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By mid-February 1918, while Germany was negotiating the Russian surrender and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Ludendorff had moved nearly 50 divisions from the east, so that on the Western Front, Germany's troops outnumbered those of the Allied armies. Germany had 192 divisions and three brigades on the Western Front by 21 March, out of 241 in the German Army. Of these divisions, 110 were in the front line, 50 of which faced the shorter British front. Another 67 divisions were in reserve, with 31 facing the BEF. By May 1918, 318,000 American soldiers were due in France, with another million planned to arrive before August. The Germans knew that the only chance of victory was to defeat the Allies before the build-up of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was complete. The German strategy for the 1918 Spring Offensive or Kaiserschlacht (Kaiser's Battle), involved four offensives, Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau and Blücher–Yorck. Michael took place on the Somme and then Georgette was conducted on the Lys and at Ypres, which was planned to confuse the enemy. Blücher took place against the French in the Champagne region. Although British intelligence knew that a German offensive was being prepared, this far-reaching plan was much more ambitious than Allied commanders expected. Ludendorff aimed to advance across the Somme, then wheel north-west, to cut the British lines of communication behind the Artois front, trapping the BEF in Flanders. Allied forces would be drawn away from the Channel ports, which were essential for British supply; the Germans could then attack these ports and other lines of communication. The British would be surrounded and surrender. The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, had agreed that the BEF would take over more of the front line, at the Boulogne Conference, against military advice, after which the British line was extended. The "line", taken over from the French, barely existed, needing much work to make it easily defensible to the positions further north, which slowed progress in the area of the Fifth Army (General Hubert Gough). During the winter of 1917–1918, the new British line was established in an arc around St. Quentin, by many small unit actions among the ruined villages in the area. There were many isolated outposts, gaps in the line and large areas of disputed territory and waste land.

Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and with a group of reserve divisions on the southern and northern flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General Staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army, and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a map exercise of the German general staff of 1905, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

News that German forces were attacking towards the Meuse bridges south of Namur, led Joffre to expect a German attack from Mézières to Givet, 40 kilometres (25 mi) further north, intended to envelop the French northern flank and another force to try to cross the Meuse from Montmédy to Sedan. On 12 August, Joffre allowed Lanrezac to move the I Corps west to Dinant on the Meuse and on 15 August, Joffre ordered the bulk of the Fifth Army to move north-west behind the Sambre. No large German force was expected to cross to the north of the Meuse, which made the French general staff certain that the German centre was weaker than expected. On 18 August, Joffre directed the Third, Fourth and Fifth armies together with the Belgians and British, to attack the German armies around Thionville and Luxembourg, where 13–15 German corps were thought to have assembled. The Third and Fourth armies were to defeat German forces between Thionville and Bastogne, as they attacked westwards towards Montmédy and Sedan. The Fifth Army was to intercept German forces advancing towards Givet and then the Fourth Army was to swing north and attack the southern flank of the German armies. The Third and Fourth armies would defeat decisively the main German armies in the west and for this, two more corps were added to the four in the Fourth Army, taken from the flanking armies.

The Russian offensive, launched on March 18, 1916, began with a two-day-long artillery bombardment (the longest yet seen on the Eastern Front) against the Germans that for the most part failed to do the planned damage due to inaccuracy. Russian infantry troops from the Tenth Army, commanded by General Alexei Evert, then moved forward against a heavily fortified German defense, suffering heavy casualties. Due to the spring thaw, many of the approaching infantrymen became bogged down in the mud, slowing the offensive; the lack of an effective supply system also hurt the Russians, as the battle stretched on for almost a month. A smaller operation near Riga, begun on March 21 by the northern Russian army division of General Alexei Kuropatkin, met with equal results. By the time artillery attacks were shut down on April 14, the Germans had recovered the entirety of what little ground they had lost. Russian casualties numbered 110,000, while the Germans lost only 20,000. Both armies’ casualty rates were boosted by deaths due to exposure to the harsh northern weather: 12,000 Russian soldiers died from frostbite. Also on April 14, as battle concluded around Lake Naroch, General Alexei Brusilov, commander of the Russian South-west Army, presented his plan for an ambitious attack along a broad stretch of the Eastern Front, to take place within the coming month. Like the British with their Somme offensive, Brusilov saw the heavy German involvement at Verdun as an opportunity to launch new attacks elsewhere. The famed Brusilov Offensive, launched June 4, 1916, would secure more territory than any other Allied offensive of the war and would succeed not only in diverting German attention and resources from Verdun but would also nearly knock Austria-Hungary out of the war. Meanwhile, in the British trenches on the Western Front that same day, Winston Churchill, then in command of an infantry battalion, wrote to his wife, Clementine, expressing anxiety over the planned increase in fighting on all fronts due to the upcoming Allied offensives: I greatly fear the general result. More than I have ever done before, I realize the stupendous nature of the task; and the unwisdom with which our affairs are conducted makes me almost despair at times of a victorious issueDo you think we should succeed in an offensive, if the Germans cannot do it at Verdun with all their skill and science?

