The Zimmermann Telegram: A Controversial Message

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  • The Zimmermann Telegram, initially believed to be a forgery, turned out to be genuine. This caused a dilemma for the Wilson administration, as revealing the evidence would compromise British intelligence.
  • The belief that the telegram was a forgery was promoted by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as some American newspapers.
  • Arthur Zimmermann himself confirmed the authenticity of the telegram, removing any doubts about its genuineness.
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日本語訳をお願いいたします。

Since the public had been told (untruthfully) that the telegram had been  stolen in a deciphered form in Mexico, the message was widely believed  at first to be an elaborate forgery perpetrated by British intelligence.  This belief, which was not restricted to pacifist and pro-German lobbies,  was promoted by German and Mexican diplomats and by some American newspapers,  especially the Hearst press empire. This presented the Wilson administration  with a dilemma?with the evidence the United States had been provided confidentially  by the British, Wilson realized the message was genuine?but he could not  make the evidence public without compromising the British codebreaking  operation. However, any doubts as to the authenticity of the telegram were removed  by Arthur Zimmermann himself. First at a press conference on 3 March 1917,  he told an American journalist, "I cannot deny it.

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>Since the public had been told (untruthfully) that the telegram had been stolen in a deciphered form in Mexico, the message was widely believed at first to be an elaborate forgery perpetrated by British intelligence. This belief, which was not restricted to pacifist and pro-German lobbies, was promoted by German and Mexican diplomats and by some American newspapers, especially the Hearst press empire. ⇒その電報は、メキシコで解読された形で盗まれたと(事実に反して)市民に語られたので、最初メッセージは英国諜報部によって行われた精巧な「偽造」であると広く思われていた。この信念は、平和主義的な親ドイツ派団体に制限されることもなく、ドイツとメキシコの外交官によって、また、若干の米国新聞、特に「ハースト・プレス・エンパイア」によって促進された。 >This presented the Wilson administration with a dilemma? (→-) with the evidence the United States had been provided confidentially by the British, Wilson realized the message was genuine? (→-) but he could not make the evidence public without compromising the British codebreaking operation. However, any doubts as to the authenticity of the telegram were removed by Arthur Zimmermann himself. First at a press conference on 3 March 1917, he told an American journalist, "I cannot deny it. ⇒これによってウィルソン政権はジレンマに陥った。― 英国からアメリカ合衆国に対して内密に提供されていた証拠によってウィルソンはメッセージを本物であると認識したけれども ― しかし、英国の(極秘の)「暗号(盗聴および)解読活動」を暴露してしまうことなくその拠証を公表することができなかったのである。しかし、(電文発信者の)アルトゥール・ツィンメルマン自身によって、電報の確実性に関する疑いがすべて晴らされた。まず1917年3月3日の記者会見で、彼はアメリカのジャーナリストにこう語ったのである。「私は、それ(電報の存在・盗聴・解読)を否定することができません。それは真実です」と。

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