QF 4.5-inch Howitzer and BL 60 Pounder Gun: Uses and Improvements in Artillery Coordination
- Learn about the uses and improvements of the QF 4.5-inch howitzer and BL 60 pounder gun in World War I artillery.
- Find out how these artillery pieces were used for neutralising enemy artillery, bombarding defences, blocking trenches, and more.
- Discover the advancements in artillery coordination, including the use of telephone exchanges and observing stations.
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The QF 4.5-inch howitzer was to be used for neutralising German artillery with gas shells, bombarding weaker defences, blocking communication trenches, night barrages and wire-cutting on ground where field guns could not reach. The BL 60 pounder gun was to be used for longer-range barrages and counter-battery fire, the 6-inch Gun for counter-battery fire, neutralisation-fire and wire-cutting using fuze 106. The larger howitzers were reserved for counter-battery fire against well-protected German artillery and the larger guns for long-range fire against targets like road junctions, bridges and headquarters. Co-ordination of artillery was improved by using more telephone exchanges, which put artillery observers in touch with more batteries. Observing stations were built to report to artillery headquarters located at corps headquarters, on the progress of infantry and a corps signals officer was appointed to oversee artillery communication, which had become much more elaborate.
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＞The QF 4.5-inch howitzer was to be used for neutralising German artillery with gas shells, bombarding weaker defences, blocking communication trenches, night barrages and wire-cutting on ground where field guns could not reach. ⇒QF 4.5インチ榴弾砲は、ドイツ軍の毒ガス弾砲撃に対する中和、比較的弱い防衛軍への砲撃、連絡塹壕の妨害、夜間の集中砲火、野戦砲が入れない地面での鉄条網切断、などのために使われることになっていた。 ＞The BL 60 pounder gun was to be used for longer-range barrages and counter-battery fire, the 6-inch Gun for counter-battery fire, neutralisation-fire and wire-cutting using fuze 106. The larger howitzers were reserved for counter-battery fire against well-protected German artillery and the larger guns for long-range fire against targets like road junctions, bridges and headquarters. ⇒BL60型ポンド砲は、長距離射程を要する集中砲火のために、6インチ砲は、反砲撃および砲火中和のために、106型起爆装置は、鉄条網切断のために、それぞれ使用されることになっていた。比較的大きな榴弾砲は、防御の固いドイツ軍砲兵隊に対する反砲撃のために使用され、そしてさらに、道路交差点、橋梁、本部棟のような目標に対して使用するものとして指定された。 ＞Co-ordination of artillery was improved by using more telephone exchanges, which put artillery observers in touch with more batteries. Observing stations were built to report to artillery headquarters located at corps headquarters, on the progress of infantry and a corps signals officer was appointed to oversee artillery communication, which had become much more elaborate. ⇒砲兵隊の調整は、多くの場合電話交換を利用して改善されたので、これまでより多くの砲兵中隊と接触して、砲兵隊・砲撃の観察者を配置できるようになった。歩兵連隊の進展に関して、軍団本部の中にある砲兵隊本部に報告するため、観察駐屯舎が建設された。そして、以前よりずっと精巧になった砲兵隊・砲撃状況を、軍団の信号係将校が監督するように任命された。
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The Second Army Report Centre at Locre Château was linked by buried cable to each corps report centre, corps heavy artillery headquarters, divisional artillery headquarters, RFC squadrons, balloon headquarters, survey stations and wireless stations. Responsibility for counter-battery fire was given to a counter-battery staff officer with a small staff, who concentrated exclusively on the defeat of the German artillery. A conference was held each evening by the counter-battery staffs of divisions and corps, methodically to collate the day's reports from observation aircraft and balloons, field survey companies, sound ranging sections and forward observation officers. Each corps had a counter-battery area, which was divided into zones and allotted to heavy artillery groups. Each heavy artillery group headquarters divided their zones into map squares, which were allotted to artillery batteries, required to be ready swiftly to open fire on them. The attacking corps organised their heavy artillery within the army plan according to local conditions. II Anzac Corps created four counter-battery groups, each with one heavy artillery group and IX Corps arranged four similar groups and five bombardment groups, one for each of the three IX Corps divisions making the initial attack and two (with the heaviest howitzers) in reserve, under the control of the corps heavy artillery commander. A Heavy Artillery Group Commander was attached to each divisional artillery headquarters, to command the heavy artillery once the infantry attack began. Field artillery arrangements within corps also varied, in IX Corps groups and sub-groups were formed so that infantry brigades had an artillery liaison officer and two sub-groups, one with six 18-pounder batteries and one with six 4.5-inch howitzer batteries.
