounted troops, infantry, camels and camel transport; and in getting all camels, both camel brigade and Egyptian Camel Transport Corps down the mountains. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade and the Somerset Battery took the Es Salt road while the remainder of the force, including the infantry, withdrew by the Wadi Es Sir track, up which the New Zealand Brigade had advanced. All day long and all the next night a long line of weary camels, horses and men slowly stumbled, slipped and fell, down the mountain track which descends some 4,000 feet (1,200 m) in 8 miles (13 km). It was well after daylight on the morning of 1 April, before the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade; the rearguard was able to start retiring again, while being fully occupied in holding off advanced German and Ottoman troops. The Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment had regained its 6th Squadron which had been detached to the infantry division; the 60th (London) Division, and was ordered to cover the rear of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. German and Ottomans attacks on this rearguard were held off until the regiment filed down through the village of Ain es Sir. At 07:45 on 1 April as the rearguard of Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment passed through the village the 2nd (Wellington West Coast) Squadron was attacked by Circassians who suddenly opened fire from a mill and adjacent caves, from houses and from behind rocks on the nearby hills.

Firing at very close range with a variety of firearms they wounded men and horses; horses rearing up, bolted, screaming joined the numerous riderless horses galloping across the hillsides. Remnants of the 2nd Squadron galloped clear of the village, dismounted and counter-attacked with the other two squadrons attacking from the ridges above the village. They rushed the mill and its occupants were killed. No prisoners were taken; the 2nd Squadron suffered 18 casualties. About 13:00 the Jordan Valley came into sight and a halt was made to distribute rations and forage which had been brought forward to meet the New Zealanders. The sun came out and the wind died away and an hour later they were riding down through flowers up to the horses' knees. All was peace and warmth and quiet, making it difficult to think that a few short hours before, the winds were raging, rain falling, and a bitter battle in progress. — C. Guy Powles, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Anzac Mounted Division The withdrawal across the Jordan River was completed by the evening of 2 April leaving bridgeheads at Ghoraniye and Makhadet Hajlah. The infantry and mounted forces had marched and fought almost continuously in the mud and rain for ten days and had suffered almost as much in both the advance and retreat. Shea's force had expended 587,338 rounds of small-arms ammunition (SAA), brought back four field guns, 700 prisoners including 20 officers and 595 other ranks along with 10 machine guns two automatic rifles, 207 rifles and 248,000 rounds of SAA. The German and Ottoman forces abandoned two travelling field cookers, 26 motor lorries, five motor cars and many horse-drawn wagons on the Amman road and an Ottoman aircraft was captured on the Hejaz railway. Officers' bivouacs, headquarters Anzac Mounted Division at Talat ed Dumm Asim launched a pursuit of the British by the 24th Assault Company with the 8th and 9th Cavalry Regiment (3rd Cavalry Division) and on 4 April German and Ottoman counterattacks by the 24th Assault Company, infantry in the 24th Division's 3rd Battalion and the 145th Infantry Regiment, began. After another unsuccessful counterattack by the Ottoman Army on 11 April they began to consolidate their positions.