The Battle of the Frontiers was a series of battles fought along the eastern frontier of France and in southern Belgium shortly after the outbreak of World War I. The battles resolved the military strategies of the French Chief of Staff General Joseph Joffre with Plan XVII and an offensive interpretation of the German Aufmarsch II deployment plan by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The German concentration on the right (northern) flank, to wheel through Belgium and attack the French in the rear, was delayed by the movement of General Charles Lanrezac's Fifth Army towards the north-west to intercept them and the presence of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on his left flank. The Franco-British were driven back by the Germans, who were able to invade northern France. French and British rearguard actions delayed the German advance, allowing the French time to transfer their forces to the west to defend Paris, resulting in the First Battle of the Marne.

Plan Gen. Alexei Evert, commander of the Russian Western Army Group, favored a defensive strategy and was opposed to Brusilov's offensive. Tsar Nicholas II had taken personal command of the army in September 1915. Evert was a strong supporter of Nicholas and the Romanovs, but the Tsar approved Brusilov's plan. The objectives were to be the cities of Kovel and Lviv, which had been lost to the Central Powers the previous year. Although Stavka had approved Brusilov's plan, his request for supporting offensives by neighboring fronts was denied. Offensive preparations Mounting pressure from the western Allies caused the Russians to hurry their preparations. Brusilov amassed four armies totaling 40 infantry divisions and 15 cavalry divisions. He faced 39 Austrian infantry divisions and 10 cavalry divisions, formed in a row of three defensive lines, although later German reinforcements were brought up. Brusilov, knowing he would not receive significant reinforcements, moved his reserves up to the front line. He used them to dig entrenchments about 300 by 90 metres (328 yd × 98 yd) along the front line. These provided shelter for the troops and hindered observation by the Austrians. The Russians secretly crept to within 91 metres (100 yd) of the Austrian lines and at some points as close as 69 metres (75 yd). Brusilov prepared for a surprise assault along 480 kilometres (300 mi) of front. The Stavka urged Brusilov to considerably shorten his attacking front to allow for a much heavier concentration of Russian troops. Brusilov insisted on his plan and the Stavka relented.

On June 4 the Russians opened the offensive with a massive, accurate but brief artillery barrage against the Austro-Hungarian lines, with the key factor of this effective bombardment being its brevity and accuracy. This was in contrast to the customary, protracted barrages at the time that gave the defenders time to bring up reserves and evacuate forward trenches, while damaging the battlefield so badly that it was hard for attackers to advance. The initial attack was successful and the Austro-Hungarian lines were broken, enabling three of Brusilov's four armies to advance on a wide front (see: Battle of Kostiuchnówka). The success of the breakthrough was helped in large part by Brusilov's innovation of shock troops to attack weak points along the Austrian lines to effect a breakthrough, which the main Russian army could then exploit. Brusilov's tactical innovations laid the foundation for the German infiltration tactics used later in the Western Front.

Despite the strategic predicament of the German army, it survived the battle, withstood the pressure of the Brusilov Offensive, and conducted an invasion of Romania. In 1917, the German army in the west survived the large British and French offensives of the Nivelle Offensive and the Third Battle of Ypres, though at great cost. Falkenhayn was sacked and replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff at the end of August 1916. At a conference at Cambrai on 5 September, a decision was taken to build a new defensive line well behind the Somme front. The Siegfriedstellung was to be built from Arras to St. Quentin, La Fère and Condé, with another new line between Verdun and Pont-à-Mousson. These lines were intended to limit any Allied breakthrough and to allow the German army to withdraw if attacked; work began on the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line) at the end of September.

The German 2nd and 1st armies on the Somme managed a recovery after the string of defeats in September, with fresh divisions to replace exhausted troops and more aircraft, artillery and ammunition diverted from the battle at Verdun and stripped from other parts of the Western Front. Command of the German Air Service (Die Fliegertruppen) was centralised and the new Luftstreitkräfte (German Air Force) was able to challenge Anglo-French air superiority with the reinforcements and new, superior fighter aircraft.

Some of the German air units had recently arrived from Russia and lacked experience of Western Front conditions, some aircraft were being replaced and many single-seat fighter pilots were newly trained. German air reconnaissance had uncovered Anglo-French preparations for the Somme offensive and after a period of bad weather in mid-June, French preparations were also seen as far south as Chaulnes. British aircraft and kite balloons, were used to observe the intermittent bombardment, which began in June and the preliminary bombardment which commenced on 24 June.

German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.