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Footnotes and appendices in the History of the Great War, show that far from neglecting Haig's desire to concentrate on the Gheluvelt plateau, Gough put a disproportionate amount of the Fifth Army artillery at the disposal of II Corps for the 3 1⁄3 divisions engaged on 31 July, compared to four divisions with two engaged and two in reserve in the other corps, with an average of 19 percent of the Fifth Army artillery each. The green line for II Corps was the shallowest, from a depth of 1,000 yards (910 m) on the southern flank at Klein Zillibeke, to 2,500 yards (2,300 m) on the northern flank along the Ypres–Roulers railway. The green line from the southern flank of XIX Corps to the northern flank of XIV Corps required an advance of 2,500–3,500 yards (2,300–3,200 m). The French First Army had the 29th Division and 133rd Division of the XXXVI Corps (Lieutenant-General Charles Nollet) and the 1st Division, 2nd Division, 51st Division and 162nd Division of I Corps (Lieutenant-General Paul Lacapelle). The I Corps had suffered many casualties in the Nivelle Offensive but had been recruited mainly from northern France and had been rested from 21 April until 20 June. The XXXVI Corps had garrisoned the North Sea coast since 1915 and had not been involved in the mutinies that took place on the Aisne front. The First Army was given 240 × 75 mm field guns, 277 trench artillery pieces (mostly 58 mm mortars), 176 heavy howitzers and mortars, 136 heavy guns and 64 super-heavy guns and howitzers, 22 being of 305 mm or more, 893 guns and mortars for 4.3 miles (7 km) of front. The 1re Armée had relieved the Belgian 4th Division and 5th Division from Boesinghe to Nordschoote from 5–10 July. The 1re Armée was to advance with the 1st and 51st divisions of I Corps on the left of the Fifth Army as flank protection against a German counter-attack from the north. The operation involved a substantial advance over difficult country, to capture the peninsula between the floods at the Martjevaart/St. Jansbeek stream and the land between there and the Yser Canal south of Noordshoote.
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Each German regiment held a zone approximately 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) wide as far back as the rear area. When the Canadian Corps attacked, each German company faced two or more battalions of approximately 1,000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept approximately 24 kilometres (15 mi) back instead of assembling close behind the second line according the defence-in-depth theory. The Canadian Corps' divisional artillery formations, totalling eight field brigades and two heavy artillery groups, were insufficient for the task at hand and were consequently reinforced with outside formations. Four heavy artillery groups, nine artillery field brigades, three divisional artillery groups and the artillery complement of the British 5th Division was attached to the Canadian Corps. In addition, ten heavy artillery groups of the flanking I and XVII Corps were assigned tasks in support of the Canadian Corps. The artillery batteries of I Corps were particularly important because they enfiladed German gun positions behind Vimy Ridge. In total, the British made available to the Canadian Corps twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of four hundred and eighty 18 pounder field guns, one hundred thirty-eight 4.5 inch howitzers, ninety-six 2 inch trench mortars, twenty-four 9.45 inch mortars, supported by 245 corps-level siege guns and heavy mortars.
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With the coming of the night the Allied fire was significantly reduced in intensity which gave a chance to the defenders to repair part of the inflicted damage. At 6:00 On 6 of May the Allied artillery renewed its bombardment and continued in the same manner as the day before throughout the entire day. This time however the Italians, French and Russians also sent patrols to check the effect of the bombardment on the Bulgarian-German lines and test the strength of the fortifications. The Bulgarians and Germans managed to hold off their attempts to close on the lines by strong infantry and artillery fire. On this day the Central Powers artillery took a more active part in the battle and often engaged in counter-infantry and counter-battery work with the help of German reconnaissance planes. By the end of the day the Allied artillery once again reduced the intensity of its fire. In the morning on 7 of May the Allies renewed their bombardment once again. On this day the barrage was even more powerful than the previous days and the Italian and French guns fired more than 15,000 shells on the lines of the Bulgarian 2/2nd Infantry Brigade alone. Stronger reconnaissance patrols were dispatched but were once again held of by the Bulgarians and Germans, who answered with sending their own patrols to determine weather the Allies were preparing for a major infantry attack. The results of the three-day artillery barrage proved unsatisfactory and General Grossetti decided that it should be continued on the 8 of May with the help of four observation balloons. The day for the main infantry attack was finally set for the 9 of May.