About this time the Ottoman Seventh Army formed a provisional cavalry regiment by combining the cavalry companies which had previously been attached to several infantry divisions; these were the 11th, 24th, 48th and 53rd Divisions. Designed to be a surprise raid by mounted troops, the movements of Shea's force in the difficult terrain and weather, had proved to be too slow and restricted and the element of surprise was lost. The attack did, however, force the recall of a German and Ottoman expedition to Tafileh; attempts to maintain a permanent garrison there, were abandoned. The strong incursion by Shea's and Chaytor's forces materially helped Feisal's force; the Ottoman 4th Army withdrew part of its garrison from Maan to help defend Amman just as Feisal began his attack there. These major troop movements; the recall of the Tafileh expedition and the partial withdrawal from Maan, helped strengthen the operations of Feisal's Arabs and the threat to the Ottoman lines of communication east of the Jordan, compelling the Ottoman army to make a permanent increase to their forces in this area. Large new Ottoman camps were established to support the growing lower Jordan defences which included a large garrison at Shunet Nimrin. These troops moved from Nablus by the Jenin railway and then by road down the Wady Fara to the Jisr ed Damieh, where the ford was replaced by a pontoon bridge. It remained an important line of communication between the 7th Army at Nablus in the west and the 4th Army in the eastern sector. For the first time since the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had been defeated; both Shea and Chetwode had opposed the attack on Amman at that time of year, believing the attacking force to be too small. Nevertheless, a second unsuccessful assault by one infantry and two mounted divisions, into the hills of Moab to Es Salt followed just a few weeks later at the end of April. It has been suggested that these two unsuccessful operations convinced the Ottoman Army to expect more attacks to be made in the same area by the same troops, while the breakthrough attack in September 1918 occurred on the Mediterranean coast.

On 30 March the Germans attacked around Le Hamel and although this was turned back, they succeeded in making gains around Hangard Wood. Five days later, the Germans renewed their drive towards Villers-Bretonneux. Part of the German attack fell on the centre and left of the French First Army. The French line fell back, but a counter-attack regained much of the ground. From north to south the line was held by British and Australian troops of the 14th (Light) Division, the 35th Australian Battalion and the 18th (Eastern) Division. By 4 April the 14th (Light) Division, around Le Hamel, had fallen back under attack from the German 228th Division. The Australians held off the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division and the 18th Division repulsed the German Guards Ersatz Division and 19th Division. The British were forced to retire by the retreat of the 14th (Light) Division, where the 41st Brigade had been pushed back for 500 yards (460 m) "in some disorder" and then retired to a ridge another 3,000 yards (2,700 m) back, which left the right flank of the 42nd Brigade uncovered. The line west of Le Hamel was reinforced by the arrival of the 15th Australian Brigade. In the afternoon, the Germans resumed their efforts and pushed the 18th Division in the south, at which point Villers-Bretonneux appeared ready to fall. The Germans came within 440 yards (400 m) of the town but Colonel Goddard of the 35th Australian Battalion, in command of the sector, ordered a surprise late afternoon counter-attack on 4 April, by the 36th Australian Battalion with c. 1000 men, supported by a company from the 35th Australian Battalion and his reserve, the 6th Battalion London Regiment. Advancing by section rushes, they pushed the Germans back towards Monument Wood and then north of Lancer Wood and forced two German divisions to retreat from Villers-Bretonneux. Flanking movements by British cavalry and Australian infantry from the 33rd and 34th Battalions helped consolidate the British gains. Further fighting around the village took place later in the month during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux. The attack on Villers-Bretonneux was the last significant German attack of Operation Michael (known to the British as the First Battle of the Somme, 1918). After the failure of the German forces to achieve their objectives, Ludendorff ended the offensive to avoid a battle of attrition. The 9th Australian Brigade had 665 casualties from c. 2,250 men engaged. German casualties were not known but there were 498 losses in two of the regiments engaged. The 9th Australian Brigade recorded 4,000 dead German soldiers on their front and the 18th Division had "severe" losses and took 259 prisoners from the 9th Bavarian Reserve, Guards Ersatz and 19th divisions.