The deployment plan for the western armies Westheer, allocated to the 7th Army (Generaloberst Josias von Heeringen) the XIV and XV corps, the XIV Reserve Corps and the 60th Landwehr Brigade, to deploy from Strasbourg to Mulhouse and Freiburg-im-Breisgau and the command of fortresses at Strasbourg and Neuf-Brisach. The 1st and 2nd Bavarian brigades, 55th Landwehr Brigade, Landwehr Regiment 110 and a battery of heavy field howitzers were also added to the army under the provisional command of the XIV Corps commander. In 1914, the XIV Corps near the Swiss border, guarded the frontier with the 58th Brigade and XV Corps guarded the border from Donon to the Rheinkopf, with several infantry regiments and Jäger battalions, with some artillery and cavalry. The mobilisation and deployment was completed from 8–13 August but the German troops were concentrated further north than anticipated, to be ready to meet a French offensive from Belfort with concentric attacks from the north and east.

The deployment plan for the western armies Westheer, allocated to the 7th Army (Generaloberst Josias von Heeringen) the XIV and XV corps, the XIV Reserve Corps and the 60th Landwehr Brigade, to deploy from Strasbourg to Mulhouse and Freiburg-im-Breisgau and the command of fortresses at Strasbourg and Neuf-Brisach. The 1st and 2nd Bavarian brigades, 55th Landwehr Brigade, Landwehr Regiment 110 and a battery of heavy field howitzers were also added to the army under the provisional command of the XIV Corps commander. In 1914, the XIV Corps near the Swiss border, guarded the frontier with the 58th Brigade and XV Corps guarded the border from Donon to the Rheinkopf, with several infantry regiments and Jäger battalions, with some artillery and cavalry. The mobilisation and deployment was completed from 8–13 August but the German troops were concentrated further north than anticipated, to be ready to meet a French offensive from Belfort with concentric attacks from the north and east.

Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army. A German attack from south-eastern Belgium towards Mézières and a possible offensive from Lorraine towards Verdun, Nancy and St. Dié was anticipated; the plan was a development of Plan XVI and made more provision for the possibility of a German offensive through Belgium. The First, Second and Third armies were to concentrate between Épinal and Verdun opposite Alsace and Lorraine, the Fifth Army was to assemble from Montmédy to Sedan and Mézières and the Fourth Army was to be held back west of Verdun, ready to move east to attack the southern flank of a German invasion through Belgium or south against the northern flank of an attack through Lorraine. No formal provision was made for combined operations with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but joint arrangements had been made and during the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911, the French had been told that six divisions could be expected to operate around Maubeuge.

The Tsar had provided large amounts of artillery and shells for Brusilov's army, however this had repercussions for the Russians as Brusilov reverted to the tactic of extensive barrages followed by waves of advancing soldiers, a tactic that had proved unsuccessful since 1915 with German commanders observing the new similarities between Kowel and the Western Front.

On 19 August the Fifth Army began to move into the angle of the Meuse and Sambre rivers close to Namur, which required a march of up to 100 kilometres (62 mi) and took the army far beyond the left flank of the Fourth Army. Opposite the French were the 2nd and 3rd armies, with 18 divisions against the 15 French divisions. The I Corps held the west bank of the Meuse from Givet to Namur, X Corps faced north-west along the Sambre, with the III Corps to the west opposite Charleroi and the XVIII Corps further to the left. French cavalry on the left flank skirmished with German cavalry on 20 August and next day Joffre ordered the Fifth Army to advance, with the BEF on the left to find and attack the German forces west of the Meuse.

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The German High Command believed they would be able to defeat the British and French on the Western Front and strangle Britain with unrestricted submarine warfare before American forces could be trained and shipped to Europe in sufficient numbers to aid the Allies. The Germans were encouraged by their successes on the Eastern Front into believing that they would be able to divert large numbers of troops to the Western Front in support of their goals. Mexican President Venustiano Carranza assigned a military commission to assess the feasibility of the Mexican takeover of their former territories contemplated by Germany. The general concluded that it would be neither possible nor even desirable to attempt such an enterprise for the following reasons: The United States was far stronger militarily than Mexico was. No serious scenarios existed under which Mexico could win a war against the United States.

The Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung or Siegfried Position) was a German defensive position of World War I, built during the winter of 1916–1917 on the Western Front, from Arras to Laffaux, near Soissons on the Aisne. In 1916, the German offensive at the Battle of Verdun had been a costly failure. The Anglo-French offensive at the Battle of the Somme had forced a defensive battle on the Germans, leaving the western armies (Westheer) exhausted. On the Eastern Front, the Brusilov Offensive had inflicted huge losses on the Austro-Hungarian armies in Russia and forced the Germans to take over more of the front. The declaration of war by Romania had placed additional strain on the German army and war economy. Construction of the Hindenburg Line in France was begun by the Germans in September 1916, to make a retirement from the Somme front possible, to counter an anticipated increase in the power of Anglo-French attacks in 1917.