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Rawlinson had already finalised his plans in discussion with his Corps commanders (Butler, Monash, Sir Arthur Currie of the Canadian Corps and Lieutenant General Charles Kavanagh of the Cavalry Corps) on 21 July. For the first time, the Australians would attack side by side with the Canadian Corps. Both had a reputation for aggressive and innovative tactics and a strong record of success over the past two years. The tactical methods had been tested by the Australians in a local counter-attack at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July. The German defenders of Hamel were deeply dug in, and their position commanded a very wide field of fire. Similar positions had resisted capture for two months in the Battle of the Somme. The Australians had used surprise rather than weight at Hamel. The artillery had opened fire only at the moment the infantry and tanks advanced, and the Germans were rapidly overrun. A key factor in the final plan was secrecy. There was to be no pre-battle bombardment, only artillery fire immediately prior to the advance of Australian, Canadian, and British forces. The final plan for the Fourth Army involved 1,386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy guns, making up 27 medium artillery brigades and thirteen heavy batteries, in addition to the infantry divisions' artillery. The fire plan for the Fourth Army's artillery was devised by Monash's senior artillery officer, Major General C. E. D. Budworth. British sound ranging advances in artillery techniques and aerial photographic reconnaissance made it possible to dispense with "ranging shots" to ensure accurate fire. Budworth had produced a timetable which allowed 504 out of 530 German guns to be hit at "zero hour", while a creeping barrage preceded the infantry. This method was similar to the Feuerwalze which the Germans themselves had used in their Spring Offensive, but its effectiveness was increased by the surprise achieved. There were also to be 580 tanks. The Canadian and Australian Corps were each allocated a brigade of four battalions, with 108 Mark V fighting tanks, 36 Mark V "Star", and 24 unarmed tanks intended to carry supplies and ammunition forward. A single battalion of Mark V tanks was allocated to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps were allocated two battalions each of 48 Medium Mark A Whippet tanks. The Allies had successfully moved the Canadian Corps of four infantry divisions to Amiens without them being detected by the Germans.
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The Franco-British attack on 9 May had been on a front of 16 mi (25 km) and in June three supporting attacks were planned by the French Second, Sixth and Seventh armies, along with an attack by the British near Zillebeke in Flanders. The preliminary bombardment was due to begin on 13 June and XXI Corps was to attack from the Lorette Spur towards Bois de Givenchy, XX Corps was to complete the capture of Neuville and the Labyrnthe and XXIII Corps was shifted slightly north to attack Souchez, Château Carleul, Côte 119 and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. IX Corps was moved from the northern boundary of the Tenth Army and placed between XXXIII Corps and XX Corps to take Vimy Ridge. During minor attacks in early June, the IX Corps divisions had gained little success and in one attack the infantry went to ground and refused to continue, which if repeated would leave the XXXIII Corps vulnerable to another advance into a salient. The artillery preparation was carefully observed from the front line and IX Corps troops were issued flares to signal to the artillery, who reported a highly accurate bombardment, particularly on the 5 Chemins crossroads and a derelict mill, which were the principal German defensive works opposite. On 15 June the commander of the 17th Division on the right of the IX Corps, wrote to General Curé, the corps commander, that preparations were incomplete and had not conformed to Note 5779, leaving the jumping-off trenches 200–300 metres (220–330 yd) from the German front line, rather than the 160 yd (150 m) or fewer laid down and that the infantry were already exhausted. In the rest of the Tenth Army the situation was the same, with infantry being set to hours of digging under German counter-bombardments. It was also discovering that the accuracy of French artillery-fire, was not sufficient make it effective. An attack on 13 June, by a regiment of the 70th Division on the sugar refinery, captured a small length of the German front trench, where they were bombarded by French artillery. An attack on 14 June took another short length of trench but the regiment had to be relieved by part of the 13th Division during the night of 15/16 June. Reports from the IX and XX corps on the southern flank, described accurate French artillery fire and XXI Corps on the Lorette Spur had a commanding view of German defences. Maistre the corps commander, had made artillery observation a specialist role for trained men, who kept close to the infantry to ensure efficient liaison. It was soon discovered that the Germans had put barbed wire 55 yd (50 m) in front of the front line, rather than just in front and special bombardments were fired to cut the wire, after which patrols went forward to check the results, despite German counter-bombardments. On the 43rd Division front, it was discovered that field artillery was only shifting the barbed wire around and not damaging cheveaux de frise but modern 155mm guns were used in time to create several gaps in the wire.