Captain Caulfeild ordered the harbor swept for mines during 2 November and well into the next day. During the sweeping, the Force "B" commander, Aitken, began the unopposed landing of troops and supplies in two groups at the harbor and three miles east of the city on a mine-free beach. By evening on 3 November, the invasion force was ashore with the exception of the 27th Mountain Battery and the Faridkot Sappers. At noon on 4 November, Aitken ordered his troops to march on the city. Well concealed defenders quickly broke up their advance. The fighting then turned to jungle skirmishing by the southern contingent and bitter street-fighting by the harbor force. The Gurkhas of the Kashmiri Rifles and the 2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment of the harbour contingent made good progress; they entered the town, captured the customs house, and Hotel Deutscher Kaiser and ran up the Union Jack. But then the advance was stopped. Less-well trained and equipped Indian battalions of the 27th (Bangalore) Brigade scattered and ran away from the battle. The 98th Infantry were attacked by swarms of angry bees and broke up. The bees attacked the Germans as well, hence the battle's nickname. British propaganda transformed the bee interlude into a fiendish German plot, conjuring up hidden trip wires to agitate the hives. The 13th Rajputs failed to play a significant role in the battle as their morale had been shaken when witnessing the retreat of the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry. Dead Indian soldiers of the British force on the beach at Tanga The colonial volunteers of the 7th and 8th Schützenkompanien [rifle companies] arrived by rail to stiffen the pressed Askari lines. The normally mounted 8th Schützenkompanie had left their horses at Neu Moshi. By late afternoon on 4 November, Lettow-Vorbeck ordered his last reserves, the 13th and 4th Askari Feldkompanien (field companies) – the 4th had just reached Tanga by train), to envelop the British flank and rear by launching bayonet attacks along the entire front to “bugle calls and piercing tribal war cries.” At least three battalions of the Imperial Service Brigade would have been wiped out to a man, if they had not taken to their heels. All semblance of order vanished as Force B's retirement “degenerated into total rout.” Still outnumbered eight to one, caution overtook some of the German officers. Through a series of errors by the buglers and misunderstandings by an officer to disengage and consolidate, Askari withdrew to a camp several miles west of Tanga. As soon as Lettow-Vorbeck learned of this, he countermanded the move and ordered a redeployment that was not completed until early morning. “For nearly all of the night [before sunrise 5 November], Tanga was Aitken's for the taking. It was the most stupendous irony of the battle.”

The second prong would be an attack on the German defences at Longido in the north around Kilimanjaro, then swing south and seize Neu Moshi, the western terminus of the Usambara or Northern Railroad. According to author Charles Miller, "the objective for the capture of Longido was to squeeze the German Schutztruppe in the upper end of a two-hundred-mile pincer." The region was a major German settlement area with established plantations of sisal, coffee and other cash crops at the northern edge of the Usambara highlands. Since small German raiding parties had already begun to ambush British detachments and attack the Uganda Railway, the destruction of German forces in the area bordering British East Africa was a key objective of the British plan of operation. Miller later wrote that "the strategy was faultless on paper." By late October 1914 the British Indian Expeditionary Force "C" gathered with 4,000 men near the border of British and German East Africa, commanded by Brigadier General J. M. Stewart. The brigade included colonial volunteers who called themselves the East Africa Mounted Rifles. Flawed intelligence reports estimated the German military presence in the region at 200 men; however, there were 600 askaris in three companies plus the colonial volunteers of 8th Schützenkompagnie [rifle company] of 86 young Germans on horseback. On 3 November 1914, some 1,500 Punjabis of the British force came up the slope at night near Longido and, at daylight in the morning fog, were caught in the crossfire of a strong German defensive position. The large force of Indian infantry fought well when counterattacked, however, during the day the British attackers made no headway, but suffered substantial casualties.By mid-morning, a mounted patrol of the 8th Rifle Company ambushed a British supply column; roughly 100 mules carrying water for the troops were stampeded away by the German horsemen. Some of the carriers in the column panicked and dropped their loads leaving food, ammunition and equipment behind. The British officers with their now widely scattered troops waited until darkness, determined their situation to be untenable, pulled out and down the mountain and marched back to British East Africa having accomplished nothing. This defeat of the invaders by a force less than half their size cooled the enthusiasm for war especially among the British colonial volunteers. The northern prong attack at Longido had been intended as little more than a diversion. Byron Farwell recounts that "the main effort was [the] ambitious amphibian assault on the port of Tanga" that commenced on 2 November 1914. With the northern prong accounted for, the askari companies were shuttled by rail to Tanga to assist in opposing the southern prong.

