Steel-reinforced concrete dug-outs: Standard designs for military defense
- The line was 90 miles long, with a garrison of twenty divisions.
- Telephone cables were buried and light railways were built for supplies.
- Barbed-wire fields and machine-gun nests were strategically placed.
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Steel-reinforced concrete dug-outs for infantry squads and artillery-observation posts were standard designs and all woodwork was made to a pattern. The line was 90 miles (140 km) long and built for a garrison of twenty divisions, one every 4.5 miles (7.2 km). Telephone cables were deeply buried and light railways built to carry supplies to the defences. The position had two trenches about 200 yards (180 m) apart, with sentry garrisons to occupy the front trench. The main line of defence was the second line, which was equipped with dug-outs for most of the front garrison. Fields of barbed-wire up to 100 yards (91 m) deep, were fixed with screw pickets in three belts 10–15 yards (9.1–13.7 m) wide and 5 yards (4.6 m) apart, in a zig-zag so that machine-guns could sweep the sides placed in front of the trench system. Artillery observation posts and machine-gun nests were built in front of and behind the trench lines.
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＞Steel-reinforced concrete dug-outs for infantry squads and artillery-observation posts were standard designs and all woodwork was made to a pattern. ⇒歩兵分隊のための、鋼で補強された鉄筋コンクリート製待避壕と砲撃監視のための哨戒陣地は、標準的な設計であり、すべての木造部が型どおりに建造された。 ＞The line was 90 miles (140 km) long and built for a garrison of twenty divisions, one every 4.5 miles (7.2 km). Telephone cables were deeply buried and light railways built to carry supplies to the defences. The position had two trenches about 200 yards (180 m) apart, with sentry garrisons to occupy the front trench. ⇒戦線は、長さ90マイル（140キロ）で、各師団あたり4.5マイル（7.2キロ）おきに20個師団の駐屯軍用として建造された。電話ケーブルは地中深く埋設され、防衛隊への供給品配送のために軽便鉄道が造られた。陣地には、およそ200ヤード（180m）間隔で2本の塹壕があり、歩哨兵駐屯軍が前線側の塹壕に駐留するようになっていた。 ＞The main line of defence was the second line, which was equipped with dug-outs for most of the front garrison. Fields of barbed-wire up to 100 yards (91 m) deep, were fixed with screw pickets in three belts 10–15 yards (9.1–13.7 m) wide and 5 yards (4.6 m) apart, in a zig-zag so that machine-guns could sweep the sides placed in front of the trench system. Artillery observation posts and machine-gun nests were built in front of and behind the trench ⇒防御用の本線は第2の戦線で、それは大部分の前線駐屯軍を収容できる待避壕を備えていた。奥行き最高100ヤード（91m）の有刺鉄線の領域は、10–15ヤード（9.1–13.7m）幅、5ヤード（4.6m）間隔の3本の帯がジグザグ状にネジ型杭で固定されていたので、機関銃が塹壕システムの前方側面を総なめにすることができる形であった。砲撃監視所と機関銃巣が、塹壕の前と後に建設された。
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A second breastwork Wohngraben begun as part of a general strengthening of the Western Front earlier in the year, about 200 yards (180 m) behind the front line was nearly finished. The Wohngraben had dug-outs underneath to accommodate 20–30 men and was connected to the front breastwork by communication trenches. Close to the front the communication trenches were solidly built, with concrete shelters and were ready to be used as flanking trenches in the event of a breakthrough. The second line of defence was far enough back from the front line for shells falling on one not to affect the other and the front breastwork became a line of sentry-posts and the second the accommodation for the main garrison, which was to move forward during an attack to hold the front line at all costs. Further back about 700–1,000 yards (640–910 m) from the front breastwork, a line of concrete machine-gun posts known as Stützpunktlinie had been built about 1,000 yards (910 m) apart, as rallying points for the infantry if an attack broke through the front position. Opposite Rue du Bois were emplacements at La Tourelle, Ferme du Bois (Apfelhof) and Ferme Cour d'Avoué (Wasserburg). Battalion frontages were held by two companies of about 280 men on a frontage of 800–1,000 yards (730–910 m), with one company in support 2,000 yards (1,800 m) to the rear and the fourth company in reserve another 2,000–4,000 yards (1,800–3,700 m) back. The new communication trenches were arranged so that the support companies could easily block a break-in from the flanks; most of the field artillery of 6–12 four-gun field batteries and several heavy batteries in each division, were on Aubers Ridge 2,500–4,000 yards (2,300–3,700 m) behind the front line, between Lorgies and Gravelin. A second line of gun positions between La Cliqueterie Farm, Bas Vailly, Le Willy