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An assembly trench was dug 150 yards (140 m) from the German front line, in three hours on the night of 30/31 May, complete with communication trenches and barbed wire. Bridges and ladders were delivered in the two days before the attack. 13,000 yards (12,000 m) of telephone cable was dug in at least 7 feet (2.1 m) deep, which withstood fifty German artillery hits before the British attack. Large numbers of posts from which machine-guns were to fire an overhead barrage were built and protective pits were dug for mules, which were to carry loads of 2,000 rounds of ammunition to advanced troops. Three field companies of engineers with a pioneer battalion were kept in reserve, to follow up the attacking infantry and rebuild roads and work on defensive positions as ground was consolidated. The artillery in support of the division devised a creeping and standing barrage plan and time-table, tailored to the estimated rates of advance of the infantry units. The standing barrage lifts were to keep all trenches within 1,500 yards (1,400 m) of the infantry under continuous fire and targets fired on by 4.5-inch howitzer, 6-inch howitzer and 8-inch howitzers were to change from them only when infantry got within 300 yards (270 m). The 18-pounder field gun standing barrages would then jump over the creeping barrages, to the next series of objectives. The concealed guns of the Guards Division field artillery were to join the creeping barrage for the advance at 4:50 a.m. and at 7:00 a.m. the 112th Army Field Brigade was to advance to the old front line, to be ready for an anticipated German counter-attack by 11:00 a.m. The 47th Division planned to attack with two brigades, each reinforced by a battalion from the reserve brigade, along either side of the Ypres–Comines Canal.
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Surplus field artillery brigade headquarters planned forward moves for the guns and were kept ready to replace casualties. It was expected that much of the artillery would need to switch rapidly from the bombardment plan to engage counter-attacking German infantry. It was planned that the Forward Observation Officers of the divisions in the first attack onto the ridge would control the artillery which had remained in place and the reserve divisions advancing down the far slope to the Oosttaverne line would control the artillery hidden close to the front line and the artillery which advanced into no-man's-land. Franks planned to neutralise German guns within 9,000 yards (8,200 m) of the attack front. On the flanks of the British attack front of 17,000 yards (16,000 m), 169 German guns had been located, for which 42 British guns (25 percent of the German total) were set aside. The 299 German guns in the path of the attack were each to be engaged by a British gun, a formula which required 341 British guns and howitzers to be reserved for counter-battery fire. Every 45 yards (41 m) of front had a medium or heavy howitzer for bombardment, which required 378 guns, with 38 super-heavy guns and howitzers (5 percent) deployed with the field artillery that was due to fire the creeping and standing barrages. Franks devised a bombardment timetable and added arrangements for a massed machine-gun barrage. The 756 medium and heavy guns and howitzers were organised in forty groups and the 1,510 field guns and howitzers in sixty-four field artillery brigades within the attacking divisions and thirty-three Army field artillery brigades, divided among the three attacking corps.
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Further north, the 169th Brigade was to advance to Polygon Wood through Glencorse Wood and 167th Brigade was to reach the north-western part of Polygon Wood through Nonne Bosschen. The 8th Division was to attack with two brigades, between Westhoek and the Ypres–Roulers railway, to the green line on the rise east of the Hanebeek stream. Eight tanks were allotted to II Corps to assist the infantry. The artillery support for the attack was the same as that for 10 August, 180 eighteen-pounder guns for the creeping barrage moving at 110 yd (100 m) in five minutes, with seventy-two 4.5-inch howitzers and 36 eighteen-pounders placing standing barrages beyond the final objective. Eight machine-gun companies were to fire barrages on the area from the north-east of Polygon Wood to west of Zonnebeke. XIX and XVIII corps further north, were also to capture the green line, slightly beyond the German Wilhelm (third) line. Each XIX Corps division had fourteen 18-pounder batteries for the creeping barrage and twenty-four 4.5-inch howitzer batteries and forty machine-guns for standing barrages, along with the normal heavy artillery groups. Each division also had 108 eighteen-pounders and thirty-six 4.5-inch howitzers for bombardment and benefitted from supply routes which had been far less heavily shelled than those further south. In the XVIII Corps area, a brigade each from the 48th and 11th divisions with eight tanks each, was to attack from the north end of St. Julien, to the White House east of Langemarck. The 20th Division planned to capture Langemarck with the 60th and 61st brigades. The 59th Brigade was to go into reserve after holding the line before the attack, less the two battalions in the front line, which were to screen the assembly of the attacking brigades. The attack was to begin on the east bank of the Steenbeek where the troops had 77–148 yd (70–135 m) of room to assemble, crossing over on wooden bridges laid by the engineers the night before the attack.
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Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.
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