The advance did little to settle von Hötzendorf's armies into a fluid front. It would be the insecurity of Auffenberg's right flank, positioned in the Pinsk Marshes that would prove a disaster for Conrad. The Second Army he had designated for the invasion of Serbia, thinking Moltke would have three, not one, army on the Eastern Front, was rerouted to the marshes but it arrived too late, presenting an excellent opportunity to the Russians. The gap left open resulted, before the Battle of Komarów was over, in the lost Battle of Gnila Lipa, further in the lost Battle of Rawa and eventually the fall of the important railhead at Lemberg. 1914 would be a disastrous year for Austria-Hungary. The Battle of Gnila Lipa took place early in the World War I on 29–30 August 1914, when the Imperial Russian Army invaded Galicia and engaged the defending Austro-Hungarian Army. It was part of a larger series of battles known collectively as the Battle of Galicia. The battle ended in a defeat of the Austro-Hungarian forces. The battle is named after a river in Western Ukraine, an historical region of Galicia. It is a tributary of Dniester, and is also called the Hnyla Lypa (Polish: Gnila Lipa). The initial Austro-Hungarian offensive against the invaders in the north of Galicia was a success, gaining victories in the Battles of Kraśnik and Battle of Komarów, in part because the Russian Army had expected the main assault to come further the south near Lemberg and had concentrated their forces there. However, when the Austro-Hungarian Third Army under Rudolf von Brudermann advanced on August 26 with its three Army Corps (XII, III and XI), it encountered a large Russian army consisting of the eight Corps of the Third and Eighth Armies. Fighting on the Zlota Lipa River, the outnumbered Austrians were soundly defeated, and by the end of the day they were in headlong retreat. Army group Kövess also suffered a defeat near Brzezny, though it managed to escape despite being nearly surrounded by the Eighth Army of Aleksei Brusilov. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf ordered a new line of defence to be established on the Gnila Lipa River. The Russians required two days to regroup their troops, which gave the retreating Austrians time enough to recover. Hötzendorf still hoped he could maintain the initiative, and he ordered the Austrian 3rd Corps to attack the Russians near Peremyshliany. Unfortunately for him, the Russian forces there now numbered 292 battalions with 1,304 artillery pieces, against the Austrian 3rd Corps' 115 battalions and just 376 field guns. The Austrian attack was easily turned back, and a massive Russian counterattack shattered the Austrian lines. Kövess also failed to stop a superior Russian force near Rohatyn. The Austrian forces retreated to Lemberg (Lvov), having suffered 20,000 casualties and lost 70 of their cannons.

The fortress city of Lemberg itself fell to the Russians on 3 September. The Austrian Second Army of Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli was quickly transferred from the Serbian front, and its VIIth Corps arrived in time to prevent a complete Austrian collapse in Galicia. The Battle of Le Cateau was fought on 26 August 1914, after the British and French retreated from the Battle of Mons and had set up defensive positions in a fighting withdrawal against the German advance at Le Cateau-Cambrésis. Although the Germans were victorious, the rearguard action was successful in that it allowed the majority of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to escape to Saint-Quentin. On the morning of 26 August, the Germans arrived and attacked II Corps (General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien). Unlike the Battle of Mons, where the majority of casualties inflicted by the British were from rifle fire, Le Cateau was an artilleryman's battle, demonstrating the devastating results which modern quick-firing artillery using shrapnel shells could have on infantry advancing in the open. The British deployed their artillery in the open, about 50–200 metres (55–219 yd) behind their infantry, while the German artillery used indirect fire from concealed positions. With the guns so close to their infantry, the British had unintentionally increased the effectiveness of the German artillery-fire, because shells aimed at the British infantry could just as easily hit the British artillery Modern map of the Le Cateau area (commune FR insee code 59136) The British 5th Division was positioned on the right flank, on the southern side of the Le Cateau–Cambrai road between Inchy and Le Cateau. The 3rd Division was in the centre, holding the ground between Caudry