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The Franco-British attack on 9 May had been on a front of 16 mi (25 km) and in June three supporting attacks were planned by the French Second, Sixth and Seventh armies, along with an attack by the British near Zillebeke in Flanders. The preliminary bombardment was due to begin on 13 June and XXI Corps was to attack from the Lorette Spur towards Bois de Givenchy, XX Corps was to complete the capture of Neuville and the Labyrnthe and XXIII Corps was shifted slightly north to attack Souchez, Château Carleul, Côte 119 and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. IX Corps was moved from the northern boundary of the Tenth Army and placed between XXXIII Corps and XX Corps to take Vimy Ridge. During minor attacks in early June, the IX Corps divisions had gained little success and in one attack the infantry went to ground and refused to continue, which if repeated would leave the XXXIII Corps vulnerable to another advance into a salient. The artillery preparation was carefully observed from the front line and IX Corps troops were issued flares to signal to the artillery, who reported a highly accurate bombardment, particularly on the 5 Chemins crossroads and a derelict mill, which were the principal German defensive works opposite. On 15 June the commander of the 17th Division on the right of the IX Corps, wrote to General Curé, the corps commander, that preparations were incomplete and had not conformed to Note 5779, leaving the jumping-off trenches 200–300 metres (220–330 yd) from the German front line, rather than the 160 yd (150 m) or fewer laid down and that the infantry were already exhausted. In the rest of the Tenth Army the situation was the same, with infantry being set to hours of digging under German counter-bombardments. It was also discovering that the accuracy of French artillery-fire, was not sufficient make it effective. An attack on 13 June, by a regiment of the 70th Division on the sugar refinery, captured a small length of the German front trench, where they were bombarded by French artillery. An attack on 14 June took another short length of trench but the regiment had to be relieved by part of the 13th Division during the night of 15/16 June. Reports from the IX and XX corps on the southern flank, described accurate French artillery fire and XXI Corps on the Lorette Spur had a commanding view of German defences. Maistre the corps commander, had made artillery observation a specialist role for trained men, who kept close to the infantry to ensure efficient liaison. It was soon discovered that the Germans had put barbed wire 55 yd (50 m) in front of the front line, rather than just in front and special bombardments were fired to cut the wire, after which patrols went forward to check the results, despite German counter-bombardments. On the 43rd Division front, it was discovered that field artillery was only shifting the barbed wire around and not damaging cheveaux de frise but modern 155mm guns were used in time to create several gaps in the wire.

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  • Nakay702
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＞The Franco-British attack ～ and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. ⇒5月9日の仏英軍攻撃は16マイル（25キロ）の前線で行われたが、6月には、フランドルのジルベケ近くの英国軍による攻撃と共同してフランス第2、第6、第7方面軍による3回の支援攻撃が計画された。予備爆撃は、6月13日に開始し、第XXI軍団はロレット山脚からボワ・ド・ジバンシーに向かって攻撃し、第XX軍団はヌヴィーユと「迷宮」の攻略を完了し、第XXIII軍団は少し北に動いてスーシェ、シャトー・カルリュ、斜面119、およびジバンシー-アン-ゴエユを攻撃することになった。 ＞IX Corps was moved ～ German defensive works opposite. ⇒第IX軍団は第10方面軍との北境界線から移動し、第XXXIII軍団と第XX軍団の間に布陣してヴィミー・リッジを奪取した。6月初旬の小攻撃では、第IX軍団の部隊はほとんど成功せず、1回の攻撃だけで歩兵隊は地下（避難壕）にこもって続行を拒否した。もしそれが繰り返されると、別の突出部に対して進軍する第XXXIII軍団の力が弱まるだろう。砲兵隊の準備（状況）が最前線から注意深く観察され、第IX軍団は砲兵隊に信号を送るためにフレア（照明弾）を発射した。その砲兵隊は、特に5か所のシュマン（山道）の交差点と廃屋製粉所に対する極めて正確な砲撃を報告したが、それは敵対するドイツ軍の主要な防衛施設であったからである。 ＞On 15 June the commander ～ under German counter-bombardments. ⇒6月15日、第IX軍団の右側にいた第17師団の司令官は、軍団司令官であるキュレ将軍に、（第17師団は）準備が不完全で、「短信5779」に適合していないため、ドイツ軍の前線から200‐300メートル（220‐330ヤード）にあった始発の塹壕が160ヤード（150 m）以下となったままなので、歩兵隊はすでに消耗しているという文書を送った。残りの第10方面軍でも状況は同じであり、歩兵隊はドイツ軍の反撃砲火の下で何時間も塹壕掘りをしているという有様であった。 ＞It was also discovering ～ commanding view of German defences. ⇒また、フランス軍の砲撃の精度は、それを有効にするのに十分でないことも露見していった。第70師団連隊の精糖所に対する6月13日の攻撃により、ドイツ軍の前線塹壕のうちほんの短い区分が攻略され、そこでフランス軍砲兵隊が（塹壕全体を）砲撃した。6月14日の攻撃では別の短い塹壕を奪取したが、6月15/16日の夜に連隊が第13師団の一部から救援してもらう必要が生じた。南側面の第IX、第XX軍団からの報告は、ロレット山脚からのフランス軍の正確な砲撃と第XXI軍団がドイツ軍の防衛隊を眼下に捕えている、と説明した。 ＞Maistre the corps commander, ～ several gaps in the wire. ⇒軍団司令官であるメストルは、砲兵隊の監視を訓練兵の専門的な役割とし、効率的な連絡を確保するため歩兵隊の近くに配置した。ドイツ軍は有刺鉄線を前線のすぐ前ではなく55ヤード（50 m）先に置いているので、その鉄線を切断するためには特別な砲撃を行い、その後巡視隊が結果を確認するために、ドイツ軍の反撃にもかかわらず、前進したことが間もなく分かった。第43師団戦の前線では、野戦砲は有刺鉄線を移動させるだけであり、可動鉄条網に損傷を与えることはないと分かったが、鉄条網の間に数か所の間隙を空けるため155ミリ（口径の）現代砲が使われた。

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