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The Tsar had provided large amounts of artillery and shells for Brusilov's army, however this had repercussions for the Russians as Brusilov reverted to the tactic of extensive barrages followed by waves of advancing soldiers, a tactic that had proved unsuccessful since 1915 with German commanders observing the new similarities between Kowel and the Western Front.

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>The Tsar had provided large amounts of artillery and shells for Brusilov's army, however this had repercussions for the Russians as Brusilov reverted to the tactic of extensive barrages followed by waves of advancing soldiers, a tactic that had proved unsuccessful since 1915 with German commanders observing the new similarities between Kowel and the Western Front. ⇒皇帝は大量の砲弾や榴弾をブルシーロフの方面軍に提供していた。しかしながら、これでブルシーロフは、兵士の波を続いて進軍させる巨大集中砲火の戦術に立ち戻ったので、ロシア兵の反動を買った。この戦術は、コーウェル(の戦い)と西部戦線の新しい類似点を観察して、1915年以降のドイツの指揮官に対しては、うまくいかないことが分かったのである。

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皇帝はブルシーロフ軍に大量の砲兵、弾薬を与えた。ブルシーロフの人海戦術を拡張した攻撃戦術に戻るものだとしてロシア軍には大きな反響を与えた。その戦術は、1915年以来、ドイツ軍の司令官たちがコーベルと西部戦線との間に新たな類似点を見出した(結果)失敗することが証明されたものであった。

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