and Inchy. The 4th Division was on the left flank, on the northern bank of the Warnelle. This was a poor choice of terrain on the part of the British, because the road was sunken in places, providing inadequate long-range firing positions. In fact, in most cases, the Germans could march close up to the British positions, which is what they often did. This was especially true at the weakest point in the British line, the right flank west of Le Cateau, where the Germans simply marched straight down the road from the north, all the way to Le Cateau. The British position was on the forward slope and consequently, casualties were heavy during the withdrawal. At 03:30, Smith-Dorrien decided to "strike the enemy hard and after he had done so, continue the retreat". The purpose of the operation was unclear to his subordinates. A "hold at all costs" mentality was evident in the 5th Division on the British right flank. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, was given a written order that "There will now be NO retirement for the fighting troops; fill up your trenches, with water, food and ammunition as far as you can." The Battle of Le Cateau 　ル・カトーの戦い

The order was confirmed by a colonel from the II Corps staff, who, upon arriving, repeated it. Smith-Dorrien's delaying operation never occurred because the order to defend arrived at the front line about the same time the Germans did, sometimes later. Nor were the conditions of a doctrinal delay observed, such as refusing to let British units become decisively engaged with the enemy. He did not choose positions with adequate fields-of-fire and with prepared and hidden routes of withdrawal. According to the German official history, the IV Corps commander, Sixt von Armin, issued an order at 11:15 that turned the regimental- and brigade-level fights into a centrally coordinated battle, but there is no evidence of German command and control above the divisional level. Seventy-five percent of IV Corps troops were in contact before they received this order and the rest never made it to the battlefield. The IV Corps commander did not control the other half of the German forces, II Cavalry Corps, which fought independently. Holding their ground despite many casualties, the British right and then the left flank began to break around midday, under unrelenting pressure from the Germans. The arrival of the Corps de cavalerie Sordet (French Cavalry Corps, General André Sordet) acted as a shield for the British left flank and supported a highly co-ordinated tactical withdrawal, despite German attempts to infiltrate and outflank the retreating British forces. That night, the Allies withdrew to Saint-Quentin. Of the 40,000 British troops fighting at Le Cateau, 7,812 British casualties were incurred, including 2,600 taken prisoner.[8] Thirty-eight guns were abandoned, most having their breech blocks removed and sights disabled by the gunners first. II Corps retreated on the morning of 27 August and in two days of marching, broke contact with the Germans. Having lost 7,000 of its infantry at Le Cateau and 2,500–3,000 footsore and exhausted men who had to be evacuated to Le Mans for recuperation, II Corps was not battleworthy for at least two days. Although credited at the time by Field Marshal Sir John French for having saved the BEF, Smith-Dorrien was later criticized for his decision to stand at Le Cateau by French. German losses were 2,900 men. The Germans were pleased with their victory. The historian of Infantry Regiment 93 wrote The battle of Beaumont-Inchy will always be one of the most glorious days in the history of the regiment, which demonstrated that in a frontal attack against an enemy that was heretofore considered unbeatable, the crack troops of the British Army, the 93rd was not merely their equal, it was superior." 75th Field Artillery Regiment said that the battle "strengthened the self-confidence of the German troops … all the more so because the British army was made up almost exclusively of long-service active army troops, who were superbly trained and equipped. — Historian, IR 93