and Gravelin about 2,500 yards (2,300 m) behind the forward battery positions had been built so that the guns could be moved back temporarily, until enough reinforcements had arrived from Lille and La Bassée to counter-attack and reoccupy the front line. Intelligence about the newly strengthened German positions was not available or given insufficient attention where known. No surprise was achieved because the British bombardment was wholly insufficient to break the German wire and breastwork defences or knock out the German front-line machine-guns. German artillery and free movement of reserves were also insufficiently suppressed. Trench layout, traffic flows and organisation behind the British front line did not allow for easy movement of reinforcements and casualties. British artillery equipment and ammunition were in poor condition: the first through over-use, the second through faulty manufacture. It soon became impossible to tell where British troops were; accurate artillery fire was impossible.
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Despite swift medical attention, a large number of men had to be taken to hospital and one soldier died of exposure. The area was covered with trenches, many of which were derelict, damaged, half-built or obliterated by artillery-fire. Identifying the course of the front line or relating it to the map was impossible, as was the reconstruction of the front line, because trenches collapsed as soon as they were dug. Despite the conditions, raids were mounted by both sides and a party of about 100 Germans was repulsed from New Munich Trench on 25 November. Despite the conditions, New Munich Trench was extended by the British to the north and another 250 yards (230 m) was dug to the south, in preparation for an attack on Munich Trench, as soon as conditions allowed.
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Morale plummeted and moving about after dark led to working parties, runners, reliefs and ration parties getting lost and wandering around until exhausted. No man's land was not wired on this part of the front and British and German troops blundered into the wrong positions, Germans being taken prisoner on six occasions. Some dug-outs in Regina Trench were usable but conditions in the artillery lines were as bad as the front line, with ammunition being delivered by pack horse under German artillery fire. "Elephant" shelters (the materials for which took ten men to carry forward and 24 hours to build) were placed in the front-line, sunk below trench and shell-hole parapets. Larger shelters were dug into the sides of roads further back and only a minimal number of troops kept in the front zone.
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In December and January, casualties due to enemy action were 439, far fewer than those due to the weather and illness; the division was relieved by the 2nd Division on 12 January. The 2nd Division, also transferred from the north side of the Ancre valley, took over from the 51st Division on 13 January, on a front of 2,500 yards (2,300 m), 1,200 yards (1,100 m) south of the village of Pys. The front line consisted of 18 infantry posts and support positions held by ten platoons, with no positions behind until Courcelette, where three platoons were based, with two companies in the vicinity. Ironside Avenue, a communication trench ran forward 800 yards (730 m) towards the front line but was so full of mud as to be impassable. Brushwood tracks which were unusable in daylight, continued the route towards the front line.
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Another two-trench system (Siegfried II Stellung) was planned near the artillery reserve positions, which were about 3,000 yards (2,700 m) behind the existing battery positions, to be built as soon as labour became available. The extra position would ensure that an attack that captured the Siegfried I Stellung (Hindenburg Line), could not continue without a pause to move artillery into range of the Siegfried II Stellung. When complete the various positions had a depth of 6,000–8,000 yards (5,500–7,300 m) and the original Hindenburg Line had become an intermediate line (Siegfried I Zwischenstellung). Work began on another defensive position in the autumn of 1917, with the original Hindenburg Line as its front-trench system. The practice of rigidly defending front-line trenches, regardless of casualties was abolished, in favour of a mobile defence of the fortified areas being built over the autumn and winter of 1916–1917.