German pleasure with the victory in part arose from a mistaken belief that they had defeated the entirety of the BEF, not knowing that they had in fact only faced one corps and one of the cavalry brigades. It was this mistake which allowed II Corps to retire as German troops were given a night of rest instead of being sent to pursue the British forces. A second battle of Le Cateau took place in much the same area from 5 to 11 October 1918. The Allies captured the St. Quentin-Cambrai railway, 12,000 prisoners and 250 guns, but suffered 536 casualties. The Rearguard Affair of Le Grand Fayt was a rearguard action fought at Grand-Fayt by the British Expeditionary Force during the Great Retreat on the Western Front in 1914. The German 2nd Army commander General Karl von Bülow had ordered a rapid pursuit after the battles of 21–24 August against the French Fifth Army and the Expeditionary Force (EF). The 1st and 2nd armies were sent to the south-west to gain the left flank of the Allied line. The X Reserve Corps encountered "especially obstinate" resistance at Marbaix and Le Grand-Fayt. On the morning of the 26 August 1914, the 2nd Connaught Rangers under Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Abercrombie covering the retreat of the British 5th Infantry Brigade from Petit Landrecies. Unknown to Abercrombie, by late morning the retreat had already taken place but the orders had not reached the Connaught Rangers. Hearing the sound of rifle fire coming from near-by Marbaix, Abercrombie set off with two platoons of infantry in the direction Marbaix only to come under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Abercrombie then ordered his force to retire on Le Grand Fayt, which locals had told him was clear of Germans, only to discover that Le Grand Fayt had been abandoned. Abercrombie and his men then came under heavy fire from Germans concealed in the village, and the order was given to retreat through the surrounding fields. Despite the German small-arms fire and the difficulty of communication in the close terrain, the retreat was carried out in an orderly fashion, although 6 officers and 280 men were still missing on 29 August, including Abercrombie. By the evening the X Reserve Corps was still near Marbaix and Avesnes. The pursuit by the 2nd Army was ordered to continue on 27 August through Landrecies and Trélon, with the X Reserve Corps advancing towards Wassigny.

The Admiralty wished to prevent the station from being used to co-ordinate attacks on shipping in the Atlantic. At the outbreak of war the Governor of Togoland, Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg was in Germany and his deputy, Major Hans-Major Georg von Döring was the acting-Governor. Sir Hugh Clifford, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Lieutenant-General Charles Macpherson Dobell, commander of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) and Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. de B. Rose, commander of the Gold Coast Regiment were absent during July 1914. W. C. F. Robertson was the acting-Governor and Captain Frederick Bryant was acting-Commandant of the Gold Coast Regiment. The Gold Coast Regiment had one pioneer company, seven infantry companies with a machine-gun each, and a battery of four QF 2.95-inch Mountain Guns, amounting to 1,595 men including 124 carriers and about 330 reservists. There were four "Volunteer Corps" with about 900 men and 1,200 police and customs officers. The Defence Scheme for the Gold Coast (1913) provided for war against the French in neighbouring Ivory Coast and the Germans in Togoland; in the event of war with Germany, the colony was to be defended along Lake Volta and the north-eastern frontier against the possibility of a raid, which was the most that the Germans in Togoland were thought capable of. The plan also provided for an offensive across the lake into the north of Togoland, before making a thrust south to the more populated portion of the colony. On 29 July, a Colonial Office telegram arrived at Accra, ordering the adoption of the precautionary stage of the Defence Scheme and Robertson forwarded the information to Bryant the next day. Bryant dispensed with the Scheme, which had not been revised after the wireless station at Kamina was built and by 31 July, had mobilised the Gold Coast Regiment along the southern, rather than the northern border with Togoland. In London on 3 August, Dobell proposed an advance if war was declared, along the coast road from Ada to Keta and thence to Lomé, which was fewer than 2 mi (3.2 km) from the border. Bryant had reached the same conclusion as Dobell and had already organised small expeditionary columns at Krachi and Ada and assembled the main force at Kumasi, ready to move in either direction. On 5 August 1914, a day after Britain declared war on Germany, the Allies cut the German sea cables between Monrovia and Tenerife, leaving the radio station at Kamina the only connexion between the colony and Germany. The same day the acting-Governor of Togoland, Döring sent a telegram to Robertson proposing neutrality, in accordance with articles X and XI of the Congo Act, which stated that colonies in the Congo Basin were to remain neutral in the event of a conflict in Europe.