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In a new manual of 1 December 1916, Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg (Principles of Command for Defensive Battle), the policy of unyielding defence of ground regardless of its tactical value, was replaced by the defence of positions suitable for artillery observation and communication with the rear, where an attacking force would "fight itself to a standstill and use up its resources while the defenders conserve their strength". Defending infantry would fight in areas, with the front divisions in an outpost zone up to 3,000 yards (2,700 m) deep behind listening posts, with the main line of resistance placed on a reverse slope, in front of artillery observation posts, which were kept far enough back to retain observation over the outpost zone. Behind the main line of resistance was a Grosskampfzone (battle zone), a second defensive area 1,500–2,500 yards (1,400–2,300 m) deep, also sited as far as possible on ground hidden from enemy observation, while in view of German artillery observers. A rückwärtige Kampfzone (rear battle zone) further back was to be occupied by the reserve battalion of each regiment.
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Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.
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A preparatory bombardment began at 2:12 a.m. on 3 July, against the same targets as 1 July but with the addition of the artillery of the 19th Division. Assembly trenches had been dug, which reduced the width of no man's land from 800–500 yards (730–460 m) at its widest. Two brigades of the 12th Division attacked at 3:15 a.m., with the left covered by a smoke-screen. Red rockets were fired immediately by the Germans and answered by field and heavy artillery barrages on the British assembly, front line and communication trenches, most of which were empty as the British infantry had moved swiftly across no man's land. The four attacking battalions found enough gaps in the German wire, to enter the front trench and press on to the support (third) trench but German infantry "pour[ed]" out of dug-outs in the first line, to counter-attack them from behind.
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Villages, woods, roads, railway lines, cantonments, bivouacs, artillery batteries and ammunition dumps were "deluged" by shell-fire, with few pauses until dawn on 17 April. Poor weather interfered with air-observation but by the night of 16 April, reconnaissance photographs taken from the air, reports from ground observers and prisoner reports, showed that wide lanes had been cut through the barbed wire entanglements in front of the German first line, where they had not been obliterated and that German trench lines and field fortifications, particularly south of Mont Sans Nom had been destroyed. Few German defences remained intact, except for those in Bois de la Grille and around Aubérive. The second line, half-way up the slopes of the Moronvilliers hills, was destroyed from south of Mont Perthois to the Suippes, barbed-wire in the woods to the north-east of Mont Sans Nom was partially cut, making an attack on the German position on the ridges above the Suippes practicable. In the west, from Bois de la Grille to Tranchée du Bois du Chien, the bombardment was less effective and the German defences in Bois de la Grille and Leopoldshöhe Trench behind it and Erfurt Trench to the east, were not destroyed. South of Mont Haut, the Konstanzlager and the row of dug-outs up the south slope of Mont Perthois, had not been seriously damaged.
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Large numbers of machine-guns were organised to fire offensive and defensive barrages and signal detachments were organised to advance with the infantry. An observation balloon was reserved for messages by signal lamp from the front line, as insurance against the failure of telephone lines and message-runners. The divisional trench mortar batteries were to bombard the German front line opposite the 142nd Brigade, where it was too close for the artillery to shell without endangering British troops. Wire-cutting began in mid-May, against considerable local retaliation by German artillery. At the end of May the two attacking brigades began training at Steenvoorde, on practice courses built to resemble the German positions to be attacked, using air reconnaissance photographs to mark the positions of machine-gun posts and hidden barbed wire. Divisional intelligence summaries were used to plan the capture of German company and battalion headquarters. The 140th Brigade with four tanks attached, was to occupy White Château and the adjacent part of Damstrasse, while the 142nd Brigade attacked the spoil heaps and the canal bank to the left. On 1 June, the British artillery began the intense stage of preparatory bombardment for trench-destruction and wire cutting and the two attacking brigades assembled for the attack from 4–6 June. British fighter aircraft tried to prevent German aircraft observing for their artillery, by dominating the air from the British front line to the German balloon line, about 10,000 yards (9,100 m) beyond. Better aircraft like the Bristol Fighter, S.E.5a and the naval Sopwith Triplane had entered service since Arras and matched the performance of the German Albatros D.III and Halberstadt D.II fighters.
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